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ABSTRACT 
 
This comparative multi-sited study examines how, why and when politically engaged youths 
in distinctive national and social movement contexts use Facebook to facilitate political 
activism. As part of the research objectives, this study is concerned with investigating how 
and why youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa use the popular corporate social 
network site for political purposes. The study explores the discursive interactions and micro-
politics of participation which plays out on selected Facebook groups and pages. It also 
examines the extent to which the selected Facebook pages and groups can be considered as 
alternative spaces for political activism. It also documents and analyses the various kinds of 
political discourses (described here as digital hidden transcripts) which are circulated by 
Zimbabwean and South African youth activists on Facebook fan pages and groups.  
 
Methodologically, this study adopts a predominantly qualitative research design although it 
also draws on quantitative data in terms of levels of interaction on Facebook groups and 
pages. Consequently, this study engages in data triangulation which allows me to make sense 
of how and why politically engaged youths from a range of six social movements in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook for political action. In terms of data collection 
techniques, the study deploys social media ethnography (online participant observation), 
qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews.   
 
Theoretically, this study jettisons the Habermasian theory of public sphere in favour of 
Fraser’s (1990) concept of the subaltern counter-publics, Scott’s (1985) metaphor of hidden 
transcripts and some insightful views on popular culture gleaned from African studies. 
Melding these ideas into a synthesised theoretical frame, this study argues that Facebook fan 
pages and groups can be conceptualised as parallel discursive arenas where marginalised 
groups (including politically active youths) have a political life outside the dominant 
mediated public sphere often in ways that are generally viewed as “irrational” and “non-
political” in mainstream Western literature. This study also proposes ways of enriching 
Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-publics by incorporating elements from Scott’s 
metaphor of hidden transcripts in order to analyse the various kinds of political discourses 
which are circulated on social media. 
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The findings demonstrate that youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa are using 
Facebook to engage in traditional and alternative forms of political participation. Findings 
show that Facebook in both political contexts is deployed for transmitting and accessing civic 
and political information, as a conduit for online donations and fundraising, for contacting 
political decision makers, as a venue of political activism, as an advertising platform for 
social and political events and as a platform for everyday political talk. It demonstrates that 
the broader political context shapes and constraints the localised appropriations of Facebook 
for political purposes in ways that deconstructs some of the postulations of the cyber-optimist 
and pessimist approaches. The study also found that youth activists in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa used Facebook in their own unique ways as shaped and dictated by the broader 
political and mediated opportunity structures. It argues that youth’s engagement with social 
media platforms for political purposes should be understood in their own terms without 
necessarily imposing inflexible boundaries on what counts as political participation. 
Although Facebook like other social media platforms foster avenues for cognitive 
engagement, discursive participation and political mobilisation, these political practices are 
not immune to the influences of offline processes. Youth activists in all the six case 
organisations used Facebook as a complementary and supplementary space for political 
processes rather than as a standalone platform. The study also argues that compared to South 
Africa, the political uses of Facebook in Zimbabwe are largely influenced by practices of 
state surveillance. It also found that whilst youth activists in South Africa are deploying 
Facebook to supplement traditional methods of political activism, their counterparts in 
Zimbabwe are using the same technology to circumvent the restricted political and media 
environment. The findings also indicate that youth activists in both countries are using 
Facebook as a change agent tool within the broader media ecology which is characterised by 
the increasing interpenetration of older and newer media platforms. 
 
In terms of micro-politics of participation and discursive interactions, this study found that 
Facebook pages and groups should viewed as a “sites of power” where corporate forces and 
platform specific code coalesce together fostering “algorithmic” gatekeeping practices and 
the favouring of paid for content over non-paid for user-generated-content which ultimately 
affects activists’ visibility and reach within the online media ecology. These gatekeeping 
practices therefore further complicate claims by cyber-optimists that social media platforms 
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are the sine qua non spaces for symmetrical and democratic participation. This study argues 
that “subtle forms of control” characterise the much glorified participatory cultures on 
Facebook in ways that defy optimistic accounts of the role of new media in political change.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis examines how, why and when youth activists use Facebook to mediate political 
action, using “not free” (Zimbabwe) and “free” (South Africa) political contexts as case 
nations. Zimbabwe has been classified as “not free” (meaning there is no respect for political 
rights and civil liberties) while South Africa has been characterised as “free” (meaning there 
is sufficient respect for political and civil liberties) though its media context is characterised 
as “partly free” (meaning there is limited respect for media freedom and freedom of 
expression) (Freedom House
1
, 2014). In this chapter, I intend to outline the introduction and 
contextual background of this thesis. I begin by briefly looking at the state of political and 
media transformations in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Besides highlighting the similarities 
and differences in terms of political transitions in both countries, this chapter also discusses, 
albeit briefly, the position of the youth in relation to the political and media transformations. I 
then proceed to tease out the research problem. The next section unpacks the architecture and 
business model of Facebook. I also discuss the academic debate on the relationship between 
social media and political action thereby contextualising my thesis within the broader 
literature on new media and social change. This chapter also outlines the research objectives 
and questions as well as maps out the theoretical and methodological approaches, which 
provide the framework upon which empirical data will be analysed in Chapters Five, Six, 
Seven and Eight. I also define key concepts used in this study and offer an outline of the rest 
of the chapters.   
                                                          
1 Whilst I make reference to Freedom House Index on freedom of expression to compare two African countries, I am very much cognisant 
of the controversial nature of these Westocentric forms of democracy measurements. I concur with scholars (Steiner, 2014) who argue these 
categorisations are not neutral and innocent, but tied to certain ideological and material interests. Critics suggest that the Freedom House 
scores favour countries that have particular political ties to and affinities with the United States (Steiner, 2014). They view such a bias as 
originating from the personal and/or financial links between Freedom House and the US government. In the context of this study, despite its 
flaws and controversies, the Freedom House indices provide one of the most developed and popularised heuristic device for ranking 
countries which aids comparison of various political and media systems, in this case Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
2 
 
1.1 Preamble on the social context 
The two cases chosen for this particular study are unidentical although they have both 
experienced transitions
2
 from authoritarian colonial rule to democratic government. 
Zimbabwe and South Africa provides two extreme cases for a richer comparative study on 
how, why and when politically engaged youths use Facebook to facilitate political activism. 
These two countries also share considerable similarities and differences in terms of political 
and media transformations. Whilst Zimbabwe got its independence in 1980, its neighbour 
South Africa experienced political transition in 1994 after the fall of the Berlin wall, when 
prospects for revolutionary change had waned, and which significantly proscribed spaces for 
thoroughgoing change (see Chapter Two). Both countries are part of the “third wave3” of 
democratisation as espoused by Huntington (1991). Contrary to the literature on transitology
4
 
(Schmitter & Karl, 1994; Huntington, 1991), the two neighbouring countries have 
experienced “elite continuity and renewal” (Sparks, 2011) rather than genuine political and 
media transformation (I will return to this shortly). Transitologists believe that regime 
transitions move in a linear fashion from an authoritarian order to a more democratic order 
(Huntington, 1991). Critiquing transitology literature, scholars (Voltmer, 2006; Levitsky & 
Way, 2010; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 3) suggest that transitions are highly uncertain 
phenomena that have complex outcomes: democracy, renewed authoritarianism or some 
combination of both. This is evident in the Zimbabwean case, where the transition from an 
authoritarian colonial state led to a “post-colonial state5” which could be classified as a 
“hybrid regime” (Young, 2004; Levitsky & Way, 2010). As Young (2004) argues, hybrid 
regimes combine democratic rules with authoritarian governance. In this kind of regime, 
institutions of the old regimes coexist with those of the new state (Young, 2004). Unlike 
Zimbabwe, South Africa transformed itself from an apartheid state (also described as 
                                                          
2 This refers to the interval between one type of political regime and another . The change is characteried by uncertainty: uncertainty in the 
conditions they occur under, uncertainty in the actors that participate in them and uncertainty in their outcomes, which can see the 
restoration of authoritarianism or the development of democracy (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 6). 
3 Huntington (1991) describes global democratisation as coming in three waves, the first beginning in the early 19th century when suffrage 
was granted to the majority of white males in the United States of America, the second wave began following the Allied victory in World 
War II which lasted for at least 20 years and finally the third wave which began in 1974 (including historic transitions in Latin American, 
Eastern European, African and Asian Pacific countries) until now.   
4 Transitology is a paradigm in political science that studies and explains political change from authoritarian societies to democratic societies 
(Schmitter & Karl, 1994; Huntington, 1991). It’s derived from the word ‘transition’- the interval between one political regime and another. 
5 The term “post” in post-colonialism appears to signal a chronologically defined periodisation and linear progression from pre-colonialism 
through colonialism to post-colonialism (Abrahamsen, 2003). However in reality the interval between the end of colonialism and the 
beginning of post-colonialism is not necessarily marked by complete transformation but rather change and continuity (Shome, 2006). 
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“colonialism of a special type6” by the South African Communist Party) to a democratic state 
(Sparks, 2011).  
Given the history of colonialism and apartheid, Zimbabwe and South Africa share 
comparable structural conditions and historical legacies in the sense that they have endured 
colonial-induced land dispossessions and territorial segregations (Bantustans in South Africa 
and reserves in rural Zimbabwe), minority rule and struggles for liberation (Pape, 1998). This 
colonial history left significant legacies in both countries like land imbalances, lack of thick 
media and economic transformation and inherited colonial laws. In both countries, the state’s 
capacity to effect seismic economic transformation policies has been profoundly constrained 
by the nature of the negotiated transitions. The Lancaster House Constitution in Zimbabwe 
set limits on the extent to which the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) government could temper with land redistribution and private property issues 
(Chiweshe, 2011; see Chapter Two). In the case of South Africa, informal negotiations prior 
to the dawn of democracy ensured that the corporate sector achieved continued economic 
control (Terreblanche, 2002) while the African National Congress (ANC) got away with 
political control. In both countries, change has been limited to “political life in the narrow 
sense and the economic system has displayed a marked continuity” (Sparks, 2008). This is 
because, as Matlosa & Shale (2013) observe, both countries have experimented with different 
models of power-sharing arrangements (in 1980 and 2009 in Zimbabwe and 1994 in South 
Africa).   
Although the two case nations have taken different paths and developed in diverse ways, it 
can be argued that their political and media transformations are converging in many ways. 
For instance, party alternation has not occurred since the regime transitions—with ZANU-PF 
(in Zimbabwe) and the ANC (in South Africa) dominating the political sphere (Freedom 
House, 2014). Both countries also share some of the undesirable features of transitional
7
 
societies in the sense that admission to the economic elite is very closely related to political 
connections (Southall, 2005; Bratton & Masunungure, 2011). Even though the two countries 
have implemented social policies like Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBB-
EE) (in South Africa), the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) and the 
                                                          
6 This expression essentially refers to the racial oppression of Black people within the context of a capitalist state. It is considered “special” 
in the sense that was no spatial separation between the colonising power (the white minority state) and the colonised black people (Du Toit, 
2010: 185). 
7
Transitologists identify four stages of political transformation: pre-transition, transition, democratisation and the consolidation phase 
(Jebril, Stetka, & Loveless, 2013). Hence in this study South Africa and Zimbabwe are referred to as transitional or democratising countries. 
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Indigenisation Programme (in Zimbabwe), the elitist nature of these interventions has meant 
that the political elite and their connections have managed to restructure themselves as the 
owners of private capital (Duncan, 2012; Chiweshe, 2011). Unlike South Africa, Zimbabwe 
has endured a decade (2000-2008) of multi-layered and multifaceted politico-economic crises 
(Mlambo & Raftopoulos, 2010) which has given birth to an “authoritarian-nationalist state” 
(Raftopoulos, 2006).  
While Zimbabwe has been described as a “competitive authoritarian regime8” because of the 
dominance of ZANU-PF over the state apparatus (Levitsky & Way, 2010; McCorley, 2013; 
2015), South Africa is considered a “model of electoral democracy” (Diamond, 1999; Bauer 
& Taylor, 2005)—irrespective of the existence of major social and economic inequities. In 
terms of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance
9
 (2014), South Africa is ranked 5th in 
Africa with a score index of 71.3 which means that it is judged to protect a full range of 
political freedoms and civil rights while Zimbabwe is ranked 47th with a score index of 35.4 
according to the same index. Compared to Zimbabwe, South Africa has a vibrant civil society 
(Heller, 2009), stronger political institutions and a freer media which act as counter-balancing 
force to the over-bearing influence of the executive (see Chapter Two for a detailed 
discussion on the social context).  
Change and continuity are also evident at the level of media transformation in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. In both countries, the public broadcasters have been riddled with cases of 
political interference, mismanagement, and corruption (see Chapter Two). Because of the co-
existence of authoritarian state control of the public media as well as the relative media 
freedom enjoyed by the private media in Zimbabwe, Rønning & Kupe (1998) describe the 
situation as signified by a “dual legacy of authoritarianism and democracy”. As Chapter Two 
will demonstrate, after attaining independence in 1980, the ZANU-PF government revived 
the authoritarian control of the public media (both print and electronic) for political 
expediency. Besides changing the name of the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) to 
the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), the new government continued to govern the 
                                                          
8 It refers to a hybrid regime type in which formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in 
which fraud, civil liberties violations and abuse of state and media resources so skew the playing field in favour of the incumbent (Levitsky 
& Way, 2010: 5).  
9 Governance is defined by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation as the provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that 
a citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens (Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance, 2014: 6). Similar to the Freedom House Index, the Ibrahim Index is not immune to the ideological and material interests that 
undergird some of these categorisaions. This is despite the fact Mo Ibrahim Foundation is an African think tank, it is not neutral and 
inherently benevolent.  
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broadcasting sector using the colonial Broadcasting Act until 2001 (Moyo, 2004). This 
affirms Sparks’s (2006) view that media institutions that emerged from the process of 
transition have generally been influenced by the political elite. Similar to the colonial regime, 
the new government also continued to use public media to entrench its hegemonic power and 
vilify pro-democracy activists and opposition parties. These foregoing statements support 
Voltmer’s (2013) insightful argument that media organisations are not created from scratch 
after the breakdown of the old regime. Her observation is that existing media organisations 
are transformed and reshaped, but still carry elements of the logic and constraints of their 
predecessors.  
In South Africa, the country’s negotiated transition set limits on the nature and character of 
media transformation. On the one hand, it experienced “democratisation” whilst on the other 
hand it witnessed the “marketisation” of the media sector (Duncan, 2010; Sparks, 2011). 
Some scholars (Berger, 2001; Jacobs, 2004) have hailed the de-racialisation of the media 
sector while others (Tomaselli & Teer-Tomaselli, 2001; Teer-Tomaselli, 2001; Boloka & 
Krabill, 2001) have bemoaned the fact that total media transformation has been limited by 
class continuity in ownership, control, content and audiences. The transformation of the 
South African media landscape from “an authoritarian-mediated sphere to a highly 
commercialised, privatised public sphere” (Wasserman, 2010: 10) has led to the 
concentration on elite audiences that is attractive to advertisers, tabloidisation of media 
content, a general neglect of public service content and exclusion of threatening voices (like 
activists) (Wasserman & Botma, 2008; see Chapter Two). This gives credence to claims that 
market-led transitions have resulted in media systems that systematically under-represented 
those who lack socio-economic power (Voltmer, 2006). Tettey (2010: 98) also concurs, 
arguing that “much of the mediated public sphere in Africa is captured by elite discourses, 
raising concerns about whose interests are served by the spaces opened up by processes of 
democratisation”. 
Like other political transitions, both countries have witnessed threats to media freedom, 
although at varying levels. In South Africa, the independence of the broadcasting sector has 
been significantly reversed by repeated attempts by the ANC to increase the control of the 
executive arm of government over broadcasting (Duncan, 2012). In the Zimbabwean case, 
despite the licensing of two commercial radio stations (Star FM and ZiFM Stereo) during the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) era, the executive has continued to interfere with 
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editorial independence of the public media. The ANC government in South Africa tabled the 
Protection of State Information Bill
10
 (POSIB) as well as proposed to establish a statutory 
Media Appeals Tribunal as an alternative to the appeals body of the Press Council of South 
Africa which stirred heated debate from 2010 onwards over the merits of the two proposals 
(Yin, 2011). The ruling party eventually settled for a modified co-regulatory system for 
complaints against the media. The ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe set up a statutory 
regulatory body the Media Information Commission (replaced by the Zimbabwe Media 
Commission in 2009) in 2001 tasked with the mandate of licensing journalists and media 
organisations. It also passed a series of repressive media laws like AIPPA
11
 (Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act), BSA
12
 (Broadcasting Services Act), POSA
13
 
(Public Order and Security Act) and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act of 
2004. The passage of the laws was designed to silence the critical private media, to inhibit 
media development (especially in the electronic media sector) and to increase the influence of 
the Minister of Information and Publicity on mediated communication in the country 
(Chuma, 2010; Moyo, 2004; see Chapters Two and Four for a discussion on the state of 
media in Zimbabwe and South Africa).  
Notwithstanding similarities and differences in terms of political and media transformations, 
both countries have experienced different levels of “democratisation conflicts14” (see 
Voltmer, Parry & Kraetzschmar, 2014, for a detailed overview). In South Africa, 
accountability conflicts have taken the form of community protests which are largely fuelled 
by a range of issues like corruption, e-tolling, service delivery backlogs, youth 
unemployment and the influx of foreign migrants (Gower, 2009). As Wasserman & Garman 
(2014) observe, these protests are born out of the frustration with the continued high levels of 
inequality and a revolt against a government that is increasingly seen as uncaring and not 
listening. Zimbabwe has experienced constitutional, accountability and electoral conflicts 
                                                          
10The Bill was passed by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces in November 2011 and 2012 respectively. But in 
September 2013 President Jacob Zuma refused to sign the Bill into law and sent it back to the parliament where it was eventually passed 
into law. It aims to regulate the classification, protection and dissemination of state information, weighing state interests against 
transparency and freedom of expression.  
11 AIPPA was passed in 2002 by the parliament of Zimbabwe. It provides for the licensing of all media organisations and registration of all 
journalists with the government appointed Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC). Anyone who disobeys this Act may have his or her name 
struck from the roll of journalists, or be suspended or made to pay a heavy fine. 
12 BSA was passed in 2001, which among other things places excessive powers in the hands of the Minister of Information, Publicity and 
Broadcasting Services, who is the ultimate licensing authority. The Act seriously inhibited investment in the broadcasting sector by creating 
unrealistic licensing conditions (like the 75 percent local content programming and outlawing foreign investment in the sector), particularly 
for commercial broadcasting. 
13 POSA which succeeded the colonial-inherited Law and Order Maintenance Act was passed in 2002 in order to restrict freedom of 
expression, movement and assembly. It criminalises anyone who undermines or makes “any abusive, indecent, obscene or false statement 
about or concerning the President or an acting President, whether in respect of his person or his office.   
14 This refers to conflicts that accompany and are triggered by, democratic transformations like constitutional, accountability and electoral 
issues. 
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which have manifested themselves through disputed elections, poor service delivery, 
deteriorating economic situation and worsening human rights record (Makumbe, 2009; 
Sachikonye, 2002).  
Besides social protests, the two countries have bottom heavy population structures, a 
phenomenon known as “youth bulge15” and their youth are generally politically and 
economically disenfranchised which is evidenced by high youth unemployment rates 
(Guduza & Chingarande, 2011; Gower, 2009; International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
2012). Both countries are ranked amongst the top 12 most unequal countries as measured by 
the Gini coefficient
16
. Although both countries boast of youthful populations which could be 
translated into “demographic dividends17”, research (Action-Aid Denmark, 2013; Resnick & 
Casale, 2011) shows that failure to integrate youth into development processes in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa has seen them being recruited as “foot soldiers” for political violence and 
criminal activities. In South Africa, young people are marginalised by political and social 
structures which are unable to uplift them (Garman & Malila, 2016). Discontent especially 
amongst out-of-school youth has been singled out as a key factor in community protests in 
both countries (Action-Aid Denmark, 2013; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Munro, 2015). As a 
result, the toxic mixture of poverty, inequality and large youthful populations poses a real 
threat to the stability of Zimbabwe and South Africa (Action-Aid Denmark, 2013; Seekings, 
2014). Writing in the South African context, Seekings further asserts that “all these factors 
might be expected to result in distinctive disaffection and a propensity for dissent” (2014: 
70).  
In terms of connectivity, Zimbabwe and South Africa are characterised by high internet 
penetration and Facebook usage rates spawned by the uptake of mobile and fixed broadband 
internet services (ZAMPS, 2013; World Wide Worx, 2014; see Chapter Two). The popularity 
of Facebook in both countries has been fuelled by the introduction of data bundles and zero-
rated
18
 services by the major mobiles service providers. Youth in both countries have also 
                                                          
15 This is a demographic phenomenon characterised by high fertility rates which result in a large share of the population consisting of 
children and young adults who are mostly dependent on parents (Lin, 2012). Viewed negatively youth bulge presupposes a “demographic 
time bomb”, whereas when looked at from a positive lens it associated with “demographic dividends”. 
16 The Gini coefficient (also known as the Gini index or Gini ratio) (/dʒini/ jee-nee) is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to 
represent the income distribution of a nation's residents, and is the most commonly used measure of inequality. 
17 This refers to the accelerated economic growth that may result from a rapid decline in a country’s fertility and the subsequent change in 
the population age structure. 
18 The practice involves mobile carriers, through a prior agreement with specific content providers, offering free mobile data to allow 
customers to access particular online content or services at no additional costs. 
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been identified as the heaviest users of Facebook; hence this study endeavoured to investigate 
whether those who are politically engaged are deploying this platform for political purposes.  
1.2 The research problem: why focus on social media and politically engaged youths? 
 
The youth constitute an important population group within any given society largely due to 
their energy and experimental outlook to life (Bauman, 2004). Young people are more 
experimental with new technologies for political action when compared to other groups 
(boyd, 2014). Some scholars (Honwana, 2012; Chamunogwa, 2011) have argued that youth’s 
demographic weight in any society gives them a numerical number which can tilt the balance 
of power when mobilised for political change. This demographic superiority presents them 
with a comparative advantage in relation to other population groups. Because of their 
numerical advantage (amongst the voting population, unemployed groups of people and so 
forth), the youth have the power to mobilise and advocate for positive and transformative 
political changes in different societies (Honwana, 2013; Bayat, 2010). Like the proletariat 
within the classical Marxist theory who are seen as holding the power to make the capitalist 
economic system ungovernable and redundant (Giddens, 1985), the youth are also 
represented as “kingmakers” within developing societies hence the coinage of monikers such 
as “youth revolutions”.  
Youths are also overly represented in social protests and non-conventional modes of political 
participation (Resnick & Casale, 2010; Loader, 2008; Dahlgren, 2013; see also Chapter Two) 
which makes them an interesting group to study in relation to the use of social media for 
political action. For example, politically engaged youths frustrated with the status quo have 
been at the forefront of major political events such as the Soweto Uprising in South Africa 
(see Olorunnisola & Martin, 2011) and the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe (Zeilig, 2008; see 
Chapter Two). A study by Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe (2007) found that youths preferred 
online-based activism compared to traditional forms. Similarly, Tapscott (2009) observes that 
young people have received special attention in academic work around new technologies 
because of the close relationship between youth and the internet. Unlike any other social 
group, young people globally interact with social media platforms more actively in their 
everyday lives. In light of these observations, it is important to study the Facebook usage of 
politically engaged youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
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Although social media are a new phenomenon in Africa, these platforms are increasingly 
being appropriated by the youth for political participation (see Bosch, 2013; SANPAD, 2013; 
Steenkamp & Hyde-Clarke, 2014; Ndlovu & Mbenga; 2013; Mare, 2014; Mhiripiri & 
Mutsvairo, 2013). As Olorunnisola (2013: 424) aptly observes, “until very recently, 
examinations of the communications dimension to socio-political transformations had 
focused principally on “old” media in single or a few assortments of African countries”. In 
Africa, immense literature (see Mudhai, 2004; Willems, 2011; Moyo, 2011; Olorunnisola & 
Martin, 2013; Mutsvairo, 2015; Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015; Kalyango & Adu-Kumi, 2012; 
Bohler-Muller & van der Merwe, 2011; Mudhai, Banda & Tettey, 2009;  Wasserman, 2011; 
Ekine, 2010; Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Moussa, 2013; Martin & Olorunnisola, 2013; Alozie, 
Akpan-Obong & Foster, 2011; Olorunnisola & Martin, 2013; Ogola, 2015; Mpofu, 2013; 
2015; Makinen & Kuira, 2012; Chuma, 2006; Ngomba, 2016; Olorunnisola & Douai, 2013) 
exists on the intersection between social media and political participation. For instance, an 
edited book by Olorunnisola & Douai, 2013 entitled: New Media Influence on Social and 
Political Change in Africa addresses the development of new mass media and 
communication tools and its influence on social and political change. Based on writings from 
scholars situated in different national and spatial contexts, the book demonstrates the 
complex engagement of new media technologies for political work. Whilst most of the case 
studies in Olorunnisola & Douai’s (2013) focus on citizen engagement through new media, 
social movements’ creative appropriation of these tools for mobilisation purposes and how 
politicians are deploying social media platforms for election campaigning, very little research 
has been conducted on how politically engaged youths use Facebook for political purposes. 
Another book titled: African Media and the Digital Public Sphere edited by Mudhai, Tettey, 
Banda, (2009) also examines the claims that new information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) are catalysts of democratic change in Africa. Adopting the optimist, 
pragmatist-realist and pessimist standpoints on the relationship between new media and 
political change, Mudhai et al., (2009) underscore the importance of contextual factors and 
digital divide in terms of how situated actors in Africa interact with new media for political 
purposes. Investigating the use of new media technologies by mainstream political parties in 
Kenya during the disputed 2007 election, Nyabuga & Mudhai (2009) argue that while new 
media has the potential to help monitor elections and mobilise political activity and possibly 
encourage political engagement, they can also reinforce positions of those in power and are 
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susceptible to manipulation by human agents. Examining the impact on social media on 
political mobilisation in East and West Africa, Kalyango & Adu-Kumi (2013) point out that 
the role of media continues to be useful in mobilising and drawing citizens to focus on issues 
that are perceived as important and in priming public opinion among many Africans to get 
engaged in the political process of governance and democratisation. In their critical 
evaluation of the Arab Spring and the Soweto Uprising, Olorunnisola & Martin (2011) 
observe that assessments underscore citizen empowerment and multiplier capabilities of new 
media but also highlight the value of contextual factors that minimise hyperbolic assumptions 
about the contribution of new media to the formation and progression of social movements.  
Notable exceptions exist in Kenya, Nigeria, Mozambique and South Africa where studies 
(see Otieno & Mukhongo, 2013; Iwilade, 2013; Honwana, 2013; SANPAD, 2013) have 
begun to sprout focusing on how youths use new media for political change. In Kenya, 
Otieno & Mukhongo (2013) examined whether there is any relationship between the level of 
youth engagement on social media and their level of interest in politics. Grounded in a post-
test quasi experiment to compare political interest between a naturally occurring group of 
Facebook users and a naturally occurring group of non-Facebook users, their findings reveals 
that Facebook has provided the youth with a platform where they can access political 
information in formats that are appealing to them. In another study by Mukhongo & 
Macharia (2016), they argue that social media has reinvigorated political participation by 
educated urban youth in Kenya. According to Mukhongo (2014), new media platforms, 
particularly social networks act as vehicles for the visual representation of a nation’s political 
discourse among the youth Web 2.0 has created online spaces (private and public) that have 
been appropriated by Kenyan youths, locally, and in the diaspora to weave their own political 
narratives and present them in forums that accommodate their views without fear of 
censorship or regulation that characterises “offline” communications. She argues that 
political images  posted  by the  youth  in Kenya on their online private spaces can be used to  
promote  political  stereotypes,  subjectivities  and perpetuate  visual  hegemonies  as well as 
allows the  youth  to   circumvent  government  surveillance tactics and affords nations an 
opportunity to correct the media hegemony by rewriting their own stories on a platform that 
is not just national, but transnational (Mukhongo, 2014).  
Writing about youth and political participation in South Africa, Mozambique, Senegal and 
Tunisia, Honwana (2013; 2014) argues that young people are protesting their socio-economic 
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and political marginalisation through social media platforms and street demonstrations. 
Through social media posts, Hip Hop lyrics and graffiti young Africans are organising in 
many ways, and are making their voices heard. Iwilade (2013) discusses the use of social 
media by youth in Nigeria and Mozambique. Both cases illustrated the use of ICTs and social 
media to mobilise for protests, in ways that not only marginalised the traditional opposition, 
but also allowed youth to broaden and dominate the protest discourses. According to Iwilade 
(2013), new media enables the youth to renegotiate their place and space with patterns of 
authority and control in Africa. For him, the intersection between youth protest, the pressures 
of a global system in crisis and the opportunities being provided by globalised social media 
has been critical not only to the deepening of resistance, but also to the ability of youth to 
appropriate the discourses and channel grievance (Iwilade, 2013).  Though important to the 
debate on social media and political action, these studies do not explicitly focus on Facebook 
and politically engaged youths. 
Although there is bourgeoning literature on the relationship between youth, social media and 
political participation in non-Western societies in general and in Africa in particular, this is 
not comparable to trends in Western societies where these issues have occupied the minds of 
scholars for a long time. Much of the literature on youth, new media and political action hails 
from Western societies and very little academic analysis has been conducted in relation to 
southern Africa, despite anecdotal evidence showing that the youth are using new media 
technologies during democratisation conflicts for mass mobilisation purposes. Extant 
literature (Kahne & Middaugh, 2012; Juris, 2005; Valenzuela, Arriagada & Scherman, 2012; 
Valenzuela, Park & Kee, 2009; Papacharissi & Mendelson, 2011) on the relationship between 
youth, social media and political participation from Western contexts has largely been framed 
within the contours of technological determinism
19
. As Olsson (2008) insightfully writes, this 
stream of literature views the political significance of social media as a consequence of 
features. Some of these studies (Pew Research Centre 2012; boyd, 2008; Storsul, 2014) 
emanating from developed societies paint a mixed picture on how politically engaged youths 
use Facebook for political purposes. Other studies (Kahne, Middaugh, & Allen, 2013; Skoric 
& Kwan, 2011; Olsson, 2007) reveal that the youth use Facebook to engage in “participatory 
                                                          
19 Technological determinism assumes that technology is the prime driver of social relations and how they are organised. 
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politics
20” (like starting a political group online, circulating a blog about a political issue, or 
forwarding political videos to friends and to join with others to mobilise political action).  
Unlike technological deterministic accounts of the relationship between new media and 
political change, Kahne et al (2013) focus on specific sets of political and cultural practices 
and how young Americans deploy social media tools to help redefine the dynamics of 
political debate and mobilisation. Contrary for institutional politics, participatory politics 
often facilitate a renegotiation of political power and control with the traditional political 
entities that are now searching for ways to engage participants (Kahne et al., 2013). 
Participatory politics allow individuals to operate with greater independence in the political 
realm, circumventing traditional gatekeepers of information and influence, such as newspaper 
editors, political parties, and interest groups. Online spaces provide for greater creativity and 
voice, as participants produce original content using video, images, and text. Rather than 
displacing institutional politics, Kahne et al., (2013) view participatory politics as a 
supplemental domain where young people can take part in a dialogue about the issues that 
matter, think about strategies of mobilisation, and do some of that mobilising collectively 
online. While some of these studies from Western contexts have generated important insights, 
they are “predicated on media-saturated societies with broad access to new media 
technologies that have extended the range of media choices available to consumers” 
(Wasserman, 2010: 10), hence it cannot help us to understand how and why politically 
engaged youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa deploy Facebook for political purposes.   
Research also indicate that Facebook was used by anti-FARC protestors to organise an 
offline social movement in Columbia (Neumayer & Raffl, 2008), by the Occupy movement 
in the United States (Sassen, 2011; Gerbaudo, 2013), by protesters in the 2011 London riots 
(Bright, 2011) and by young activists during the Arab Spring
21
 (Gerbaudo, 2013; Honwana, 
2012; Herrera, 2012) to facilitate collection action in the physical world. As intimated earlier, 
most of these studies have tended to reproduce hyperbolic conclusions about the mythical 
powers of social media. Because of the dominance of Western scholars in the knowledge 
production processes, this has meant that Facebook activist cultures and communication 
practices that emerge from Western societies, where new media technologies have long been 
                                                          
20 Participatory politics are defined as acts that are interactive, peer-based, not guided by deference to elites or formal institutions, and meant 
to address issues of public concern (Cohen & Kahne, 2012) 
21 This term used to define the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests, riots and civil wars in the Arab world that began on the 
18th of December 2010. It led to the removal of presidents in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen; civil uprisings erupted in Libya, Bahrain 
and Syria; major protests also broke out in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Sudan (Lynch, 2012). 
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incorporated into activist practices “are applied out of context, and sometimes awkwardly in 
Africa” (Ibelema, 2008: 36). This study attempted to correct this misnomer by studying the 
environment in which Facebook is deployed as well as “what [young] people actually do with 
[social] media” (Couldry, 2010: 204).  
Besides single country studies (Herrera, 2012; Lim, 2012; 2013; Aouragh, 2012) coming 
from Tunisia and Egypt, there is a dearth of comparative research on how and why politically 
engaged youths—who are seen as central to community protests in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa—are appropriating Facebook to support their work. Notwithstanding the abundance of 
literature on new media technologies, youth and political action (Moyo, 2007; Paterson, 
2013; Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015, Moyo, 2011; Moyo, 2007, there is a marked dearth of this 
kind of research in Sub-Saharan Africa, more so in Southern Africa (Booysen, 2015). This 
study seeks to bridge that gap. It endeavours to find out whether youths utilise Facebook as 
an alternative space of political activism given their marginalisation from the mainstream 
mediated public sphere. It also examined the place of social media in lives of politically 
engaged youths as well as assessed the potential of Facebook to act as an agent of change.  
 
While pockets of research (Wasserman, 2007; Moyo, 2009; Moyo, 2011; Chuma, 2016; 
Bosch, 2013; SANPAD, 2013; Steenkamp & Hyde-Clarke, 2014; Duncan, 2014; Ndlovu & 
Mbenga; 2013; Mhiripiri & Mutsvairo, 2013; Mare, 2014; Chiumbu, 2012) have begun to 
sprout detailing how Zimbabweans and South Africans use new media technologies for 
political purposes, this stream of literature does not explicitly focus on politically engaged 
youths who are main concern of this particular study. For instance, research by Moyo (2011) 
focuses on the use of citizen journalism platforms to disarticulate dictatorial tendencies of the 
ZANU-PF regime in Zimbabwe. Mutsvairo & Sirks (2015) focuses explicitly on the 
contribution of the Baba Jukwa Facebook page in reinforcing political participation in 
Zimbabwe. Their study is mainly concerned with the interactions on the Facebook page 
rather than on how, why, when do youth as a category of social media users deploy the 
platform for political participation. Mutsvairo & Sirks (2015) concluded that in spite of the 
page’s ability to encourage Zimbabweans to openly discuss and share thoughts, there simply 
is no evidence that Baba Jukwa had helped facilitate increased democratic participation. In as 
much as these age-blind studies are very insightful, they are silent on disaggregated data on 
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the use of social media platforms by young people, their political posting behaviours and 
discursive participation practices. 
There is a litany of research (see Wasserman, 2007; Chiumbu, 2012; Loudon, 2010; Glenn & 
Mattes, 2011; Dawson, 2012; Willems, 2010; Wasserman, 2011; Munro, 2015) on new media 
technologies and political action in South Africa, although most of the literature neglects the 
issue of how, why, to what effect and when do young people use social media for political 
participation. As Mutsvairo (2016) reminds us, there has outrageously been lack of empirical 
accounts detailing who is doing what, why, where, when and with what impact in sub-
Saharan Africa. Most of these studies (Chiumbu, 2012; Wasserman, 2007; Loudon, 2010) are 
preoccupied with how social movement actors deploy new media technologies like websites, 
emails, mobile phones and the internet to instigate social and political change. As Chiumbu 
(2015) aptly puts it, new media technologies are indeed incorporated in the movements’ 
communication repertoire, but mainly for administrative and networking purposes and not 
necessarily for mass mobilisation purposes. Very few of these studies (Bosch, 2013; Ndlovu 
& Mbenga, 2013; SANPAD, 2013) have attempted to examine how and why youth activists 
increasingly prefer to use social media platforms when compared to the mainstream media 
for their political actions. This emergent body of research in South Africa suggests that many 
young people are opting to use new media and alternative forms of media as they feel 
marginalised by the mainstream media and party political institutions (SANPAD, 2013; 
Garman & Malila, 2016; Wasserman, 2014; Bosch, 2013).  
Due to a lack of systematic and empirical research, it is not clear whether or not politically 
engaged youths in both countries are using Facebook to facilitate online political activism. 
This is more acute because extant research which is by and large age-blind fails to examine 
the civic experiences of different segments of the youth—that is politically engaged or 
disengaged. As this study will show, age-blindness does not do justice to the issue of youth 
political disengagement which has been characterised as symbolising a “civic crisis” 
(Putnam, 2000) in Western societies as well as in developing societies especially in sub-
Saharan Africa (Seekings, 2014). Because the youth are often poorly served by traditional 
civic and political institutions, including mainstream media, they provide an important target 
group for understanding how and why they use new media technologies for political 
purposes. In terms of methodological approach, studies (Chuma, 2006; Lewis, Hussen & van 
Vuuren, 2013; Ndlovu & Mbenga, 2013; Steenkamp & Hyde-Clarke, 2014; Munro, 2015) 
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from South Africa have relied heavily on qualitative content analysis of Facebook pages 
hence lack an appreciation of the “insider’s perspective” and “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 
1973) obtainable through qualitative interviews and online participant observation. As 
Chapter Four will show, in-depth interviews are important because they allow researchers to 
explore the views, experiences, beliefs and motivations of individual participants (Deacon, 
Pickering, Golding & Murdock, 1999).  
Although scholars (Walton, 2014; Gerbaudo, 2012; 2016; Sakr, 2013; Chiumbu, 2015) have 
looked at the role of Facebook page and group administrators as agenda setters in African 
social movements, there is conspicuous scarcity of research focusing on the discursive 
interactions and micro-politics of participation on Facebook pages. Gerbaudo (2016) 
examined the levels of user engagement and the dominant themes on two highly influential 
activist Facebook pages: the WAAKS (We are all Khaled Said) Facebook page, the most 
important communication channel in the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and the DRY (Real 
Democracy Now) Facebook page, an arm of the foremost protest organisation in the 
Indignados movement in Spain. He found that these groups were characterised by peaks in 
feedback loops between administrators and users as well as moments of digital enthuasism 
(Gerbaudo, 2016). With the exception of this study, there are no studies in Southern Africa 
which have focused on discursive interactions and the micro-politics of participation on 
Facebook pages and groups.  As such, the present study sought to fill this lacuna. 
In her recent study, Chiumbu (2015) explores the power dynamics and pre-figurative politics 
that punctuate social media use within social movements in South Africa. Through the lens of 
radical democracy and critical participation theories, Chiumbu (2015: 1-2) argues that while 
the material on the websites, social media platforms and print media project counter-
hegemonic ideologies, the discursive and institutional practices of the social movements do 
not manifest radical democratic principles and genuine participation. She notes that the 
discursive struggles and tensions highlight the importance of recognising power dynamics 
within media practices of social movements (Chiumbu, 2015). Through interviews and online 
participant observation, it also assessed the extent to which Facebook pages and groups could 
be viewed as an alternative space for online political activism.  
1.3 Facebook: So what is it and how does it work? 
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Founded in 2004, Facebook’s mission is “to give people the power to share and make the 
world more open and connected” (Facebook, 2015). Facebook was started by Mark 
Zuckerberg with his college roommates and fellow students at Harvard University. Initially 
designed to allow university students to stay connected with college friends and to find dates, 
Facebook is the most visited social network site on the internet (Alexa, 2015). It boasts of 
1.44 billion monthly active users, which means that it is used by every seventh person on 
Earth (Alexa, 2015). As of 31
st
 March 2015, Facebook had 1.25 billion mobile monthly 
active users. At least 936 million daily active users were logging on to the site (Facebook, 
2015). In Africa, there were 51,612,460 Facebook users as of 31
st
 December 2012, 
representing a 4.8% penetration rate (Internetworldstats, 2014). Although there is a gradual 
decrease in daily users, specifically among teenagers in Western countries, the youth remain 
the most active users of the site (Miller, 2013; Miller, Costa, Haynes, McDonald, Nicolescu, 
Sinanan, Spyer, Venkatraman & Wang, 2016). Given its embeddness in the everyday lives of 
the youth, Facebook provides an interesting “research laboratory” to examine how and why 
politically active youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa use the site to facilitate political 
activism. 
Facebook’s business model is based on systematically monitoring and harvesting of user data 
(such as the way people describe themselves in their profiles, who they are connected to, their 
interests and hobbies and their online activities) which the company eventually sells as a 
commodity to advertising clients (Van Dijck, 2013; Fuchs & Sandoval, 2014). Facebook acts 
as an advertising agent linking advertisers with a huge pool of users on its database. Although 
the company listed on the New York stock exchange in a record breaking transaction in 2012, 
it essentially relies on digital free labour to generate economic value (Scholz, 2013; 
Andrejevic, 2010). As Fuchs (2014) notes, Facebook uses privacy policies to legitimate its 
capital accumulation model of turning user data into a private good. Like other media 
platforms, Facebook is susceptible to both state and corporate censorship. As MacKinnon, 
Miltner, Gray & Lim (2014: 132) observe, the site’s ability “to respect users’ freedom of 
expression is heavily influenced by national legal and regulatory contexts”. The company 
also subjects its users to intermediary censorship, which may limit activists’ freedom of 
speech and expression (Zuckerman, 2013). This means that the violation of the site’s 
community standards can lead to the deletion of content, blocking it from view for users in 
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specific jurisdictions, or shutting down of the account of a user who posts certain content 
(Youmans & York, 2012).  
While Twitter and Facebook are sometimes seen as similar in terms of their usage, they are 
distinctly different in terms of their respective technical infrastructures, appearance, and 
terminology (boyd & Ellison, 2008). The two sites are comparable in terms of their modes of 
communication. In terms of redistribution of content (Twitter uses retweet while Facebook 
has a share button). For interaction purposes, Facebook has features like comment, chat and 
private messaging (I will return to these features below) while Twitter makes use of 
mentions, @reply and direct message. Both platforms also have acknowledging features (like 
on Facebook and favourite on Twitter). They are also different in the sense that Twitter 
restricts its users to 140 characters, while Facebook imposes no restriction. Both platforms 
have hashtag features, although Twitter was the first to roll it out. Whereas Twitter is 
generally treated as generally public in nature, Facebook intersects the private and public 
spheres in complex ways. In contrast to Twitter, Facebook allows its users to create groups, 
fan pages and write notes (Below I will define these terms). Unlike Twitter, Instagram and 
MySpace users who can use pseudonyms, Facebook require its users to use their real names 
(Youmans & York, 2012). Compared to mobile-centric platforms like Instagram, Facebook 
can be accessed through an array of technological gadgets. A Facebook account can be 
opened by anyone aged 13 years and above with a valid email address or mobile phone 
number. 
Facebook is built around an architecture of code that produces a specific digital environment. 
Architecture denotes a composite of structure, design and organisation (Papacharissi, 2009). 
Like the architecture of physical spaces, the Facebook architecture simultaneously enables 
and restricts particular modes of interaction (Valtysson, 2012). This is because the site is 
specified by programming code (boyd, 2010). Its features allow users to friend
22
 other users, 
share text updates (status updates), photos and private messages, with a large emphasis on 
interacting online through “liking23”, “tagging”, “sharing”, “following” and commenting on 
the “status” of friends (Sherwood & Nicholson, 2012). “Friending” on Facebook is not 
restricted to people you know, but people you may or should know according to an 
                                                          
22 Friends are contacts added by users. One has to “accept” a friend request before being added to a user’s list of contacts. 
23 In February 2016, Facebook introduced a range of "likes" that express a far more nuanced range approval. The social network rolled out 
"Reactions" - an extension of the "Like" button - to allow users to express sadness, wow, anger, love and laughter. The five new buttons 
appear as animated emoticons that pop up when the "Like" button is held down on mobile devices. The buttons appear on desktops when 
users hover over the "Like" button. 
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algorithm’s computation. “Liking” constitutes a provoked automated gesture that yields 
precious information about people’s desires and predilections (van Dijck, 2012). “Following” 
discloses and connects people’s interests and allows for the detection of trends.  
Upon joining Facebook, users obtain a “page” on which to create a personal “profile”. As 
Fuchs (2014) posits, Facebook is implicated in the licquafaction of boundaries (blurring the 
oft-cited divide between the private and public sphere). This is because the site allows for the 
convergence of personal data, communicative data, social network data/ community data (in 
relation to private roles like friend, father, mother and so forth), civic roles (like socio-
cultural roles as fan community members), public roles (like socio-political roles as youth 
activists) and so forth (Fuchs, 2014). Thus it integrates tools that support various forms of 
sociality (like cognition, communication and cooperation) into one platform. In terms of 
privacy settings, the Facebook architecture is designed in such a way that users are able to 
control which parts of their profiles are visible to others. Users’ profiles can be viewed by 
friends only, friends of friends, friends and networks and everyone on the internet. 
As pointed out earlier, Facebook has features like the “wall” which refers to a space on every 
user’s profile page that allows friends to post messages for others to see; “pokes”, which 
allows users to send an emoticon known as a poke to each other; “chat”, which allows users 
to communicate with their friends in real-time; “photos”, where users can upload albums and 
photos; “voice calls”, which enables users to make live voice calls via Facebook chat; 
“notes”, a blogging feature which allows users to post their stories, embeddable images and 
tags and “fan pages” where users can show support for a public figure (Facebook, 2015). 
Causes is another feature which enables users to make donations to charities (predefined by 
Facebook). To keep users updated about their social circles, Facebook has two features: 
newsfeed (which appears on the homepage of each user) and mini-feed (which appears in 
each individual’s profile). Newsfeed updates a personalised list of news stories throughout 
the day generated by the activity of friends. 
The groups feature is another important component of Facebook. Facebook allows users to 
create and join groups based around common interests and activities. Once a user joins a 
Facebook group, he/she receives a message on the notifications button whenever someone 
posts something in the group. There are three kinds of Facebook groups: secret, public and 
private (Westling, 2007; Kushin & Kitchener, 2009). A secret group does not appear in group 
search results or in members’ profiles and requires an invitation from an administrator to join. 
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Group information can only be viewed by members. A public group allows anyone to join 
and to invite others to join. Information in this group can be viewed by anyone with a 
Facebook account. A private group requires approval from Facebook administrator(s) for one 
to join. Anyone can see the group information but all discussions, posted items and list of 
members remain private. It is important to underscore that Facebook is a dynamic 
environment which is constantly changing and upgrading its architecture and EdgeRank 
algorithms. The group feature provided a fruitful “testing ground” to tease out the discursive 
interactions and micro-politics of participation on Facebook.  
The choice to focus on Facebook was also shaped by the fact that Facebook compared to 
Twitter has a far larger penetration in Africa. Facebook is by far the most popular social 
media platform in Zimbabwe and South Africa (see Chapter Two). Most studies from 
Western contexts have focused on Twitter which has left Facebook surprisingly understudied 
(Gerbaudo, 2016). At the time when i undertook fieldwork for this particular study, Facebook 
was the place of choice for politically engaged youths judging by the amount of political 
conversations on profiles, pages and groups. Below, I look at the debate of the role of social 
media in youth political involvement. 
1.4 Social media and political action: The grand debate? 
 
boyd (2008) asks a pertinent question: Can social network sites enable political action? 
Although the answer to this poignant question remains elusive (Wasserman, 2011; Jebril et 
al, 2013), an interesting debate has ensued within academic literature pitting cyber-optimists, 
cyber-pessimists and cyber-realists. Cyber-optimists (Shirky, 2008; Papacharissi, 2010) 
celebrate social media’s revolutionary and democratising potential in ways that resonate with 
technological deterministic discourses. Cyber-pessimists (Gladwell, 2010; Dean, 2005) 
question the revolutionary potential of the social media in bringing about political change. In 
the middle, are cyber-realists (Morozov, 2011; Aouragh, 2013; 2013) who adopt a more 
cautious approach that transcends both the cyber-optimist and cyber-pessimist approaches. 
As Wolfsfeld, Segev & Sheafer (2013) observe, the third approach tends to use comparative 
research to emphasise the impact that political, social, and economic variations have on the 
role of the social media in collective action. 
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Cyber-optimists (Shirky, 2008; Diamond, 2010) have branded Facebook as a “liberation 
technology” and “technology of freedom”, which assist activist groupings in their quest to 
reinvigorate democratic processes. Liberation technology is defined as “any form of 
information and communication technology (ICT) that can expand political, social, and 
economic freedom” (Diamond, 2010: 51). He describes social media as “liberation 
technology” that “enables citizens to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, 
mobilise protest and monitor elections” (Diamond, 2010: 70). Because of this belief in 
“liberation technologies”, social media platforms like Facebook are viewed as endowed with 
unlimited powers which eventually empower people to liberate themselves from state 
repression (El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2012). Scholars (Dahlgren, 2013; Root, 2012) argue that 
social media platforms enhance access to information, enable citizen interactions and 
facilitate discussions and opinion formation. In light of this, I sought to examine from 
interview responses whether Zimbabwean and South African youths viewed Facebook as 
“liberation technology”.  
 
Reinventing Sen’s (1999) notion of freedom enhancement24, Shirky, the leading evangelist of 
cyber-optimism, argues that the political use of Facebook enhances freedom: “Social tools 
create what economists would call a positive supply-side shock to the amount of freedom in 
the world. [...] To speak online is to publish, and to publish online is to connect with others. 
With the arrival of globally accessible publishing, freedom of speech is now freedom of the 
press and freedom of the press is freedom of assembly” (2008: 172). He further argues that 
social media “will result in a net improvement for democracy” (Gladwell & Shirky, 2011: 
154). With these issues in mind, this study will seek to assess whether such “unmitigated 
euphoria” and optimism is warranted in Southern Africa. The study also examined whether 
the benefits of Facebook as espoused by Shirky holds for youth activists in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa.  
 
Cyber-optimists laud Facebook pages for “levelling the playing field” (Castells, 2012) by 
empowering otherwise powerless actors as well as acting as a crucial tool of political 
activism (Neumayer & Raffl, 2008; Makinen & Kuira, 2008; Harlow, 2012; Lim, 2012). For 
instance, Castells (2012: 229) argues that the “networked movements of our time are largely 
                                                          
24 It is based on the notion that development is a process of expansion of capabilities as well as expansion of the real freedoms that the 
citizens enjoy to pursue the objectives they have reason to value. 
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based on the internet”. Social media are also touted as spawning new repertoires of collective 
action (Castells, 2012) like “digital repertoires of action” (Earl & Kimport, 2011) or 
“connective action” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012) at the local, national and transnational 
level. Facebook pages are also seen as enhancing activists’ ability to share, cooperate, and act 
together (Shirky, 2008). Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund & Sandoval (2011) also suggest that 
the internet has the ability to build communities. As intimated earlier, Facebook pages are 
also viewed as providing cultural and political spaces for young people to “have a right to 
express themselves, for their voices to become visible to “be heard” [through]” (Livingstone, 
Couldry & Markham, 2007: 4). In-depth interviews were used to ascertain the validity of 
these claims by cyber-optimists in both countries. Online participant observation was used to 
analyse whether Facebook had lived up to the cyber-utopian promise, or if the idea of social 
media platforms promoting great political engagement was merely a myth. 
 
Young activists and marginalised groups often excluded from mainstream media are seen as 
turning to social media (Harlow, 2012; Gerbaudo, 2013), which serves as both the 
communication channel and the actual “field” of activism itself (Lievrouw, 2011). Jenkins 
sees social media in context of the development that “the Web has become a site of consumer 
participation” (Jenkins, 2008: 137). With the aid of qualitative interviews, I will examine 
whether youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa are using Facebook to compensate for 
the lack of political voice in the mainstream media. Online observations also assisted me to 
assess whether youth activists are utilising Facebook as an actual “field” of activism.  
 
Writing about the Arab Spring, Gerbaudo (2012) argues that the We Are All Khalid Said 
(WAAKS) Facebook page was used as an “emotional choreography of assembly” which 
facilitated the coming together of an individualised constituency around common identities, 
common places, common names and formats of action. This page constituted a trending and 
magnetic place where young activists converged to exchange information about police 
brutality, human rights violations as well as agitating for the overthrow of the Egyptian 
government. Online observations assisted me to investigate whether Zimbabwean and South 
African youth activists used Facebook to facilitate an “emotional choreography of assembly”. 
 
Despite the afore-mentioned hyperbolic accounts about the potential of social media to 
instigate political change during the Arab Spring, more sober theorisations have begun to 
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emerge (see Curran, 2012; Voltmer, 2013; Lynch, 2012; Robertson, 2013). These scholars 
argue that the role of social media in the process of regime change cannot be disentangled 
from other societal factors and variables. For instance, Curran (2012) observes that wider 
societal contextual factors (such as deteriorating economic conditions, youth unemployment, 
electoral fraud, and political repression) played an instrumental role while social media were 
implicated as amplifiers of the protests and demonstrations. In the same vein, some scholars 
(Fuchs, 2014; Lynch, 2012) argue that social media may have played an important role at key 
moments in the unfolding of those revolutionary events, but they did so within a context 
shaped by older media like Al-Jazeera. The argument here is that new media cannot be 
extricated from legacy media. Robertson (2013: 339-340) notes that while social media 
promotes a particular type of conversation, but this exchanging of views and opinions cannot 
form the only part of the democratisation process, and understanding “media connectivity” 
among the various actors is necessary. These scholars (Curran, 2012; Robertson, 2013; 
Lynch, 2012; Lim, 2014) advocate for transcending the debate between cyber-optimist and 
cyber-pessimist perspectives on the role of social media in political change, they propose a 
shift away from perspectives that isolate the internet from other media, and they call for a 
better understanding of the dialectical relationship between online and offline political action. 
This study sought to find out whether there was interconnectivity between the use of 
Facebook and “old” media for political action by Zimbabwean and South African youth 
activists.  
 
Cyber-pessimists (Gladwell, 2010; Dean, 2005) argue that social media are not “magic 
bullets” for solving waning levels of formal political participation. They foreground the 
disadvantages of relying on social media for political participation. Cyber-pessimists 
postulate that social media reinforces asymmetries between the information rich and poor and 
engaged and disengaged youth (Norris & Curtice, 2006). Facebook pages are viewed as a 
new threat to democracy (lambasted for depoliticising and fragmenting citizens) (Dean, 
2005). Given the imbalances with regard to access to the internet, this study sought to find 
out how the political economy of connectivity shaped participation levels on Facebook.  
 
 Facebook activism is lambasted for being based on weak ties and therefore demanding low-
risk participation (Gladwell, 2010). Gladwell criticises cyber-optimists for believing “...a 
Facebook friend is the same as a real friend. In addition, while social network [sites] are 
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effective at increasing participation, they only do so by ‘lessening the level of motivation that 
participation requires” (2010: 47). Based on the distinction between close friends and more 
distant friends and acquaintances, Gladwell (2010) posits that Facebook does not contribute 
to collective identities built on strong ties necessary for high risk activism. He adds that 
Facebook activism only make it “easier for activists to express themselves, and harder for 
that expression to have any impact” (Gladwell, 2010: 47). For Gladwell (2010: 49), social 
media “are not a natural enemy of the status quo” and “are well suited to making the existing 
social order more efficient”. Extending this argument further, scholars (Kuper, 2012; 
Bretherton, 2011) who reincarnate the ghost of Karl Marx’s critique of religion as the “opium 
of the oppressed” also dismiss Facebook as an “anti-revolutionary” platform that keeps the 
world quiet and peaceful. I also investigated respondents’ assessment of Facebook’s potential 
as an agent of change. 
 
Cyber-agnosticism
25
as propounded by Morozov (2011: 319) puts emphasis on studying the 
environment in which social media operate and rejects the view that social media have a 
single preordained outcome. He criticises cyber-optimism for promoting the gospel of 
“technological solutionism26” where technical fixes are seen as an answer to democratic 
challenges (Morozov, 2013). Mosco (2004) calls this belief in the liberating power of 
technology the notion of the “digital sublime”. According to Morozov (2013: 43), 
technological solutionism “impoverish and infantilise our public debate”. Building on 
Gladwell’s argument, Morozov (2009) contends that Facebook activism is a very shallow and 
an ineffective form of activism, which he termed “slacktivism”. Slacktivism refers to a feel-
good online activism that has zero political or social impact (Morozov, 2011; White, 2010; 
Dean, 2005). As Morozov (2011) observes, this type of activism gives those who participate 
in “slacktivist27” campaigns an illusion of having a meaningful impact on the world without 
demanding anything more than joining a Facebook group. In concurrence, Lim (2013: 2) 
adds that Facebook activism has a tendency of being fast, thin and many  (which means it 
amasses a lot of “followers” and “likes” through viral campaigns but lacks the gravitas to 
effect tangible political change).   
                                                          
25 Cyber-agnosticism is based on an unyielding refusal to take an stance on whether the internet is tool for liberation or repression (Morozov, 
2011) 
26 Technological solutionism refers to the treatment of “all complex social situations either as neatly defined problems with definite, 
computable solutions or as transparent and self-evident processes that can be easily optimised – if only the right algorithms are in place” 
(Morozov, 2010; xiii). 
27 Slacktivism has come to represent a pejorative term that refers to supposedly inauthentic, low-threshold forms of political engagement 
online, such as signing an e-petition or “liking” a Facebook page. Compared to offline methods, slacktivism is viewed as low effort forms of 
online engagement are less effective than offline methods (Dennis, 2015).  
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For cyber-pessimists, “slacktivism” results in the replacement of effective real-world 
activism with ineffective online activism (Christensen, 2011). However recent research 
(Dennis, 2015; Barberá, Wang, Bonneau, Jost, Nagler & Gonzalez-Bailon, 2015) suggest that 
while cyber-pessimists dismiss social media activism as “clicktivism” or “slacktivism” those 
who change their profile picture, filters, retweet trending hashtags and post prayers as signs 
of solidarity also have a role in activism in their own little ways. According to Barberá et al., 
(2015), there are two kinds of groups within the protest and non-protest communication 
networks: centre (made of a small minority active at the centre that generated most of the 
content, photos, and messages) and “critical periphery” (made of a larger group of people 
who amplify and share the messages from the core group). Dennis (2015) further argues that 
the slacktivist critique is flawed by an overtly narrow focus. He points out that the critique 
lacks an appreciation for the complexity of normalised use and instead uses specific examples 
to support vague, grand theories of internet usage. He accuses critiques of slacktivism for 
over-focussing on social media in isolation thereby ignoring the multifaceted engagement 
strategies that political actors employ, and the expansive, hybrid media system that such tools 
operate within. Slacktivism is often deemed to be lazy activism yet given the time-pressure 
that citizens experience day-to-day, the granular nature of web 2.0 technologies may lower 
the threshold for involvement (Dennis, 2015). In-depth interviews were useful in empirically 
assessing whether this pessimistic outlook is warranted in Zimbabwe and South Africa.   
 
While acknowledging that social media fuels political participation, Morozov (2011) also 
warns that the same platforms are being used by authoritarian regimes to track, suppress, and 
silence dissidents. Corporate social media surveillance and policing practices are seen as 
spawning a “panopticon28” (Foucault, 1995) or surveillance29 society, in which ordinary 
citizens and activists are criminalised for their online activities. In concurrence, Aouragh 
(2012; 2013) views Facebook as a double-edged technology
30
 with both empowering and 
disempowering potentialities. Likening social media to Damocles’ sword, Aouragh (2013) 
argues that those who are empowered by taking the seat under the sword do so haunted by the 
                                                          
28 The concept of panopticon associated with Jeremy Bentham is concerned with the all pervasiveness of mass surveillance in modern 
societies, where the few (state authorities) see the many (the entire population).  
29
 A society organised around the collection, recording, storage, analysis and application of information on individuals and groups. 
30
 Social or other media neither result in positive or negative consequences. They do not act. They do not make society. They do not have 
one-dimensional impacts. Media are systems that are in a complex manner embedded into antagonistic economic, political and cultural 
power structures that are antagonistic (Fuchs, 2016). 
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constant threat of being killed by the same sword, because slaughter could come at the 
slightest disruption. This observation dovetails with Curran’s (2002) view that media 
[including new and social media] are spaces, where media power and counter-power are 
played out. Cases abound where authoritarian (like Iran, China, Bahrain, Egypt and Syria) 
and liberal-democratic systems (United States of America) have used social media to entrap 
activists and to conduct mass surveillance of citizens through accessing servers directly and 
imposing intermediary liability on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) (MacKinnon, 2011; 
Youmans & York, 2012). I also sought to establish if and how the “chilling effect” of state 
surveillance influenced the way youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa deployed 
Facebook for political purposes. 
 
Critical perspectives of the political economy of the internet and social media have also 
highlighted the limitations of social media in terms of bringing about revolutionary political 
change (Barassi & Trere, 2013; Freedman, 2012; van Dijck, 2011). These scholars (Fuchs, 
2013; Freedman, 2012) who recuperate the role of critical theory in understanding new media 
technologies foreground the importance of reflecting on existing configurations of power. 
They demonstrate that social media are embedded into structures of control and domination 
(Fuchs, 2016; Freedman, 2012). Critiquing cyber-optimists’ hyperbolic claims, critical 
political economists of the internet
31
 argue that, far from reinventing the public sphere, the 
social media attention economy is linked to issues of surveillance, corporate control and the 
exploitation of users’ “immaterial labour32” (Andrejevic, 2010). Rather than fostering 
produsage(blurring of production and consumption) (Bruns, 2008), the usage of social media 
is viewed as the outsourcing of productive labour from wage labour to users who work 
completely for free and help maximising the rate of exploitation (Fuchs, 2012). Fisher (2012) 
introduces the notion of “audience alienation”, suggesting that users of Facebook are not only 
exploited, but also do not control content and content production. Activists are therefore 
vulnerable to the privacy policies and politics of the platform owners (Zuckerman, 2013). As 
Youmans & York (2012) argue, the commercial mechanisms of social media and the needs of 
activists do not necessarily match. This study sought to find out how the commercial 
considerations of Facebook clashed with youth activists’ needs. Next, I discuss the theoretical 
framework.  
                                                          
31 Marxist in its orientation, this perspective analyse the private commercial social media companies in capitalist societies from the point of 
view of their inherent nature to pursue and maximise profits sometimes at the expense of promoting public good (Sandoval &  Fuchs, 2010). 
32 Immaterial labour denotes activity that produces ‘cultural content’ of the commodity. It involves a series of activities that are not normally 
recognised as ‘work’ like Facebooking and blogging. 
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1.5 The Theoretical Context 
 
The analysis was influenced by the Fraser’s (1990; 1992; 1997) concept of subaltern counter-
publics and Scott’s (1976; 1985; 1990) metaphor of hidden transcripts (see Chapter Three for 
a comprehensive theoretical framework). I was interested in testing the applicability of 
Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-publics in the Zimbabwean and South African contexts. 
This study also sought to extend the analytical rigour of Fraser’s theoretical frame through 
the incorporation of Scott’s metaphor of hidden transcripts, which acknowledges the multi-
dimensional nature of resistance as well as the creative circulation of subversive discourses 
behind the backs of the powerful elite. Fraser’s theoretical frame provides a valuable 
conceptual resource to analyse how and why youth activists use Facebook for political 
activities, the extent to which Facebook groups can be considered as alternative spaces for 
political activism and how discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation play out 
on Facebook groups. Scott’s metaphor of hidden transcripts was also useful for analysing the 
various kinds of political discourses which are shared by politically engaged youth on 
Facebook. 
 
In a critique of Habermas’s (1989) notion of the public sphere (more on this will be discussed 
in Chapter Three), Fraser (1990) argues that marginalised groups may find greater 
opportunities for exercising voice through creating their own spaces, which she terms 
“subaltern counter-publics”. The term refers to “parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn permit them 
to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs” (Fraser, 1992: 
123). These spaces are also characterised by alternative modes of address, alternative forms 
of social expression, alternative modes of political participation and ways of communicating 
with a range of publics, who are often politically and culturally marginalised. Through in-
depth interviews, I sought to get “thick descriptions” on how and why politically engaged 
youths used Facebook for political purposes in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
 
Focusing on the fragmentation of the public sphere, Fraser (1990) highlights the legitimate 
political and social contestation which emanate from marginalised groups over who is 
allowed to speak in the public, on behalf of whom and what topics are fit for discussion. 
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Alternative spaces to the dominant bourgeois public sphere are seen as enabling marginalised 
groups to express their grievances, challenge symbolic domination and advance their political 
interests. This study was interested in finding out how respondents used Facebook to advance 
their political objectives.  
 
Fraser’s theory is concerned with the existence of the dominant public sphere (populated by 
the elites) and subaltern counter-publics (made up of historically and culturally marginalised 
groups) that have been excluded from the dominant public sphere by legal or extra-legal 
means. This kind of theorisation constitutes an insightful conceptual resource for this study 
because it is sensitive to the wider socio-political and communication context in which youth 
activists deploy Facebook for political purposes. It recognises that in stratified societies (like 
Zimbabwe and South Africa) characterised by structural relations of dominance and 
subordination, multiple publics exist for different social groups. The theory also 
acknowledges the political innovations [human agency] of marginalised groups [youth 
activists] outside the mainstream mediated public sphere.  
 
Building on Fraser’s notion of subaltern counter-publics, I coin the term “transnational 
alternative public spheres” to denote the geographically dispersed communicative arenas 
spawned by Facebook groups and pages. These communicative arenas allow group members 
to post, like, comment and chat with others dotted around the globe. Following Melucci 
(1996), private Facebook groups can also be conceptualised as “submerged networks33” of 
everyday political mobilisation. Thus Facebook groups and pages are viewed as providing 
spaces where youth activists can contact elected officials directly, share political satire, and 
express political opinions. This is because subaltern counter-publics allow for the 
participation of groups (including youth activists) who do not master the critical rational 
discourse used by politicians, intellectuals, and journalists who dominate mass media 
discussions (Fraser, 1990).   
 
This study sought to evaluate the extent to which Facebook pages could be conceptualised as 
spaces of withdrawal and regroupment and bases and training grounds for youth agitational 
activities directed towards wider publics in Zimbabwe and South Africa. As Fraser notes, 
                                                          
33 Submerged networks are made up of the relationships between participants in social movements that are hidden from public view, through 
which people communicate and exchange information with each other, while also negotiating a collective identity and developing a sense of 
belonging (Melucci, 1996). 
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subaltern counter-publics can come to serve a politics of transformation by giving previously 
excluded groups the time and opportunity to construct their political preferences and express 
their concerns for themselves (1992). In these alternative spheres, marginalised groups 
“develop counter-discourses and language, recast their needs and identities and then agitate 
for their subjects to be debated in the public sphere” (Fraser, 1992: 109). As a result, the 
public sphere becomes a space of contestation and negotiation among different publics. 
Online observations enabled me to investigate if the above was reflective of how Facebook is 
used in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
 
As Chapter Three will discuss in more detail, Fraser’s concept of “intra-public relations” 
which refers to the quality and character of discursive relations within a subaltern counter-
public will be employed to investigate the dialogical nature and micro-politics of 
participation on Facebook groups. It is also a theoretical assumption of this study that 
Facebook pages as “invented [mediated] spaces of participation34” (Cornwall, 2002) are 
framed by those who create them, and infused with power relations and cultures of 
interaction carried into them from other spaces (see chapter two). In Gaventa’s terms, 
Facebook groups are spaces of power, in which forms of overt or tacit domination silence 
certain actors or keep them from entering at all (2006). As Young (1996: 123) observes, 
“norms of deliberation are culturally specific and often operate as forms of power that silence 
or devalue the speech of some people”.  
 
                                                          
34 This term refers to spaces created or claimed by citizens meant to challenge the status quo, resist the dominant power relations and 
advocate for social change (such as direct action, protests and demonstrations) (Cornwall, 2002).  
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For reasons I will articulate in Chapter Three, I deployed Scott’s metaphor of hidden 
transcripts which shares several theoretical affinities with Fraser’s notions of alternative 
styles of political speech and counter-discourses, to document and analyse the kinds of 
political discourses which are shared by respondents on Facebook groups. Scott’s, like 
Fraser’s, theory of everyday forms of resistance proceeds from the basic argument that 
marginalised groups require spaces of relative autonomy where they could circulate hidden 
transcripts beyond the supervision of the dominant publics. According to Scott (1985), hidden 
transcripts denote subtle forms of contesting ”public transcripts” or dominant discourses by 
making use of prescribed roles and language to resist the abuse of power. Some of the hidden 
transcripts which were identified by Scott (which are also relevant for this study as analytical 
pointers) include: rumour, gossip, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms and anonymity. I 
also modified Scott’s metaphor of hidden transcripts to read “digital hidden transcripts” (I 
will elaborate on this concept in Chapters Three and Eight).  
 
1.6.1 Research Question and Objectives 
 
The main research question of this study is: how, why and when do youth activists use 
Facebook to mediate political action in Zimbabwe and South Africa? 
In conceptualising this broad research question, I disaggregate it into four research 
objectives:  
 
 How and why do youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook to 
mediate political action?  
 How do dialogic interactions and micro-politics of participation play out on Facebook 
groups and fan pages used by youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa? 
 To what extent, if any, are Facebook groups and fan pages providing alternative 
spaces for political activism for youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa?  
 What kind of political discourses are being circulated by youth activists in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa on their Facebook groups and fan pages?  
 
1.6.2 Assumptions of the study 
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This study is premised on the following assumptions: Firstly, based on a review of studies 
that explore the nexus between social media, young people and political participation 
(Honwana, 2012; Herrera, 2012; Bosch, 2013), I assumed that Facebook allows youth 
activists who lack meaningful voice in the dominant mediated public sphere in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa to engage in alternative forms of political mobilisation. This is in line with 
Lim’s (2014) argument that social media constitutes an alternative arena for young people to 
engage and discuss issues of common concern especially in political contexts where public 
gatherings are highly repressed. The above assumption is also based on the suggestion that 
digital media broadens youth political activism by lowering the cost of involvement, creating 
new mechanism for organising groups and opening new channels of information that bypass 
traditional gatekeepers (di Gennaro & Dutton, 2006). Secondly, I assumed that because of the 
demonstration effect that accompanied the Arab Spring where the youth used social media to 
organise and mobilise political protests against dictatorial regimes (Gerbaudo, 2013), similar 
trends could be discerned in Zimbabwe and South Africa.   
 
Thirdly, I assumed that youth activists in Zimbabwe where invited spaces of political 
participation (like traditional media) have been are repressed are more likely to use Facebook 
to engage in everyday forms of mediated resistance (Scott, 1976; see Chapter Three) than 
their counterparts in South Africa, where “invited spaces of participation35” (Cornwall, 2002) 
are present and relatively free from government interference. As Lim notes, in political 
contexts where spaces of opinion formation are repressed and over-commercialised, 
Facebook can “potentially facilitate activists to form subaltern counter-publics needed in the 
fostering of hidden transcripts” (2014: 58). 
 
1.6.3 Significance and justification of the Study 
 
This study aims to contribute to the academic literature on Facebook and youth political 
participation in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The larger significance of this study is to 
contribute to theory-building around the use of social media for political activism in 
democratic and non-democratic contexts. This is because due to a Western bias in media 
studies “some areas of the world and non-western democracies remain either ignored or 
occupy a marginal position in comparative studies, both theoretically and empirically as well 
                                                          
35 These are formal channels of participatory democracy that are mandated by the state or private institutional agencies to promote citizen 
participation in decision making (see Cornwall, 2002; Miraftab, 2004).  
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as normative assumptions rooted in Western traditions remain largely unquestioned” 
(Wasserman & de Beer, 2009: 431). This helped me to push back the narrow presumptions 
about the universality of technological determinism and, “by constructing a grounded 
empiricism, contribute to existing critical explorations” (Aouragh, 2012: 519). As Nyamnjoh 
(2005: 9) reminds us, “it is regrettable that scholarly focus has been rather on what lCTs do to 
Africans, instead of what Africans do with lCTs”. A gap, therefore, remains uncovered in 
terms of empirically exploring the usage of social media platforms by youth activists in 
Southern Africa. The events in North Africa provides me with an ample opportunity to bring 
“the [Southern] African dimension to the raging academic debate; not so as to further muddle 
the pot but as a way of seeking clarity on contentious assumptions about the role of ICTs” 
(Olorunnisola & Martin, 2013: 2) in political processes.  
 
As discussed above, most of the studies on social media and youth political participation have 
generally been country specific (see Vromen, 2003; Storsul, 2014; SANPAD, 2013; Booysen, 
2015) and quantitative in nature (Karpf, Kreiss, & Nielsen, 2013). Because of the qualitative 
and comparative thrust of this study, it represents one of the few empirical studies to integrate 
the most similar systems (MSSD) and the most different systems designs (MDSD) to 
examine how and why politically engaged youths in repressive and non-repressive contexts 
use Facebook for political purposes. It is not clear how youth activists from a range of social 
movements in Southern Africa are adapting to the mushrooming of social media platforms. It 
specifically contributes to the new ways youth actors organise themselves and imagine social 
change in the developing world.  
 
As noted earlier, a review of available literature on the deployment of Facebook for political 
action by Zimbabwean and South African youths indicate that empirical data on this area is 
scarce. This study therefore addresses this literature gap and provides a basis for 
understanding the place of social media in the lives of young people.  
 
Theoretically, this study endeavoured to test whether conceptual resources such as Fraser‘s 
“subaltern counterpublics” (1992) developed in the West are applicable in African contexts 
where political and media systems are very different. The study will also test and extend the 
analytical rigour of Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-publics through the incorporation of 
Scott’s metaphor of hidden transcripts. Whilst I appreciate the collective strengths of the two 
32 
 
conceptual frameworks, I modified some of their ideas by coining concepts like 
“transnational alternative public sphere” and “digital hidden transcripts” in order to 
illuminate this study’s research objectives (see Chapter Two). Following Fraser (1990) and 
Scott (1976), I conceptualised Facebook groups as transnational alternative public spheres 
which allow youth activists to share digital hidden transcripts, engage in both serious and 
playful political engagement and express individual and collective dissent. It also sought to 
establish whether content posted on Facebook pages and groups by youth activists constitute 
counter-hegemonic discourses as revealed in research conducted in Western societies. As 
Uldam (2010:3) puts it: “it is by analysing how social movement organisations’ (SMOs) 
actors use different online spaces as locations for strategic framing and the formation of 
political identities that we can begin to study how the internet may contribute to an 
alternative public sphere where also voices of dissent are heard”. 
 
Methodologically, this study deployed in-depth interviews, social media ethnography
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 and 
qualitative content analysis to gather empirical data. The advantage of deploying a qualitative 
comparative study is that phenomena can be studied in context and considered with relation 
to a complex combination of variables (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). The integration of the 
MSSD and MDSD makes this study unique in media studies because the predominant 
strategy has been the use of the most similar system design (MSSD) (Downey & Stanyer, 
2005) as a standalone research design. In Chapter Four, I will demonstrate that studying the 
use of Facebook for political purposes does not necessarily require new methodological 
approaches, but rather calls for methodological creativity and flexibility on the part of the 
researcher who remains the central “research instrument” in multi-sited environments. This 
study shows that despite the ephemeral and dynamic qualities of the virtual sphere, it remains 
a textual world researchable by traditional data collection techniques. 
 
At a more general level, this study makes a modest contribution to the body of knowledge 
about the use of ICTs in political action, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and 
other protests around the world about which claims are often made that they were facilitated 
by social media.  
 
                                                          
36 This involves living part of one’s life on the internet, keeping up-to-date with and participating and collaborating in social media 
discussions (Postill & Pink, 2012). 
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1.7 Research Methods, Procedures and Techniques 
This study is a qualitative comparative study which is anchored within the MDSD design (see 
Chapter Four). It also partly draws on basic quantitative meta-data gathered through online 
participant observation. Quantitative data enabled me to make insightful findings on the 
participation levels on Facebook groups. This was done through the collation of statistics of 
the number of people who have joined a Facebook group, number of comments, number of 
likes and number of “shares” received by a particular post and gender disaggregated data of 
participants on Facebook discussions. Qualitative research also enabled me to gather 
“descriptive data, peoples own written or spoken words and observable behaviour” (Taylor & 
Bogdan, 1984:5). Qualitative researchers are generally interested in respondents’ own 
interpretations of reality which are deeply embedded in a rich contextual web that cannot be 
separated and generalised out to some mass population (Bryman, 2004). Overall, this study 
engaged in data triangulation which entails using different sources of information in order to 
increase the validity of the research. It is rooted within the ambit of comparative small-N case 
study design. Comparative method seeks to uncover patterns of similarity and difference 
across a number of observed phenomena as well as revealing unique aspects of a particular 
entity (Ragin, 2000). Thus by comparing how and why politically engaged youths use 
Facebook for political participation in different countries can we see what makes each of 
these contexts unique on the one hand and similar on the other. 
Youth activists interviewed in this study are drawn from purposively selected social 
movements (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, National Constitutional Assembly, Youth Forum 
Zimbabwe, Unemployed People’s Movement, Right to Know Campaign and PASSOP) in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. Although these case studies are not necessarily all youth social 
movement organisations, youth as a constituency constitutes an important category of 
members in these organisations. Instead of the general membership of these social movement 
organisations, I was interested in the social media practices and posting behaviour of the 
youths in the two case nations. This is very important because as intimated earlier youths are 
at the forefront of the deployment of social media platforms in their everyday lives compared 
to other age-based cohorts. The reasons why these case organisations are treated as social 
movement organisations is outlined in Chapter Four. These cases were selected for 
instrumental purposes rather than for intrinsic reasons (see Chapter Four, Stake, 1995; for a 
discussion on instrumental and intrinsic case study).  
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Although some of the SMOs (like the NCA, CiZC and R2K Campaign) studied here are 
generally viewed as mainstream and composed mainly of urban middle-class members, they 
can be conceptualised as “subalterns” in the sense that issues they deal with issues that 
concern people who are excluded from the dominant power structures. I am also cognisant of 
the fact that the concept of subalternity is complex and not easy to define or attach to any 
group (Gramsci, 1971). It is context-specific and As Spivak (1988) observes, subalternity is 
very much situational and dependent on the context which political and media power are 
exercised. Whilst organisations such as CiZC and R2K Campaign have access to mainstream 
media structures of representation, they are also excluded from government “controlled” 
media in both countries. Most of these organisations exist on the margins of [state] power and 
“lack autonomous political power” (Smith, 2010: 39), leading to their alienation from 
invented spaces of [mediated] participation. Unlike in South Africa, where subaltern groups 
have have access to an array of invented spaces of [mediated participation], in Zimbabwe 
similar groups for them to “survive the dominant social pressures, legal restrictions, and other 
challenges from dominant publics and the state” (Squires, 2002: 457) have had to rely on the 
enclave, counter-public and satellite public spheres.  
It is important to note that these organisations are largely made up of working class and 
grassroots activists although prominent positions are occupied by urban middle class 
members (in the case of CiZC and R2K Campaign). This tendency of urban middle class 
members occupying the most prominent positions in SMOs and political formations is not 
unique to Zimbabwe and South Africa. As Spivak (1988) aptly avers, anti-colonial 
nationalism assumed a distinctively bourgeois character, and was thus perceived by many to 
reproduce the social and political inequalities that were prominent under colonial rule. 
Therefore, the six case organisations are subaltern in as much as they are constituted by 
grassroots activists in their ranks.  
Given the qualitative thrust of this research, I used convenience and snowball sampling 
methods to recruit participants. In order to answer the four broad objectives of this study, I 
used in-depth interviews to probe how and why youth activists utilised Facebook for political 
purposes. I also deployed a combination of semi-structured and unstructured questions during 
interviews. I also used online participant observation to obtain first-hand experience of the 
discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation within Facebook groups as well as 
assessing the extent to which these groups can be considered as an alternative space for 
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political activism. Online participant observation also known as “social media ethnography” 
(Postill & Pink, 2012), encapsulates observing activists’ activities and interactions with 
friends’ on Facebook groups. Through this method, I was able to yield important information 
about participation levels in Facebook groups. Online observations of Facebook groups also 
yielded rich qualitative and quantitative data which I used to frame my interview questions. 
Online participant observations findings were compared to data gathered from in-depth 
interviews with youth activists. To answer objective number four, I conducted a qualitative 
content analysis of data gathered from public Facebook groups. This allowed me to 
systematically document and analyse the kinds of political discourses which are shared by 
politically active youths on Facebook (see Chapter Four). 
1.8 Organisation of the thesis 
 
This thesis is composed of nine chapters. The current chapter introduces the research, 
discusses briefly the social context of this research; retraces the academic debate on the 
relationship between social media and political action; outlines the research problem, 
question and objectives; explores the conceptual frame suitable for this study and teases out 
the methodological approach of this study.  
 
In Chapter Two, I outline the social context of the research paying special attention to the 
state of political and communication transformations in Zimbabwe and South Africa. I also 
look at the state of youth and political participation in both countries, thereby foregrounding 
the research gap that I seek to bridge.  
 
In Chapter Three, I further develop a conceptual framework which synthesises Fraser’s 
model of alternative public sphere and Scott’s metaphor of hidden transcripts.  
 
Chapter Four revisits the methodological route and ethical dilemmas navigated throughout 
the data collection process. In this chapter, I focus on my role as an online participant 
observer on Facebook as well as my interviewer status (knower) within a research context 
that is characterised by mistrust of outsiders. 
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I then move to Chapter Five where I present and interpret my research findings. This chapter 
is divided into two sections: a) responses of the youth activists on how they use Facebook for 
political purposes. 
 
In Chapter Six, I examine the reasons why youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa use 
Facebook for political purposes.  
 
Chapter Seven looks at the dialogic nature and micro-politics of participation on Facebook 
groups and the extent to which can Facebook groups be considered as alternative spaces for 
political activism.  
 
In Chapter Eight, I present and interpret research findings meant to answer the fourth 
objective which focuses on the documentation and analysis of the various kinds of political 
discourses circulated by youth activists on Facebook groups and profile pages. Data for this 
particular chapter is drawn from online participant observations and qualitative content 
analysis.  
 
Finally in Chapter Nine, I wrap up and summarise the key arguments of the thesis by offering 
a critical assessment of the study’s findings in relation to the research questions it set out to 
answer. I also point to areas for further research.  
 
1.9 Definition of Key Concepts 
 
In this section, my attempt is not to provide exhaustive definitions to some of the recurring 
concepts in this study, but rather to point out the way in which they are used in this thesis. 
These include: youth, social movements, progressive social movements, cyber-activism, 
social media, social network sites and political action.  
 
Youth: Youth is a fluid concept that defies analytical boundaries. For operational 
convenience, the term is used within the contours of age specific definition to refer to every 
person between the ages of 15 and 35 years (The African Youth Charter, 2011). I use this 
expanded definition of youth because it allows me to take into consideration the period of 
“waithood” (Dhillon & Yousef, 2009) associated with developing countries. Waithood refers 
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to a kind of prolonged adolescence characterised by the involuntary delay in forming a family 
and gaining social and economic independence from their parents or nuclear family (Dhillon 
& Yousef, 2009; Honwana, 2012). This idea ties in neatly with Arnett’s (2000) notion of 
“emerging adulthoods” which refers to a phase of the life span between adolescence and full-
fledged adulthood which encompasses late adolescence and early adulthood. It primarily 
describes young people living in developing countries. As Bauman (2004: 76) adds, today’s 
youth have been “cast in a condition of liminal drift, with no way of knowing whether it is 
transitory or permanent”. 
 
Social Media: This term denotes social network sites and other services, both commercial 
and non-commercial, that build on the technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow 
the creation and exchange of user-generated content (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). Social media 
are “social” in the sense that they enable users to realise various forms of sociality like 
cognition, communication and cooperation (Fuchs, 2014). Although this research primarily 
focuses on Facebook, it interchangeably uses this term with the generic catchword, social 
media.  
 
Social Network Sites: It refers to web-based services that enable users to connect by creating 
personal information profiles, inviting friends and colleagues to have access to those profiles, 
and sending e-mails and instant messages between each other (boyd & Ellison, 2007; Kaplan 
& Haenlein, 2010). In this study the term is used to refer to Facebook.  
 
Social movements: It refers to “those organised efforts, on the part of excluded groups, to 
promote or resist changes in the structure of society that involve recourse to non-institutional 
forms of political participation” (McAdam, 1982: 25). These informal networks based on 
shared beliefs and solidarity often mobilise about conflictual issues through the frequent use 
of various forms of protest. I use the term to refer to the six activist groupings under 
consideration.   
 
Cyber-activism: The concept, a portmanteau of “cyber” and “activism”, refers “to the act of 
using the internet to advance a political cause that is difficult to advance offline” (Howard, 
2011: 145; Earl & Kimport, 2011). Other terms like web activism, digital activism and net 
activism have been used to describe this kind of activism. Unlike traditional forms of 
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activism, cyber-activism leverages the networked properties of the internet and social media. 
It includes practices like culture jamming, email-bombs, virtual sit-ins, online petitions and 
hacktivism
37
. It encapsulates organised public effort, making effective claims on the target 
authority in which civic initiators use digital media technologies to expedite change in the 
political and social realms. It is viewed as closely associated with dissent, resistance and 
rebellion (Hands, 2011).  
 
Political Action: It refers to “action by ordinary citizens directed towards influencing some 
political outcomes” (Brady, 1999: 737). Although it is a multi-dimensional concept, it’s used 
in this study to signify both traditional and alternative forms of political participation like 
lobbying, voting, attending political rallies, starting a new political Facebook group, writing 
and disseminating a blog about a political issue, forwarding political cartoons or engaging in 
direct action. Whilst it will be evident throughout this dissertation that I discuss youth 
political engagement within formal politics and neo-liberal political order, this should not be 
viewed as an attempt to valorise neo-liberal forms of democratic citizenship. I acknowledge 
that political engagement also takes place within the radical democracy political order where 
radical informal politics are equally important. As Mouffe (1992; 2005: 36) aptly points out, 
what constitutes the public good is conditioned by hegemonic processes. She propounds a 
notion of citizenship that “is a form of political identity” and understands [young] citizens as 
“persons who might be engaged in many different communities and who have differing 
conceptions of the good” (Mouffe, 1992: 30-31). Radical democratic citizenship, therefore, 
involves a form of political engagement that goes beyond the formal obligations of liberal 
citizenship and the collective uniformity of communitarian-republican citizenship (Mouffe, 
1992). This [radical democratic citizenship] form of identification is conditioned by the 
(re)articulations of subject positions enabled in a public sphere as well as possibilities for 
embracing, negotiating and resisting them (Uldam, 2010). 
 
Progressive social movements: these are defined as those informal networks oriented 
towards improving social conditions for various social groups and infusing new policies, 
processes and ideas into politics (Castells, 2010). These are essentially inclusive movements 
that seek to articulate the demands of the poor and politically disenfranchised through 
                                                          
37 Hacktivism (a portmanteau of hack and activism) is the use of computers and computer networks to promote political ends, for instance 
free speech, human rights and freedom of assembly.  
39 
 
interactive campaigns that address structural issues (Cheru & Gill, 1997). Six activist 
groupings under consideration constitute progressive social movements.  
 
1.10 Conclusion 
 
This introductory chapter has set the scene of the thesis by outlining the statement of the 
problem as well as research objectives to be answered in this study. Besides looking at the 
contextual background of the research, I have also revisited the academic debate on the 
relationship between social media and political action. This was important in the sense that it 
allowed me to situate my study within the broader academic debate. In terms of outlining the 
statement of the problem, I have demonstrated that existing literature on youth, social media 
and political participation does not focus explicitly on politically engaged youths, ignores the 
reasons why youth use Facebook for political purposes, is silent on the dialogic nature and 
micro-politics of participation in Facebook groups, and has not looked at the extent to which 
Facebook groups can be considered as alternative spaces of political activism. Cognisant of 
this research lacuna, I have discussed the data collection techniques that I use to answer the 
afore-mentioned research questions. I have also briefly looked at the conceptual tools 
(Fraserian model of alternative public sphere and Scott’s metaphor of hidden transcripts) that 
I use to illuminate my research objectives. The next chapter discusses the social context of 
this research. It focuses on the state of political and economic transformations in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
 
2. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided an introductory foundation of this thesis. This chapter outlines 
the contextual background of this study with a special focus on the state of political and 
media transformations in Zimbabwe and South Africa. As articulated in Chapter One, I 
deploy Sparks’s (2009) notion of elite continuity as an analytical framework in order to make 
sense of political and media changes in post-colonial societies. The chapter also discusses the 
position of the youth in relation to the ever-changing political and media systems in the two 
neighbouring countries. This chapter also invokes Dahlgren’s (2009) theorisation of civic 
disengagement as a conceptual resource to explain the state of youth political participation in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. It examines the disengaged and engaged youth paradigms in the 
two neighbouring countries. Thereafter it focuses on the state of the mainstream media as 
well as the telecommunications (internet, mobile and social media) landscape in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. It also discusses the relationship between social media and political 
participation in relation to the state of political and media transformations in the two case 
nations.  
 
2.1 The Zimbabwean Context 
 
Zimbabwe gained its independence from Britain on the 18
th
 of April 1980 after a protracted 
liberation struggle. As part of the negotiated transition, the Lancaster House Constitution was 
signed between Britain and the Patriotic Front, which paved way for the holding of general 
elections. It must be noted that whilst the Lancaster House agreement was a pragmatic 
solution to restore peace (Sibanda, 1991; Preston, 2004), it failed miserably to resolve the 
pertinent issues such as the deracialisation of the economy which subsequently sowed seeds 
for future conflicts on land (the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, FTLRP between 2000 
and 2002). This is because, as De Villiers (2003: 9) observes, various safeguards were built 
into the Constitution to protect the private property rights of the white citizens (this meant 
that land could not be redistributed unless via the willing buyer willing seller clause). Despite 
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the adoption of the legally agreed “willing-seller willing-buyer” policy stipulated in the 
Lancaster House Constitution because of the restricted executive power of the new 
government, it failed to redistribute sufficient land to quell demands from rural social 
movements and landless people (Moyo, 1995; Tshuma, 1997). Consequently, the negotiated 
transition led to partial transformation at the political level and left the colonial capitalist 
economy intact. As some scholars (Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000; Astrow, 1983) observe, 
the negotiated settlement led to the abandonment of key principles of the liberation struggle 
as well as the adoption of an economic system that perpetuated the same injustices that the 
struggle sought to eradicate.  
The new government inherited a relatively sophisticated and diversified economy at 
independence which was however fraught with embedded racial inequalities in terms of 
income and wealth distribution (Sachikonye, 2003; Mandaza, 1986). As part of its nation 
building project, the ZANU-PF government adopted the policy of reconciliation (Zhou & 
Zvoushe, 2012) despite its Marxist rhetoric. Although the policy was noble at face value, 
politically the vision was manipulated by the ruling party to build an atmosphere of political 
compliance towards the ruling elite and to institutionalise ZANU-PF’s political hegemony 
(Moyo, 2013). The new government also Africanised the personnel of key state institutions as 
well as implemented the Growth-With-Equity policy which foregrounded welfarist social 
policies in the allocation and distribution of resources and social benefits (Mandaza, 1986; 
Zhou & Masunungure, 2006). Because of its welfarist social policies, enrolments at all levels 
of education increased through the expansion of education and training infrastructure leading 
Mlambo (1998) to describe the first decade as synonymous with “scheming for the poor”.  
However the massive spending on social services during the first decade coupled with the 
government’s decision to repay the massive foreign debt incurred before independence, and 
extremely unfavourable terms of trade for African countries led to budget deficits and debts 
which put the country in a precarious economic position (Bond & Manyanya, 2003). This 
culminated in the adoption of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
prescribed Economic Structural Adjustments Programmes (ESAP) in 1991 (Mlambo, 1998). 
As will be discussed later, like in many other political transitions, this marketisation of the 
economy was tantamount to “scheming against the poor” (Mlambo, 1998) because it led to 
massive unemployment, social unrest and de-industrialisation.   
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At the political level, despite the political transition that occurred in 1980, authoritarian 
tendencies inherited from the colonial state and the liberation struggle persisted (McCandless, 
2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003) in a new Zimbabwe. This further cements Milton’s (2000) 
observation that “it is almost impossible to eliminate institutional traces inherited from the 
past when transforming institutions that have already served the old regime”. Writing about 
the persistence of authoritarianism in post-colonial Zimbabwe, Ranger (1997) has described 
the situation as a function of “political liberation without democratisation” of traditional 
political institutions and rules of the political game. The country, thus, only experienced the 
transfer of state power from the white minority establishment to the majority black 
government without making any significant changes to the structures and operations of the 
colonial state apart from recruiting new staff for the public service. This gives credence to 
Mamdani’s argument that in most African post-colonial states: “… although the bifurcated 
state created with colonialism was deracialised after independence it was not democratised” 
(1996: 8). 
At independence, the incoming government also inherited the power of the colonial state in 
terms of the monopoly of the use of force and the structures of surveillance and control 
(Moyo, 2013). As Tendi (2016) observes, the Central Intelligence Organisation’s (CIO) 
surveillance reach and more generally the preponderance of the Zimbabwean state are seen as 
institutional legacies of the colonial Rhodesian state, which was strong, highly 
bureaucratised, and centralised. This persistence of continuity rather than complete 
transformation also manifested itself through the retention of repressive colonial laws (like 
the Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act). As Moyo (2013) 
argues, these laws were retained in order to restrain and arrest political competitors, silence 
critics and proscribe democratic space. Some of these laws were used to justify the violent 
decimation of the opposition the Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union (PF-
ZAPU) in the 1980s through a double-edged military operation code-named Gukurahundi
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(wiping off chaff) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). At the end of the massacres, PF-ZAPU and 
ZANU signed the Unity Accord in 1987, which gave birth to a marriage of convenience 
known as ZANU-PF. The ‘united’ ruling party also attempted, but failed, to introduce a 
legislated one-party political system (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). Even though ZANU-PF failed 
in its de-jure one-party state project, “it went ahead to implement a de-facto one-party system 
                                                          
38 Gukurahundi refers to the situation where the government responded to acts of banditry committed by disgruntled former Zimbabwe 
People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) combatants by deploying the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade killing at least 20, 000 mostly 
Ndebele speaking civilians in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces . 
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in the governance sphere through the colonisation of the state, the bureaucracy and a range of 
public institutions” (Saunders, 1999: 20). Noteworthy to highlight that the growth of 
unbridled authoritarian tendencies was also exacerbated by an inherited under-developed 
black civil society (McCandless, 2011; Moyo, 1993), which failed to speak truth to power.  
It was during the second decade of independence (which coincided with the end of apartheid 
in South Africa and the “second wave” of democracy in Africa) that Zimbabwe experienced 
some form of cosmetic political liberalisation with the sprouting of civil society organisations 
working on human rights and governance issues (Win, 2004). Some of these civics filled the 
gap left behind by the retreating frontiers of the state (during the ESAP era) while others 
ensured checks and balance on the ruling elite (Bratton & Masunungure, 2011). As the 
economic dividends of ESAP failed to materialise, popular urban unrest and protests became 
the order of day as the working class and student activists revolted against deteriorating 
standards of living (McCandless, 2011). Like during the first decade, the government reacted 
by promulgating a series of repressive laws aimed at curtailing the operations of civics. 
However, it was the revolt of the war veterans demanding compensation for their role during 
the liberation struggle (Kriger, 2005) that forced the government to act. Fearing internal 
strife, Robert Mugabe used unbudgeted state resources to buy-off the war veterans (Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2011). Whilst the awarding of war gratuities did the trick in capturing the war 
veterans, economically it led to Black Friday (the Zimbabwean dollar was devalued by 74% 
in November 1997). This marked the start of a sustained free-fall of the economy culminating 
into what is known as the “Zimbabwean crises” (see Mlambo & Raftopoulos, 2010). 
 
The year 2000 is often marked as a watershed period in Zimbabwe in that it witnessed a 
number of “critical junctures39” such as the land invasions in the year 2000 (which are largely 
attributable to the failure to deal with the unfinished business of the transition as discussed 
earlier); the rejection of the government’s draft Constitution in 2000 and the formation of the 
Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 which spawned a series of disputed 
elections—that almost pushed the country to the edge of total collapse (Chiumbu & 
Musemwa, 2012; Mlambo & Raftopoulos, 2010; Bond & Manyanya, 2003). These events 
contributed immensely to what has been described as the Zimbabwean crises (from 2000 to 
2008).  
                                                          
39This consist of a single or series of events that combine with pre-existing factors to produce conditions that may not otherwise have 
occurred if it were not for that event(s) (Collier & Collier, 1991: 29).  
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At the core of the Zimbabwean crises was the violent land reform which was undertaken by 
war veterans, rural social movements and the ZANU-PF government following the rejection 
of the parliament-led draft constitution during a referendum (Moyo, 2001; Sadomba, 2008). 
One of the clauses of the rejected constitution allowed the government of the day to 
compulsorily acquire land for resettlement without compensation. Because of the over-
reliance of the economy on commercial agriculture, the violent land seizures led to food 
insecurity, joblessness, and foreign currency shortages and also invited targeted sanctions 
from Britain and her allies (Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012; Alexander & Tendi, 2008). Besides 
dealing with landlessness, the redistribution process was undertaken as a way of punishing 
white commercial farmers who were seen as financiers of the MDC and civics which 
mobilised people to vote against the elite-driven constitution (see Hammar & Raftopoulos, 
2003). The process was also accompanied by the breakdown of rule of law, mass migration 
and capital flight.  
Whilst it is outside the remit of this study to discuss at length the anatomy of the 
Zimbabwean crises, it must be noted that the debate within the “crisis literature” revolves 
around the culpability of Robert Mugabe (Mugabe-centric narratives) (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 
2012), the land issue (Moyo & Yeros, 2007; Mamdani, 2008; Sadomba, 2008) and the crisis 
of governance (Masunungure & Badza, 2010; Sachikonye 2002; Muzondidya, 2010). The 
debate pits “patriotic agrarianists40”against “civic nationalists41”. According to “patriotic 
agrarianists”, the genesis of the crisis stems from the Zimbabwe government’s bold 
rectification of historically rooted injustices in land distribution, whose visible consequence 
was a highly skewed, racialised land ownership and land use pattern (Moyo & Yeros, 2007). 
Instead of ushering in an economic revolution, the land reform programme led to an 
economic crisis because the newly resettled farmers had no expertise and capital to continue 
with commercial agriculture. Thus the agrarian revolution was accompanied by a marked 
decrease in agricultural production. 
Civic nationalists proceed from the premise that Zimbabwe suffers from a governance crisis, 
and therefore, resolving the governance problem also solves the other attendant problems 
(Chikuhwa, 2004; Mlambo & Raftopoulos, 2010). This governance crisis manifests itself 
though quasi-military authoritarian tendencies. Facing arguably, the most serious threat to its 
                                                          
40 These are public intellectuals who leapt to the defence of ZANU-PF and its redistributive economic policies (Helliker, 2010). 
41 This refers to public intellectuals who demote the significance of the agrarian question in Zimbabwe by focusing explicitly on human 
rights violations, and bad governance issues.  
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political security, Chuma (2013) argues that ZANU-PF restructured the state in a way that 
made it less tolerant and open to opposition, more militarised, authoritarian and predatory. 
This school of thought argues that the ruling party instituted a series of legal and extra-legal 
measures (see Chapter One) designed to deal with mounting protest actions and internal 
opposition (Onslow, 2011). The passage of the laws was also aimed at monopolising political 
space and marginalising all recalcitrant political voices.  
After almost a decade-long socio-political and economic crisis, the three major political 
parties in Zimbabwe signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA) brokered by the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) on 15th September 2008 (Raftopoulos, 2010, 
Bratton & Masunungure, 2012). The truce was in response to the June 2008 run-off election 
which was riddled by rampant state-sponsored violence against opposition supporters 
(Alexander & Tendi, 2008). According to the agreement, Robert Mugabe was to remain 
president, Morgan Tsvangirai became the prime minister, and distributed ministries to 
ZANU-PF (14, including defence, state security, and justice), Tsvangirai’s MDC faction (13, 
including finance, health, and constitutional and parliamentary affairs), and Arthur 
Mutambara’s faction (three). The signing of GPA also paved way for the formation of an 
inclusive government in February 2009. As Matlosa & Shale (2013) observe, the political 
sharing experiment in Zimbabwe served the interests of political elites, especially their 
appetite for state power. 
Economically, the GNU is credited for presiding over the return of consumer goods on 
supermarket shelves and halting the economic decline. Through the adoption of the multi-
currency system (like the US dollar, the South African Rand and so forth), the government 
was also able to arrest the hyperinflationary trend (Makochekanwa, 2010). Although it 
brought economic stability, the inclusive government also failed to democratise state 
institutions (such the police, army, judiciary, parastatals and public media) which are seen as 
extensions of ZANU-PF’s hegemonic power. Most state institutions remained intact, both in 
“their social position and in terms of their internal structure” (Sparks, 2006). ZANU-PF also 
continued to hold monopoly of political power under the guise of inclusivity. This was 
evidenced through the unilateral appointment of key government personnel and refusal to 
effect media and security reforms (Mare, 2013).   
Cosmetic reforms like the setting up of statutory bodies dealing with elections, media, human 
rights and corruption as well as the passage of the new constitution undertaken by the GNU 
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did little to open up spaces for citizen participation. ZANU-PF also dragged its feet during 
the constitutional making process although the referendum was eventually held on the 26th of 
March 2013 after four years of political bickering. The “Yes” vote won by a landslide and the 
new charter was signed into law by the president which paved way for the holding of national 
elections on the 31st of July 2013. The elections were resoundingly won by Robert Mugabe 
and his party amidst vote rigging allegations from the MDC-T. It is important to highlight 
that despite the MDC-T’s vote-rigging claims; the party ran a poor election campaign (see 
Zamchiya, 2013) and also has over the years metamorphosed into an elite-driven project. 
Unlike MDC-T, ZANU-PF has been able to “perfect…a system of mutations under different 
circumstances without changing its essential character” (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2011: 323). 
The revolutionary party managed to put its crumbling house in order and ran a slick, well-
funded, united and generally peaceful election campaign, in contrast to the 2008 violent 
campaign (Tendi, 2013; see also Zamchiya, 2013; Raftopolous, 2013; Alexander & McGregor, 
2013; Hodzi, 2014b; Gallagher, 2015; Tendi, 2016 for a nuanced analysis of the 2013 
harmonised elections). Although the elections ended a five year fractious power sharing 
arrangement, it restored the one party dominant system whilst deferring the tackling of deep-
seated issues like youth unemployment.  
2.1.2 The socio-economic position of the youth in Zimbabwe 
 
Like many developing countries, Zimbabwe has a young population with 67% of the whole 
population falling below 35 years of age (ZIMSTAT, 2012). Most of these youth are 
unemployed. Research (PICES, 2011) suggests that 83.5 percent of the unemployed persons 
are aged between 15 to 34 years. While youth unemployment is a global problem (ILO, 
2012), in Zimbabwe the situation has been accentuated by the Zimbabwean crises. 
Acknowledging the crisis at hand, President Robert Mugabe in August 2012 warned that: 
“youth unemployment and under-employment present one of the biggest challenges facing 
the nation, which if not addressed, is a potential threat to national peace and stability”. The 
situation has also been worsened by the mismatch between educational qualifications and the 
skills required by industry and the unpredictable macro-economic policies which are not 
conducive to both local and foreign investment.  
The socio-economic position of the youth in Zimbabwe has been shaped significantly by 
various macro-economic policies adopted by the government. As intimated earlier, massive 
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investment in social services during the first decade of independence led to positive youth 
development (Mashingaidze, 2010). These developmental gains were eroded during ESAP 
decade (1990-1999) following the introduction of cost-recovery fees, liberalisation of trade 
and devaluation of local currency (Mlambo, 1998). Ever since the implementation of ESAP, 
the youth have had to contend with receding opportunities for wage employment, inflation of 
qualifications and growing favouritism which excluded them from available work (Mate, 
2012). The Zimbabwean crises also led to the informalisation of the economy, de-
industrialisation and massive retrenchments of the working class (Jones, 2010; Kamete, 
2010a) with deleterious effects on the youth. As argued by Mate (2012: 2), “the question of 
youth unemployment and poverty is at the core of the Zimbabwean crises”. Some of the 
youth have been absorbed as agents and dealers in the burgeoning informal sector and 
parallel (black) market (Kamete, 2010). Other youth (mostly from southern parts of 
Zimbabwe) have expressed their discontent through “voting with their feet” (migration to 
neighbouring countries) rather than overt protest (Action-Aid Denmark, 2013).  
Although the GNU set up the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment as well as the Zimbabwe Youth Council (ZYC) to deal with socio-economic 
challenges facing the youth, nothing much has come out of these initiatives. Even the launch 
of the Ukondla/Kurera Youth Fund meant to economically empower the youth failed to 
ameliorate the situation because the loans were distributed along partisan basis. The ZANU-
PF minister responsible ensured that the youth fund was used for political expediency. Youth 
empowerment has, thus, remained an empty rhetoric used by the government to pacify young 
people who are seen as restive. Below, I focus on youth and political participation. 
2.1.3 Contextualising Youth and Political Participation 
 
As outlined in Chapter One, political participation is defined here as citizens’ actions aimed 
at influencing some political outcomes (Brady, 1999). Unlike some definitions (Verba & Nie, 
1972; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Huntington & Nelson, 1976) which focus on state-centric and 
physical activities, Brady’s conceptualisation is broad enough to embrace various repertoires 
of civic activities which exist outside of the formal political sphere. Political participation can 
be sub-divided into traditional and alternative modes (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Carpentier, 
2011). Traditional forms of political participation are generally more structured and normally 
“lawful” like voting, party membership, financial support for the political organisations, 
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attending political meetings, contacting elected officials and so forth. Bourne (2010) observes 
that alternative forms of political participation consist of signing of petitions, demonstrations, 
boycotting products, cyber-activism and so forth. It should be noted that the distinction 
between traditional and alternative forms of political participation is rather blurred as the two 
modes converge and complement each other in complex ways. In line with Bauman’s (1999) 
notion of liquid modernity, one can postulate the existence of liquid forms of political 
participation. As Dahlgren (2005) aptly avers, political engagement is now more fluid and 
less dependent on traditional organisations. This is reflected in Beck (1998) and Bauman’s 
(1999) concepts such as life -, sub-and identity-politics, which treat the political as a 
dimension of the social (Mouffe, 2000), rendering the boundaries between politics, cultural 
values and identity processes more fluid.   
 
Dahlgren’s (2009) insightful work on civic [dis]engagement in mature democracies provides 
a useful analytical framework for evaluating youth’s political involvement in Zimbabwe. 
There is a general belief that in youth civic engagement as traditionally defined: that is, 
interacting with established civic and political institutions such as government, political 
parties, social movement organisations and youth training programmes has been on the 
decline (Putnam, 2000; Loader, 2007; Vromen, 2003). Youth are viewed as dancing to the 
beat of a different civic drum than earlier generations, preferring individually-motivated, 
digitally-enabled, cause-based activism to the more top-down, institution-centred, adult-
directed civic styles of yesteryear (Freelon, McIlwain, & Clark, 2016). For instance, 
Dahlgren (2009) identifies three ways in which youth political involvement can manifest 
itself: political indifference, ambivalence and resignation. Youth can express “political 
resignation”, when they feel that the political system excludes them from meaningful 
participation (see Dahlgren, 2009, for a more detailed analysis).  
 
Civic disengagement is viewed as signalling “political ambivalence”, which can be seen as a 
minimum type of involvement that does not result in participation, because of the lack of 
strong motivation to participate, or because of the amount of resources required in order to 
participate (Dahlgren, 2009: 82). Young people can also express “political indifference”, 
which is manifested as an alienation from politics, or a treatment of politics and their 
representations on the media as irrelevant (Dahlgren, 2009: 82). This echoes Hirschman’s 
(1970) notion of “exiting the system”, thus the youth can be seen as physically, mentally and 
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emotionally withdrawing from civic or political participation. For Hirschman (1970), the 
“exit option” supersedes the “voice option” in political contexts where the latter is ineffective 
or impossible. As I will discuss later, two paradigms have emerged focusing on the engaged 
and disengaged youth. Arguing that these two paradigms fail to comprehensively explain 
youthful political participation, Farthing (2010: 182) reminds us that both engagement and 
disengagement are simultaneously occurring as young people navigate an entirely new world. 
 
2.1.4 The disengaged youth paradigm in Zimbabwe 
 
Proponents (Putnam, 2000; Delli-Carpini, 2002; Loader, 2007) of this paradigm argue that 
youth disengagement from traditional forms of political participation signal the dawn of a 
civic crisis. Research (Action-Aid Denmark, 2013) suggests that although half of the young 
people in Zimbabwe were registered to vote in the 2013 general elections, only a paltry 18% 
of the youth (aged between 18-30) turned out for elections during the 2008 general elections 
(ZESN, 2010). This is despite the fact that young people make up 61 percent of the 7.9 
million Zimbabweans who are eligible to vote (ZimStats, 2012). The low number of young 
people who actually voted in 2008 and the under-registration in 2013 has been flagged as a 
sign of waning youth interest in traditional forms of political participation (Hodzi, 2014a). 
This is because electoral politics is often presented as the raison d’tre of political 
participation. However declining levels of electoral participation is not peculiarly a 
Zimbabwean problem; rather, it is a global challenge (Loader, 2007; Delli-Carpini, 2002). 
Even Western democracies are experiencing falling youth voter turnout (Sloam, 2013; 
Vromen, 2011). Putnam (2000) has described the American youth as “lone bowlers”, who are 
politically apathetic and driven more by consumerism than a desire for active citizenship. The 
disengaged youth paradigm view young people’s rejection of traditional political forms (like 
voting and traditional media) as the “fault” of young people. 
Bennett (2008) theorises about the generational shift from “dutiful citizenship” towards “self-
actualising citizenship”. According to Bennett (2008), the “dutiful citizen” focuses on 
election and government as the core of democratic participation, trusts leaders and joins 
formal political organisations, uses traditional media to follow the news and expresses that 
obligation through traditional forms of political participation. In contrast, the “self-actualising 
citizen” has weaker allegiance to government, focuses on lifestyle politics, mistrusts media 
and politicians, joins loose networks for social and political action and uses digital media to 
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engage in alternative forms of political participation (Bennett, 2008). As discussed earlier, 
alternative forms of political expression consist of activities like engaging in voluntary 
organisations, participating in offline and online protests, signing of petitions, contacting 
political decision makers via online platforms and expressing political views in online 
forums. This study sought to evaluate whether youth activists in Zimbabwe are using 
Facebook to engage in some of these alternative forms of political participation.  
Zimbabwean youth’s disengagement from formal politics was also illustrated by a negligible 
number of young people who turned out at various constitutional outreach meetings that were 
meant to capture people’s views in 2011 (Action-Aid Denmark, 2013). Research (Action-Aid 
Denmark, 2013) shows that young people interviewed felt politically marginalised and that 
their voices are hardly heard in the public domain. This low political efficacy amongst young 
Zimbabweans reinforces Dahlgren’s (2009) claim that when citizens feel that the political 
system is excluding them they often react through political resignation. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, although most rural youth were invited to constitutional outreach meetings they 
were not given an opportunity to speak, as ZANU-PF and traditional leaders decided 
beforehand who should speak. This brings to the fore the distinction between invited 
(constitutional outreach meetings) and invented spaces of participation (Cornwall, 2002). 
Invited spaces of participation are social spaces created by the government to induce 
participation by communities. In situations where “invited spaces of participation” fail to 
engender active citizenship; Ballard (2008: 180) claims that they can “serve to demobilise 
rather than mobilise citizens”. This study sought to investigate whether politically active 
youths are opting out of invited spaces of participation in order to make use of invented 
spaces of participation like Facebook in Zimbabwe.   
Literature shows that a significant proportion of young Zimbabweans have lost confidence in 
elections because of the political violence and perpetual electoral fraud committed by ZANU-
PF (Action-Aid Denmark, 2013; Chamunogwa, 2011). As Mushakavanhu (2014) writes, 
young people in Zimbabwe are disengaging from electoral politics because they perceive 
formal political structures as corrupt, ineffective, and unrelated to their everyday lives. 
Respondents in an Action-Aid Denmark (2013) survey also indicated that voting was 
worthless because it doesn’t make a difference in their everyday lives. These findings have 
parallels with studies (Wasserman & Garman, 2014; SANPAD, 2013) conducted amongst 
South African youth. Young South Africans interviewed as part of these studies noted that 
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they are disillusioned with politics and pessimistic about their chances in the post-apartheid 
economy. Like their Zimbabwean counterparts, they described voting as a futile exercise with 
no tangible benefits. This results in a political behaviour that Dahlgren (2009) called political 
indifference.  
Research (Action-Aid Denmark, 2013) also indicates that a large proportion of youth do not 
“feel free” to join any party (45%) or to say what they think (45%). This is attributable to the 
political atmosphere of fear engendered by the ruling elite. Given the gerontocratic and 
patriarchal leadership structures of most political parties and civic organisations, the youth 
have little space to articulate their social and political views. Matthews, Limb & Taylor’s 
(1999) concept of “culture of non-participation” is fitting here to demonstrate how some 
political institutions systematically foreclose the opportunities for the youth to express their 
opinions and preferences. In terms of gender disaggregated data, young women tend to be 
less interested and active in political issues than their male peers (Action-Aid Denmark, 
2013). This is generally reflective of the patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean politics. Young 
Zimbabweans also revealed that they felt powerless towards intimidation and violence while 
almost half (41%) felt under pressure to vote in a particular way (Action-Aid Denmark, 
2013). This could be attributed to state-sponsored intimidation which forces the electorate to 
vote for the ruling party even against their political will. Most of the youth felt under-engaged 
in political activities of representation. In cases where youth participation has occurred, it 
tended to be ad-hoc and tokenistic. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that youth 
participation in Zimbabwean mainstream politics has been inhibited by the absence of 
sufficient space for political participation. In view of the above, I endeavoured to establish 
whether the lack of political space constituted one of the reasons why youth activists use 
Facebook as a political resource in Zimbabwe. 
2.1.5 The engaged youth paradigm 
 
Unlike the previous school of thought, the engaged youth paradigm argues that many citizens 
are politically active although they do so outside the political system (Dahlgren, 2013; Sloam, 
2007). This paradigm puts the fault at the doorstep of political institutions and argues that 
disengagement is a rational response to unresponsive institutions (Farthing, 2010). Even with 
mainstream political parties, Kademaunga (2011) observes that Zimbabwean youth are 
confined to party youth leagues or their equivalents where they are regarded as a “window-
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dressing” constituency. Youth are excluded from decision-making and agenda-setting 
processes of mainstream political parties which promotes ‘institutionalised marginalisation’ 
(Kademaunga, 2011: 157). As Kademaunga (2011) observes, young people have fallen 
victim to the schemes and gamesmanship of their political elders. This view dovetails with 
Hodzi’s (2014a: 48) argument that “the structural dynamics of these political parties deny the 
youth agency and make them conform”. Engaged youth citizenship has manifested itself 
through student activism in Zimbabwe (Zeilig, 2008; Chikwanha, 2010; Hwami & Kapoor, 
2012). Because youth political participation is closely associated with student activism and 
liberation struggle, it is predominantly elitist in nature (mostly urban and middle class youth).  
 
Notwithstanding its elitist nature, scholars (Chamunogwa, 2011; Magure, 2010; 
Mashingaidze, 2010) observe that student activists have been at the forefront of most 
demonstrations against creeping authoritarian tendencies since the late 1980s. As Magure 
(2010) observes, student activism should be viewed as the “seedbed for an emergent civil 
society” from the 1990s going forward. This is because student activists played an 
instrumental role in the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1997 
and the MDC in 1999. They also played a key role in the creation of youth social formations 
(like the Youth Forum Zimbabwe, the Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe, Youth 
Agenda Trust and so forth). However ever since the disputed elections in 2008, Hodzi 
(2014a) observe that participation by the youth in electoral politics has been driven by 
individual interests rather than collective grievances or political identity. Participation by the 
youth in cause-oriented activities has been cited as evidence that they are interested in politics 
broadly defined. The point is that Zimbabwean youths have not “exited the [political] 
system” (Hirschman, 1970) but rather diversified into extra-parliamentarian activities. 
Similar trends have been witnessed in liberal democracies (Micheletti & MacFarland, 2011; 
Curtice & Seyd, 2007) where a decline in conventional participation has been accompanied 
by an increase in unconventional participation. Therefore this study sought to examine 
whether Facebook constituted a venue for unconventional participation for youth activists.  
 
Despite Zimbabwean youths’ low levels of trust in politics and political institutions, most 
interviewees expressed willingness to vote in upcoming elections (Action-Aid Denmark, 
2013). On the issue of participating in protests, 41% of the Action-Aid Denmark (2013) 
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survey respondents reported that they would “raise an issue” if given the chance (47% have 
already done so), while 29% indicated that they would participate in a demonstration (only 
6% have done so). Writing in the British context, Gerodimos (2010) argues that young people 
still care about formal politics and are interested in public affairs, although they have their 
own agendas and reject established political practices (Gerodimos, 2010). Research from 
Britain and Australia (Vromen, 2011; Sloam, 2013) also indicates that young citizens have 
not contracted out of politics, but rather are engaged in alternative forms of participation that 
seem to have more relevance to their everyday lives. For the present study, it was only 
through online observations and interviews with politically active youths that I was able to 
find out how they are deploying Facebook to express their political opinions and engage in 
cyber-activism.  
Young people’s political involvement in Zimbabwe has also manifested itself through 
popular culture (Muwonwa, 2012; Willems, 2010). Urban grooves
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satire and stereotypical voices of the marginalised, has also been identified by some scholars 
(Mate, 2012; Ndlela, 2008; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2009) as constitutive of an 
emerging strand of youth popular politics characterised by ad-hoc activism. This constitutes 
exercising “voice against the system” (Hirschman, 1970). Ndlela (2008) suggests that most 
youth have curved out spaces form themselves on the internet and social media platforms. 
According to Action-Aid Denmark (2013), more than a quarter of the youth interviewed seek 
information on political issues every day, with one out of twenty doing so on the internet. 
Similar trends have been observed in Western democracies where young people are sourcing 
for political information on the internet (Pew Research Centre, 2012; Sloam, 2009). Building 
on existing literature, I explored youth activists’ use of Facebook as a source of political 
information.   
 
In the next section, I assess the state of the mainstream public sphere in Zimbabwe. Such an 
assessment is very important because it allows me to demonstrate that the Habermasian 
theory of public sphere fails to account for the various communicative arenas which the 
marginalised groups often turn to voice out their opinions especially in multi-cultural and 
stratified societies (like Zimbabwe and South Africa). I specifically focus on the state of the 
                                                          
42 This refers to a glocalised version of R ‘n’ B and hip hop music which enabled the urban youth to traverse the public sphere hitherto 
occupied by politicians, scholars, and other opinion shapers (Mate, 2012). 
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various tiers of the mainstream media (public, private and community) before teasing out the 
digital media context in Zimbabwe.  
 
2.1.6 The state of the mainstream media in Zimbabwe 
As far as the Zimbabwean mediated public sphere is concerned, it is noteworthy to 
underscore that at independence in 1980 the country inherited a fairly diversified media 
landscape characterised by a vibrant state-owned media and a blossoming private press 
reflective of the existing economy which was dominated by private white capital (Chuma, 
2008; Rønning & Kupe, 1998). Unlike in South Africa where the mainstream media shifted 
towards a normative ideal of a watchdog media, which worked in the interest of “the public” 
by exposing the shortcomings of the new government (Garman & Malila, 2016), in 
Zimbabwe the mainstream media adopted a “developmental journalism” approach which 
emphasised supporting the ruling elite rather than blowing the whistle for offside situations. 
Besides introducing significant ownership and editorial changes in the public print and 
broadcasting sector, the ZANU-PF government maintained the state monopoly in 
broadcasting as well as the repressive legal infrastructure used by the colonial regime 
(Saunders, 1999; Chuma, 2010; Ndlela, 2008). As Rønning & Kupe (2000) argue, this 
resulted in a dynamic tension between a “democratic” (as reflected in the Lancaster 
Constitution) and an “authoritarian” impetus (in-built inherited restrictive laws), which 
undermined the diversity and pluralism of political opinion in the Zimbabwean mainstream 
public sphere. Because of these “legacies of the past” (Voltmer, 2013: 115) as well as “forces 
of inertia merge[d] with new values and practices adopted in the course of transition often 
leading to hybrid forms of journalism and political communication” (Voltmer & Rawnsley, 
2009: 236). As will be discussed below, the result has been a failure to democratise 
participation in the mediated public sphere by groups or interests other than those sanctioned 
by the powerful elite (see Chapter Three). Public interest was also conflated with national 
interest by the new government.  
Elite continuity and renewal manifested itself in the public broadcasting sector where despite 
the government’s policy of liberalisation in the 1990s, it remained characterised by two 
salient features: firstly, its legal status as a state monopoly, and secondly, its location under 
the Ministry of Information and Publicity which rendered it a political tool in the hands of the 
government of the day (Moyo, 2004). Because of lack of public media transformation, the 
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dominant public sphere has largely remained a prime institutional site for the “manufacturing 
of public consent” (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) by the ruling elite (Tendi, 2011). As 
intimated in chapter one, “the demise of the old regime and, with it, old models of journalism 
does not necessarily bring about a higher degree of professionalism” (Voltmer, 2013: 
201).Like during the colonial era, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) remains 
the only television station 34 years after independence. Although two commercial radio 
stations such as ZiFM (owned by a ZANU-PF member of parliament for Nyanga South and 
deputy minister of media information and broadcasting services, Supa Mandiwanzira) and 
Star FM (owned by Zimpapers which falls under the direct supervision of the Ministry of 
Media, Information and Broadcasting Services) were licensed during the tenure of the GNU 
in 2009, because of their political economy they provide uncritical coverage of government 
activities (Mare, 2013). In March 2015, the government also awarded eight commercial 
community radio stations to individuals and entities affiliated with ZANU-PF. These include 
Munyaradzi Hwengwere, Supa Mandiwanzira, Obert Mpofu and Jonathan Moyo, Zimpapers 
and Kingstons. In short, the cosmetic reforms in the radio sector has witnessed both elite 
continuity in control over the media and a renewal of a media elite with the emergence of a 
new cohort of media owners and operators (mostly aligned to the new political elite) (Sparks, 
2011). 
It was only during the second decade of independence (1990-1999) which is often touted as 
the “golden age” of the Zimbabwean press (Chari, 2009) that the country experienced a 
phenomenal quantitative growth of new private newspapers and magazines. The launch of 
private newspapers (like the Financial Gazette) and magazines (like Moto magazine) 
provided a formidable counter-hegemonic challenge to the ruling government’s hegemony-
construction project (Saunders, 1991; Willems, 2013), although most of them found it 
difficult to survive in a contracting economy. However, it was the launch of the Daily News 
by the Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) at a time when the country was 
experiencing an economic maelstrom, which completely changed the face of the Zimbabwean 
media landscape (Moyo, 2009; Chari, 2009). Practising a normative approach to news 
reporting known as “oppositional journalism” (Chuma, 2010), the paper became a strategic 
conduit for venting popular discontent. 
In a bid to counter “oppositional journalism”, the ZANU-PF government attempted to 
monopolise the public sphere (by shutting down private newspapers) through forcing the 
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state-owned media to practise “patriotic journalism” (Chuma, 2010; IMPI Report, 2014). This 
normative approach to news reporting manifested itself through the narrativisation and 
dissemination of a highly selective discourse Zimbabwean nation which was deliberately 
calculated to interpellate the people of Zimbabwe (Ranger, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & 
Willems, 2010). It was also intended to whip up pan-African sentiment across the continent 
in the fight against Western enemies seeking to overthrow the country’s hard-won 
independence. The state-owned media became a political player in its own right privileging 
the hegemonic discourse of the ruling party over others. This affirms Fraser’s (1990) 
observation that a single public sphere contributes to the filtering of diverse rhetorical and 
stylistic norms. 
Between 2001 and 2005, the ZANU-PF government fearing that oppositional journalism 
would mobilise people into the streets passed a series of legal and extra-legal restrictions  
(see Chapter One) meant to curtail freedom of speech, assembly, political association and 
expression and access to information (Moyo, 2009; Willems, 2013; Atwood, 2009). This was 
accompanied by a serious clamp down on journalists (foreign and local) and activists who 
were blacklisted as anti-ZANU-PF. Newspapers which refused to comply with the provisions 
of AIPPA (including the Daily News) were forced to close down (see Moyo, 2009). The state 
broadcaster, ZBC, was forced to introduce seismic changes in radio and television 
programming. These included the removal of critical foreign news bulletins as well as the 
virtual banning of radio airplay of locally produced songs that were critical of government 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Willems, 2010). In the end, the state-owned media offered a magnified 
image of the ruling elite through churning out “patriotic” media content.  
With the systematic colonisation of the dominant public sphere by the political elite, citizens 
were left with fewer spaces of civic engagement and public debate (Moyo, 2011; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni & Willems, 2010; IMPI Report, 2014). Empirical research (Moyo, 2010; 
Mabweazara, 2012; Mare, 2013) suggests that citizens had to turn to clandestine radio 
stations (SW Radio Africa based in the UK, Studio 7 based in the United States of America 
and Radio Voice of the People based in South Africa) and news websites that served as 
alternative voices on Zimbabwe. These constituted the “diasporic journalism” (Kupe, 2007) 
or “parallel markets of information” (Moyo, 2009), platforms through which most of these 
subaltern or anti-state discourses articulated and exerted themselves. Communicative 
channels (like popular cultural forms such as music and tabloid newspapers) allowed citizens 
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and activists to produce, disseminate news and to counter state propaganda churned out via 
the mainstream public media in Zimbabwe (see Manganga, 2012; Moyo, 2010; Mano, 2011; 
Willems, 2011; Mabweazara & Strelitz, 2009).  
In the next section, I look at the Zimbabwean telecommunications context. This is because in 
order to understand online political activism, it was essential for this study to find out if and 
how Facebook has been integrated into youth activists’ political work. 
2.1.7 The Zimbabwean Telecommunications Context 
 
Zimbabwe is a late comer to the world of internet development, having wasted a number 
years during the crisis decade. Significant progress in the telecommunications sector took 
place during the tenure of the GNU following the setting up of a standalone ministry dealing 
with ICT issues, the dollarisation of the economy, the roll-out of the fibre-optic networks and 
the scrapping of import duty on ICT hardware and software products (Banda, 2010; Chari, 
2014). The dollarisation of the economy led to the elimination of hyper-inflation and 
reduction in exchange rate volatility (Chitambara, 2009), which allowed telecommunication 
companies to recapitalise. Internet diffusion was also facilitated by the mass migration (to 
South Africa, United Kingdom, Australia and other countries) which occurred during the 
crisis period as the new expatriates sought to stay in touch with friends and family (Atwood, 
2009). A combination of these factors paved way for the mushrooming of Internet Access 
Providers (IAPs), Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and internet cafes in urban areas 
(POTRAZ, 2014).  
 
Internet penetration rates have phenomenally grown from a 9.8 percent in March 2008 to 47 
percent in 2014 (POTRAZ, 2014). Mobile internet access has contributed significantly to this 
upsurge, with the most recent survey (POTRAZ, 2014) indicating that 98.9 percent of internet 
users are logging online via mobile phone. This is attributable to the influx of low-cost 
smartphones (like Huawei and ZTE) from China and other Asian markets as well as locally-
produced smartphones like GTel. In spite of the mass adoption of the mobile phone in 
Zimbabwe, the costs of accessing mobile and broadband internet remain extremely high. As 
of July 31
st
 2014, the cheapest ISP was TelOne charging US$25 for 10 gigabyte (GB) for its 
ADSL broadband basic package, US$45 for 25 GB, US$85 for 50 GB and US$ 160 for 
unlimited internet access for their platinum package. All the major mobile service providers 
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have introduced data bundles and zero-rated
43
 services for popular social media platforms 
like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp which has contributed significantly to the upsurge of 
internet connectivity although the practice has also been critiqued for violating norms of net 
neutrality
44
. Competition in both mobile and fixed internet sector have contributed to price 
reductions, although asymmetries in internet access continue to manifest itself along class, 
geographical (mostly an urban phenomenon), gender and racial lines. The current study, 
therefore, examines the ways in which internet cost shapes how respondents in Zimbabwe use 
Facebook to advance their causes. It also investigated the social position of youth who are 
using Facebook for political purposes.  
Although recent statistics (POTRAZ, 2014) show that the country’s SIM card penetration rate 
has reached 106 percent, it is arguable that given the high rate of multiple phone ownership 
and dual SIM phones the actual mobile phone penetration may be lower than this figure. 
Econet Wireless is the largest mobile service provider with 8.5 million subscribers followed 
by Telecel Zimbabwe with an estimated subscriber base of 2.54 million and finally NetOne 
with a total of 2.45 million subscribers (POTRAZ, 2014). In terms of the most popular social 
network site, Facebook tops the rankings with the site being visited by 15% of Zimbabweans 
and 31% of people living in urban areas (ZAMPS, 2013). Disaggregated data on Facebook 
usage in Zimbabwe remains elusive, but it is estimated that the user base is over 1, 500,000 
with more than 70 % accessing the platform through mobile phones (ZAMPS, 2013). Similar 
to other countries, Facebook is mostly used by young people in Zimbabwe although there no 
age-disaggregated statistics (ZAMPS, 2013). Although statistics on Facebook usage are 
insightful, they do not necessarily tell us much about how this platform is used as a space of 
resistance in Zimbabwe. For instance, Ekine (2010: x) reminds us of how misleading 
statistics may be, especially in developing contexts such as Africa where media usage may 
occur in patterns that differ quite radically from those in Western societies. In bridging this 
gap, I investigated how Facebook has been integrated into Zimbabwean youth activists’ 
political work.  
 
Although the country is doggedly known for its restrictive media environment (see Chapter 
Two), internet and mobile phone usage is nominally “free” from government interference 
                                                          
43
Although this practice constitutes a competitive tool for introducing both Internet access and relevant online content to low-income 
communities, by granting free access to some websites but charging for others, it entails preferential treatment of certain sources of content. 
44
The principle that internet service providers should enable access to all content and applications regardless of the source, and without 
favouring or blocking particular products or websites. 
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(Freedom House, 2014). This does not mean communication surveillance
45
 is not taking place 
in Zimbabwe. Media reports suggest that it is occurring secretly based on the leaked emails 
and WhatsApp chats of Elizabeth Macheka, Tendai Biti and Morgan Tsvangirai during the 
tenure of government of national unity. More recent research (Tendi, 2016) suggests that 
communication surveillance has been used in the succession and factional battles which 
rocked ZANU-PF in the run up to the party’s 2014 National Congress. The battles claimed 
the scalp of Vice-President Joice Mujuru and a number of former liberation war stalwarts. As 
Tendi (2016: 20) argues, “‘invisible’ or seemingly‘ non-existent’ high-tech surveillance, 
taking the form of electronic bugs, hidden cameras, phone monitoring technology, voice 
cloning software, and drone cameras were apparently central to Military Intelligence’s (MI) 
surveillance strategies”. The use of these new surveillance technologies highlights the 
enduring potential capacity and ambition of the Zimbabwean intelligence sector to deploy 
these technologies despite wider institutional problems in the context of economic decline 
and poor remuneration for state employees, politicisation, militarisation, and internal 
divisions (Tendi, 2016: 21). With these considerations in mind, this thesis sought to examine 
how the threat of communication surveillance shaped posting behaviour and the use of 
Facebook for political purposes. 
 
The country, however, has set up a Monitoring of Interception of Communications Centre 
(MICC) and passed the Interception of Communications Act (ICA) of 2007, which give 
powers to the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the Commissioner of Police and the 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to spy on citizens’ mobile phones and e-mails. Section 9 of the 
Act also imposes intermediary liability on mobile operators and ISPs compelling them to 
install the hardware and software required for the state to carry out surveillance. Using this 
law POTRAZ banned the use of Blackberry Messenger in Zimbabwe because the service 
uses encrypted messages. This is because the service contravenes one of the ICA 
requirements which reads: “all telecommunication services should have the capability of 
being intercepted.” In September 2013, the government enacted Statutory Instrument (SI 
142/2013) which imposed some content restrictions and SIM card registration requirements 
on mobile phone users. This draconian legislation was however repealed following the 
adverse report by the parliamentary legal portfolio committee in July 2014 and was replaced 
                                                          
45 Communications surveillance encompasses a broad range of activity that implicates the privacy and expressive value inherent in 
communications networks. It includes not only the actual reading of private communications by a another human being, but also the full 
range of monitoring, interception, collection, analysis, use, preservation and retention of, interference with, or access to information that 
includes, reflects, or arises from a person’s communications in the past, present, or future (Human Rights Watch, 2014). 
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by the Statutory Instrument (SI 95/2014). Unlike SI 142/2013 which allowed POTRAZ to 
provide information from its central database to a law enforcement agent if it had received a 
prior written request from an official of the law enforcement agency with the rank of 
Assistant Commissioner of Police, or equivalent rank in any other law enforcement agency, 
the SI 95/2014 requires a prior written request from an official of the law enforcement 
agency.  
 
Although there are no reported cases of internet filtering in Zimbabwe, there is suspicion that 
the government has acquired sophisticated surveillance equipment from China (Freedom 
House, 2013). In 2011, the country made history for making the first “Facebook arrest46” 
following the detention of Vikazi Mavhudzi for a comment he made on the site. Another 
Facebook user informed the police about the comment leading to his subsequent arrest and 
detention (Mokwetsi, 2011). Given this context, I attempted to find out from the respondents 
whether the “chilling-effect” of state communication surveillance limited open public 
discourse on Facebook in Zimbabwe.  
 
2.1.8 Social media and political participation in Zimbabwe 
 
Social media has become an indispensable part of Zimbabwe’s political communication 
landscape (Mare, 2014; Mushakavanhu, 2014; Zhangazha, 2013). Political parties, civic 
organisations, pro-democracy activists and ordinary citizens have utilised social media to 
promote their political causes, to encourage the youth to register, check their names on the 
voters’ roll and eventually go out and vote (Hodzi, 2014a). Others have used these platforms 
to publicise extra-legal activities and human rights abuses, to articulate their political views 
without fear from reprisals from the state and to challenge sterile hegemonic political 
discourse associated with the repressive political order in Zimbabwe (Manganga, 2012; 
Muwonwa, 2012). Politicians from the main political parties have also opened social media 
accounts as avenues for political communication and engagement. Most of these politicians 
have used Facebook specifically to interact with their constituencies, to broadcast information 
to their supporters, to solicit policy suggestions and to engage in political commentary 
(Mushakavanhu, 2014). It is important for this study to find out how and why youth activists 
use Facebook to advance their political objectives.  
                                                          
46 The comment he posted ex-Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s Facebook page read: “I am overwhelmed; I don’t know what to say Mr. 
PM. What happened in Egypt is sending shockwaves to dictators around the world. No weapon but unity of purpose worth emulating, hey.” 
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Social media has also been used by major political parties and activist groupings to mobilise 
young voters during the 16
th
 of March 2013 referendum and 31
st
 of July 2013 harmonised 
elections (Mutsvairo, 2015; Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015; Mujere & Mwatwara, 2015). Like in 
developed countries (see Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; Stromer-Galley, 2014), politicians and 
political parties in Zimbabwe demonstrated that “old habits die hard” because their online 
campaigning tended to replicate traditional one-way, top-down communication flows, 
offering few real opportunities for citizen engagement. Vibrant political debates and 
discussions were hosted on Twitter and Facebook accounts like Baba Jukwa, Amai Jukwa, 
#263chat
47
, Hon.Tendai Biti and Psychology Maziwisa
48
 (see Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015). 
Although the impact of this usage on swaying voting behaviour is hard to quantify, social 
media campaigns were aimed at young voters. An anonymous Facebook user with the 
pseudonym Baba Jukwa became a social media sensation for his frequent posts that exposed 
alleged secrets from within ZANU-PF. As a digital whistle-blower, Baba Jukwa embarked on 
a naming and shaming campaign against corrupt ZANU-PF officials. Online observations and 
interview responses enabled me to explore how politically engaged youth interact with 
Facebook to advance their causes. Next, I discuss the South African context. 
 
2.2 The South African Context 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, South Africa’s democracy has been significantly shaped by the 
negotiated transition. The country’s transition was characterised by two distinct processes: 
political democratisation and economic liberalisation. In terms of political democratisation, 
ever since the dismantling of apartheid in 1994, the country has witnessed strides in terms of 
“democratic consolidation”—a progressive constitution, media freedom, freedom of 
expression, judicial independence and multi-partyism (Heller, 2009). The 1996 Constitution 
guarantees citizens an array of rights including freedom of expression and media freedom, the 
right to free association and to vote for whom they please amongst others. Five successful 
national elections have taken place since 1994, which is ample evidence of a well-functioning 
“consolidated representative democracy” (Heller, 2009). Four presidents (Nelson Mandela, 
Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe and Jacob Zuma) have ruled the country. With the 
                                                          
47 @263chat refers to a Zimbabwean media business offering which was created by Nigel Mugamu in 2012. It focuses on encouraging and 
participating in progressive national conversations. It uses #263chat on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp platforms. 
48 He is the deputy director of information and publicity for ZANU-PF and a Member of Parliament for Highfields West in the National 
Assembly.  
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exception of the National Key Points Act, most apartheid repressive laws were repealed and a 
political climate permitting public scrutiny and protest activity was established (Habib, 
2003). 
A burgeoning body of “transition literature” has emerged focusing on the successes and 
failures of South Africa’s negotiated transition to democracy as well as the continued 
domination of privileged groups via the repositioning of partnerships between elites in the 
post-apartheid era and the continued marginalisation of groups historically disempowered 
through apartheid (see Southall, 2003; Sparks, 2011; Heller, 2009). Writing about the 
remnants of formal apartheid in South Africa, scholars (see Bond, 2000; 2009; Marais, 2008) 
argue that the country experienced “elite transition” characterised by the transformation of 
the political system as well as the retention of the capitalist economic policies. Because of the 
uneasy co-existence between “the incoming political elites and the established economic 
elites” (Southall, 2003), Von Lieres has characterised South Africa as resembling “the 
simultaneous intertwining of democracy and marginalisation” (2005: 23). In 1998 during a 
parliamentary debate on reconciliation and nation-building, the then deputy president Thabo 
Mbeki described South Africa as mirroring the “two nations” in one scenario. These “two 
nations” are divided by extreme wealth inequalities, income differentials and life chances. In 
concurrence, Gwede Mantashe, the African National Congress (ANC) secretary general is on 
record as having described South Africa as “an Irish coffee-society with black at the bottom 
and white on top
49”. The point here is that most black South Africans are living under 
conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational and communication 
infrastructure. 
In terms of economic liberalisation, the ANC government adopted the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) which was superseded by the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Plan (GEAR). Like ESAP implemented in Zimbabwe, GEAR entailed the 
cutting down of government spending and attracting foreign investment through business tax 
cuts and privatisation (Padayachee & Desai, 2013). In an effort to cushion the majority of 
South Africans from the austere effects of GEAR and to address the inequities of the past, the 
ANC government adopted a significant amount of economic and social policies. Some of 
these policies have led to a de-racialisation of the apex of the class structure but left a 
significant chunk of the population (mostly blacks) wallowing in poverty and unemployment 
                                                          
49www.iol.co.za. Independent Online (Independent Newspapers Pty Limited), 10 October 2012. 
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(Padayachee & Desai, 2013). Noteworthy to point out that the role of the social security 
system (social grants) which has assisted over 12 million people with monthly income has 
played an invaluable role in reducing absolute poverty in the country since 2000 (Stats SA, 
2013), although the country continues to top the table of Gini coefficients and intra-
household inequality (Malada, 2013). The ANC government also implemented the Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) (revised and renamed the Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment, B-BBEE) and Affirmative Action programmes during Thabo Mbeki’s tenure, 
although these policies were largely ineffective and elitist in nature (Bond, 2009). Despite 
these strides, Robins (2005) maintains that the socio-economic rights that citizens in a 
democracy are entitled to have failed to materialise for the majority of South Africans. 
Transition literature also demonstrates that the country still faces “critical challenges in 
deepening democracy” (Heller, 2009: 6). In spite of attempts by the ANC government to 
champion a public sphere “bristling with institutions and policies designed to facilitate public 
deliberation” (Hamilton, 2009: 357), South African citizens from subordinate groups still find 
it difficult to engage the state effectively (Heller, 2009). In addition, the contradictory 
processes of citizens’ safeguarded legal statuses and a range of rights including the freedom 
of speech and expression are incongruous with the continued exclusion from economic 
equality and empowerment as well as participation in the public sphere (Von Lieres, 2005), 
alluding to Heller’s (2009) suggestion that these rights and freedoms remain statuses only 
without practice. The subordination of the civil society to political society has made it 
difficult for the former to participate in opinion formation, and indeed, decision making 
(Beall et al., 2005). In this "low intensity democracy” (Southall, 2004), when the political 
society transacts with civil society, it does so in a highly selective and controlled manner 
(Heller, 2009). Selective engagement, on the part of the state, has created a bifurcated civil 
society—an organised one that effectively engages the state and a subaltern one—“almost 
completely neutralised or side-lined” (Heller, 2009: 136; Bond & Desai, 2010). Instead of 
confronting the “fetters of the convened public sphere”, the government has opted for 
techniques of silencing and evasion (Hamilton, 2009: 355). This study sought to find out 
from interviews whether respondents are using Facebook to compensate for their 
marginalisation from traditional spaces of opinion formation.  
Instead of a variety of civic organisations carrying their issues into the public sphere for 
debate and contention, subaltern South Africans are dependent on the party in power which 
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sets the agenda, determines the issues and even decides which “identities enter the political 
domain” (Heller, 2009: 132). This situation was worse during Mbeki’s administration when 
power was centralised in the executive arm of government. Similar to Mugabe’s authoritarian 
tendencies, Thabo Mbeki subjected civics to a wide range of covert and overt forms of 
repression (Duncan, 2012). The government also dismantled “invited spaces of participation” 
in local government thereby resulting in the mushrooming of “invented spaces of 
participation” (Miraftab & Willis, 2005). Invited spaces of participation such as youth 
councils are formal channels through which young people’s issues can be discussed. The 
benefit of these invented spaces of participation is that invaluable knowledge public officials 
“gain about situations and opinions they usually have little contact with” (Garman & Malila, 
2016). In the South African context, these avenues help public officials to develop an 
understanding of what lies behind community protests over the provision of public services 
before dismissing them as “third force” sponsored disturbances. Through in-depth interviews, 
I investigated whether politically engaged youths used Facebook because they lack 
meaningful political voice in invited spaces of participation. 
Since the end of formal apartheid, attempts by the ANC government to improve service 
delivery have not been sufficient to assuage the frustration and anger of poor people 
(Alexander, 2012; Mottiar & Bond, 2012). Alexander (2012) has described South Africa as 
the “protest capital of the world”, although there is no empirical basis for this characterisation 
because no standard measure exists across countries. The country, however, has experienced 
an upsurge in protest action on issues relating to service delivery, corruption, lack of 
accountability and labour issues (including salary demands in the mining sector); with the 
number of what the Ministry of Police refer to as “crowd management” incidents reaching 
record levels in 2010-2011. Crowd management incidences refer to non-protest related 
gatherings like sports events, donkey carnivals and cake sales as well as unrest and peaceful 
demonstrations where the police monitor the gatherings or intervene to make arrests or need 
to use force. These incidences are frequent in South Africa, contributing to an average of 
more than 8000 gatherings per year (South African Police Service, SAPS, 2011).  
Generally referred to as “social delivery protests” by the mainstream media, Wasserman & 
Garman (2014) describe them as “community protests” which are viewed as articulations of a 
more deep-seated disillusionment with the dividends of democracy. As Wasserman & 
Garman (2014) argue, most of these protests are not about service delivery but about crime 
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and not being listened to by elected officials. Although Alexander (2010) characterise these 
protests as constituting part of the broader “rebellion of the poor”, Sinwell (2011: 63) 
disagrees noting that “given the fragmented nature of current protests, there is a danger that 
they are “romantically” understood, and that radical tactics are not necessarily underpinned 
by revolutionary politics”. Other scholars (Bond et al., 2012; Mottiar & Bond, 2012) argue 
that these protests are often geographically and politically isolated from each other, lack an 
ideological orientation and have no common programmes or bridging organisational 
strategies. In response to rising discontent, there are signs of the Zuma government becoming 
increasingly defensive and intolerant of dissent (Duncan, 2012). The murder of Andries 
Tatane (during a community protest in 2011 in Ficksburg) and the Marikana massacre
50
 are 
some of the examples of state-sponsored violence during Zuma’s reign. There are also cases 
where some South African municipalities are denying citizens the right to protest through the 
abuse of the Regulation of Gatherings Act (Duncan, 2014). Through in-depth interviews, I 
sought to investigate whether the closure of political space through militarised policing of 
protests constitute one of the reasons why youth activists deployed Facebook as a venue of 
activism in South Africa.   
2.2.1 The socio-economic situation of youth in South Africa 
 
As intimated earlier, despite the burial of formal apartheid in 1994, its legacy lives on in 
structural inequalities, systemic discrimination and palpable injustice (Padayachee & Desai, 
2013). Because of the segregationist policies of the colonial and apartheid regimes, poverty in 
South Africa has racial, age, gender and spatial dimensions (Padayachee & Desai, 2013). 
Like many other developing countries, the country boasts of a youthful population—of which 
70% of the national population—are below 35 years of age. Research (Stats SA, 2013; 
National Youth Development Agency, 2011) has shown that racialised inequalities are more 
pronounced in the lives of young people. According to Statistics South Africa (2012), the 
country has an official
51
 unemployment rate of 24%, but if discouraged job-seekers are 
factored in, the rate of unofficial unemployment skyrockets to 35.8% (Lings, 2011). Recent 
statistics (Stats SA, 2014) show that the unemployment rate among youth aged 15 to 34 
increased from 32.7% to 36.1% between 2008 and 2014. The problem has been exacerbated 
                                                          
50It refers to the single most lethal use of force by South Africa Police Services (SAPS) against miners at Lonmin Mine (in Rustenburg) 
following a series of wildcat strikes, in which  44 people were killed while 78 others were injured on the 16th of August 2012.  
51 StatsSA’s measurement of unemployment is based on the assumption that “an unemployed person must have taken active steps to look for 
work or to start some form of self-employment” (1998: 1). 
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by the global recession, which saw “almost all of the job losses in 2009/10 being experienced 
by those under the age of 30, and with less than a grade 12 education” (National Planning 
Commission, 2010). While youth unemployment is a global problem (ILO, 2012), in South 
Africa, the challenge is a function of the level of education and work experience of young 
people (National Youth Development Agency, 2011). 
Compared to white South African youth, black youth live in a world of unemployment (with 
50% of black youth unemployed in 2008, compared to 4% of white youth), poverty, high 
population growth rate, HIV and Aids, inadequate schooling and largely unavailable basic 
social amenities (see Malada, 2013; Phaswana, 2009). This complements research by Stats 
SA (2011) which indicates that black African children were much more likely to experience 
hunger than white children (16% compared to 0.3%). In terms of gender disaggregated data, 
female youth in the 15-24 and 25-35 age categories are also more likely to live in lower-
income households than their male counterparts, regardless of their population group or 
province of residence (Stats SA, 2011: 41). On the educational level, a large number of black 
youth in particular drop out of formal schooling and remain unemployed for a number of 
years (Lam et al, 2008).  
Cognisant of the racialised and gendered nature of youth poverty, inequality and 
unemployment, a dark discourse associated with fears of a “demographic time bomb” has 
arisen within policy making corridors (South African Reconciliation Barometer, 2012). This 
overly pessimistic dark discourse frames high levels of youth unemployment as “our single 
greatest risk to social stability in South Africa, likely to rebel if left with no alternative but 
unemployment and poverty” (NPC, 2011: 4; NYDA, 2011: 2). Former general secretary of 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) Zwelinzima Vavi has also described 
the country’s volatile mix of ”unemployment, grinding poverty and deepening inequalities” 
as a “ticking time bomb” (South African Reconciliation Barometer, 2012). Extending this 
view further, the former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan in 2012 warned that the country 
could face political unrest reminiscent of the Arab Spring unless jobs were created and 
inequalities reduced. However, this pessimistic discourse has been strongly refuted by Lefko-
Everrett (2012), who argues that South African youth are much more than ticking bombs and 
demographic dividends that they have been reduced to in mainstream public discourse. 
Post-Apartheid South Africa has developed an integrated and comprehensive legislation and 
policies aimed at protecting and promoting the rights and development prospects of the youth 
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(Stats SA, 2011; Phaswana, 2009). Besides the existence of the national youth policy, the 
country has also put in place formal structures of youth participation such as the National 
Youth Development Agency
52
 (NYDA) tasked with the mandate of initiating, designing, 
coordinating, monitoring, advocating and evaluating all programmes aimed at integrating the 
youth into the economy and society in general. The agency has however been riddled with 
mismanagement problems as well as abuse of public funds whilst the majority of the youth 
are wallowing in poverty (Malada, 2013). It is important to note that because of poverty and 
other structural factors, youth remain on the margins of political and socio-economic 
participation, unable to make meaningful contributions to decisions that affect their lives 
(Garman & Malila, 2016). Even government efforts to implement the Youth Wage Subsidy in 
2012 failed to sail through after fierce opposition to the policy from trade unions, which 
claimed that the subsidy would open the door to cheap labour and jeopardise existing jobs. In 
view of the foregoing arguments, it is arguable that youth marginalisation is a function of the 
fact that young people do not have an organised and an independent voice to articulate their 
concerns to elected officials. Next, I look at youth political participation in South Africa. 
2.2.2 The state of youth and political participation in South Africa 
 
Similar to the Zimbabwean case, I also deploy Dahlgren’s (2009) insights on civic 
[dis]engagement which I synthesise with South African literature (Glenn & Mattes, 2012; 
Mattes & Richmond, 2014; SANPAD, 2013; Wasserman & Garman, 2014) in order to 
explain young people’s political involvement. Like in Zimbabwe, two schools of thought 
have surfaced: the engaged and disengaged youth paradigms. In South Africa, the debate on 
youth civic crisis (associated with post-apartheid South African youth) is often juxtaposed 
with the “golden” era of youth activism (associated with the “young lions” of 1976). Young 
lions refer to South African youths (mostly Africans) of the 1970s and 1980s, who defended 
their rights and helped to bring about the end of apartheid (Boyce, 2012; Seekings, 1996).  
Unlike young lions, the post-apartheid South African youth have been represented as the “lost 
generation” (Seekings, 1996; 2014). The term “lost generation” refers to marginalised and 
unemployed black youth living outside of the social structures and devoid of the values 
deemed essential for “civilised” society (Seekings, 1996). Mattes has coined the term “born 
free generation” to denote South African youth who entered adulthood and “came of age 
                                                          
52 The NYDA was established under the NYDA Act, 2008 (Act 54 of 2008) as a formal structure aimed at enhancing youth participation in 
the economy through targeted and integrated programmes with focus on career, skills, job and entrepreneurship development.  
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politically after 27 April 1994” (2012: 134). Largely viewed as disengaged from societal 
institutions, these youth have been stereotypically presented as either a “problem” or 
“victims” (Phaswana, 2009; Dlamini, 2005). It should be underlined that these stereotypical 
descriptions obscure the contributions that young people make in their communities 
(SANPAD, 2013; Phaswana, 2009; SA Reconciliation Barometer, 2012). I concur with Fakir, 
Bhengu & Larsen (2010) that in South Africa socio-economic differentiation shapes political 
participation while racial cleavages also have an impact on political participation among the 
youth. 
2.2.3 The disengaged youth paradigm in South Africa 
 
As discussed in the Zimbabwean case, debate has also ensued about the state of youth 
participation in civic and political life in South Africa. Three questions have preoccupied 
scholars over the years: What has happened to the youth? How did this happen? Who is 
responsible? In their response to these complex questions, the disengaged youth paradigm 
scholars (Everatt, 2000; Jacobs, 2004; Ngcobo, 2004) trace the decrease in youth political 
participation to the transitional period immediately after 1994. As Everatt (2000) notes, 
between 1996 and 1998, the youth sector was marked by fragmentation and disillusionment. 
This is because, as he puts it, “youth mobilisation was treated as a tap that could be switched 
off and on as the vagaries of the negotiating process demanded” (Everatt, 2000:12). In the 
same breath, Jacobs (2004) suggests that the transformation of parties into professional 
political organisations geared towards elections led to highly constricted deliberation 
processes which replaced inclusive processes. Because of this professionalisation of politics 
(which privileged the educated and economically empowered) in South Africa, the youth 
were side-lined. This resulted in the demobilisation of the youth as their political contribution 
as the foot-soldiers of the struggle, was no longer needed (Everatt, 2000; Marks & McKenzie, 
1998). Reflecting on the patronising attitude of political parties towards young South 
Africans, Pityana (2012) suggests that “born frees” have been silenced and marginalised. Part 
of the main objective of this study is to find out whether politically engaged youths who are 
marginalised from traditional spaces of participation are using Facebook as an alternative 
sphere for political activism.  
The disengaged youth paradigm foregrounds the idea that there are clear signs of declining 
levels of political knowledge and participation in South Africa (Mattes, 2012). In Glenn & 
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Mattes’ (2011) words, this means that the young South Africans display low levels of 
“cognitive engagement” (a combination of political discussion and political interest). 
Research (Mattes & Richmond, 2014; Glenn & Mattes, 2011) conducted thus far indicates 
that the current status of youth political participation is very different from the apartheid 
period. Compared to the “young lions”, the “born frees” are seen as a bunch of entertainment 
mongers who have no interest in politics (Mkhize, 2015). Although Born Frees (31%) 
constitute the second biggest segment of eligible voters in 2008, just behind the Struggle 
Generation
53
 (43%), the level of political and electoral participation among South African 
youth has declined compared to the previous decade (especially among youth between the 
ages of 18 and 25 who account for only 44, 5% of registered voters) (Mattes, 2012). This 
reflects the fact that youths’ “physical engagement” with the South African political system is 
on a downward plunge (Glenn & Mattes, 2011; Mattes & Richmond, 2015). Besides lack of 
interest, most of the South African youth do not see the point of voting (Matshiqi, 2011). Low 
youth turnout at polling stations has been framed as signifying a brewing “crisis of 
democracy” (Malada, 2013). As highlighted earlier, this situation is not restricted to South 
Africa but also affects mature democracies (see Buckingham, 2002; Gustafsson, 2013). 
Extant literature (Booysen, 2015; Fakir et al, 2010; Ndlovu, 2013; Munro, 2015) shows that 
young people are among those least likely to see formal political process as relevant to them 
and they display a low level of political participation. As Fakir et al (2010: 101), observe, 
“those who are relatively privileged because of their access to education and upward social 
mobility might be opting out of political and electoral processes because those processes are 
perceived to be inefficient, passé and ineffective in catering to the needs of such a 
constituency”. This negative view of the political system may engender political resignation 
(Dahlgren, 2009). According to the 2008 study conducted by the South African Social 
Attitudes Survey (SASAS), out of the respondents (16-29 year-olds) who were asked directly 
how interested they are in politics, only 37% of South Africans aged 16 and older indicated 
that they were “very” or “quite” interested in politics (Roberts & Letsoalo, 2009). Survey 
findings by the SA Reconciliation Barometer (2012) also point to declining levels of 
confidence in key societal institutions amongst this age cohort (14-35 years) with only 35.2% 
of white youth reporting confidence in national government, compared with 46.6% of adults. 
Similarly, only 39.2% of coloured youth reported confidence in local government, compared 
                                                          
53 This refers to people who turned 16 between 1976 and 1996 during a time of continued political violence and resistance (Mattes, 2012: 
140) 
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to 50.2% of adults. Black youth and adults are more likely to indicate higher levels of 
confidence across all of the institutions than other groups (SA Reconciliation Barometer, 
2012; Fakir et al, 2010). This echoes Glenn & Mattes’ (2011) observation that young white 
and Indian South Africans display politics of withdrawal. It is clear that socio-economic 
differentiation and racial cleavages in South Africa have an impact on political participation 
among the youth (Roberts & Letsoalo, 2009) 
Recent studies (SANPAD, 2013; Booysen, 2015; Wasserman & Garman, 2014) reveal that 
South African youth are generally uninterested and mistrustful of political institutions (like 
the government, parliament, the police, traditional media and political parties) which are 
constitutive of the dominant public sphere. This profound loss of faith in institutions of the 
state has also been documented in America (Putnam, 2000; Delli-Carpini, 2000). The 
SANPAD (2013) survey also indicated that while levels of political activity and engagement 
are low across all categories of respondents, young Black South Africans show significantly 
higher levels of involvement in political activities than other races. This is because “those 
who are relatively less privileged (or those who are privileged but rely on political 
connections for business and access to goods and services) are still keenly interested in the 
political process as it brings access to goods and services which they would not get were they 
not an intrinsic part of the political process” (Fakir et al,., 2010: 101). In a nutshell, those who 
lean towards the disengaged youth perspective glorify formal politics as the centre of 
democratic participation thereby castigating the personalisation of the political sphere as 
symptomatic of a civic crisis. 
Youth civic apathy has also been associated with declining levels of student activism at 
universities and technikons (Deegan, 2002; Fakir et al., 2010). However this trend changed 
dramatically in 2015 with the sudden resurrection of student movement unionism in South 
Africa as evidenced by the #Rhodesmustfall, #Feesmustfall, #NationalShutDown, 
#Outsourcingmustfall, #Zumamustfall and other related hashtag campaigns. These protests 
took faculty and university leadership by surprise as students demanded a change in the 
curriculum and increased access to affordable education As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016) 
observes, the university in South Africa became a key site of struggle. Kick-started by 
students under the umbrella name, Rhodes Must Fall Movement (RMF), at the University of 
Cape Town, the student protests were later taken forward by a range of movements at other 
local and international universities. The movement was about more than the statue’s removal 
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as protesters called for curriculum reform and transformation of university faculty (a small 
minority of professors at South Africa’s top universities are black) and an end to outsourcing 
(Jacobs & Wasserman, 2015). Services like cleaning, catering and campus security had been 
handed over to private companies, which meant the loss of benefits like tuition discount for 
the children of campus workers. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016) argues that the student struggles 
expanded into broader demands for decolonisation, transformation and Africanisation.  
Social movements like the Black Student Movement at Rhodes University, Occupy 
Stellenbosch
54
 at Stellenbosch University and Rhodes Must Fall Movement at the University 
of Cape Town have been at the forefront for advocating for the purging of all oppressive 
remnants of apartheid, including language policy (which gives preference to Afrikaans at the 
expense of other African languages), removal of all symbols of colonialism and apartheid like 
statues and recognition of black academics in terms of career mobility. These campaigns have 
given rise to militant student activism which shares traits with the Zimbabwean student 
movement unionism of the 1990s and early 2000s which took the ruling elite to task over 
privatisation, commercialisation of tertiary education and authoritarian tendencies within the 
political system of the country (Magure, 2010).  
2.2.4 The engaged youth paradigm in South Africa 
 
This paradigm foregrounds the idea that the decline in formal participation does not indicate a 
rejection of politics per se, but reflects changing forms of participation. It highlights the fact 
that declining levels of actual voting and voter registration among the South African youth 
should not be read as signalling a decrease in political participation (Dlamini, 2005; Fakir et 
al, 2010; Booysen, 2015). As pointed out earlier, this perspective is of the view that young 
South Africans are engaging in alternative forms of political participation like engaging in 
cause-oriented and protest activities (SA Reconciliation Barometer, 2012; Fakir et al, 2010; 
Booysen, 2015). As Malada (2013) aptly avers, active citizenship in a democracy is not just 
about voting every five years but also involves taking responsibility, exercising one’s 
democratic right to hold public representatives accountable and building systems of direct 
democracy, where the need for representative democracy is minimised. While acknowledging 
the depoliticisation effects associated with consumerism among young people, scholars 
                                                          
54 Open Stellenbosch is a collective of university students and staff seeking radical change in a space of deeply entrenched structural racism 
and patriarchy. They are working to purge the oppressive remnants of apartheid that exist at the campus in pursuit of a truly African 
university.  
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(Dlamini, 2005; Mkhize, 2015) are quick to dismiss as naïve the belief that there was ever a 
golden age when every youth was an activist. Scholars (Dlamini, 2005; Resnick & Casale, 
2011) are of the view that the youth are actively involved in “new social movements55” that 
sprouted during the democratisation phase of the transition. As Loader (2007: 10) observes, 
“the rejection of arrogant and self-absorbed professional politics may not be a cynical 
withdrawal, but rather interpreted as the beginnings of a legitimate opposition”.   
Proponents (Sader & Weidman, 2004) of this perspective challenge the validity of 
stereotypical representations of the South African youth as dissatisfied and disaffected. 
Scholars (Booysen, 2015; Roberts & Letsoalo, 2009) posit that it is more of political 
institutions failing to involve the young people and prioritising their interests, which leads to 
their unwillingness to participate. For instance, the youth have argued that the current 
electoral system of proportional representation limited their ability to select representatives 
because the responsibility was left to the parties, of which they were not necessarily members 
(IEC, 2008). Similar studies (Boyce, 2010; Kamper & Badenhorst, 2010) on youth political 
participation suggest that the majority of South African youth do have faith in democracy and 
its social institutions but that they, along with other age groups, are dissatisfied with public 
service. Youth disengagement from formal politics in South Africa has been accompanied by 
high levels of protest actions (Bernstein & Johnston 2007; Resnick & Casale, 2011; Booysen, 
2015). These community protest actions are seen as a way to get the attention of politicians 
(Wasserman & Garman, 2014) as well as making their own politics visible in the public 
domain. According to the SA Reconciliation Barometer (2012), one in five South Africans 
under 35 reported being involved in a violent
56
 protest in 2011. In 2008, one out of five 
respondents indicated that they had taken part in a protest or demonstration, and 6 percent 
said they had used force or violence. The survey also revealed that just under one quarter of 
South Africans indicated that they had been part of a peaceful demonstration (23.7%) or 
strike (24.4%) in the past year, and 17.6% that they had participated in a more violent or 
destructive event: up from 11.6% in 2011 (SA Reconciliation Barometer, 2012). Young black 
unemployed men have also been identified as the main instigators of community protests 
                                                          
55 Unlike the wave of “post-class” movements that sprouted in most Western societies in the mid-1960s focusing on identity politics 
(Castells, 2004), this term in the South African context refers a wide range of post-apartheid social formations dealing with service delivery 
issues. In the Western world, “old” social movements and an overarching objective of claims to the redistribution of material resources, new 
social movements are more concerned with identity and lifestyle issues as something to be built, articulated and invented rather than 
explained in reference to a social structure (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).  
 
56 Alexander (2014) distinguishes between peaceful, disruptive and violent protests. Violent protests involve destroying property, erecting 
barricades and closure of main roads. 
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(Langa & von Holdt, 2012; Langa & Kiguwa, 2013). I investigated whether youth activists in 
South Africa used Facebook to engage in cyber-protests. 
Research in Western democracies (Loader, Vromen & Xenos, 2014; Fyfe, 2009) indicates 
that youth participation is occurring in different places and at different levels of society. In 
the same vein, Juris & Pleyers (2009) show that political participation has changed in form to 
incorporate new forms of civic engagement and citizenship. This change in form has been 
described as an attempt to “refine politics itself” (della Porta, 2005). Young people are 
viewed as preferring to engage in individualised and flexible non-traditional forms of 
political participation (Vromen, 2011; Bennett, 2008; Juris, 2005). These individualised 
forms of participation include traditional modes such as voting, writing letters to MPs, 
donating money and non-traditional modes that are facilitated by new technology, including 
petition signing, boycotts, chat rooms, email chain letters and SMS (Vromen, 2007: 51). In 
this study, I attempted to establish the validity of Vromen’s claim with regards to the South 
African case. 
As in Zimbabwe, South Africa youth are viewed as having opted for alternative forms of 
political participation that can be seen as more effective especially when there are sizeable 
institutional barriers that can discourage them from voting (SA Reconciliation Barometer, 
2012; SANPAD, 2013). Dahlgren (2013) contends that disengagement from formal politics 
should be seen as a political act in the sense that it constitutes a rational response under 
certain circumstances. South African youth, argues Bosch (2013), are not overtly politically 
active in the mainstream sense of participation in political organisations but they are 
engaging in alternative forms of political sub-activism. This corresponds with Bakardjieva’s 
notion of “sub-activism” which is “not about political power in the strict sense, but about 
personal empowerment seen as the power of the subject to be the person that they want to be 
in accordance with [their] reflexively chosen moral and political standards” (2010: 134). 
Noteworthy to highlight that this kind of analysis promotes the fragmentation of political 
agency associated with post-modern theorisation because it obscures the role of coordination 
and organisation in bringing about revolutionary political change. This study explored how 
South African youth activists deployed Facebook to engage in “sub-activism”. Next, I look at 
the South African communications context.  
2.2.5 The state of the mainstream media in South Africa 
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Post-apartheid South African media has enjoyed much more freedom compared to the 
apartheid era, where an intricate set of laws severely curtailed the media’s ability to challenge 
the apartheid state (Wasserman & Garman, 2012; Kaarsholm, 2009). The dawn of democracy 
brought an end to decades of repressive state regulation of the media. The media in South 
Africa underwent a shift in the operations and understanding of what their role in society was 
to become (Garman & Malila, 2016; Wasserman, 2012; Wasserman & De Beer, 2010). It also 
brought into existence a vibrant media sector which has fought hard to protect the country’s 
constitution. South Africa also witnessed the arrival of new radio, television stations and 
tabloid newspapers (Wasserman & Jacobs, 2013; Wasserman, 2010). It was also 
accompanied by the marketisation and liberalisation of the South African public and private 
media sectors (Sparks, 2009; Wasserman, 2010) which saw media conglomerates like 
Naspers (which owns MultiChoice) spreading their tentacles into Africa, Asia and Latin 
America media markets. To date, the mainstream private media in South Africa is dominated 
by four print media oligopolies (Media24 owned largely by Naspers, Independent 
Newspapers, Times Media Ltd and Caxton), one dominant public broadcaster, one 
commercial free-to-air television station, two satellite television firms (DStv MultiChoice 
Africa and TopTV), hundreds of community radio stations and newspapers and dozens of 
magazines (Chiumbu, 2012; Media Diversity and Development Agency (MDDA), 2009). 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, a debate has ensued about the state of media transformation in 
post-apartheid South Africa. Whilst some scholars (Tomaselli & Teer-Tomaselli, 2001; 
Krabill, 2000) have hailed strides made since the dawn of democracy, Berger (2001) has 
weighed in to the debate arguing that the glass has “more liquid it [media] contains now than 
it [media] did before 1994” (Berger, 2001: 161). Other scholars (Boloka & Krabill, 2000; 
Duncan, 2008; Steenveld, 2004) have questioned the depth and significance of media 
diversification and deregulation, arguing that the legacy of colonialism and apartheid on mass 
media development continued to impact on the nature of the mainstream public sphere. As 
Nyamnjoh (2010: 68) observes, despite the media transformation that reached its peak in 
1998, this has not necessarily “made the newspapers more representative of South African 
society”. This means that existing newspapers do not speak to all audiences in a stratified 
society like South Africa.  
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Because of the lack of racial transformation of ownership and the lack of diversity (Kupe, 
2011) within the South African print media sector, Friedman (2011) argues that the 
mainstream media provide a “view from the suburbs” which constitutes a very narrow sliver 
of South African reality. From recent baseline surveys of youth, media and citizenship 
(SANPAD, 2013; Malila, Oelofsen, Garman, & Wasserman, 2013), it appears that the 
mainstream media’s representation of South African reality does not resonate with youth’s 
everyday lives. Most of the youth surveyed did not feel that the mainstream news was 
relevant to them in any way and they felt largely excluded from media coverage. 
Respondents also criticised the mainstream public and private media for affording them little 
opportunity to speak back and participate in debates. In their research in the Eastern Cape in 
South Africa, Garman & Malila (2016) found that many young, black and poor South 
Africans do not recognise themselves or their communities in the stories they see, hear or 
read in the mainstream media. Consequently, the failure of the media to listen to people 
places a barrier between the media they consume and their lived experiences (Garman & 
Malila, 2016). Respondents observed that the news lacked relevance to their lives. This is 
because the media in South Africa are failing to listen to their daily challenges. Research on 
the coverage of education stories in South African newspapers shows that they lack the 
voices of young people (Garman & Malila, 2016). Because of the absence of active listening 
by the media in South Africa, young people have limited spaces where they can speak out 
and receive attention. This further echoes Fraser’s (1990) argument that an elitist public 
sphere tends to exclude certain kinds of identities and subjectivities from being heard.  
 
Highlighting the persistence of inequalities in terms of wealth and power in South Africa, 
Sparks (2011) speaks of “elite continuity57”. The point is that commercial media are still 
governed by the market logic that results in the stratification of audiences according to 
income and social position. For instance, South Africa’s mainstream media (private 
newspapers and television) targets the audience which falls in the LSM
58
 5.5 cutting out the 
majority of the ordinary people with low incomes who fall under lower LSMs (Duncan & 
Glenn, 2010). The increased marketisation and conglomeration of the South African media 
landscape has resulted in the preference of elite audiences among the commercial media 
                                                          
57 This can be observed not only in the power structures inscribed in the existing institutions, but also in the personnel in positions of power, 
thus perpetuating the logic of the old regime (Sparks, 2008).  
58 It is a demographic and market segmentation tool developed by the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF) to measure 
the standard of living of audiences, using criteria such as salary levels, degrees of urbanisation, and ownership of cars and major appliances. 
LSM 10 is the highest, and LSM I the lowest. Most audiences are skewed towards the lower LSMs (Duncan & Glenn, 2010: 297). 
76 
 
(Wasserman & Botma, 2008) as well as the fragmentation of publics (into clusters of elite 
and poor audiences). Through its privileging of elite audiences (although the elite are no 
longer defined strictly in racial terms), the mainstream private media has contributed to the 
systematic exclusion of subaltern, economically-marginalised publics (mostly blacks, 
women, youth and marginalised ethnic groups with low purchasing power) from the 
dominant public sphere (Garman, 2011; Wasserman & Garman, 2012; Hamilton, 2009; 
Duncan, 2011).  
 
Like in other political transitions, the South African government retained its grip in broadcast 
media through the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), leading Rao & 
Wasserman (2015) to argue that it has evolved into an uncritical pro-government agency. 
Similar to ZBC in Zimbabwe, the SABC is frequently criticised for showing pro-government 
bias. The public broadcaster has not escaped the protruding tentacles of commercialisation 
(see, Duncan & Glenn, 2010; Fourie, 2007; Hamilton, 2009). SABC has had to rely on 
advertising revenue to complement state funding and licence fees for its sustainability. 
Consequently, SABC’s leapfrogging into the market approach has resulted in the 
prioritisation of commercial interests at the expense of public service content and nation 
building (Fourie, 2007; Teer-Tomaselli, 1996). This is because, as Fourie (2007) observes, 
commercialisation fosters the programming of light entertainment and thereby advances the 
tabloidisation of the media as well as the undermining of public service media/content.  
 
It is clear from the foregoing that in a country as diverse as South Africa, a single public 
sphere cannot be able to represent the full spectrum of lived experiences and to provide a 
platform for a range of citizens to express their voices (Wasserman & Garman, 2012; Kupe, 
2011). In view of the inaccessible dominant public sphere, Kaarsholm (2009) suggests, that 
majority of the people rely on different systems of networking that make up counter-publics. 
Tabloid newspapers (like the Daily Sun) focusing on the daily lived experiences of the poor 
and working class, which are largely absent from the mainstream commercial press has been 
described as providing alternative public sphere (Wasserman, 2010; Bosch, 2011). By giving 
voice to marginalised groups, tabloids can be understood as being “part of a political 
discourse in African countries where access to the mainstream media or participation in 
political debate remains the preserve of the elite” (Wasserman, 2011: 2-3). Similar claims 
have been made with regards to the community media sector which is supported by 
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government agencies in order to serve marginalised communities despite its under-funding 
which has complicated its efforts to broaden the public sphere (Duncan, 2010; Chiumbu, 
2010). 
 
Some of the marginalised groups who have been shunned by the mainstream public and 
private media are political activists. The private media have generally been disparaged for 
ignoring the activities of social movements or for skewing coverage to focus on ideological 
clashes between political groupings (Jacobs & Johnson, 2007). Because of the advertising-
driven mainstream private media in South Africa, the views of activists are often represented 
in ways more palatable to mainstream discourse and thinking—often cast in a negative light 
(McKinley & Naidoo, 2004; Duncan, 2010; Kariithi & Kareithi, 2007; Chiumbu, 2012; 
Willems, 2010; Dawson, 2012; Wasserman, Chuma & Bosch, 2016). Some activist 
organisations have “consciously begun developing their own independent spaces for the 
production of forms of representation” (McKinley & Naidoo, 2004:2; Dawson, 2012). These 
independent spaces include magazines, websites, film and video distribution networks, 
festivals, conventions and local meeting spaces. As Finlay (2011) observes, some of these 
independent publishing projects fulfil the criteria of active counter-public spheres in that they 
make space for the discussion of marginalised social content. Others find alternative avenues 
for speaking and being heard (including voting, protest, petitions and social media platforms). 
I sought to examine the extent to which Facebook can be considered an alternative avenue for 
speaking and being heard in South Africa. 
2.2.6 The South African Telecommunications Context 
 
The slow growth of the fixed telecommunications sector in South Africa has been attributed 
to the government’s failed policy of managed liberalisation which sought to preserve a 
central role for state-owned operators and state shareholding in private companies (Horwitz, 
2007). Significant growth in the fixed telecommunications sector was witnessed in 2006 
following the licensing of a private fixed-line operator Neotel and in August 2008 when a 
court ruled that value-added network service (VANS) providers could self-provide facilities 
(Duncan, 2011). This liberalisation of the sector was also accompanied by the explosion of 
the mobile market. The roll-out of several undersea cables and the establishment of a state-
owned internet company Broadband InfraCo in 2009 significantly improved the country’s 
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bandwidth capacity (Duncan, 2011). However these initiatives have not resulted in reduced 
prices as initially envisaged.  
According to the Internetworldstats (2014), South Africa’s internet penetration is estimated at 
48.9% as of December 2013. Similar to Zimbabwe, the number of mobile internet 
subscriptions in South Africa contributes significantly to the total penetration rate. It is 
important to note that access is consistent with geographical and economic inequalities in the 
country. Discrepancies in internet access also follow gender lines with 69% males connected 
compared to 31% females (Goldstuck, 2010). Age-disaggregated data shows that most 
internet users fall within the 35-54 age group. In South Africa, one of the major barriers to 
internet use is low English language literacy. Bearing in the mind the afore-mentioned 
connectivity constraints, I sought to find out how discursive interactions and micro-politics of 
participation played out in Facebook groups and fan pages. 
 
Besides Telkom (which provides internet connectivity largely through ADSL) and other 
private fixed-line operators, the country’s major mobile service providers (Vodacom, MTN, 
and Cell-C, Virgin Mobile and 8ta) have entered into the mobile internet market (Duncan, 
2012). These networks also provide wireless 3G broadband access to the internet, although 
their pre-paid data plans are relatively expensive for ordinary users. Research (Research ICT 
Africa, RIA, 2013) indicates that mobile broadband has overtaken fixed broadband in South 
Africa in terms of subscribers, affordability and speed of service. Compared to fixed 
operators, mobile internet data plans are relatively cheaper and faster. This explains why the 
mobile phone constitutes a major entry point for internet usage in South Africa (Research 
ICT Africa, 2012; de Lanerolle, 2012). Pre-paid mobile data packages cost between R15 for 
25 MB and R349 for 5 GB (which translates to 7 cents per MB). Blackberry which offers 
data at a relatively affordable flat rate provides an alternative for South Africans who cannot 
afford post-paid mobile internet packages. Like in Zimbabwe, mobile service providers in 
South Africa have also rolled out zero-rated data bundles for services like WhatsApp, 
Facebook and Twitter which has contributed significantly to the popularisation of these 
platforms. The prices for broadband ADSL internet range between R165 per month for the 
speed of up to 2 Mbps and R795 per month for the internet speed of up to 40Mbps. These 
prices exclude ADSL access and line rental. These high internet prices restrict and limit 
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significant engagement with the tools and resources available through the internet for a 
majority of South Africans.  
South Africa is one of the most “mobile-centric” (Gitau, Marsden & Donner, 2010) 
environments in the world with 64 million mobile phone subscriptions, which amounts to a 
sim card penetration rate of nearly 127 percent. As noted in relation to Zimbabwe, this sim 
card penetration rate includes multiple phone and dual SIM phone owners. A new report 
estimates that South Africa has 20 million smartphone users (KPCB, 2014). Given that most 
South African internet users access it via mobile phones, it is difficult for them to use the 
medium for the purposes of accessing political information because of slow speed and high 
user costs (Walton & Leukes, 2013). In the light of the foregoing, this study examined how 
politically active youth in South Africa utilised Facebook to promote their political 
objectives. More importantly it is only through an ethnographic study of how youth activists 
interact with Facebook in their everyday civic activities that we can understand the role of the 
platform in facilitating online activism.  
Facebook is the most popular social network site in South Africa with an estimated 9,4-
million active users, a significant leap from 6,8-million users in 2013 (World Wide Worx, 
2014). It is often listed by young people as being the most (68.7%) commonly used site 
(SANPAD, 2013) ahead of other platforms like WhatsApp, Twitter, BlackBerry Messenger 
and Mxit. Survey data (SA Reconciliation Barometer, 2012) also show that South African 
urban and white youth exhibit the highest levels of involvement in online political activities. 
This “virtual engagement” (Glenn & Mattes, 2011) with the political system demonstrates a 
shift from more passive forms of viewership and listenership towards more active forms of 
interaction in virtual spaces. I examined the dialogic nature and micro-politics of 
participation on Facebook groups. 
Internet users in South Africa enjoy relative digital media freedom, although there are fears 
of the existence of subtle state and corporate censorship by ISPs (Duncan, 2012). This is 
because under the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002 (ECTA), ISPs 
are compelled to register with the Film and Publications Board, which falls under the 
Department of Home Affairs. The same law compel ISPs to respond to and implement take-
down notices (TDNs) regarding illegal content, like child pornography, material that could be 
defamatory without justification, or copyright violations. The Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA) compel 
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mobile operators to register all their current users or de-activate their service if they fail to 
provide proof of address and proper identification documents. This mandatory SIM card 
registration as well as the requirement for telecommunication service providers to erect 
surveillance equipment suggests that South Africans like their counterparts in Zimbabwe are 
susceptible to communication surveillance (see Mare, 2015; Swart, 2015a; 2015b). 
Furthermore, the operation of the National Communications Centre (NCC) outside the RICA 
framework means that the surveillance power of the state can be abused for political gain 
(Swart, 2015b). Like Zimbabwe, South Africa is not immune to state surveillance since the 
“spy cables” scandal has shown that there are various regulatory loopholes currently being 
exploited by intelligence and security personnel to conduct physical and electronic 
surveillance of citizens (Jordan, 2015; Mare, 2015). In view of both state and corporate 
censorship, this study investigated whether these threats had a “chilling effect” on how youth 
activists used Facebook for political activities in South Africa.  
2.2.7 Social media and political participation in South Africa 
 
Studies (Bosch, 2013; Hyde-Clarke & Steenkamp, 2013; Ndlovu, 2013; Ndlovu & Mbenga, 
2013; Walton & Leukes, 2013; Chuma, 2006; Duncan, 2014) demonstrate that new media 
technologies have been embraced as an avenue for political participation in South Africa. 
Social media platforms are deployed by political parties, civil society organisations, activists 
and ordinary people to engage in individualised forms of activism, to source political news, to 
join interest groups, to participate in discussions of a political nature and to disseminate 
information (Bosch, 2013; Steenkamp & Hyde-Clarke, 2012; Ndlovu & Mbenga, 2013; 
Munro, 2015).  Through qualitative interviews and online observations, I explored how 
politically active youth used Facebook to facilitate political activism.  
South African political representatives are increasingly using the internet and social media to 
post political messages and to communicate with their (connected) constituencies (Ndlovu, 
2013: 109). For instance, the presidency runs an official and verified Twitter page 
“PresidencyZA”; a Facebook page, “The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa”; a 
YouTube channel “PresidencyZA Channel”; and a Flickr photo-account, titled “The 
Presidency of the Republic of South Africa’s Photostream” (Chatora, 2012). Zuma has been 
the subject of countless memes, gifs, remixes, photoshopped pictures and YouTube videos of 
Zuma’s apparent innumeracy (Jacobs & Wasserman, 2015). As Wasserman & Jacobs (2015) 
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observe, former opposition party leader Helen Zille (of the opposition party Democratic 
Alliance (DA)) has become known for tweeting from the hip, and landed her in trouble for 
unguarded remarks. They further note that Zille’s Twitter dominance reflected racial 
disparities (still largely skewed to the small white minority) in internet access and use in 
South Africa. Following the launch of the Economic Freedom Front (EFF), the DA was 
deposed from their Twitter dominance by young MPs like Mbuyiseni Ndlozi and Julius 
Malema and the emergence of #BlackTwitter in South Africa (Jacobs & Wasserman, 2015). 
These platforms provide citizens with information on government initiatives and facilitate 
interaction with the presidency and ministries (Chatora, 2012). The country’s ex-Finance 
minister (Trevor Manuel) and the current minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, have also 
utilised social media platforms to encourage public participation in the budget process. Part 
of the aim of this study was to investigate how South African youth activists deployed 
Facebook to contact elected officials. 
Social media platforms were also extensively utilised by the major political parties during the 
2014 national election (Phakathi, 2014). The sites were used to broadcast their election 
manifestos, to mobilise voters, to report election transgressions, to solicit views from 
potential voters and to post election results in real time (Mutheiwana, 2014). Voters also used 
this platform to circulate election-related photos and selfies
59
. It is important to note that 
South African politicians and political parties continue to use social media as broadcast 
media, not as dialogic media, even those who claim to be appealing to a youth audience 
(Duncan, 2014). This study endeavoured to observe and analyse the dialogic nature of 
participation and micro-politics of participation on Facebook groups.  
 
Besides the creative appropriation of social media platforms for political communication, 
student activists during the protests that rocked South African universities in 2015 also made 
use of these technologies. The students exploited social media and the internet’s full potential 
as an online public sphere. Hashtags like #RhodesMustFall #RhodesSoWhite and 
#TransformWits symbolised the transformation of contemporary political activism in South 
Africa. The hashtags articulated actual events: the hashtag #RhodesMustFall amplified on an 
already existing movement, mostly by black students, at UCT against a colonial era statue of 
Cecil John Rhodes. The hashtags took over relegating the mainstream media to the dustbin of 
                                                          
59It is a self-portrait photograph, typically taken with a hand-held digital camera or camera phone. 
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history (Jacobs & Wasserman, 2015). The mainstream media become increasingly irrelevant 
to what was going on in the streets. Ordinary people also followed the protests online 
(initially mainstream global news channels avoided the protests) as they were unfolding 
(Jacobs & Wasserman, 2015). This indicates that the internet and social media became the 
source of breaking and developing news. At the University of the Western Cape — a 
historically black university in Cape Town, which struggles to command the same 
mainstream media attention as historically white, middle class University of Cape Town 
(UCT) or Stellenbosch University (where students fought over language policy) — students 
called for donations of vital supplies via Facebook (Jacobs & Wasserman, 2015). This study 
therefore sought to find out whether youth activists in South Africa are using Facebook to 
solicit for donations and fundraising.  
2.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have unpacked the state of political, media and telecommunication 
transformations in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This chapter has established that political 
transitions from apartheid to democracy in South Africa and from the colonial state to a post-
colonial state in Zimbabwe   have been “far from uniform” (Sparks, 2009). Zimbabwe and 
South Africa have unfinished business of transitions to deal with regards to war-time and 
apartheid legacies, as illustrated by the “democratisation conflicts” (Voltmer & 
Kraetzschmar, 2015) which have engulfed the two countries since the dawn of independence 
and democracy respectively. In both countries, the youth are generally disengaged from 
conventional forms of political participation such as voting or contacting elected officials, 
although they are also over-represented in the populations of those who engage in protest and 
political violence. Invoking Dahlgren’s (2009) analytical framework, I have argued that the 
two countries are witnessing the simultaneous processes of youth engagement and 
disengagement. In this Chapter, I have also demonstrated that the mainstream private media 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe are the preserve of political and economic elites. Unlike in 
South Africa, I have shown that marginalised groups in Zimbabwe are turning to alternative 
media to deliberate on issues of common concern.Both countries are characterised by 
constricted public spheres (due to political restrictions in Zimbabwe and the political 
economy of access to media in South Africa) which makes it difficult for young people to 
influence public opinion. I have also shown that despite evident signs of youth 
disengagement from formal politics, alternative forms of political participation are sprouting 
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at the margins of the mainstream public sphere. In the next chapter, I develop the conceptual 
framework which guides the analysis of this study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has developed a conceptual frame which I use to analyse the research 
questions of this study. In this chapter, I outline and develop the conceptual framework that I 
use to analyse the research questions of this study. In keeping with Michel Serres’ advice that 
“a single theoretical “pass key” will never suffice to open all doors rather, as he insists, each 
time you want to “unlock” a specific problem, you must forge the specific theoretical key[s] 
which will be adequate to the problem in hand” (Serres, 1995: 50), I draw on the combined 
strengths of Nancy Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-public and James C. Scott’s 
metaphor of hidden transcripts
60
. I begin this chapter by revisiting the basic assumptions of 
the Habermasian public sphere before discussing the criticisms as well as the responses 
levelled against the theory. I proceed to briefly assess the state of the mainstream public and 
private media (the dominant public sphere according to Fraser, 1990) in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa and show the relevance of Fraser’s ideas as a conceptual frame. I then move on to 
discuss the analytic features of Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-publics as well as the 
major criticisms waged against it. I also look at the responses advanced by various scholars in 
an attempt to illustrate the relevance of Fraser’s ideas for this study. I also outline the link 
between the idea of subaltern counter-publics and the metaphor of hidden transcripts.  
 
Scholars (Bentivegna, 2006; Papacharissi, 2010) have observed that any study of the 
relationship between the internet and politics cannot be undertaken without revisiting the 
concept of the public sphere. In the same vein, I concur with scholars (Zhang, 2012; 
Dahlberg, 2011) who argue that in order to understand what is happening in online spaces, 
there is need to take criticisms levelled against the Habermasian public sphere more 
seriously. Consequently, I draw on the Fraser’s ideas which acknowledge the existence of the 
dominant public sphere and a plurality of multiple subaltern counter-publics which are 
sometimes competing, rather than engaging in rational-critical discussion oriented towards a 
consensus. The distinction between the dominant public sphere and subaltern counter-publics 
                                                          
60 It refers to subtle forms of contesting “public transcripts/ dominant discourses” by making use of prescribed roles and language to resist 
the abuse of power—including things like ‘rumour, gossip, disguises, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, folktales, ritual gestures, 
and anonymity’ (Scott, 1985). 
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allows me to consider structural factors associated with the dominant media which militates 
against marginalised groups’ political participation thereby forcing them to create multiple 
publics (like Facebook groups).  
 
This theoretical frame also postulates that stratified societies
61
 are traversed with pervasive 
structural inequalities (along age, class, ethnicity, geography, religion and so forth) which 
provide certain parts of the citizenry with disproportionate power to make themselves heard 
in the mainstream public sphere. The argument here is that publics in multi-cultural and 
stratified societies such as Zimbabwe and South Africa are fragmented, unequal and 
consequently do not have the same access to the unitary public sphere. As discussed in 
Chapter One, given the stratified nature of Zimbabwe and South Africa it makes sense to 
speak of a plurality of communicative arenas and conduits along which political action is 
enacted and ideas are debated. This is because, as Fraser (1990; 1992) observes, marginalised 
groups (including youths) have a political life outside the formal structures of political 
participation. As such, I find Fraser’s ideas of subaltern counter-publics and intra-public 
relations to be relevant conceptual resources for analysing how and why youth activists use 
Facebook to mediate political action, assessing the extent to which Facebook can be 
considered as an alternative public sphere
62
 as well as analysing how discursive interactions 
and micro-politics of participation play out in various Facebook groups. Following Fraser’s 
(1990) postulation, I conceptualise Facebook groups and pages as parallel discursive arenas 
allowing youth activists to invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn permit them 
to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs. 
 
For specific reasons (which will be outlined in section 2.6), I graft the metaphor of hidden 
transcripts (Scott, 1976) onto the Fraser’s ideas. I modify the term to “digital hidden 
transcripts
63” in order to examine the various kinds of political discourses which are 
circulated by youth activists on Facebook in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Hidden transcripts 
refer to secretive discourses which are created by subordinate groups that represent a critique 
of power spoken behind the backs of the dominant groups (including the state) (Scott, 1976). 
The notion of hidden transcripts allows me to pay closer attention to the acts, language and 
                                                          
61It denotes societies whose basic framework generates unequal social groups in structural relations of domination and subordination (Fraser, 
1997: 80). 
62 For the purposes of this study, the term alternative public sphere is used interchangeably with other concepts such as subaltern counter 
publics (Fraser, 1990) and counter public sphere (Squires, 2002). 
63 It refers to digitally-mediated subversive political discourses and popular cultural expressions meant to contest dominant discourses which 
are circulated in virtual spaces. 
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symbols of the hidden narratives acted out “backstage” (like on closed Facebook groups). 
“Backstage” and “frontstage” are concepts associated with the dramaturgical theory advanced 
by Erving Goffman (1959). According to him, when people perceive themselves to be on the 
“frontstage”, that is, on public Facebook pages, they communicate politics in a restrained 
manner, avoiding conflict and comments that implicate larger social structures. In other 
words, people avoid making political expressions that put them at risk of being arrested in 
authoritarian contexts. In contrast, when people perceive themselves to be in private or semi-
public (backstage), they engage in unconstrained political discussions of social issues and 
public affairs (Goffman, 1959). Next I discuss the Habermasian public sphere. 
 
3.1. The Habermasian Public Sphere 
 
The term “public sphere”, largely credited to Jürgen Habermas, though associated with the 
works of several political theorists (like Hannah Arendt, Plato and Aristotle), remains one of 
the most enduring theories dealing with the idea of political communication and how unified 
public opinion becomes political action (Calhoun, 1992). In his seminal book published in 
1962 [1989], German philosopher and Frankfurt School
64
 sociologist, Habermas provides an 
extensive historical and sociological sketch of the rise and decline of the “liberal model of the 
bourgeois public sphere” (1989). This sphere was “bourgeois” because it was populated by 
the wealthy stratum of the middle class. It was “liberal” in the sense that it was made up of 
free citizens who conversed as equals. Grounded in Marxian political theory, Habermas 
theorised about the emergence of a public sphere of informal discussion and debate as part of 
the expanded cultural and political realm afforded by the growth in print culture and literacy 
through books, pamphlets and, especially, the press in 18th century Europe (mostly in 
Britain, France and Germany).  
 
Habermas theorised about the existence of the public sphere as an intermediary system 
between the private sphere (or the realm where people work, exchange goods, and maintain 
their families), and the sphere of public authority (or the realm of the state, the law, and the 
ruling class) (1989: 30). The public sphere is defined “as a body of private persons assembled 
to discuss matters of public concern or common interest” (Habermas, 1989: 7). For 
                                                          
64 The Frankfurt school associated with Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno inaugurated critical communications studies in the 1930s and 
combined political economy of the media, cultural analysis of texts and audience reception studies. Frankfurt School theorists argued that 
the media were controlled by groups who employed them to further their own interests and power (Kellner, 2009). 
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Habermas, the public is related to the notion of the commons that is associated with ideas like 
Gemeinschaft (German), community, the common use of resources like a marketplace or a 
fountain, and communal organisation (1989: 6). Thus the idea of public presupposes that the 
people taking part in discussions are acting as public citizens whose deliberations are of 
relevance to the wider public. The idea of sphere comprised of any and all spaces, physical or 
virtual as well as a mix of formal and informal institutions which existed in a bounded 
Westphalian nation state (Fraser, 2007). The public sphere is not just a sphere of public 
political communication, but also a sphere free from state censorship and from private 
ownership (Habermas, 1991: 36). This sphere should be free from state censorship and 
corporate ownership so that there is open debate and public opinion which is arrived at 
without coercion and manipulation (Fuchs, 2014). In modern societies, this sphere represents 
a theatre in in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk (Fraser, 
1990).  
 
According to Habermas, the political public sphere comprised of the institutional 
communicative spaces, universally accessible, that facilitated the formation of discussion and 
public opinion, via the unfettered flow of relevant information and ideas (1989: 136). In other 
words, this sphere was characterised by universal accessibility in the sense that all citizens 
could voluntarily participate in discussions based on rational-critical debate. It also 
guaranteed free access and freedoms of assembly, association and expression (Fuchs, 2014). 
This meant that interlocutors would set aside such characteristics as differences in birth and 
fortune and speak to one another as if they were social and economic peers. Habermas later 
revised this postulation by acknowledging that the status (command of resources such as 
property and intellectual skills) of the participant was important. Reason was to be the sole 
arbiter of issues in the public sphere which means that discussions were to be based on 
reliable sources of information. The resultant conversation, which Habermas calls “praxis” or 
public opinion which is conversation which leads to the formation of shared opinion was 
supposed to hold officials accountable and to ensure that the actions of the state express the 
will of the citizenry (1991). It was also assumed that politicians would then take democratic 
decisions on the basis of debates in the public sphere.  
 
For the consummation of a public sphere, a set of ingredients were supposed to be present 
and lie in a certain relationship to each other (Habermas, 1991). For instance, the family was 
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expected to engage in literary activities that are centred around reading within the intimate 
space of the home, and not watch TV, listen to the radio or consume magazines—all of which 
provoke “individuated acts of reception” (Habermas, 1991: 161) leading to “impersonal 
indulgence in stimulating relaxation”, rather than the public use of reason (1991: 170). 
Habermas argued that paying for books, the theatre, a concert and a museum (which are 
products of the capitalist system) was the necessary “precondition for rational-critical debate” 
(1991: 164). For him, the resultant conversation was free of the taint of the capitalist system 
(Garman, 2011).  
 
Beginning in earnest in the mid-1800s, Habermas argues that the public sphere was 
transformed from face-to-face public discussions to the transmission of considered public 
opinion of society to the state via forms of legally guaranteed free speech, free press and free 
assembly and eventually through the parliamentary institutions of representative government 
(sees Downey & Fenton, 2003; Calhoun, 1992; Fuchs, 2014). The press became a crucial 
vehicle for critical-rational debate as well as the transmission of shared opinion to the state. 
Habermas attributes a change in public participation to economic, political, and social events 
that shaped society at that time. This transformation of the 18
th
 century public sphere was 
caused by the rise of state capitalism, the growth of commodification and commercialisation 
of culture through the media (especially radio, film, television and magazines). As will be 
outlined later, the “refeudalisation” of the public sphere by the state and the market meant 
that space for participatory communication was severely constricted. The situation was made 
worse by the increasing complexity and rationalisation of societies over the course of the 20
th
 
century (Downey & Fenton, 2003), which led to the loss of the delineation of the strictly 
private domain of family, in which literary activities (tied to books, literary journals, novels 
and letters) were the foundation for the outgrowth of conversations going on in public spaces.  
 
Habermas saw the distinction between rational communication and the public representation 
of private interests as increasingly becoming blurred. Given his belief in the strict boundary 
between the private and public spheres, Habermas bemoaned the blurring of the two spheres 
as contributing to the pollution of public discussions. Connected to the issue of the blurring of 
the private and public spheres, according to Habermas, was also the intrusion of the mass 
media into the intimate space of the family, resulting in individualised media consumption 
(rather than common viewing spaces for citizens) and the loss of literary inspired subjectivity. 
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Habermas also criticised the type and quality of media consumed by private individuals, 
which he felt affected the individual’s sense of self and their place and role in society. 
Although Habermas did not critique mobile and social media which are associated with 
individualised media consumption, his ideas remain valid. For Habermas, new forms of 
media characterised by individuated reception were responsible for inculcating a passive 
culture of consumption, thereby replacing what he termed “serious involvement” and the 
“shared critical activity of public discourse”, a withdrawal from literary and political debate 
and the maintenance of a false sense of contributing to public opinion (1991). As Lunt & 
Livingstone (2013) aptly observe, Habermas pointed to problems of political apathy (linked 
to the rise of consumer society), representative democracy (which distanced the public from 
politics) and the welfare state (which created a softening of class divisions and increasing 
intrusion of public administration into private lives).  
 
Fuchs (2014) urges scholars to read the Habermasian public sphere as a method of immanent 
critique
65
 that critically scrutinises the limits of the media and culture grounded in power 
relations and political economy. This is because Habermas criticises the commercialisation of 
the press by arguing that such kind of “press itself became more manipulable to the extent 
that it became commercialised” (1989: 185). He added that such a “world fashioned by the 
mass media is a public sphere in appearance only” (Habermas, 1991: 171). His reasoning was 
that such as a public sphere of the media would become undemocratic and a privatised realm 
controlled by powerful actors instead of citizens (Fuchs, 2014). Habermas observed that in 
capitalist media, publicity is not generated from below, but from above (Habermas, 1991: 
177). Because of over-commercialisation of the mass media, the public sphere was thus 
transformed from a forum for rational-critical debate into a “platform for advertising” 
(Habermas, 1989: 181). Commercialisation and commodification also transformed the public 
sphere into “a sphere of culture consumption” that is only a “pseudo-public sphere” 
(Habermas, 1991: 162) and a “manipulated public sphere” (in which states and corporations 
use “publicity” in the modern sense to secure for themselves a kind of plebiscitary 
acclamation) (1991: 217). Instead of hosting robust rational-critical discussions on public 
issues, Habermas dismissed modern-day mass media content as “administered conversation” 
(administered by public relations agents, advertisers, ruling elite and news media owners). 
                                                          
65 It compares proclaimed ideals to reality and if it finds out that reality permanently contradicts its own ideals, and then it becomes clear 
that there is a fundamental mismatch and that reality needs to be changed in order to overcome this incongruity (Fuchs, 2014: 63). 
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The point is that rational-critical debate was replaced by the systematic selection and 
representation of information undertaken according to commercial or political interests.  
 
Habermas also accuses the modern public sphere of depoliticising citizens by turning them in 
consumers who are disinterested in issues of the common good and democratic participation. 
For him, “Reporting facts as human-interest stories, mixing information with entertainment 
[tabloidisation of media content], arranging material episodically, and breaking down 
complex relationships into smaller fragments – all of this comes together to form a syndrome 
that works to depoliticise public communication” (Habermas, 1996: 377). Cumulatively, this 
was seen as exacerbating the process of individualisation, leading to a loss of political 
consciousness, especially class consciousness (Villa, 2008). I will respond to this 
Habermasian claim in section 2.4 when I argue that Facebook groups and pages can be 
conceptualised as subaltern counter-publics. Habermas also criticised the modern-day mass 
media for not allowing citizens to talk back: they “deprive people of the opportunity to say 
something and to disagree” (1991: 171). This kind of vertical communication can easily 
result in an “uneven distribution of effective voice” (Couldry, 2010: 145). Depriving people 
of the opportunity to say something and to disagree, the modern-day mass media have 
become vehicles for political propaganda, capitalist hegemony and ideological reproduction 
(Papacharissi, 2009).  
 
Although Habermas initially criticised the mass media, in his later writings, he acknowledges 
the modern-day problem of providing public meeting spaces so that millions of citizens can 
converse, and evokes the normative idea of the value of the news media as the vehicle to deal 
with this problem. He writes: “In a large public body, this kind of communication requires 
specific means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today 
newspapers and magazines, radio and TV are the media of the public sphere” (quoted by 
Eley, 1992: 289). His argument is that the mass media—commercial or not—can play a valid 
public sphere role if they allow access to information to everyone, keep matters of serious 
and general concern and allow for feedback (through SMSs or letters to the editor, comments 
section and so forth). Scholars (Garnham, 1995; Castells, 2008; Örnebring & Jönsson, 2004) 
have adopted this Habermasian public sphere as a normative standard to evaluate the state of 
health of the media landscape. The heuristic standard has also been used to delineate the 
media that fail to do this as non-public sphere vehicles (Garman, 2011). The media meeting 
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the test of public service content (like public broadcasting service television), public interest 
issues and “serious journalism” have been hailed as vehicles of the public sphere (Curran, 
2002) while those which focus on private and personal issues and genres which rely on 
entertainment and personal gratification (like tabloid press, television and radio) have been 
berated for lowering standards of public discussion (Papacharissi, 2004). I will respond to 
this assumption of the existence of a strict demarcation between public and private issues 
when I discuss Fraser’s ideas.  
 
The mass media are widely viewed as the central institution of the contemporary public 
sphere (Garnham, 1995; Castells, 1997; Thompson, 2000). It is important to note that 
although the media is not the place where the public sphere resides, it is not the public sphere 
per se, but it is a vehicle through which such a space can be created. The liberal-pluralist 
perspective of media–state relations views the mass media system as playing an intermediary 
or the fifth estate role between the state and citizens (Willems, 2011; Bignell, 2000; Klein, 
2000). This is because the media act as a discursive space and a conduit through which both 
the “input” and the “output” of the political system are delivered (Dahlgren, 1995: 2). As a 
constitutive element of the civil society, the media is seen as important in carrying 
information that enables citizens to make informed political choices as well as influencing the 
decisions of the state (Castells, 2008; Dahlgren, 1995). In recent years, new media 
technologies (like the internet and social media) have also been classified as the public sphere 
(Castells, 2008; Curran, 2012; Papacharissi, 2010; Goldberg, 2011; Isofidis, 2012). New 
media technologies are believed to have widened the public sphere to global audiences, 
spawning what Papacharissi (2004) refers to as the “virtual public sphere”. Next I look at the 
critique of the Habermasian public sphere.  
 
3.2 Critiques and replies on the Habermasian public sphere 
 
Despite the apparent strengths of the Habermasian public sphere in allowing for the richest, 
best developed conceptualisation available of the social nature and foundations of public life 
(see Calhoun, 1992; Fraser, 1992) as well as an analytic category to measure the extent to 
which the media act as platforms for public participation (Garnham 1992), the theory has 
attracted criticism from various scholars (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013; Rasmussen, 2013; 
Goode & McKee, 2013; Susen, 2011). In this section, I will focus mainly on the feminist, 
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working class, postmodernist
66
 and poststructuralist
67
 critiques of the theory. Building on 
some of these criticisms, I will advance Fraser’s ideas which acknowledge the existence of 
multiple public “sphericules” (Gitlin, 1998).   
 
Scholars (Fraser, 1990; Felski, 1989; Eley, 1992) have advanced a feminist critique against 
the Habermasian notion of public sphere. Within this feminist critique are two broad 
criticisms levelled against Habermas relating to legitimacy and efficacy. The legitimacy 
critique questions the legitimacy of what passes for public opinion in democratic theory and 
in social reality. Far from being a universal and all-inclusive public sphere, Eley (1992) and 
Fraser (1990) argue that such as a space was the preserve of white males, upper classes and 
educated rich men, juxtaposed to the private sphere that was seen as the domain of women. 
Their argument is that the systematic exclusion of women from the public sphere led to the 
creation of a “masculine” and “rational” austere style of public speech and behaviour (Eley, 
1992; Fraser, 1990). As will be demonstrated in Chapter Three, age is another fault line of 
exclusion which tends to marginalise the youth from traditional forms of political 
participation. 
 
In response to Habermas’s assertion that participants must leave behind their particular 
identities when they enter into public debate, Fraser argues that by forcing interlocutors to 
leave behind their own cultural or status backgrounds when debating about public issues 
merely obscures the power operating in the public sphere and makes it harder for 
subordinates to overcome inequalities (1990). Fraser (1992) also points out that it is 
impossible to reach the real deliberation because such bracketing usually works to the 
advantage of dominant groups when deliberation is used to obliterate the voice of the 
subordinated. The problem with bracketing of inequalities in service to the Habermasian lofty 
ideal of common good is that it forces social unequals to deliberate as equals, when in actual 
fact subordinated groups (like the youth) are not given a voice in public discussions. In the 
same vein, Bakhtin does not see participation in public discussion as requiring interlocutors 
to leave behind their social positions, and thus the “anaesthetising” of one’s views and 
language (Gardiner, 2004).  
                                                          
66It provides a critique of representation and the modern (Enlightenment) assumptions of social coherence and notions of causality in favour 
of multiplicity, plurality, fragmentation and indeterminacy. This theory also rejects the totalising macro-perspectives on society in favour of 
micro-theory and micro-politics (Kellner & Best, 2001). 
67 It advances a critique of the validity of structuralism’s method of binary opposition and maintains that meanings and intellectual 
categories are shifting and unstable. It believes that language is an unstable system of referents, thus it is impossible ever to capture 
completely the meaning of action, text or intention (Harrison, 2006).  
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The efficacy critiques point to the public’s inability to communicate its will to institutions, 
and to institutions’ inability to realise the public’s will (Fraser, 2007). As Fraser (1992) 
argues, the Habermasian public sphere fails to register the full range of systemic obstacles 
that deprive discursively generated public opinion of political muscle. Highlighting the 
respective roles of private economic power and entrenched bureaucratic interests, the feminist 
critique served to deepen doubt about the efficacy of public opinion as a political force in 
capitalist societies. The feminist critique also underscores the fact that an egalitarian society 
should be based on a plurality of public arenas in order to be democratic and multicultural 
(Fraser, 1990). More on Fraser’s ideas will be discussed in section 3.3.1.  
 
Advancing a working class critique Negt & Kluge (1993) accuse Habermas’s theory of being 
ahistorical because of its neglect of popular movements that existed in the 17
th
 , 18
th
 and 19
th
 
centuries, like the working-class movement (proletarian public sphere). Scholars (Negt & 
Kluge, 1993; Gitlin, 1998) arguing for a pluralist conception of the public sphere demonstrate 
that there multiple public spheres for different segments of people in stratified and 
multicultural societies. This chimes with the claims by the postmodern critique that the 
Habermasian public sphere was a sphere of the middle classes and dominant elites. This 
means that marginalised others were side-lined from such an exclusive public sphere. The 
Habermasian public sphere fails to explain and account for acts of resistance and voices of 
protest by marginalised groups (Squires, 2002; Verstraeten, 1995). According to the 
postmodern critique, for an egalitarian society to be democratic and multi-cultural, it should 
be based on a plurality of public arenas (Benhabib, 1992; Mouffe, 1999). Struggles against 
marginalisation and oppression are viewed as taking place in multiple public “sphericules” 
(Gitlin, 1998) rather than in a single sphere. I sought to test the applicability of the Fraser’s 
concept of subaltern counter-publics in examining how politically engaged youths use 
Facebook to support their work in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
 
Critiques of the Habermasian public sphere also reveal how such conceptualisation privileges 
a particular style of rational communication that largely favours the elite at the expense of the 
subordinated social groups (Pateman, 1989; Bickford, 2011). As Bickford observes, when 
rational deliberation is the only legitimate mode of participation in political processes and 
public debate, the voices that are heard – and amplified by the [traditional] media – are of 
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those that already have access to “political, communicative, or economic resources” (2011: 
1025).Because of the over-reliance on expert discourses, Fraser (1989: 174) argues that 
rational communication “disregards the views of subordinate groups who are rendered 
passive, positioned as potential recipients of pre-defined services rather than as agents 
involved in interpreting their needs and shaping life conditions”. By viewing interlocutors as 
rational beings, Habermas is also criticised for failing to acknowledge the existence of other 
valid modes of political expression like carnivalesque, emotional, agnosticism and passion 
which are very important for democracy (Dahlgren, 2005; Mouffe, 2005; Papacharissi, 2014). 
As Bakhtin (1984) points out, the public sphere is also characterised by carnival which means 
that laughter, frivolity and the carnivalesque open up an “unofficial” discourses space from 
which the official world may be ridiculed and resistance sustained. Schudson (1997) also 
argues that public discourse is not the main ingredient, or the soul of democracy, for it is 
seldom egalitarian, may be too large and amorphous, is rarely civil, and ultimately offers no 
magical solution to problems of democracy. In addition to the dominant narrative of rational-
critical communication, Bickford (2011) urges researchers to “think differently about what 
democratic political communication in a conflictual and inegalitarian context might require,” 
and that “emotion and partisan thinking” should be considered “morally appropriate elements 
of democratic communication.” This includes emotional expressions such as angry street 
protests and personal outbursts directed to politicians on social media platforms. Recent 
studies (Harlow, 2013; Gerbaudo, 2012).of protest discourses have shown that much of their 
content is personal, informal, emotional or humorous.  
 
Advancing a post-structuralist critique, scholars (Lyotard, 1984; Goode & McKee, 2012; 
Downing, 2000) argue that conflict, dissensus and critical argumentation can be productive 
and, indeed, necessary means for advancing democratic culture and debate. As Mouffe (2000: 
149) further argues, “the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from 
the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus possible, but to mobilise those 
passions towards democratic designs.” She adds that the Habermasian public sphere based on 
“consensus” is bound to fail, because “consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional 
hegemony, as a stabilisation of power, and … always entails some form of exclusion” (1999: 
756). Instead of a consensual space, other scholars (Foucault, 1995; Mouffe, 2005) view the 
public sphere as a site of political struggle and conflict.  
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Critiques of the Habermasian public sphere also point to the pervasiveness of power 
asymmetries in public discussions (Susen, 2011). As Foucault (1995) argues, power 
permeates all human relations and thus rejects the possibility of a power-free zone of 
communication. Habermas’s theory is criticised for failing to acknowledge the existence of 
inequalities in terms of access to communication channels. There are asymmetries in terms of 
ownership of media technologies (like mobile phones, computers, television and so forth). 
Besides, there is an uneven distribution of communicative competence (in terms of digital 
literacy, skills and knowledge) in modern societies. As Couldry (2010) notes, there are also 
inequalities in terms of “effective voice68” which works against marginalised groups. This is 
more pronounced in stratified societies (capitalist, patriarchal and gerontocratic) where power 
(economic, political, symbolic, cultural and social) is unequally distributed. As Susen (2011) 
suggests, the symbolic resources of critique are always dependent on the social resources of 
power.  
 
In his most recent works (1996; 1999; 2001), Habermas has revised his analysis of public 
sphere to fit the ever-changing conditions of modern societies. He now embraces the 
contested nature of public life, the importance of recognition of diverse identities and, 
therefore, the legitimacy of multiple forms and sites of deliberation (alternative public 
spheres) as well as their capacity for challenging domination. As he writes, these multiple 
sites of deliberation are “a network for communicating information and points of view which 
branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, regional, local and sub-
cultural arenas” (Habermas, 2001: 373). Despite this climb-down, Habermas still maintains 
that the public sphere is anchored in rational critical debate (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013).  
The Habermasian notion of the public sphere has also met criticism from African studies 
scholars (Santos, 2012; Ndlela, 2007; Willems, 2012). Highlighting  the epistemological and 
theoretical roots of the idea of public sphere in Western liberal thinking, these scholars 
Santos, 2012; Willems, 2012) have discussed and debated the extent to which Habermas’s 
concepts are useful in explaining and interrogating developments in Africa (Willems, 2012). 
Their argument is that its theoretical and cultural presuppositions are entirely European and 
they are not necessarily universally valid, even when they purport to be general 
theoriesSantos, 2012). For Ndlela (2007), whilst there are possibilities for researchers to use 
                                                          
68 This refers to the conditions under which people’s practices of voice are sustained and the outcomes of those practices validated (Couldry, 
2010: 113). 
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the public sphere theory to understand communication practices in Africa, there are also 
serious impediments which should be taken on board. They propose that researchers should 
look at “actually existing” (Fraser, 1992) public spheres instead of transposing a prescriptive 
concept of public sphere onto Africa to assess its match with this concept.   
Advancing what he calls a meta-theoretical critique of the concept of the public sphere, 
Santos (2012: 43) argues that there is need for epistemological diversity. He also asks 
pertinent questions like: Does non-Western societies need the concept of public sphere? How 
much political reality is left out or made invisible by the concept of public sphere? Can the 
limitations of Eurocentric origin be superseded by theoretical and political reconstruction? At 
what cost? Assuming that the public sphere has become a hegemonic concept, is it possible to 
use it in a counter-hegemonic way? Santos (2012: 47) suggests that to account for 
epistemological diversity involves the recognition that the theories produced in Western 
contexts are best equipped to account for the social, political and cultural realities of Western 
societies and that in order adequately to account for the realities of non-Western contexts 
other theories must be developed and anchored in other epistemologies – the epistemologies 
of the South (Santos, 2012: 47). This entails de-Westernising mainstream theory through the 
strategic deployment of theoretical constructs from non-Western societies to disrupt the 
dominant epistemic canon.   
Writing prior to the popularisation of the public sphere theory in Africa, Ekeh (1975), in his 
seminal article titled: Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: a theoretical statement, 
acknowledged the bifurcated nature of publics in Africa. He points out that the Western 
experience of a unified public sphere, which the state and civil society both occupy, is not 
reflective of African social spaces (Ekeh, 1975: 111). For Ekeh:  
[I]f we are to capture the spirit of African politics we must seek what is unique in 
them. I am persuaded that the colonial experience provides that uniqueness. Our post-
colonial present has been fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past that 
has defined for us the spheres of morality that have come to dominate our politics. 
Like other alternative public sphere theorists from Western contexts, Ekeh identifies the 
existence two publics in Africa: the primordial and the civic public. He notes that:  
At one level is the private realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments 
influence and determine the individual’s public behaviour… On the other hand, there 
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is a public realm which is historically associated with the colonial administration and 
which has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa” (Ekeh, 
1975: 111).  
The primordial public “occupies vast tracts of the political spaces that are relevant for the 
welfare of the individual, sometimes limiting and breaching the state’s efforts to extend its 
claims beyond the civic public sphere” (Ekeh, 1975: 107). In Africa, ethnicity constitutes an 
important shared identity for the construction of primordial publics. Ekeh (1975) further 
argues that most people find political sense in the primordial public with its own architecture 
of meaning and political etiquette. The civic public was dominated by the colonial 
administration (later inherited by post-colonial governments) and signifies traditional forms 
of political participation.  
Extending Ekeh’s (1975) line of thought, Mbembe (2001) also theorises on the existence of 
two publics: alternative popular publics and official publics. The ruled often resort to carving 
out a space for themselves, therefore constituting their own alternative popular publics next to 
official publics. For Mbembe, the alternative popular public ‘occupies vast tracts of the 
political spaces that are relevant for the welfare of the individual, sometimes limiting and 
breaching the state’s efforts to extend its claims beyond the official public’ (1975:107). The 
point is that the political and social ingenuity of the postcolonial subject lies in his/her ability 
to manoeuvre through the conceptual spaces to achieve a counter-meaning opposed to the 
“official” construction of sense and order. Having outlined the critique of Habermas’s theory 
as well as spelling out my preference for Fraserian ideas, below I look at alternative public 
sphere as a theoretical construct.  
3.3. An outline of the theory of alternative public sphere 
 
This section begins by outlining the basic assumptions of the theory of the alternative public 
sphere before zeroing in on Fraser’s ideas. As intimated earlier in section 2.2, alternative 
public sphere theoreticians start from the basic premise that there is a multiplicity of parallel, 
complementary, diverse, contending, sometimes acrimonious public spheres (Asen, 2000; 
Fraser, 1990; Keane, 2000; Gitlin, 1998). This shift towards multiplicity and fragmentation of 
the public sphere has been spurred by the recognition of social complexity and socio-cultural 
diversity as well as the realisation that the notion of a monolithic sphere has limited 
applicability in explaining political communication practices which occur in stratified and 
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diverse societies (Fraser, 1990; Asen, 2000). The reasoning here is that stratified societies 
produce huge inequalities which affect the autonomy of publics as well as the accessibility of 
public spheres. It is believed that the Habermasian public sphere has been shaken 
substantially by societal changes (occasioned by globalisation and technological 
developments) opening up increasing possibilities in the process for counter-public spheres to 
flourish (Keane, 2000; Rasmussen, 2013; Fenton & Downey, 2003).  
 
It is within this context that the term “counter-public” arose as a critical term “to signify that 
some publics develop not simply as one among a constellation of discursive entities, but as 
explicitly articulated alternatives to wider publics that exclude the interests of potential 
participants” (Asen, 2000: 425). Theoreticians within this school of thought are also 
concerned with how different public spheres, composed of members of marginalised groups 
(such as the youth), respond to various political, social, cultural and economic conditions and 
how marginalised groups react to their systematic side-lining from the dominant public 
sphere (Squires, 2002; Mansbridge, 1996). (More on the socio-political and economic context 
of Zimbabwe and South Africa will be discussed in Chapter Three). 
 
It is important to explain why I use the term alternative
69
 public sphere interchangeably with 
other concepts such as subaltern counter-publics (Fraser, 1990) and counter public sphere 
(Felski, 1989; Squires, 2002) in this study. The three concepts are concerned with how 
subordinated groups try to challenge power relations to make marginalised and critical voices 
heard.  Discourse here is defined as socially contingent systems of meaning, which form the 
identities of subjects and objects (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). The term counter in counter-
discourses indicates that these discourses are defined against or in opposition to a (more) 
dominant discourse. This means that counter-discourses emerge in response to exclusions 
within dominant discourses (Dahlberg, 2007). As far alternative public sphere is concerned, 
Örnebring & Jönsson (2004: 286) point out that the term “alternative” suggests that the 
discourse itself takes place somewhere else other than in the mainstream mediated public 
sphere; with other participants, other issues are addressed and debates take a different form 
than in the dominant public sphere. Although there are many scholars (see Felski, 1989; 
Gitlin, 1998; Squires, 2002; Asen, 2000; Negt & Kluge, 1972; Warner, 2002; Mouffe, 1999; 
                                                          
69 It refers to the counter-discourse which challenges the existing social order and aids the pursuit of social change (Yim Jeong-su, 2003: 
37). 
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Ekeh, 1975; Mbembe, 2001) on the issue of alternative public sphere, Fraser’s ideas 
constitute some of the most developed, and relevant for this study.  
 
3.3.1 Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-publics 
 
In section 2.2, I discussed briefly Fraser’s ideas. Now I wish to take this further by focusing 
on the suitability of Fraser’s ideas to my study. In her ground-breaking article published in 
1990, Fraser outlines the basic analytical features of her revisionist historiography of the 
public sphere. She points out that instead of a bourgeois conception of the public sphere, 
what is needed is a post-bourgeois conception that recognises the existence of multiple 
publics. Building on and reacting to Habermas’s theorisation, Fraser argues that instead of a 
monolithic public sphere, there is the dominant public sphere (official publics according to 
Mbembe, 2001) and multiple subaltern counter-publics (alternative popular publics in 
Mbembe’s diction) in both democratic and undemocratic societies. According to Fraser, the 
former is a constituency of the powerful elite although it strives for universalism by appealing 
to the general public (this analytical feature allowed me to assess the state of the mainstream 
media in South Africa and Zimbabwe in section 2.2.7 and 2.3.7). The mainstream media 
which ideally provide information, debate and opinion for all members of society constitute 
this sphere. The latter is made up of multiple publics populated by historically and culturally 
marginalised groups that have been excluded from the dominant public sphere by legal or 
extra-legal means (Fraser, 1992) (this conceptual resource is important because it allows me 
to examine how, why and when youth activists use Facebook to mediate political action). In 
this study, the distinction provided by Fraser (1992) allows me to consider not only the 
dominant public sphere of the political and economic elites, but also the subaltern counter-
publics of the marginalised others. Rather than being parallel, Fraser sees subaltern counter-
publics as standing apart from, feeding off and into the bourgeoisie public sphere. I assessed 
the extent to which Facebook pages be considered as an alternative space for political 
activism.   
 
Similar to Fraser’s subaltern counter-publics, Rasmussen (2013; 2014) identifies two 
dimensions of the contemporary public sphere: the representational public sphere and the 
presentational public sphere. The presentational public sphere (also the dominant public 
sphere is Fraser’s terminology) refers to more traditional media platforms and their attendant 
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characteristics as well as a plethora of heterogeneous themes, styles, participants and voices 
that it promotes. Unlike in the presentation public sphere where deliberations are dominated 
by a few (mostly male and middle class), the representational public sphere denotes the use of 
social media platforms, internet and other alternative platforms of communication. This is 
generally viewed as promoting “inclusive” and “democratic” forms of deliberation by cyber-
optimists as articulated in Chapter One. As Rasmussen (2013: 98) observes, the 
representation public sphere is characterised by a lower threshold for participation in public 
communication platforms, which enables more people to take part.  
 
Subaltern counter-publics is defined as “parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn permit them 
to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (Fraser, 
1992: 123). Her argument is that subaltern counter-publics circulate counter-discourses in 
order to transgress norms of deliberation, generate debate and remake shared meaning. 
Besides simply allowing marginalised groups to exercise voice, parallel discursive arenas 
also enable them to critique the dominant discourses peddled by the dominant publics. I 
examined how youth activists use Facebook to mediate political action in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa.  
 
In contrast to Habermas, Fraser posits that marginalised groups need: “venues in which to 
undertake communicative processes that were not, as it were, under the supervision of 
dominant groups [or else they would be] less able than otherwise to articulate and defend 
their interests in the comprehensive public sphere. They would be less able than otherwise to 
expose modes of deliberation that mask domination by absorbing the less powerful into a 
false “we” that reflects the more powerful” (1997: 81). The point is that, in a unified public 
sphere, members of subordinated groups are less likely to find the right voice or words to 
express their thoughts and hence are unable to articulate and defend their interests. I 
investigated from online participant observation and interview responses how youth activists 
used Facebook to exercise voice and to critique the dominant discourses. I assessed the 
reasons why youth activists used Facebook to mediate political action in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. 
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Building on Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-publics, I coin the term ”transnational 
subaltern counter-publics” in order to stress how Facebook groups and pages as discursive 
and conversational spaces overflow the bounds of the nation-state. Transnational subaltern 
counter-publics refers to a mediated interactive and conversational space where nationally 
and globally geographically dispersed participants can gather and share information, debate 
opinions and tease out their political interests and social needs without the direct supervision 
of the ruling elite. As semi-public spaces, Facebook groups and fan pages allow networks of 
friends and connections to communicate and deliberate on issues of common concern from 
their home environments and over great distances. I examined how youth activists used 
Facebook to facilitate political action in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
 
As Fraser (1990) argues, the need for subaltern counter-publics arises from the ways in which 
social inequalities in stratified societies can “infect” deliberation even in the absence of 
formal exclusions. Her view is that marginalised groups (including youth activists) are forced 
to create their own (human agency) spaces of deliberation in reaction to the exclusionary 
politics of the dominant public sphere and the state. Through in-depth interviews with youth 
activists, I investigated the reasons why they used Facebook to facilitate political activism. I 
also examined how youth activists (who are often denied public voice or entrance into public 
spaces by dominant groups and the state) deployed Facebook to advance their political 
objectives in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
 
Fraser conceives subaltern counter-publics as having a dual character. On the one hand: “they 
function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as 
bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics. It is 
precisely in the dialectic between these two functions that their emancipatory potential 
resides” (Fraser, 1990: 82). These discursive spaces are seen as respecting interlocutors’ 
identities (politics of recognition) as well as offering avenues from which agitation and 
resistance against institutional and political hegemony is promoted and maintained (politics 
of redistribution). I will seek to examine how youth activists use Facebook to mobilise 
support for their work in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Through a combination of online 
participant observation and in-depth interviews, I explored whether youth activists used 
Facebook groups as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment as well as bases and training 
grounds for political activism. 
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According to Fraser (1990), subaltern counter-publics help expand the discursive space as 
well as elaborating alternative styles of political behaviour and alternative norms of public 
speech. This kind of sphere allows groups with diverse values and rhetorics to participate. 
Fraser’s notion of subaltern counter-publics is akin to Cornwall’s idea of invented spaces of 
participation which refers to “those arenas in which people join together, often with others 
like them, in collective actions, self-help initiatives, or everyday sociality” (Cornwall, 
2004:76). Thus it can be argued that activists have occupied Facebook and turned the site into 
a platform for critical discussion and political mobilisation against the power-bloc. Building 
on Holston’s (2008) notion of “insurgent citizenship”, Facebook groups and pages can also 
be conceptualised as an alternative spaces of participation through which youth activists 
engage their needs in terms of citizen rights. 
 
Unlike Habermas who banishes private interests from the public sphere, Fraser believes that 
there are no natural boundaries between private and public concerns. According to Fraser, 
what counts as a matter of common concern is arrived at through deliberation. Thus no topics 
should be ruled off limits in advance of discursive contestation. Fraser’s argument chimes 
with Buckingham’s criticism of the “rigid distinction between the public and private” in 
which there is no place “for the “irrational” side of language, for rhetoric or narrative, nor 
indeed for aesthetics, for ceremony, or ritual, indeed, for precisely those elements which 
characterise popular cultural forms” (1997: 354-355). Through online participant observation 
and qualitative content analysis, I documented and analysed the political discourses which are 
circulated by youth activists on Facebook groups and pages. 
 
According to Fraser (1992), subaltern counter-publics are not only arenas for the formation of 
discursive opinion but also arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities. She 
sub-divides subaltern counter-publics into two categories: the strong publics and the weak 
publics. Strong publics (like parliaments) are spaces of institutionalised deliberation whose 
discourse encompasses both opinion formation and decision-making while weak publics (like 
associational groups) are spaces whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion 
formation and does not also encompass decision-making (Fraser, 1992: 125). I will also 
assess whether discursive interactions on Facebook are characterised by strong or weak 
publics in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
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Fraser also argues that the public sphere has always been constructed through exclusion and 
conflicts. Her point is that subaltern counter-publics are characterised by intra-sphere conflict 
and contestation. The argument is that these spheres are not spaces of zero degree culture, 
which are hospitable to any possible form of cultural expression. Instead these spheres are 
culturally conditioned discursive entities with embedded internal dynamics which filter and 
alter the utterances they frame as well as accommodating some expressive modes and not 
others. Fraser distinguishes “intra” from “inter-public relations” within subaltern counter-
publics. Intra-public relations denote the character and quality of discursive interactions 
within a given public sphere while inter-public relations refers to the character of interactions 
among different publics (Fraser, 1990: 65-66). Drawing on Fraser’s ideas, this study 
examined how discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation played out on 
Facebook groups and fan pages. In the next section, I discuss the critique and reactions to the 
Fraser’s ideas.  
 
3.3.2 Critiques and reactions to the Fraser’s ideas 
 
In this section, I discuss four main criticisms and reactions (from scholars sympathetic to the 
Fraser’s ideas) levelled against and in support of Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-
publics.  I also demonstrate the suitability of the Fraser’s ideas for this particular study.  
 
1) That fragmented public spheres are incompatible with democracy 
Critics (Garnham, 1992; Habermas, 2006; Fuchs, 2014) of the Fraser’s ideas have argued that 
the proliferation of multiple publics contribute to the fragmentation and decline of 
deliberative democracy. Multiple publics without unity are criticised for engaging in 
reformist identity politics without challenging the whole, which negatively affects the lives of 
all subordinated groups (Fuchs, 2014). The argument here is that one needs unity in diversity 
in order to struggle for participatory democracy and for maintaining this condition once it is 
reached. This means that in an egalitarian society common communication media are needed 
for guaranteeing cohesion and solidarity and a strong democracy (Garnham, 1992; Fuchs, 
2014).Writing about the fragmentation of public spheres occasioned by the internet, Sunstein 
argues that subaltern counter-publics (like discussion boards) spawn group polarisation 
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through “homophilous sorting70” which is inimical to deliberative democracy (2001: 65). 
Sunstein’s argument is that for deliberative democracy to take place people should be 
exposed to materials that they have not chosen in advance and people should have a range of 
common experiences, in order that they may come to an understanding with respect to 
particular issues.  
 
In response, scholars (Keane, 2000; Dahlberg, 2007; Fenton & Downey, 2003) sympathetic 
to Fraser’s ideas have argued that differentiation and fragmentation is not to the detriment of 
deliberative democracy. Writing about agnostic public spaces, Mouffe (2005) argues that a 
plurality of oppositional discourses and social organisation is central to current notions of 
political mobilisation and participation. In other words, multiple public spheres are not only 
viewed as offering vital input to democracy but acting as a barometer for a healthy 
democratic system where no single public sphere enjoys a monopoly in public disputes about 
the distribution of power (Fenton & Downey, 2003; Keane, 1996). Dahlberg also adds that 
deliberation within ‘like-minded’ groups provide an important step in building alternative 
visions of life before contributing to opening the boundary of dominant discourse through 
more explicit forms of contestation (2007). Despite initially chastising deliberative enclaves 
as antithetical to democracy, Sunstein acknowledges that “like-minded” deliberation spaces 
might be useful in developing groups, “that would otherwise be invisible, silenced, or 
squelched in the general debate” (2001: 75-76). Multiple counter-publics are therefore seen 
as increasing political participation and acting as the seedbed of social movement building 
(like the civil rights movement).   
 
2) That alternative public spheres risk becoming undemocratic 
Another criticism levelled against the Fraser’s ideas is that alternative public spheres 
conceived as separate from the mainstream public sphere fail to challenge the hegemonic 
structures (McLaughlin, 1993). The point is that alternative public spheres risk developing 
alternative dominant social relations and structures (McLaughlin, 1993).   
 
In response to McLaughlin, Fraser (2007) acknowledges that some subaltern counter-publics 
are explicitly anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian. She notes that even those with democratic 
and egalitarian intentions are not always above practicing their own modes of informal 
                                                          
70This refers to the proliferation of separate communities or conversations that are not in mutual contact. 
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exclusion and marginalisation. Fraser posits that the major function of counter-publics is to 
expand the space for the effective participation in politics of different and marginal voices. I 
will seek to examine how discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation play out 
on Facebook pages.  
 
3) That Fraser’s ideas indirectly reifies the bourgeois public sphere  
Fraser has been criticised for reifying the Habermas’s theory of public sphere. Dean argues 
that she is: “not convinced that adding an s solves the problem of the public sphere...despite 
its best intentions, the multi-spheres approach reinforces the priority of a bourgeois public 
sphere as a goal site, as an ideal, as the fundamental arbiter of inclusion” (Dean, 2001: 248-
249). In response to the foregoing criticism, Crack (2008) argues that rather than reifying the 
bourgeois public sphere, Fraser offers a successful rhetorical challenge of the primacy of the 
dominant public by theorising about the existence of contesting as well as overlapping 
multiple publics. 
 
4) That subaltern counter-publics fails to acknowledge antagonism and passion inherent 
in social relations 
One of the shortcomings of Fraser’s theory like the Habermasian notion of the public sphere 
is that it is unable to acknowledge the dimension of antagonism that the pluralism of values 
entails and its ineradicable character (Mouffe, 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Fraser is also 
critiqued for following Habermas’s footsteps in terms of ignoring the dimension of the 
“political71” and reducing politics to a set of technical moves and neutral procedures. This 
leads her to ignore the possibility of a non-adversarial democratic politics. As scholars 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2000, 2005) of radical democracy have noted, political 
spaces are characterised by disagreement and antagonism. For Mouffe (2005), contestation of 
the dominating discourse needs to be incorporated into any healthy, democratic environment. 
This ensures the representation of marginalised groups and opinions. Contrary to the various 
liberal models including Fraser’s subaltern counter-publics, Mouffe (2005) argues that the 
agonistic approach recognises that society is always politically instituted and never forgets 
that the terrain in which hegemonic interventions take place is always the outcome of 
previous hegemonic practices and that it is never an neutral one. According to Mouffe (2005: 
                                                          
71 The “political” refers to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in all human societies and ―”politics” refers to the ―ensemble of 
practices, discourses and institutions‖ that seek to establish order and organise human co-existence in conditions that are always potentially 
conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of ―the “political” (Mouffe, 1999:754). 
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3), the agonistic public space is the battleground where different hegemonic projects are 
confronted, without any possibility of final reconciliation. This kind of public space provides 
arenas where citizens can express their disagreements and where difference can be 
confronted.  
 
Mouffe (2005) argues that far being a harbinger of rational-consensus debate only, emotions 
also permeate political action. Like Bickford (2011), Mouffe suggests that emotions should 
be treated as an alternative type of democratic practice. The public sphere should 
accommodate passions and should enable the expression of collective passions. She adds that 
it is important to “mobilise passions towards collective design” rather than strive for rational 
discussion-based consensus (Mouffe, 2005: 5). This shows that radical democracy scholars 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2005) are sceptical about the capacity of conventional 
democracies to engage the energies of ordinary citizens. Radical democracy views 
participation as central to the realisation of active citizenship. Although Fraser and scholars 
sympathetic to her ideas have not directly engaged with Laclau & Mouffe’s discourse theory, 
this study deployed these radical democratic views to destabilise some of the tenets of the 
subaltern counter-publics.   
 
There is a plethora of studies (Palczewski, 2001; Harlow & Harp, 2012; Eckert & Chadha, 
2012) that have used Nancy Fraser’s theory of subaltern counter-publics to examine how 
activists use the internet to engage in political action. This study indirectly answers 
Palczweski’s (2001: 161) clarion call that given the increasing role that emerging 
communication technologies are playing in activism, particular attention needs to be directed 
at how social media impacts counter-public formation and public sphere activism. I will 
examine how and why youth activists use Facebook for social and political mobilisation in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
 
5) That Fraser’s ideas reifies identity as the only marker of counter-public membership 
 
Scholars (Asen & Brouwer, 2001; Squires, 2002; Warner, 2002) who have engaged with 
Fraser’s ideas have criticised her conceptualisation for reifying identity (such as gender, age, 
class and so forth) as the only marker of counter-public membership thereby obscuring other 
important issues. Warner, for instance, also argues that there is no reason to assume that 
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everybody who partakes in a particular counter-public inhabits a subaltern social position 
(2002).  
 
In response to the above criticism, the same scholars (Asen, 2000; Asen & Brouwer, 2001; 
Warner, 2002) have advanced a relational perspective meant to get rid of reductionism 
(associated with Fraser’s ideas) by focusing on a dynamic relation between the dominant and 
counter-publics. They suggest that counter-public membership is not a fixed identity but a 
transient situation, a malleable product of changes in political relationships (Hansen in Negt 
& Kluge, 1993). Warner adds that the reasons why members of a certain public might be 
regarded as subaltern can differ greatly and that sometimes mere participation in a certain 
public can make people subaltern (2002: 87). In this study, I desist from the tendency to 
ascribe a coherent identity to marginalised groups by acknowledging that the youth activists 
are differentiated through complex, overlapping and multiple markers of identity such as sex, 
class, race, age, geographical location and so forth. Next I discuss the theoretical linkages 
between Fraser and Scott’s ideas. 
 
3.4 Theoretical overlaps between subaltern counter-publics and hidden transcripts 
 
Whilst I recognise the utility of the social movement framing theory (Benford & Snow, 2000) 
as a complementary lens that could be integrated with the notion of the subaltern counter-
publics, I prefer to use the metaphor of the hidden transcripts to account for the subtle forms 
of political engagement which often escape the radar of conventional forms of political 
participation in African contexts. In this particular section, I discuss the strong affinities that 
exist between Fraser and Scott’s ideas, which are important for this particular study. 
Anthropologist James C. Scott’s (1976; 1985; 1990) concept of hidden transcripts is, I argue, 
particularly illuminative and salient to the analysis of the political discourses which are 
circulated by youth activists on Facebook.  
 
Influenced by Foucault’s decentred notion of power (“wherever there is power there is 
resistance”) as well as an attempt to respond to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Scott 
propounded a theory of micro-politics known as the “everyday forms of resistance”.  Scott’s 
ideas like Fraser’s (1990) are concerned with the workings of the “political” outside formal 
political system as well as the various ways through which subordinate groups are able to 
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penetrate the dominant discourse. He argues that organised collective action may not be 
possible everywhere (due to geographical dispersion, ethnic and linguistic differences, a lack 
of organisational skills and experience, and so forth), and thus alternative forms of struggles 
(like flexible, small-scale and unbureaucratic activism) must be discovered and 
acknowledged (Scott, 1985). For him, resistance particularly by disenfranchised groups (like 
youth) takes place in the realm of the everyday in ways which often go unnoticed by 
researchers (Scott, 1990). Scott (1985) defined resistance as any act(s) by members of the 
subordinate group that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, 
taxes, prestige) made on that group by dominant groups (for instance, landlords, the state) or 
to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à- vis these 
dominant groups.  
 
According to Scott, everyday forms of resistance refers to “the prosaic but constant struggle 
between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents, and interest 
from them. Most forms of this struggle stop well short of outright collective defiance” (1985: 
xvi). It is clear from the foregoing quote that everyday forms of resistance are stratagems 
deployed by subordinate groups in thwarting the claims of the dominant group or the state 
which dominates the public exercise of power. Thus, quiescence should not be equated with 
the acquiescence of subaltern groups to relations of domination (Scott, 1985). Instead of 
focusing our attention on physical and material protests in the streets, Scott (1990) suggests 
that resistance encapsulates a range of practices, often hidden and invisible, used by 
subordinate groups to contest those who make attempts to dominate them.  
 
In his ethnographic research amongst the Sedaka peasants in Malaysia, Scott found that rice 
farmers when faced with new agricultural technologies and the ‘new green revolution’ of 
double cropping that threatened their livelihoods engaged in various forms of everyday 
resistance (1985). The peasants resorted to low profile techniques such as foot dragging, 
poaching, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and arson 
sabotage to contest social hierarchies and reclaim the symbolic balance of power (Scott, 
1985). This means that, instead of outright collective action, Sedaka peasants reluctantly 
engaged in their day-to-day tasks, concealed their true feelings in the presence of their 
landlords, abandoned their duties without permission, refused to pay tax to landlords and 
stole grain stocks from their landlords.  
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Scott demonstrates the fact that resistance is multi-dimensional and fluid in nature. As Scott 
observes, the dichotomy between “real” and “token” resistance fundamentally misconstrues 
the very basis of the economic and political struggle conducted daily by subordinate groups 
(1990). Real resistance refers to organised, systematic, pre-planned or selfless practices with 
revolutionary consequences, while token resistance points to unorganised incidental acts 
without any revolutionary consequences, and which are accommodated in the power structure 
(Scott, 1990). Thus rather than over-hyping the occurrence of macro-forms of resistance (like 
the Arab Spring), Scott’s theory alerts us to remain attuned for the “political” in the 
ostensibly “non-political” of everyday life. Scott’s theory is akin to what Gluckman calls 
“rituals of rebellion72” as well as Bakhtin’s (1984) metaphor of the “carnival”, which depicts 
parody and laughter as strategic weapons of the marginalised to provide momentary 
interruptions to, or if not coping mechanism in the face of, the dominant narratives that are 
deployed by the powerful elite. 
 
Scott partly addresses the question about how do everyday forms of resistance become 
change enabling activism (macro-forms of resistance like changing governments, changing 
undesirable policies and so forth) rather than mere grumbling in the corner. Answering the 
above question, Scott suggests that everyday forms of resistance do not automatically lead to 
macro-forms of resistance. He argues that the “persistent practice of everyday forms of 
resistance underwritten by a subculture of complicity can achieve many, if not all, of the 
results aimed at by social movements” (Scott, 1985: 422). The argument is that bit by bit the 
cumulative impact of everyday forms of resistance may “lay the groundwork” for substantial 
social change by eroding away an unpopular regime. It must be noted that Scott 
acknowledged that social change does not occur mechanistically but rather speaks of the 
microscopic growth of barrier reefs against which “the ship of state [eventually] runs 
aground” (1989: 20). Similarly, writing about the effects of cartoons on political change in 
Cameroon Nyamnjoh (2009: 97) argues that, it “may be gradual, cumulative, and in the long 
term, than on effectiveness that stresses immediate outcomes to the detriment of that which 
takes time to unfold.” The notion of everyday forms of resistance is also important for 
                                                          
72 It denotes ritualised forms of hostility or institutional protest used by the ruled to express their grievances against rulers without 
necessarily overturning the system (Gluckman, 1960: 127).  
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understanding how youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa are resisting the threats and 
existence of communication surveillance on Facebook. 
 
It is important to highlight the theoretical affinities that exist between the works of Fraser and 
Scott. Central to Scott’s theory is the metaphor of “transcripts” which refers to the ways of 
speaking and behaving in different social settings (1990). Scott distinguished public from 
hidden transcripts. Public transcripts refer to the verbal and non-verbal acts carried out by 
powerful elite in the dominant public sphere while the hidden transcripts denote the discourse 
that takes place “offstage,” beyond the direct observation of the powerful elite (Scott, 1990: 
4), mostly in subaltern counter-publics. The distinction between the public and hidden 
transcripts resonates with the chasm that exists between the dominant public sphere and 
subaltern counter-publics (Fraser, 1992). Both scholars (Fraser, 1990; Scott, 1985) agree that 
the dominant discourse is a highly partisan and partial narrative designed to affirm and 
naturalise the power of dominant elites as well as to conceal or euphemise the duty of their 
rule.  
 
Fraser and Scott also concur that marginalised groups use alternative spaces of resistance to 
circulate oppositional discourses. For Scott, hidden transcripts are circulated through “social 
spaces of relative autonomy” or offstage social spaces (subaltern counter-publics in Fraser’s 
terminology) which are essentially sites where power does not saturate or colonise the 
consciousness of subordinate groups (1990:118). Fraser (1990: 61) observes that counter-
publics are characterised by the performance of “alternative styles of political behaviour [and 
discourses]”. According to Scott (1985), social spaces of relative autonomy refer to forums 
where marginalised groups are able to raise their own voices. This typifies what Bayat (2010) 
refers to as “zones of relative freedom” which can be occupied and appropriated ordinary 
actors. In line with Scott’s idea, I conceptualise Facebook groups and pages as “social spaces 
of relative autonomy” where youth activists circulate their hidden transcripts. The argument 
is that unlike legacy media, Facebook can viewed as relatively autonomous although it is still 
subjected to control and gatekeeping by owners and the state surveillance (see Chapters One 
and Seven).  
 
Social media has increasingly been conceptualised as constitutive of spaces of resistance 
which allow marginalised groups to disarticulate hegemonic discourses and circulate 
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alternative viewpoints (Cheong & Leung, 2008; Aouragh, 2012; Pal & Dutta, 2008; Soriano, 
& Sreekumar, 2012). New media technologies are seen as creating new spaces for discourse 
and collective resistance transcending national borders (Voltmer, 2013; Lim, 2014). Social 
media (including Facebook) provided a channel to translate the hidden transcript into the 
public transcript during the Arab Spring (Lim, 2014). Some scholars (Dahlgren, 2013; Lim, 
2014) argue that social media are synonymous with popular cultural spaces. The argument is 
that popular culture or issues of a seemingly private character can become a springboard for 
political concerns and impinge on people’s sensibilities for civic engagement (Dahlgren, 
2013). Caution must be taken on board when conceptualising social media as popular culture 
in the Anglo-Saxon
73
 canon of media and cultural studies at least in Africa. This is because 
internet access (either through broadband or mobile) is predominantly a middle-class and 
urban-biased phenomenon although the situation is changing with the mass adoption of 
cheaper smartphones. Because of these glaring asymmetries in internet access, the majority of 
the people are disconnected from online conversations. Friedman (2013) posits that social 
media in Africa has not yet attained the status of being the “voice of the people”. 
 
Drawing on the metaphor of hidden transcripts (Scott, 1976) which has many affinities with 
Fraser’s (1990) notion of “alternative styles of political behaviour”, I modify this term to 
digital hidden transcripts in order to document and analyse the different kinds of political 
discourses which are circulated by youth activists on Facebook. The advantage of employing 
digital hidden transcripts as a heuristic resource as opposed to “oppositional discourses” 
(Fraser, 1992) is that Scott’s theory identifies various forms of contesting and engaging 
dominant discourses like rumour, gossip, disguises, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, 
folktales, ritual gestures and anonymity (1985), which can be used as analytical tools. In this 
study, I will test the applicability of analytical constructs like rumours, gossip and linguistic 
tricks as propounded by Scott (I define these terms below) as well as others gleaned from 
literature dealing with popular resistance in Africa (Willems & Obadare, 2014; Willems, 
2012; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Eko, 2007; Barber, 1997; Mbembe, 2001). These heuristic indicators 
are crucial for the analysis of alternative modes of political expression which are shared on 
Facebook pages and groups.  
 
                                                          
73 It is generally defined as “the space in which mass-produced products such as soap operas, magazines and clothes are consumed” 
(Willems, 2011: 49).  
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In Africa, the circulation of political cartoons, rumour, jokes, radio “trottoir” (pavement 
radio in English) and gossip have been identified as providing alternative ways of engaging 
with the state and with politics that do not carry the formal hallmarks of deliberative 
democracy (Fabian, 1998; Wasserman, 2011; Willems, 2011; 2012). Nyamnjoh (2005) 
defines political rumour as the emergence and circulation of information that is either not yet 
confirmed publicly or refuted by official sources rather than falsehoods. Gossip refers to idle 
talk, especially about the private or personal affairs of the powerful elite (Rosnow & Fine, 
1976). Jokes refer to something spoken, written or done with a humorous intention. They 
often employ devices like irony, sarcasm and word play. Political cartoons denote texts 
(written, audio and video) which are meant to act as satirical subversions that mock the 
excesses of the state and its political officials (Eko, 2007). Radio “trottoir” refers to the 
popular and unofficial discussion of current affairs in Africa (Ellis, 1989: 321). Through 
qualitative content analysis, I will also seek to establish if there are any other hidden 
transcripts being circulated by youth activists on Facebook besides the aforementioned 
analytical categories. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has proposed to apply and test the analytical rigour of Fraser’s concept of 
subaltern counter-publics in examining how, why and when youth activists use Facebook to 
facilitate political activism in Zimbabwe and South Africa. I have also enlisted the theoretical 
support of the metaphor of hidden transcripts (Scott, 1976) to complement the Fraser’s ideas. 
I began this chapter with a review of the analytical features of the Habermasian public sphere 
as well as demonstrating its limited applicability in understanding political communication in 
stratified and multi-cultural societies. This chapter has demonstrated that the mainstream 
mediated public sphere in Zimbabwe and South Africa is constituted differently with the 
former being more market-oriented while the latter is largely state-controlled. In short, the 
Zimbabwean media sphere is shaped by political restrictions while in South Africa the 
mainstream private media serves the economically elite who are considered profitable 
thereby excluding the majority of citizens from participation and representation in the public 
sphere at national level. The fragmentation of the public sphere along social inequalities in 
South Africa has seen most citizens resorting to community and tabloid media while those in 
Zimbabwe are using online and diasporic media platforms. In view of this state of affairs, I 
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have argued that it makes sense to speak of multiple public “sphericules” (Gitlin, 1998) in 
which various segments of the population create their own spaces to express their views 
about the state.  
 
I have also outlined Fraser’s concept of subaltern counter-publics thereby underscoring its 
suitability for this particular study. I have also discussed the major criticisms levelled against 
the theory of alternative public spheres in general and Fraser’s ideas in particular. I also 
highlighted the responses propounded by scholars who support Fraser’s ideas in a bid to 
demonstrate the applicability of this conceptual resource in this study. I have also sought to 
enrich the Fraser’s ideas by grafting some fruitful elements from Scott’s metaphor of hidden 
transcripts. Unlike Fraser’s notion of counter-discourses, I have argued that Scott’s idea of 
hidden transcripts (which I modify to digital hidden transcripts) allows me to document and 
analyse the various kinds of political discourses which are circulated by youth activists on 
Facebook pages and groups. In the next chapter, I look at the methodological approach 
employed in gathering empirical data for the study.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
4. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical framework which informs this study. In this 
chapter, I outline and justify the choice and relevance of qualitative research methodology, 
data collection tools and sampling techniques deployed to examine how and why 
Zimbabwean and South African youths use Facebook to facilitate political action. I begin by 
briefly outlining the methodological considerations associated with researching the internet 
and social media. I proceed to discuss the mechanics of conducting comparative small-N 
studies as well as multi-sited ethnographic studies in the digital age. I then situate this study 
within the broader context of a comparative case study approach. Thereafter I discuss the 
philosophical and epistemological foundations of qualitative research methodology, thereby 
justifying my research design. I also present the methods of data collection, analysis and 
presentation as well as the sampling techniques employed in this study. As part of my data 
collection, I also draw on basic quantitative data gathered from Facebook groups and pages in 
order to assess their dialogic nature and micro-politics of participation. This chapter will also 
make a case for data triangulation. It also outlines the strategies used to gain entry into the 
‘field’, ethical dilemmas negotiated and data analysis tools deployed.  
4.1 Internet research: revisiting the methodological debate 
 
This section focuses on the methodological debate associated with conducting research on the 
internet and social media. Given the increasing role played by new media in people’s 
everyday lives, researchers have begun to focus on Facebook as an ethnographic object and 
area of inquiry (see boyd, 2007; Miller, 2011; Baker, 2013; Pink & Postill, 2012). A highly 
polarised debate (Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006) on how best to study new media 
technologies has emerged, pitting at least two extreme sides—those who believe there is no 
need for new inventions in methods (Livingstone, 2002) and those who believe that a whole 
set of new methods are required (Hine, 2005). 
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The first camp in this methodological debate maintains that traditional methods are adaptable 
and flexible enough to meet the demands of studying internet sociality, given the recent 
theoretical debates in anthropology about multiple identities and dynamism of communities 
(Hakken, 1999; Marcus, 1995). As Livingstone (2002: 19) suggests, by using traditional 
methodological approaches to research new media technologies, the “very newness of the 
new [media technologies] … tends to get left out, while the features in common with the 
older [technologies] get researched”. The point is that online and offline spaces are not 
necessarily different because the online environment remains “of this world” (Horst& Miller, 
2012) and not, therefore, beyond existing knowledge or method. 
Some scholars (Sudweeks & Simoff, 1999; Miller & Slater, 2000), however, recommend the 
re-sharpening of existing research methods to fit new research environments in which new 
technologies challenge existing research assumptions and premises. These scholars (Denzin 
2004; Wittel, 2000; Howard, 2002) advance a “modernising” perspective, and call for a 
different methodological orientation on the part of the researcher, in order to speak to the 
ever-changing digital fields. The argument is also that conventional techniques must innovate 
and transform to accommodate the blurring nature of offline and online field sites (Paech, 
2009; Murthy, 2008). Besides transforming the offline field site, new media are viewed as 
having fundamentally dislocated the notion of “fieldwork” as we know it (Howard, 2002; 
Wittel, 2000). Attempts to “modernise” ethnography has seen the fieldwork in “the field” 
being substituted by “fieldwork in and of networks” (Wittel, 2002; Howard, 2002). 
Approaching a field site as a network involves finding different entry points into a 
phenomenon, following different relationships between people and practices, and making 
sense of different types of networks and their relation to one another. This school of thought 
advocates for the use of hybrid research techniques, like face-to-face and online interviews. 
Some scholars (Bruns & Burgess, 2012) have advocated for the shift towards Big Data in 
social media research. Big data entails the use of network analysis and data visualisation 
techniques to map out large-scale communication patterns and network structures 
(Stephansen & Couldry, 2014). However critics (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Crawford, Miltner 
& Gray, 2014) of big data argue that by privileging large-scale quantitative approaches, it 
side-lines other forms of analysis and limits the kinds of questions that can be asked. Thus, 
although big data can reveal connections and patterns, “it has little to say about their meaning 
and context” (Stephansen & Couldry, 2014: 4). Instead critics (boyd & Crawford, 2012) of 
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Big data propose the use qualitative and mixed research methods which foreground textual 
analysis and qualitative interviews with social media users.  
According to the second camp, traditional research methods are now moribund, hence new 
methods are urgently required (Hine, 2005). New technologies are castigated for spawning a 
“crisis for the ethnographic project” (Horst, Hjorth & Tacchi, 2012; Postill& Pink, 2012), 
thereby destabilising the epistemological, ontological and methodological roots of social 
research. The net effect of this transformation is that there is a lack of a common and mutual 
perception of the physical context between the researcher and the researched (Beaulieu & 
Estalella, 2009). These technologies are also seen as unleashing ethnography from the 
traditional single and bounded field site towards the notion of “multi-sited fieldwork” 
(Marcus, 1995). Multi-sited fieldwork encapsulates the moving out from the single sites and 
local situations to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in 
diffuse time-space (Marcus, 1998). Scholars (Hine, 2005; Garcia, Standlee, Bechkoff & Cui, 
2009) in this school of thought argue that the state of flux which characterises new 
technologies defies conventional research methodologies and therefore requires new 
methodological approaches. Highlighting the differences between the physical and virtual 
spaces, scholars (Donath, 1999; Horst &Miller, 2012) also posit that online spheres 
reconfigure researchers’ understanding of the field, researchers’ location within the field, 
participation and ethical guidelines. Their argument is that traditional methods were designed 
for the study of physically bounded social interactions; hence there is need for newer methods 
to understand deterritorialised social interactions. This school of thought advocates for the 
adoption of digital methods such as online questionnaires, online interviews and “virtual 
ethnography” (Hine, 2005).  
Despite the above hair-splitting debate, Jankowski & van Selm (2005) posit that modifying 
existing methods is a more common practice than radical reconstruction. Cognisant of the 
fact that ethnography is on the move from the offline to the online field site, scholars 
(Murthy, 2008; Miller & Slater, 2000; Hine, 2005; Kozinets, 2002; Howard, 2002) have 
suggested that online fieldwork constitute virtual ethnography (and many other 
methodological neologisms). Virtual ethnography is about the extension of traditional 
ethnographic methods in the study of technologically mediated-interactions in online 
networks and communities (Hine, 2005). Unlike traditional ethnography, online ethnographic 
studies foreground the use of digital practices like email communication as well as covert and 
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overt participation in chatrooms [such as Facebook groups and profile pages] to conduct 
forms of participant content analysis. As will be discussed below, I used online participant 
observation, interviews and qualitative content analysis to examine how youth activists use 
Facebook to facilitate political action. In the next section, I give a brief overview of 
ethnography. 
4.2 Ethnography: a reflexive approach in multi-sited fieldwork 
 
The terms “ethnography” and “participant observation” have been used synonymously 
although the latter has always been a data collection tool associated with ethnographic studies 
(Beddows, 2008) while the former is both a “method and methodology” (Brewer, 2000). 
Thus employing an ethnographic approach entails the fusion of a number of research 
techniques which goes beyond just participant observation. Participant observation is a data 
collection instrument that relies heavily on the cultivation of personal relationships with local 
informants as a way of learning about a culture, involving both observing and participating in 
the social life of a group (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). Although often characterised as a 
method, ethnography encompasses a range of approaches, all of which inscribe a certain 
relationship between the researcher and the researched.  
Ethnography is predominantly qualitative in terms of its ontological and epistemological 
foundation (Marcus, 1998). This approach is about the epistemic position of the researcher 
that finds explanation in its epistemological foundation: “ethno” (people) and “graphy” 
(describing) (Lindlof, 1995: 20). In the words of the pioneer of ethnography, Bronislaw 
Malinowski (1922: 25), the approach intends “to grasp the native’s point of view…to realise 
his/her vision of the world”. One of the central motifs of traditional ethnography is that the 
researcher should live with the local community and compile detailed accounts of life, 
traditions and cultural practices of the local people (Palmer, 2001). Because direct and 
sustained social contacts with the researched (Willis & Trondman, 2000) is one of the core 
pillars of ethnography, this kind of approach makes it possible for the researcher to 
understand events in the context in which they happen. For Miller et al (2016), within the 
discipline of anthropology a central tenet of ethnography is time. A person must be present in 
the field site for an extended period, typically more than one year. Ethnographic studies 
encapsulate several data collection tools (participant observation, interviews, informal 
conversations) which are concerned mainly with observing things that happen in their natural 
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settings, listening to people’s experiences and questioning people in their social settings 
(Walsh, 1998).  
Ethnography seeks to “investigate in particular the perspectives of participants, the nature and 
forms of their knowledge, their interactions, practices and discourses aiming to draw 
connections between practices, experiences and the context” (Lüders, 2004: 225). In this 
study, such an approach enabled me to participate overtly or covertly (I will revisit the ethics 
of lurking in section 4. 3) in youth activists’ daily lives on Facebook for an extended period 
of time, observing what is posted, making sense of online interactions, asking questions and 
collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues under investigation 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Clifford, 1997). Given that the researcher has been a 
Facebook user since the year 2008 and lived in both case nations at the time of research, he 
had “sufficient proficiency in the local language[s] so that they can understand conversations 
between other people, not just conversation directed at them” (Miller et al, 2016: 14). 
Ethnography is also characterised by the keeping of extensive field notes which assist the 
researcher in creating a picture of situations that help to understand the subject matter at 
hand. Another merit of ethnography is that “[it] deliberately leaves openings for 
unanticipated discoveries and directions” (Amit, 2000:17).  
A large body of ethnographic studies (Gerbaudo, 2012; Postill & Pink, 2012; Storsul, 2014; 
Gustafsson, 2013) focusing on the use of ICTs by political activists within the context of 
social movements in Western democracies have emerged. Based on multi-sited fieldwork, 
these ethnographic studies (Miller, 2011; Barassi & Trere, 2013; Marichal, 2012; Postill & 
Pink, 2012; Mudhai, 2004) employed extensive and intensive periods of offline and online 
participant observations in protests, qualitative content analysis of websites and discussion 
boards as well as interviews with activists. These studies underscore the fact that ethnography 
constitutes a flexible, adaptable and an enduring methodological approach suitable for 
studying new technologies and activist practices.  
This particular study, as pointed out earlier, deploys social media ethnography (Postill& Pink, 
2012) which is characterised by intermittent periods of online participant observations as well 
as structured and unstructured interviews with youth activists. Instead of simply dipping into 
and out of Facebook groups and profile pages, I resorted to periodic interactions with the 
researched via Facebook chat and private messages. In order to avoid influencing the course 
of debate and the behaviour of observed participants on Facebook groups and profile pages, I 
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desisted from asking questions in a discussion thread and on the “wall”. My role as 
participant-as-observer was limited to “liking” and “sharing” of interesting Facebook posts. 
These practices should considered as benign because I was just redistributing and 
acknowledging postings rather than interacting (through commenting and reply features) with 
the content. As Pink & Postill (2012) rightfully point out, social media ethnography does not 
replace long-term immersion in a society or culture or aims to produce “classic” ethnographic 
knowledge but, rather, creates deep, contextual and contingent understandings produced 
through intensive and collaborative sensory, embodied engagements often involving digital 
technologies in co-producing knowledge. Unlike traditional ethnography, which tended to 
reify speech as more authentic than writing as part of its romantic legacy, social media 
ethnography treats written texts associated with online cultures as valid accounts of the 
realities of those being studied. Facebook allowed me to engage in ethnography as a “textual 
practice” (Hine, 2000). This means that texts (Facebook postings) were taken as 
“ethnographic material which tells us about the understanding which authors have of the 
reality which they inhabit” (Hine, 2000: 43).  
In this study, Facebook constitutes a rich communicative medium (for conducting interviews 
with respondents and maintaining social relations), data (such as status updates, group 
discussion threads, external links) and context (a shared, observable space that feeds into and 
frames data collection) (Baker, 2013: 142), in which to examine how youth activists use 
Facebook to mediate political action. As a research site, Facebook constitutes a valuable 
source of data that offers me unique pathways into youth’s “trace data74” and thoughts on 
political activism. It permits me to get an insight into the participants’ lives that could have 
previously been hidden from the researcher’s gaze. This is because Facebook allows 
researchers to “burrow further into [participants’] lives” (Murthy, 2008: 845). Next I look at 
the qualitative research methodology. 
4.3 Research design and procedure 
 
4.3.1 The qualitative research tradition 
 
                                                          
74
Trace data are digital records that humans consciously or unconsciously leave behind as they navigate the digital world (Dubois & Ford, 
2015) 
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This study is theoretically positioned within the Fraser’s75 ideas of subaltern counter-publics 
and the metaphor of hidden transcripts (Scott, 1976) (see Chapter Three) which puts the 
narratives of subordinate groups at the centre of social research. As post-structuralist feminist 
(see Fraser, 1990) and resistance (see Scott, 1976; 1990) scholars, Fraser and Scott believe in 
the existence of multiple and situated realities. This belief in multiple realities constitutes one 
of the philosophical orientations of qualitative research methodology (Lincoln & Guba, 
1995). Qualitative methods are oriented towards discovery and process; have high validity; 
are less concerned with generalisation, and are more concerned with deeper understanding of 
the research problem in its unique context. As Baxter & Babbie (2003: 61) write, qualitative 
research moves beyond description of a particular phenomenon to strive for a comprehensive 
understanding of mean making in a particular setting. The ontological and epistemological 
foundations of qualitative research makes it the most appropriate methodology for the present 
study, which is concerned with understanding how and why youth activists use Facebook to 
mediate political action. Given the predominance of quantitative studies in the field of 
political communication, Vromen (2007: 52) calls upon scholars to embrace qualitative 
methods in order to explore both individual attitudes and forms of participation. 
Rooted in several disciplines (Lindlof, 1995) as well as the Weberian notion of verstehen
76
, 
qualitative research methodology is an assortment of philosophical positions, methodological 
tactics, and analytical procedures (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). The term “qualitative” implies 
an emphasis on examination of the processes and meanings, but not measured in terms of 
quantity, amount, or frequency (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Epistemologically, qualitative 
research is anchored in the phenomenology or the interpretivist paradigm. As Baxter & 
Babbie (2003) observes, the interpretive paradigm suggests that human /social sciences are 
concerned with understanding human behaviour, and the primary goal of the interpretive 
researcher is to embrace the subjective world of the people they are studying and try to see 
the world through their eyes. This contrasts significantly with the positivist epistemology, 
which focuses on objective reality knowable through empirical observation associated with 
quantitative research (Bryman, 2004; Babbie & Mouton, 2001). The reason for this 
“marriage” between phenomenology and qualitative methodology is based on the insistence 
on an interpretative understanding of the meanings and self-descriptions of individual, which 
privileges participant observation, qualitative content analysis and individual in-depth 
                                                          
75 Fraser (1990) posits that multiple, subaltern counter-publics spheres unlike a unitary public sphere allow like-minded people to come 
together and articulate their issues, concerns, or identity. 
76 The term refers to an understanding of the meaning that people ascribe to their social situation and activities (Bryman, 1988). 
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interviews. In-depth interviews allow me to understand what happens to the technology 
(Facebook) when it is appropriated and adapted by young people for political purposes. 
Proponents of qualitative research place particular emphasis on the contextual understanding 
of perspectives of social actors, to retrieve experiences from the past, to gain expert insight or 
information, to obtain descriptions of events or scenes that are unavailable for observation, to 
foster trust or to analyse certain kinds of discourse (Lindlof, 1995; Bryman, 2004; Silverman, 
2005; Baxter & Babbie, 2003). The advantage of qualitative research is that it allows one to 
make sense of, or interpret reality in terms of the meanings that people bring to them and not 
the meaning imposed by the researcher through the relationship between variables 
(Silverman, 2005; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). This study is predominantly qualitative, although 
I make use of quantitative data, in the sense that it is concerned with digging below the 
surface to explore how, why or what and to explore relationships and connections (deep data) 
(Bryman, 1988). In other words, it allows me to access “thick descriptions” of how and why 
politically engaged youths use Facebook for political purposes in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. Qualitative research methodology helps us answer the how and what questions that 
must be addressed in order to answer the why and so what questions. Qualitative researchers 
believe that people construct their realities or “subjective meanings” through actions 
determined by their lived circumstances which structure or constrain the way they construct 
meanings in the course of everyday life (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). Such an approach enables 
me to investigate and understand the underlying contextual factors on why youth activists use 
Facebook to promote their causes “through the eyes of those being studied” (Bryman, 2004: 
280).  
The flexible nature of qualitative research enables me “to embark on a mission of discovery 
rather than one of verification” (Bryman, 2004: 281), in this case how and why Facebook has 
been integrated into youth activists’ broader activities. Although rooted in qualitative 
research, this study is situated within the emerging field of small data analysis (Stephansen & 
Couldry, 2014) which combines basic quantitative metrics (how many people have joined, 
liked or participated actively on Facebook groups and the gender-disaggregated data of 
participants), qualitative content analysis of selected Facebook and qualitative interviews. 
This quantitative meta-data will also yield important information for me about participation 
levels in Facebook groups and profile pages. Qualitative research is also useful because it is 
only through an inquiry into the experience of the researched, the meaning they attach to their 
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routines that can offer us the possibility of an answer (Scott, 1985: 46). Through the aid of in-
depth interviews, it allows me “to probe beneath the surface appearances” (Bryman, 
2004:280) of reality to provide the reasons on why youth activists use Facebook to advance 
their political objectives.  
 
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, qualitative research is best positioned to access 
“an insider’s view” (emic perspective) of the social phenomenon under consideration when 
compared to quantitative research which exhibits a tendency for the researcher to view events 
from the outside and to impose empirical concerns upon social reality (Bryman, 1988). 
Gaining an “insider’s view” is very important in this research context because it allows me to 
understand how youth activists integrate Facebook into their broader activities. Qualitative 
research is concerned with the contextual understanding of social behaviour and seeks to 
provide a detailed account of the context within which people’s behaviour takes place 
(Silverman, 2005). It is important to gain an understanding of the actual habitat or “lifeworld” 
within which activists’ behaviour takes place because experiences of people are essentially 
context bound. This is important for this research which uses online participant observation to 
understand how youth activists use Facebook to facilitate political activism in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa.  
Qualitative research is also concerned with understanding particulars rather than generalising 
to universals. Guba & Lincoln (1982: 238) suggest that in qualitative research, one can never 
generalise because phenomena are always studied within a certain context and time frame. 
The qualitative approach enables the study of many interesting phenomena relating to what 
people actually do in their day-to-day lives, whether in homes, offices or other public and 
private places (Silverman, 2005). Through online participant observation, I will seek to 
examine what youth activists do [Facebook postings] in their day-to-day lives [on Facebook 
groups and profile pages]. Below I look at the comparative case study research design. 
4.3.4 Comparative case study approach 
 
This study is framed within broader ambit of a comparative case study approach. A case is 
defined as “a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). The term case study as used here refers to an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
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between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). As 
Yin (2003: 13) explains, a case study design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the 
study is to answer how and why questions; (b) the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviour 
of those involved in the study; (c) the researcher want to cover contextual conditions because 
he/she believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under investigation; or (d) the boundaries 
are not clear between the phenomenon and context (which is the case in the present study). 
Rooted in the qualitative research tradition, a case study approach was also chosen because of 
its openness to multiple sources of evidence which enables the researcher to deal with a full 
variety of evidence emerging from direct observation [online participant observation] of the 
events being studied and interviews [in-depth interviews] of the persons involved in the 
events (Wimmer & Dominick, 1987; Stake, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
Comparative cross-national research is a way of identifying the similarities and differences 
among “macro-social units” (such as countries, regions and other larger political entities) 
(Ragin, 2000; Collier, 1993) with the aim of revealing uniqueness. It entails learning about 
how and why different systems are different or similar as well as generating in-depth, 
contextual understanding (Ragin, 2000). As Downey & Stanyer (2005) notes, comparative 
analysis helps us to notice differences and through this making us aware of the geographical 
limitations of concepts and the importance of generalising prudently. Although single case 
studies can certainly provide rich insights into the practices associated uniquely with one 
specific platform (Yin, 2003), comparative method has the advantage of allowing for the 
systematic examination of two or more cases in order to highlight how different they are, thus 
establishing a framework for interpreting how parallel processes of change are played out in 
different ways in each context (Collier, 1993: 108). There are two approaches in comparative 
research: the most similar system design and the most different system design (Lijphart, 
1971). Because in small-N case studies the selection of cases is a deliberate choice based on 
the theory-driven comparative method, this study integrates both the most different system 
design (MDSD) and the most similar system design (MSSD) to examine how and why youth 
activists from a democratic (South Africa) and non-democratic (Zimbabwe) political system 
use Facebook for political action (see Chapters One and Two for a comparison of the two 
countries).  
Hallin & Mancini (2004: 2) ask a relevant question: Why comparative analysis? They point 
out that the role comparative analysis in social research can be understood in terms of two 
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basic functions: its role in concept formation and clarification and its role in causal inference 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Comparative research is important because it sensitises us to 
variation and to similarity, and this can contribute powerfully to concept formation and to the 
refinement of our conceptual apparatus. It enables us to conceptualise more clearly what 
aspects of the system actually require explanation. As Bendix (1963: 535) observes, 
comparative studies “provide an important check on the generalisations implicit” in our 
concepts and forces us to clarify the limits of their application. The second reason 
comparison is important in social investifation is that it allows in many cases to test 
hypothesis about the interrelationships among social phenomena (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 
4).  
Noteworthy to highlight that while it is typical for comparativists to use either MSSD or 
MDSD, some researchers use both system designs (see LeBas, 2011).  On the one hand, the 
MSSD compares very similar cases (apples with apples) which only differ in the dependent 
variable, on the assumption that this would make it easier to find those independent variables 
which can explain the presence/absence of the dependent variable (Przeworski & Teune, 
1970: 33; Norris, 2010). It focuses on variation across cases as the basis of explanation 
thereby “controlling” for certain shared cultural, social or regime characteristics, such as 
studies comparing elections campaigns among member states within the SADC region. Thus, 
the MSSD seeks to compare political systems that share a host of common features in an 
effort to neutralise some differences while highlighting others. On the other hand, the MDSD 
compares very different cases (apples with oranges), all of which however have in common 
the same dependent variable, so that any other circumstance which is present in all the cases 
can be regarded as the independent variable. It concentrates on the commonalities across 
cases so as to eliminate other explanations (Przeworski & Teune, 1970).  It seeks to identify 
those features that are the same among different countries in an effort to account for a 
particular outcome and use contrasting cases in order to find the cause of the differences. The 
“most different” strategy also seeks to maximise contextual variations when identifying 
regularities in the phenomenon under examination, such as comparing the use of Facebook by 
youth activists in democratic and non-democratic contexts. It also seeks to identify the key 
features that are different among similar countries and which account for the observed 
political outcome. It achieves this through deploying the basic logic of falsification
77
, which 
                                                          
77 The basic argument is that science progresses by eliminating possible causes for observed phenomena rather than by finding positive 
relationships. 
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is anchored in the tradition of Popperian philosophy of science (Popper, 1959). In this way, 
MDSD allows the researcher to distil out the common elements from a diverse set of 
countries that have greater explanatory power (Collier, 1993:112).  
 
In terms of their differences, the MDSD differs from the MSSD in the sense that it does not 
take a strict variable. As Peters (1998) argues, the most similar and most different systems 
designs therefore do very different things. On the one hand, the MSSD deals more directly 
with countries as a unit of analysis. It attempts to control for extraneous sources of variance 
by selecting cases in which this is not likely to be a major problem. On the other hand, the 
MDSD is not particularly interested in countries; this is more variable-based research. 
However, as Peters (1998: 41) observes, practically it is difficult to deploy one research 
design while leaving the other. It is only through combining both research designs that one 
can counter any deficiencies that may be countered in either of the two. The reason for 
adopting a combined research design is that because of the area focus of the thesis it was 
important to include shared historical features of the countries under analysis since these 
features would have structured the countries’ social, economic and political perspectives in a 
way that, although not uniform, should account for some level of similarity. On the one hand, 
the MDSD was deployed in order to “distil out the common elements from a diverse set of 
countries that have a greater explanatory power” (Landman, 2008: 70). On the other hand, the 
MSSD allowed for the historical comparison of cases under investigation. Therefore the 
integration of both approaches allowed for the identification of similarities and differences 
which are essential for comparative method. Drawing inspiration from scholars (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996; McCorley, 2015) who have integrated the MDSD and MSSD in their 
comparative studies, I also used a similar approach to compare how and why youth activists 
use Facebook for political purposes South Africa and Zimbabwe. Below, I briefly motivate 
the rationale for choosing the two case nations. 
Rationale for choosing the case nations 
There are certain criteria which should be met in order for the “most similar” and “most 
different” system designs to be combined in a single study. As Landman (2008: 75) argues, 
the combination of the two approaches needs to ensure that three criteria are adhered to in 
order to make sound inferences: “…the proper specification of the outcome to be explained, 
the reasons for adopting…[a] system design, as well as the choice of the particular countries 
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under scrutiny”. As discussed extensively in Chapters One and Two, the two countries have 
different regime types although they share numerous “historical legacies and characteristics 
that lend them to family resemblance selection” (McCorley, 2015: 17). Their historical 
trajectories make them similar in some ways (see Chapter One). The reason for choosing 
Zimbabwe and South Africa was based on the variations on the dependent variable, current 
level of democratic governance. Both countries have not yet experienced the “two-turnover 
test
78” (Huntington, 1991) and do not seem to do so any time soon (McCorley, 2013; 2015). 
Zimbabwe has retreated into authoritarian governance which embodies the instrumentalism of 
violent prebendalism and patronage (Gallagher, 2015). Although South Africa in some respects 
has been successful in implementing political reforms to develop the complexity of the 
economy, increased complexity over the past two decades has not meant that democracy has 
been ingrained (McCorley, 2015: 123; see Chapters One and Two). As demonstrated in 
Chapter One, data sets from the Freedom House and Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
(IIAG) have classified the two case nations differently on the democratic and authoritarian 
scale. South Africa is placed on the democratic side of the regime divide while Zimbabwe is 
characterised as an authoritarian regime (Freedom House, 2014; Ibrahim Index on African 
Governance, 2014).  
Building on Siebert, Peterson & Schramm’s (1956) classifications of media systems, Hallin 
& Mancini’s (2004) seminal work offers a standardised measurement for comparing media 
systems within Western democracies. The primary focus of Hallin and Mancini’s Comparing 
Media Systems is the relationship between media systems and political systems (2004: 1). 
This typology has been used classify the South African and Zimbabwean media systems (see 
Hadland, 2007; 2012; D’Angelo & Pollock, 2010). Inspired by Hallin & Mancini (2004) 
typology
79
 of press-state relations in mature democracies, D’Angelo & Pollock (2010) have 
revised and updated this model arguing that although Zimbabwe and South Africa fit within 
the “Mediterranean”/ “polarised pluralist80” model, they can further be classified into 
“hegemonic” and “participatory pluralist” models respectively. This is partly because in 
                                                          
78 According to Huntington (1991) a nascent democracy is considered consolidated only after it has achieved two peaceful electoral 
alternations after the foundation of the democratic elections. Although passing the two-turnover test does not guarantee that the country will 
not regress back into authoritarianism, it is generally used in indicating whether a new democracy has matured.  
79 Hallin & Mancini (2004) compared the media and political systems of 18 countries in Europe and North America. They found these 
countries could be clustered into three broad groups, or “ideal types”: the Liberal model, the Democratic Corporatist model and the 
Polarised Pluralist model. They propose four major dimensions according to which media systems in Western Europe and North America 
can usefully be compared: (1) the development of media markets, with particular emphasis on the strong or weak development of mass 
circulation press (high or low levels of press circulation); (2) political parallelism, that is, the degree and nature  of the links between the 
media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in the country; (3) 
the development of journalistic professionalism and (4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system  (see Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004: 68-72). 
80 A polarised pluralist model, with media integrated into party politics, weaker commercial media and a strong role for the state 
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Zimbabwe the independent media opeates in an environment which is severely constricted 
whilst the public media is heavily controlled by the government. Although the Zimbabwean 
and South African media systems share some similarities, there are important differences 
which have been enunciated in Chapter Two.  
 
Hadland (2007; 2012) has also attempted to Africanise Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) three 
models of media and political systems and concluded that South Africa’s media system falls 
largely into the “polarised pluralist” model though it retains strong liberal81 model traits. 
Some of the liberal model features exhibited by South Africa include the massive 
development of commercial newspapers with little state involvement and the relative 
dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial media in general. South Africa also fits 
into the “polarised pluralist” model because of the dominance of political coverage and the 
media’s predisposition towards elite audiences. Although the South African media system 
does have leanings towards the “democratic corporatist82” model, with some political 
parallelism
83
, a vibrant civic life, and limits on state power, Hadland (2012: 101) also pointed 
to the limited range of political perspectives found in the media (Hadland, 2012: 101).  The 
state-owned public broadcaster, although displaying elements of bias towards the ruling party 
at certain times, such as elections, and promoting “developmental journalism” (Hadland, 
2012: 106), also incorporates commercial approaches into its journalistic orientation and 
programming (Duncan & Glenn, 2010).  
 
Zimbabwe, one the other, hand fits into the “polarised pluralist” model largely because the 
media system has a high degree of political parallelism, relatively low levels of journalistic 
professionalism and the state has historically played a central, interventionist role in the 
media (IMPI, 2015; see Chapter Two). The Zimbabwean media system has institutionalised 
an environment in which party politics and the media are closely integrated, with a relatively 
weaker commercial radio broadcasting sector (see Chapter Two). As intimated in Chapter 
Two, media polarisation which manifests itself through explicit partisan editorial orientation 
means that the Zimbabwean media system is characterised by “considerable” pluralism 
                                                          
81 A liberal model, in which the media operate according to the principles of the free market, without formal connections between media and 
politics and with minimal state intervention. 
82 In this model, commercial media coexist with the media tied to orgsnised social and political groups and the state has a small but active 
role.  
83
 Political parallelism is one of four “major dimensions” used to categorise countries and their media systems into one or other of Hallin 
and Mancini’s three models of media and politics. The concept of political parallelism refers in essence to the closeness of the links between 
a political system and the media and examines the extent to which media systems reflect the major political trends and cleavages of the host 
country. 
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(Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 61). On the one hand, the state media is unapologetic for its support 
for the ruling ZANU-PF government, on the other hand, the private media appear to have 
signed a pact with the opposition to “hear no evil,” “speak no evil” and “see no evil” 
regarding its affairs (Chari, 2009:10; Chuma, 2005). Hallin & Mancini (2004) observe that a 
high degree of political parallelism, in which the media very directly reflect the spectrum and 
culture of a country’s political life, is most often the hallmark of either the “polarised 
pluralist” model. In Zimbabwe, the media are used as instruments of struggle in conflicts, by 
the ruling party (ZANU-PF) and by opposition parties (MDC-T) struggling against each 
other, but also by other contending parties in periods of democratic politics. For Hallin & 
Mancini (2004), the state in the “polarised pluralist” model plays a large role as an owner, 
regulator, and funder of media. Unlike the commercialised SABC in South Africa, the ZBC 
receives a substantial funding from the government and licence fees which explains the 
extensive political interference in editorial decision making (Moyo, 2009; Mare, 2014). 
Whereas in Zimbabwe, the government owns newspapers through its majority shares in 
Zimpapers, in South Africa there are no state-owned newspapers. The Freedom House (2015) 
rates the Zimbabwean media system as “unfree” while South Africa is considered “partly 
free”. Thus arguably media systems in Zimbabwe and South Africa have very characteristics 
in common. 
 
Both case nations are also important because of the instrumental role of youths in struggles 
for political change and the marked usage of new media technologies to amplify grievances 
and for political mobilisation (Seekings, 2014; Munro, 2015; ActionAid Denmark, 2013). As 
intimated in earlier chapters, these are some of the reasons why this particular study chose to 
focus on Zimbabwe and South Africa, notwithstanding, important factors such as 
convenience and geographical proximity. For practical reasons, the chosen case nations 
allowed the researcher to visit them easily and conduct fieldwork. Next, I discuss the 
rationale for choosing the six case organisations.   
 
4.3.3 Selection of case organisations 
 
Since this study constitutes an embedded multi-case study containing more than one sub-unit 
of analysis (2 countries and 6 organisations), it is important to note that I use these case 
studies instrumentally rather than intrinsically. According to Stake (1995), there are two types 
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of single case study: the intrinsic and the instrumental. The intrinsic case study is generally 
used to learn about a unique phenomenon which the study focuses on whereas the 
instrumental case study describes a specific case of a general phenomenon (Stake, 1995). 
Instrumental case study approach is concerned with theory building. For the purposes of this 
study, the six case organisations were selected to play an instrumental and supportive role 
thereby helping the reader in understanding broader social and political phenomena like the 
relationship between Facebook, youth and political action in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
This means that the case organisations chosen here are of secondary interest.  
The choice of the six social movements under investigation here was shaped by my prior 
research (Mare, 2014) experience in a cross-national comparative study on how political 
activists used social media to organise protests in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland, South 
Africa and Malawi. During this research I realised that most of the political activists who 
were using social media to organise demonstrations in Zimbabwe and South Africa tended to 
be young people. Most of these youths were affiliated with social movements like the Crisis 
in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC), National Constitutional Assembly
84
 (NCA), Youth Forum 
Zimbabwe (YFZ), Unemployed People’s Movement (UPM), Right to Know Campaign 
(R2K) and People Against Suffering Oppression and Poverty Afrika (PASSOP Afrika). 
Consequently, these social movements were chosen, using a purposive sampling technique. 
Purposive sampling is done when the sample is selected by keeping a certain purpose in mind 
(Marshall, 1996), in this case, social movements made up of young people who use social 
media to engage in political activism. Another criterion for choosing these case organisations 
was on the basis of an “information oriented selection strategy” (Flyvbjerg, 2001). This 
means these case organisations were selected on the basis of expectations about their 
information content rather than representativeness and random sampling. The six case 
organisations were chosen because of their involvement in offline political/social activism, 
their politically engaged youthful constituencies and their “strong outward presence on the 
Net” (in this case, active use of Facebook) (Dahlgren, 2000: 340) in their respective 
countries. In the end, the chosen six organisations constitute “proto-typical” cases which 
helped me to examine how and why young activists use Facebook for political activism in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. Next, I look at the case organisations.  
                                                          
84
At the time of this research, the NCA had not yet transformed itself from a mass broad based movement into a political party. It did so in 
September 2013 during its national congress. 
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The NCA was formed in 1997 with the primary goal of advocating for the writing of a 
people-centred constitution. As a pressure group, the NCA was instrumental in the formation 
of the MDC in 1999 and has over the years been at the forefront of protests against Mugabe’s 
domestic tyranny. As of the 30
th
 of August 3013, NCA had 33 000 members on its Facebook 
group. The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition is the largest conglomeration of more than 350 civil 
society organisations. Its youth cluster is made of youth social formations like the Zimbabwe 
Youth Movement, Youth Agenda Trust and Youth Empowerment Trust. The organisation 
had 67 981 members on its Facebook page. The YFZ was formed in 2004 as the first youth 
social formation outside student activism in Zimbabwe. Boasting a network of grassroots 
activists and volunteers in rural and urban areas, the organisation aims to promote youth 
empowerment and increase the participation of young men and women in policy dialogue and 
political discourse. YFZ had 40 000 members on its Facebook page. 
The UPM was formed in August 2009 following concerns about high unemployment in 
Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa and dissatisfaction with the local 
government’s response to this situation. Formed by a small group of unemployed (old and 
young) people with limited financial resources, the organisation has been at the forefront of 
convening public meetings, issuing media statements, participating in public debates, and 
organising protests and demonstrations in Grahamstown and other parts of South Africa. 
UPM had 917 members on its Facebook page. PASSOP Afrika was established in 2007 with 
the sole purpose of fighting for the rights of asylum-seekers, refugees and immigrants in 
South Africa. It draws the majority of its members and volunteers from the refugee 
community in the Western Cape. It had 4 964 members on its Facebook page. The R2K 
Campaign was launched in August 2010, is an umbrella group of organisations and activists 
campaigning to advance the free flow of information in South Africa. Popular for its access to 
information campaign against the Protection of State Information Bill (the Secrecy Bill), R2K 
Campaign has expanded its scope to include broader issues like access to information, 
freedom of expression and the free flow of information. It had 7,753 members on its 
Facebook page. 
It is important to highlight that the six case organisations qualify as social movements in the 
sense that they “are informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise 
about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest” (della Porta & 
Diani, 1999: 16). Another important characteristic of these case organisations is that they are 
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actively involved in contentious politics and collective claim-making in their respective 
countries. Contentious politics refers to a situation “when ordinary people, often in league 
with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities and 
opponents” (Tarrow, 1998: 2). The three selected social movements in Zimbabwe have been 
at the forefront of organising public meetings, demonstrations, petition drives, issuing 
statements to and in the media, and pamphleteering (McCandless, 2011). Similarly in South 
Africa, the PASSOP Afrika, R2K Campaign and UPM make use of repertoires of contention 
such as engaging in public demonstrations, public meetings, petitions and agitating for the 
passage of progressive laws. These organisations also have a full-time secretariat, an office, 
paid staff and or volunteers (Kamete, 2010b). Below, I discuss about negotiating entry into 
the field.  
4.3.4 Negotiating entry into a multi-sited research context 
 
Negotiating entry is a tedious process which involves managing one’s identity, self-
presentation in everyday life and building cordial relationships with the researched. As part of 
my pre-fieldwork preparation, I spent a significant amount of time on Facebook trawling 
through groups, fan and profile pages as a “passive observer” in an attempt to get an 
“intimate familiarity” (Brewer, 2000) of the research site. I will revisit the ethics of passive 
observation in section 4.7. This approach to gaining entry known as “mental access” 
(Gummesson, 2000) enabled me to understand what is happening, delineate what to observe 
and from whom to gather information. Informally, the fieldwork process began in August 
2009 when I became interested in monitoring how prominent activists in Zimbabwe were 
using Facebook to discuss the Zimbabwean crisis. Although lurking as an ethnographic 
strategy is replete with ethical challenges (which will be discussed later), it allows for a 
period of cultural familiarisation in order to facilitate a relatively smooth entry into the field. 
But officially, the fieldwork for this particular study commenced on the 1
st 
of August 2011 
after receiving informed consent (I will look at ethical issues in section 4.7) from individual 
participants and gatekeepers from the case organisations under consideration. I disclosed my 
status as a PhD student at Rhodes University undertaking a research project on the use of 
Facebook for political activities by the youth in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Before 
embarking on my fieldwork, I had been granted an ethical clearance from Rhodes 
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University’s ethics committee as well as a release letter (see appendix 1) addressed to 
gatekeepers at the six case organisations.    
Because multi-sited fieldwork involves multiple gates of entry (Wittel, 2000), I found myself 
having to deal with gatekeeping at individual (youth activists), group (Facebook 
administrators) and organisational (leaders of the six social movements) levels. Being 
accepted as a member-cum-researcher in a Facebook group required negotiating access with 
the administrator(s) (often someone who is not the leader of the organisation). Given the 
multi-sited nature of my fieldwork, I also found myself knocking on physical and virtual 
gates manned by different gatekeepers. These gates are sometimes closed, partially closed or 
opened. This is because Facebook privacy settings allow users to restrict who could access 
their profiles. Participants were selected based on active participation on Facebook and 
offline protest actions. Active participants refer to users who create, transform, distribute, and 
consume content on the web (van Dijck, 2009). I had minimal success recruiting respondents 
through emails (sent to their professional addresses) and private messages on Facebook. Most 
of my emails were either ignored or sent back with a message of refusal. I kept on knocking 
persistently until some “gates” were opened. Referral through friends and Facebook group 
administrators also proved worthwhile, as some respondents who initially turned down my 
requests ended up agreeing to take part in the study. This means that the process of gaining 
entry is never linear but involves negotiation, persistence and continuous re-negotiation. I 
found some social movements (like the CiZC, PASSOP Afrika and YFZ) more difficult to 
access than others because of the inherent fear harboured by gatekeepers that researchers can 
infiltrate their organisations using research as a cover up. Some of these organisations have 
been under state security surveillance which explains their schizophrenic attitude towards 
researchers.  
In order to negotiate physical access, I used Patton’s (2002) “known sponsor approach” 
which entailed relying on the leaders of the purposively sampled case organisations to 
introduce me to the rest of the members. This kind of snowball sampling technique allowed 
me to gather research subjects through the identification of an initial subject who was used to 
provide names of other participants (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). I briefed these “known 
sponsors” about the nature of my research, data collection tools, fieldwork timescale and 
ethical obligations. This was in line with Lofland & Lofland’s (1984: 25) observation that 
since qualitative researchers are asking participants to “grant access to their lives, their 
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minds, and their emotions,” it is also important to provide respondents with a straightforward 
description of the goals of the research. Support at the leadership levels of the social 
movements was crucial to my success in gaining access to the rest of the members. This is 
because, as Stake (1995) asserts, “individuals often immediately acquiesce if a superior has 
granted permission”. I asked “known sponsors” to introduce me to youth activists within their 
organisations who were heavy users of Facebook. I also used the Rhodes University student 
card to introduce myself to some respondents. The process of negotiating entry was, however, 
not smooth sailing as some youth activists in Zimbabwe were suspicious of identity and 
research objectives beyond academic interests. This deep mistrust of my identity is captured 
in the following conversation:  
Chief, I hear you on your desire to conduct research on Facebook and youth activism 
but I have to be frank with you. My fear is that we may be opening up our 
organisation to someone working for the CIO
85
. Do you have a release letter or 
student ID from your institution before we can grant you access? 
Despite this apparent mistrust, the fact that I “shared” Facebook friends and group affiliations 
with some of the respondents opened physical and virtual gates for me to conduct fieldwork. 
This is because, as Ekdale (2013) observes, social media provide a digital archive for 
participants to “study up” on the researcher. Because of the “shared” friendship, some 
respondents treated me as a fellow activist, therefore a “comrade” in the struggle. I was 
constantly greeted using the title “comrade” on Facebook and during face-to-face interviews. 
Be-friending my respondents on Facebook allowed me to track their online practices as well 
as maintaining social relationships with them. I also managed to tap into my extended 
networks of friends, activists, journalists and academics who helped me to reach some of the 
youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Access to respondents in South Africa was 
also enhanced by the fact that some of the social movements had working relationship with 
the Highway Africa Centre and conference, a part of Rhodes University’s School of 
Journalism and Media Studies.  
Next, I discuss the data collection techniques and sampling procedures. 
4.4 Data collection techniques and sampling procedures 
 
                                                          
85 The Central Intelligence Officers (CIO) is the national intelligence agency or ‘secret police’ of Zimbabwe.  
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In keeping with the epistemological imperatives of the qualitative research tradition, this 
study blends traditional and digital data collection techniques (Murthy, 2008), also known as 
“hybridisation” (Denzin, 2004) which includes: online participant observation, qualitative 
content analysis and individual in-depth interviews (I discuss these data gathering 
instruments below). This hybrid approach “not only gives researchers a larger and more 
exciting array of methods, but also enables them to demarginalise the voice of respondents” 
(Murthy, 2008: 837). Quantitative data on the levels of participation on Facebook was also 
collected through online participant observation. 
4.4.1 Social media ethnography (online participant observation) 
 
As outlined earlier, online participant observation is one of the key data collection techniques 
for ethnography. This technique is defined as the process which enables researchers to learn 
about the activities of the people under study in their natural settings through observing and 
participating in those activities (Kawulich, 2005). It entails being involved for an extended 
period of time in the daily lives of people (for instance, Facebook groups and profile pages) 
under investigation. This method views virtual worlds as legitimate contexts of culture and 
meaning making as the actual world. Thus Facebook groups and fan pages as sites of 
meaningful social action and cultural reconstruction can be studied through ethnographic 
methods like physical communities. Participant observation allowed me to go beyond taken-
for-granted assumptions and dig deep into youth activists’ everyday life contexts [on 
Facebook] or what Malinowski (1922) calls the “the imponderabilia of everyday life”. This 
technique also allowed me to view youths’ “backstage culture” (DeMunck & Sobo, 1998) on 
Facebook. Combining the advantage of unobtrusive observation with the benefits of 
engagement with research participants, online participant observation allowed me to 
participate in and observe youth activists’ online activities. Moving between mediated and 
unmediated spaces, I was able to observe and interview youth activists on how they use 
Facebook to promote their political objectives. I also used this technique to understand the 
levels of participation and micro-politics of participation on Facebook groups and profile 
pages. 
The advantage of online participant observation is that it allowed me to engage in “deep 
hanging out” (Geertz, 1998; boyd, 2007) as well as to conduct online qualitative interviews 
with youth activists. Deep hanging out is a form of participatory observation in which the 
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researcher is physically or virtually present in a group for extended periods of time or for 
long informal sessions (interactions via private message and chat on Facebook). This is 
because the immersion into a specific locality [such as Facebook groups and fan pages] and 
online participant observation remains the cornerstone of both traditional and virtual 
ethnographic research (Miller & Slater, 2000; Hine, 2005; Postill & Pink, 2012). Through 
this immersion in Facebook groups and profile pages, I was able to experience events as an 
insider in the same way that the youth activists I was studying experienced these events. 
Described as social media ethnography (Postill & Pink, 2012), online participant observation 
enabled me to observe youth activists’ political discussions and levels of interaction on 
Facebook groups and profile pages. This practice finds support in Lichterman’s (1998: 401) 
suggestion that [online] participant observation “can teach us much about the everyday 
meanings of doing social activism”. Given the “general tendency for people to disclose more 
about themselves online” (Hine, 2005: 18), social media ethnography allowed me to observe 
youth activists’ use of Facebook for political purposes which could not be gathered through 
qualitative interviews. It also allowed me to assess the extent to which Facebook can be 
considered as an alternative space for political activism.  
Formally online participant observation took place during a period of two years (from the 1
st
 
of August 2011 to the 30
th
 of August 2013). Although I did not keep records of how much 
time I spent combing through Facebook, on average I scanned at least 10 profile pages a day 
in an effort to keep track of youth activists’ everyday political conversations. I also regularly 
monitored discursive interactions in the six Facebook groups under investigation. In total, I 
befriended and observed at least 102 Facebook profile pages. These Facebook users were 
selected on the basis of purposive and snowball sampling techniques which allowed me to 
focus on active participants on the site and youth activists who were already using the 
platform for political purposes. Online participant observation gave me first-hand information 
on Facebook activist practices and the participative nature of on different groups and profile 
pages. Building on Postill & Pink’s (2012) typology, my ethnographic fieldwork revolved 
around five overlapping routines: observing, catching up, exploring, interacting, and 
archiving (I will look at these routines in detail below). 
The first routine entailed observing conversations, interactions, practices and activities of 
individuals and group members on Facebook. A decision (based on ethical considerations) 
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was made to observe and identify relevant “political86” rather than “personal87” postings on 
Facebook groups and profile pages, although I acknowledge that there are very blurry lines 
between them. This allowed me to draw a flexible checklist (see appendix 4) of how young 
people use Facebook for political purposes. Directly observing what youth activists “shared”, 
“updated” and “commented” on in their Facebook groups and profile pages enabled me to get 
insight into how they used the site to facilitate political activism and protests. As 
Haythornthwaite (2005: 127) suggests, “looking at what people talk about with others is an 
ideal unit for examining social behaviours (…) and reveals aspects of groups that are not 
evident from aggregations of individual behaviours”.  As part of the observation phase, I took 
field notes (through saving relevant status updates, conversations, images and so forth) based 
on my personal impressions (see appendix 4). 
Besides merely observing and identifying relevant political postings and discursive 
interactions on Facebook groups and profile pages, the second routine I engaged in was 
catching-up with my respondents. I kept track of the happenings on my research participants’ 
Facebook groups and profile pages through periodically checking my “notifications88” 
function. I also used the Facebook news feed
89
 function as a “semi-public notice board”. This 
means I read and got timeous updates on individual and group discussions through regularly 
checking my Facebook news feed. My third routine involved exploration. Through this 
routine, I regularly followed and monitored external website links, listened to audio and 
watched video messages posted by youth activists on their Facebook groups and profile 
pages. Following and monitoring youth activists’ trace data on Facebook allowed me to track 
patterns of communication and to quantify the levels of participation on the platform. Most of 
the external website links posted by youth activists often took me to online newspapers, 
blogs, social movements’ websites, motivational quotations and book reviews.  
As a fore-runner to in-depth interviews, my fourth routine involved interacting with my 
respondents through Facebook chat, private messages and e-mail. Besides enabling me to 
develop an extended set of “weak-ties” with the respondents, informal conversations on 
                                                          
86
By political posts, I refer these objectives are directed towards engaging with how power and resources are organised in society, and what 
needs to be done to change power relations and the distribution of resources. I also refer to posts that raise political questions and can be 
used to encourage political debate or even action. These posts focus on different targets ranging from government, political parties, 
corporate organisations, and multinational corporations, regional and supra-national entities and so forth. 
87 These are posts with purely associational and communicative objectives that happen in and are influenced by one’s socio-political and 
cultural environment. For instance: “I have just checked in at city hotel”. 
88
 This feature acted as an alarm system keeping me abreast of events occurring in different groups and activities of Facebook users who are 
my friends on the site. 
89 This is a function which automatically deliver news about your friends’ latest actions on Facebook to your homepage) regularly 
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Facebook allowed me to ask follow up questions intended to allow respondents to expand 
their answers on individual subjects. Dubois & Ford (2015) call these informal conversations 
“trace interviews90”. Trace interviews allowed me to use data gathered from online 
participant observation as probes thereby serving as “instructive way[s] of stimulating the 
interviewees’ memory and encouraging [them] to elaborate” (Orgad, 2005: 61). Because 
“researchers can easily reinterpret or misinterpret these messages if they lack deep knowledge 
of the individuals and relationships involved” (Howard, 2002: 555), informal conversations 
gave me a platform to seek clarification on the contextual meanings of different messages 
posted, shared and recommended on the site. Interaction also involved “liking” posts shared 
on Facebook by youth activists. Liking was chosen as a mode of interaction because it 
ensured that I did not influence the course of events and Facebook discussions. As noted 
earlier, I desisted from “commenting” and “replying” directly to political post (Facebook 
discussion thread) as way of minimising my participation. Informal conversations (though 
chats and private messages) on Facebook facilitated “phatic communion” (Miller, 2008) with 
a large pool of respondents with very low investments in time per contact. During these 
informal interviews with youth activists, I often talked about their profiles and group 
discussions to get a sense of what they thought about the political discourses and 
conversations they engaged in with their friends on Facebook. 
The fifth routine consisted of archiving the qualitative and quantitative data mined from 
Facebook groups and profile pages. Archiving of online data is required “in order to have 
stable object to study and refer to when the analysis is to be documented” (Bruggler, 2011: 
24). Instead of “written diaries” or “field notes” (Malinowski, 1922) associated with 
traditional ethnography, I used a combination of manual (copying and pasting onto an MS 
word document) and electronic (relying on archived material by Facebook Inc.) archiving 
systems. I archived quantitative meta-data on the number of people who had joined a group, 
number of participants who commented on various political posts, number of participants 
who liked a post and number of participants who replied to a post. Facebook group and 
profile pages interactions were downloaded as html files. These were exported into Excel 
sheets separating the units of text by variables such as date, author, comment, and addressee 
(if applicable). I regularly copied and pasted onto MS word documents any status updates 
which suited my research questions (see section 4.4.2). For the purposes of data storage and 
                                                          
90 Trace interviews involve the collection, visualisation, and discussion of a participant’s traces with that participant. This process enables 
participants to interpret data by providing contextual details and clues about their motivations for undertaking particular actions represented 
in the data as well as to point to missing or inaccurate data ((Dubois & Ford, 2015: 2072). 
138 
 
capture, archived data was classified according to the theme of the status update, comments, 
pseudonym of the author, publication date, group information and name of the event. 
Facebook is also handy for researchers because it archives data that are constitutively 
evanescent, rapidly changing and at risk of disappearing (Mosco, 2014). In this case, 
electronic archiving was complemented by manual archiving since research (Hanna, 2009) 
has shown that activists have the tendency to delete information they consider incriminating 
after a mobilisation event. Archived material was also used during in-depth interviews to 
probe further youth activists’ perspectives on how they use Facebook to mediate political 
action. In the next section, I look at qualitative content analysis.  
4.4.2 Qualitative Content Analysis 
 
In line with this study’s fourth research question, which seeks to document and analyse the 
kinds of political discourses circulated by youth activists on Facebook groups and profile 
pages, I also used qualitative thematic/content analysis. Content analysis refers to a 
quantitative method for the “objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952: 18; see also Krippendorf, 1969). 
Quantitative content analysis is concerned with identifying and counting the frequency of 
particular traits of a media text so as to deduce and establish certain causal relationships 
between variables and their wider social significance (Deacon, Pickering, Golding & 
Murdock, 2007: 119). Because of the interpretive thrust of this study, I used qualitative 
thematic/ content analysis. Qualitative thematic/content analysis refers to a technique that 
goes beyond examining the manifest contents or surface structures of a media text, by 
attempting to unearth its latent/implicit messages or the “deep structural readings” (Wigston, 
2009: 5; Berg, 1998; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). It is a research method for the “subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of 
coding and identifying theme or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1278). Unlike 
quantitative content analysis, which is based on predefined categories, the qualitative content 
analysis is concerned with uncovering themes found in content to address latent meanings 
contained within texts (Mayring, 1999). Media texts are considered to be constitutive of 
various social meanings which are situated in particular social contexts (Deacon et al., 1999; 
Altheide, 1987). As such, qualitative content analysis allowed me to identify important 
themes or categories within a body of Facebook content (text, images, audio), and to provide 
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a rich description of the social reality created by those themes/categories as they are lived out 
in a particular setting (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). 
 
As Huang (2009: 151) argues, qualitative content analysis allows researchers to capture “the 
key trends and characteristics of the activists’ internet use”. In social movement studies, 
qualitative content analysis has been used to analyse 250 politically oriented Facebook 
groups (Marichal, 2012), and to explore whether the internet can serve a public sphere 
(Salter, 2003). In this study, through a qualitative content analysis of the Facebook postings, I 
was able to document and analyse the kinds of political discourses circulated by youth 
activists on the platform. Qualitative content analysis of content posted on Facebook groups 
and profile pages also helped me to understand the extent to which the platform can be 
considered an alternative space for political activism. 
 
The sampling frame for qualitative content analysis constituted 1230 Facebook postings (text, 
images, links and video) archived from the 1
st
 of August 2011 to the 30
th
 of August 2013. A 
period of two years was also considered a long enough time to get “thick descriptions” 
(Geertz, 1973) by observing and documenting youth’s everyday political practices on 
Facebook. As intimated earlier, I focused on political as opposed to personal Facebook 
postings. Besides personal postings (include post meant for private consumption), 
advertisements for products, discussions about topics that had no relevance whatsoever to 
political issues or events were also excluded from the purposively sampled 3182 posts (see 
section 5.3.1). I also excluded postings containing redundant remarks and that did not answer 
the research questions of this study. After I identified political posts (as defined earlier), I 
proceeded to thematically analyse them in order to identify themes. The chosen postings had 
very different sizes, some quite short and others very long. As the unit of analysis, I used the 
format of one post (i.e., wall post, shared post, comment), whether it was posted by the group 
administrator or by an individual on his/her Facebook group or profile page. Out of a corpus 
of 3182 posts, 230 posts were purposively chosen because of their information richness and 
relevance for this study. This is because qualitative content analysts “purposively select text 
which can inform the research questions being investigated” (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009: 2). 
 
Data was organised into categories or themes in accordance with the research questions, 
theoretical frame (see Chapter Two) and Hsieh & Shannon’s (2005) conventional and 
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directed coding system. According to Hsieh & Shannon (2005), conventional content analysis 
(or inductive category development application) refers to a system in which coding categories 
are derived directly and inductively from the raw data. Directed content analysis (or 
deductive category application) refers to a system in which initial coding starts with a theory 
or relevant research objectives bringing them in connection with the text (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). In this case, conventional qualitative content analysis enabled me to immerse myself 
in the data and allow themes to emerge from the data during data analysis process. I took 
notes during the coding process, writing short descriptions of what each code meant and how 
it could be used to understand the phenomenon. In deploying conventional qualitative content 
analysis, I took into cognisance the socio-political and media contexts within which the 
observations were made. 
 
As indicated in Chapter Two, the notion of “digital hidden transcripts” will be used later in 
Chapter Seven to document and analyse the kinds of political discourses circulated by youth 
activists on Facebook groups and profile pages. Building on Hsieh & Shannon’s (2005) 
directed qualitative content analysis, various genres of digital hidden transcripts as discussed 
in Chapter Two were deductively categorised and analysed in relation to raw data. Through a 
constant process of moving back and forth between theory, literature review, and my data, I 
coded
91
 raw data on the basis of digital hidden transcripts. Thus Facebook postings were 
analysed and categorised on the basis of analytical categories identified by Scott (1990) and 
other scholars (Willems, 2010; 2011; Nyamnjoh, 2005) on popular culture in Africa. These 
include: political rumour, jokes, cartoons, gossip and online petitions (see Chapter Two). 
Data was compared with the above codes
92
 to see if they correspond or if there are any 
emerging themes. A qualitative content analysis of Facebook postings also served the 
purpose of preparing me sufficiently for the role of interviewer in individual in-depth 
interviews. Below I discuss about individual in-depth interviews. 
4.4.3 Individual in-depth interviews 
 
At the start of this fieldwork, I intended to use focus group discussions (FGDs), but given the 
political sensitivities around conducting research (I will focus on ethical issues in section 4.7) 
                                                          
91 Coding is a way of defining relevant data and to label them with a word or short phrase. It means naming segments of data with a label 
that simultaneously categorises, summarises and accounts for each piece of data (Charmaz, 2007).  
92 Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive data. Codes usually are attached to “chunks” of varying size- 
words, phrases, sentence or paragraphs connected or unconnected to a specific setting (Neuman, 2006:460). 
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especially in Zimbabwe, most respondents expressed reservations about taking part in 
interviews occurring in a group context. Realising that I risked running out of potential 
respondents if I proceeded with FGDs, I decided to use individual in-depth interviews. The 
advantage of an in-depth interview is that it proceeds as a confidential and secure 
conversation between the interviewer and the respondent. In-depth interviews are concerned 
with eliciting individuals’ personal histories, perspectives, and experiences, particularly when 
sensitive topics are being explored (Warren, 2001). I was also interested in cultivating a sense 
of trust between myself and the respondents. Instead of relying on online data, in-depth 
interviews allowed me “[to] obtain users’ constructions of their experience of Internet 
[Facebook] use’ (Orgad, 2005: 54). In-depth interviews were also chosen because they give 
the respondents an opportunity to freely express their experiences and explanations about the 
issue under investigation (Bryman, 2004). These interviews were partly informed by online 
participant observations and qualitative content analysis of status updates posted on Facebook 
groups and profile pages. In-depth interviews allowed me to fill gaps and to verify data 
gathered through online participant observations. This provided me with additional 
information – especially regarding purposed use (verbalised) and actual use of Facebook. 
Generally regarded as a “conversation” (Kvale, 1996) or as a “conversation with a purpose” 
(Baxter & Babbie, 2003), in-depth interviews put emphasis on researchers asking questions 
and listening, and respondents answering. Because of the ability of in-depth interviews to 
provide “extensive data concerning participants’ opinions, recollections, values, motivations 
and feelings” (Du Plooy, 1995:112), this method was used to examine how and why 
politically engaged youth use Facebook to advance political objectives. It also allowed me to 
account for the kind of activist work that young people do “behind the screen” (Orgad, 2005: 
58). The interviews with youth activists took various forms ranging from face-to-face 
discussions, Facebook chats, e-mail and telephonic interviews. Given the challenge of 
accessing dispersed populations and dealing with young people’s physical immobility 
(Pascoe, 2012), I also used my mobile phone to schedule interviews, to conduct interviews 
and to pose follow-up questions. As Pelckmans (2010: 31) suggests, “telephone calls to and 
from the field (“phoning the field”) serve as a reminder of the open-ended and seemingly 
placeless nature of contemporary fieldwork”. Cognisant of the risks associated with mobile 
communication surveillance, I sought informed consent from my respondents before 
proceeding with telephonic interviews. I also ensured that sensitive questions were posed 
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through relatively secure platforms like Gmail, Facebook private messages and WhatsApp 
chat in order to safeguard the security of my respondents. Overall, the mobile phone served 
as a recording, receiving and broadcasting tool which allowed me to be in perpetual contact 
with the field. 
Due to time, financial constraints and the cross-national nature of the study, it was difficult to 
travel throughout Zimbabwe and South Africa conducting face-to-face interviews with 
youths; hence I used digital tools to reach my respondents. Platforms like the short message 
application WhatsApp proved to be equally important data collection tools for reaching 
geographically dispersed respondents. This mobile instant messaging platform enabled me to 
conduct interviews during times when my respondents were free to chat. Besides probing for 
more information, I also used WhatsApp to maintain social relationships during and after the 
fieldwork process. I also used emails to send semi-structured open-ended questions to my 
respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Extended question and answer session permitted 
by email interview sessions also helped me to establish rapport, comfort and generate more 
detailed answers. 
Although most of the respondents who preferred email interviews took long to respond, I had 
the advantage of following up on them via Facebook chat. Facebook chat proved the most 
popular form of interviewing as most respondents found it hard to attend physical meetings. 
As one respondent remarked, “I prefer that we conduct the interview on Facebook because it 
allows me to do other things while I am chatting with you”. Consequently, I resorted to 
Facebook’s real-time chat system which gave me an opportunity to communicate with several 
respondents whilst simultaneously observing their online activities. The advantage of this 
mode of interviewing is that respondents “write in their own words” which reduces data 
transfer errors and the time required to transcribe recorded interviews (Bryman, 1988). 
Another advantage of this form of interviewing is that chats on Facebook are “saved” as 
messages which allows for some kind of automated archiving. Both online and offline 
interviews enabled me to verify information observed online and also to expand on themes 
that emerged from online participant observation. 
I interviewed six Facebook group administrators about their motivation(s) for the creation of 
a group. A total of 49 respondents (38 males and 11 females) were interviewed in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa (see Figure 1). This gender discrepancy in terms of my respondents can be 
explained by the fact activist work is generally skewed towards men. This is a good round 
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number, particularly if interviews are supplemented with online participant-observation and 
qualitative content analysis. As Adler & Adler (2002) suggest, a broad range of between a 
dozen and 60, with 30 being the mean offers the advantage of penetrating beyond a very 
small number of people without imposing the hardship of endless data gathering, especially 
when researchers are faced with time constraints. They argue that when considering the 
length of time this type of research often takes, the difficulty of gaining entry to even the 
most mundane group or setting, and the difficulty in transcribing thousands of hours of 
interviews (Adler & Adler, 2002). The other reason was the fact that after interviewing 49 
respondents, I decided to call off in-depth interviews after noticing that interviewees were 
repeating what others had said.  
Table 1: Distribution of respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
Name of social movements Number of respondents  
National Constitutional 
Assembly 
8 
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition  14 
Youth Forum in Zimbabwe 8 
PASSOP Afrika 5 
UPM 8 
Right to Know Campaign 6 
Total 49 
 
I conducted most of the face-to-face interviews between August 2011 and August 2013. The 
timing of the fieldwork exercise coincided with the referendum and the 2013 harmonised 
elections in Zimbabwe and upsurge in social protests in South Africa which took place in 
2012. I scheduled the interviews at a time and place convenient to the respondents. Most of 
the interviews with youth activists took place in offices, cafes, cars, boardrooms and 
university seminar rooms. All the face-to-face interviews were recorded using a Blackberry 
phone (after seeking permission from participants) and transcribed with the exception of 
telephonic interviews where extensive notes were taken and written up as verbatim as 
possible. Interviews took an average of one hour depending on the responses from 
respondents. Although all interviews were conducted in English, but in South Africa I ended 
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up recruiting a translator because some of my respondents were not fluent English speakers. 
As a “cultural broker” (Temple & Young, 2004), the translator was employed to interpret the 
actual interviews. In cases where respondents refused to be phone-recorded, I resorted to 
meticulous manual note-taking throughout the interviews. Recorded interviews were 
uploaded to a laptop with a personal password for safe keeping. Useful informal 
conversations on Facebook were archived using a combination of MS word and pdf formats.  
A wide range of questions related to the four broad research questions were asked via semi-
structured and unstructured interviews. In semi-structured interviews, the researcher may 
begin with a set of questions or concerns but is free to engage with the respondent using 
follow-up questions, to re-phrase a question, and to ask for clarifications (Priest, 1996; Blee 
& Taylor, 2002). Besides ensuring consistency with all interviewees, an interview guide 
permitted me to keep the interview within the parameters traced out by the aim of the study. 
As such, the questions were aimed at eliciting respondents’ points of view, motivations and 
perceptions on how, why and when they use Facebook for political purposes. Some of the 
questions include: Can you explain how you use Facebook to engage in political activism? 
What kind of political activities do you engage in on Facebook? As a group administrator, 
can you explain how you use Facebook to facilitate political and social mobilisation? What 
kind of political information do you often post on your Facebook group or profile page? Why 
do you use Facebook (and not any other traditional and social media) to promote your 
political causes?  Under what conditions do you employ Facebook for political activism? 
How has the use of Facebook during the Arab Spring influenced the way you use the site for 
political activism? In your opinion, how has Facebook changed the way you conduct political 
activism? Are there any cases where your online activism spilled into offline activism? If yes 
or no, can you explain how and why? When using Facebook, have you ever blocked, 
unfriended or hidden someone because they posted political issues that you disagreed with or 
found offensive? If yes, explain how did you deal with it? (see the interview guide in the 
appendix 2 and 3). Next I discuss the sampling techniques for qualitative interviews. 
4.4.4Sampling procedure for interviews 
 
This study used a combination of purposive, convenience and snowball sampling techniques 
to recruit 49 youth activists for in-depth interviews. As intimated earlier, purposive sampling 
involves the selection of a sample on the basis of the researcher’s knowledge of the 
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population and its elements and the nature of the research aims (Baxter & Babbie, 2003: 
135). Some interviewees were purposively selected during my online participant observation 
on Facebook. These respondents were selected because of their “active participation” (van 
Dijck, 2009) on Facebook, age (falling between 16 and 35 years) and knowledge of digital 
activism. Convenience sampling technique is when subjects are selected on the basis of their 
accessibility and proximity to the researcher (Marshall, 1996). In this case, youth activists 
who were present at the social movements’ offices were identified as potential interviewees. 
Through snowball sampling, I was able to rely on my initial respondents to recruit more 
youth activists within their social movements. These sampling techniques were used because 
guidelines for sampling for qualitative researchers are highly flexible and situational (Deacon 
et al., 1999).  
Whilst doing my PhD fieldwork, I was commissioned by the Media Centre
93
 to train citizen 
journalists and community activists on how to use social media to advance social and 
political objectives in Zimbabwe, which allowed me to identify more interviewees for this 
particular study. I was also commissioned by the same organisation to conduct a baseline 
study on how the youth use new media to engage in political activities in five major cities 
(Mutare, Gweru, Harare, Bulawayo and Masvingo). These part-time engagements ended up 
opening possibilities for an expanding web of contact and enquiry. I was able to interview 
over 250 young people in Zimbabwe. Next I look at data triangulation.  
4.5 Triangulation 
 
Originally derived from surveying, where it refers to the use of a series of triangles to map 
out an area (Bryman, 2004), triangulation has been used in social sciences as part of the 
rationale for multi-method research. In social sciences, triangulation refers to the use of more 
than one approach to the investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence 
in the ensuing findings (Bryman, 2004; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). It involves the use of 
multiple measures, data sources, methods, tools, people, investigators and even theories 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Wimmer & Dominick, 2006). At the core of triangulation is the 
argument that despite the epistemological and ontological differences between qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies, synergies between the two can be found (Bryman, 
2004). Scholars (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Bryman, 2004) advocating for triangulation point 
                                                          
93 The Media Centre is a non-governmental organisation working on access to information issues based in Harare, Zimbabwe.  
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out that those who argue that qualitative and quantitative research belong to different sides of 
the epistemological divide have exaggerated the differences between these methods and 
ignored their common features.  
Triangulation is hailed for allowing researchers to cross check data from multiple sources to 
search for regularities in the research data (Donoghue & Punch, 2003). Because it offers the 
prospect of enhanced confidence and the wider and deep understanding of the study 
phenomena, this study triangulated quantitative and qualitative data. Because this study is 
anchored within the frame of small data, it deploys data triangulation which entails gathering 
qualitative and quantitative data through several data techniques (in-depth interviews, 
qualitative content analysis and online participant observation), so that slices of data at 
different times and social situations, as well as on a variety of people, are gathered (Bryman, 
2004). As outlined earlier, quantitative data was gathered through online participant 
observation. Quantitative data gathered was aimed at assessing the dialogic nature of 
Facebook groups and fan pages (see section 4.4.1).Below I focus on data analysis procedures. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
 
As intimated earlier (see section 4.4.2), conventional and directed content analysis (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2000) was used to make sense of Facebook postings as part of 
qualitative content analysis. Because the processing and analysis of qualitative data is not so 
much “a distinct stage of the research” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995: 204), I began my 
informal data analysis during the process of verbatim transcription of interviews and 
recording of field notes (both offline and online data). Data from in-depth interviews and 
online participant observation was analysed using a qualitative coding approach (Kirby & 
McKenna, 1989). As part of this qualitative coding approach, all interviews were transcribed. 
After the verbatim transcription of the interview data, I listened to all recorded materials 
repeatedly whilst scribbling notes and listing thematic categories. Initial coding was 
generated through reading responses whilst labelling data that are related without worrying 
about the variety of categories. This initial coding process allowed me to make sense of raw 
data without bringing theory and literature to bear on it.  
 
Throughout this cyclical process, I constantly wrote short notes, listed ideas and diagrammed 
relationships I noticed and searched for special vocabulary that respondents used. Special 
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vocabulary used here includes: “alternative site of struggle”, “virtual public square”, “an 
instrument of political freedom”, and “our own mini-website”. After the initial coding 
process, I engaged in focused coding which allowed me to eliminate, combine or sub-divide 
analytic themes and look for repeating ideas and larger themes that connect codes. This 
allowed me to zoom in on all the responses that referred directly to my study objectives and 
research questions. During the formal data analysis phase, I was cognisant of the need to 
identify common themes and interesting narratives related to my main research questions. 
Online data from online participant observation was also categorised in accordance with the 
research questions of this study. Because qualitative data analysis is generally 
unapologetically “creative and interpretive” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998: 29), I used interesting 
narratives and verbatim quotes as representative illustrations. 
 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven therefore report findings from online participant observation 
and interview data in light of the study’s research questions. Analytic themes related to how 
youth activists use Facebook for political purposes are presented in Chapter Five followed by 
the reasons why young activists use Facebook for political purposes in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven presents findings on the dialogic interactions and 
micro-politics of participation on Facebook groups and profile pages while section 7.3 
assesses the extent to which Facebook can be considered as an alternative sphere for political 
activism. Next I discuss the ethical considerations which guide this study. 
 
4.7 Ethical considerations 
 
Any scientific endeavour is riddled with the challenge of ensuring a delicate balance between 
knowledge production and adhering to ethical guidelines. This study was no different, as my 
desire to produce knowledge had to be counterbalanced by upholding scientific principles.  
Although I received ethical clearance from Rhodes University’s Ethical Standards 
Committee, I must point out that university ethical codes are insufficient to illuminate hidden 
aspects and offer practical solutions to researchers in online inquiry settings. Whilst I do not 
advocate for the total abandonment of academic scientific ethics, I believe that these 
guidelines are not cast in stone. These ethical guidelines should be “contextualised” 
(Whiteman, 2010) in line with multi-sited environments. Contextualised ethics, as Whiteman 
(2012) notes, do not exclude the relevance of general principles to the practice of research but 
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rather explore the interpretation and relevance of these principals in the specific research 
context. 
Because scientific research ethics exhort researchers to avoid harming their respondents as 
well as to avoid infringing on the rights of respondents, I had to navigate a minefield of 
ethical issues. Some of the ethical questions that arose during the fieldwork and reporting 
phase include: Who are my respondents?  Whose data is it? What is private information? 
What is public information? How do I handle online data in my thesis? Should I include 
verbatim quotations from Facebook group and profile pages and risk that the participant is 
traceable through current or future search facilities? All these foregoing ethical questions are 
intimately connected to the well-established and broader ethical debates around private 
versus public realms, consent, and rights to privacy (Hammersley & Traianou, 2012).  
In order to meet the ethical obligations of this study, I requested permission to be a researcher 
on the six Facebook groups from their administrators. Although some of these groups were 
public groups, meaning their information could be accessed by everyone on Facebook, I 
requested for permission from Facebook group administrators to use messages contained 
therein. I also asked youth activists for their permission to use Facebook postings and to 
record them during the interviews. Given the intricate relationship between informed consent 
and privacy concerns in an online environment, I adopted “de-lurking” as an ethical strategy. 
De-lurking entails making my presence known to the youth activists before befriending and 
covertly observing them on Facebook (boyd, 2007). This strategy enabled me to develop 
social rapport with participants I observed and contacted for further conversation. 
Another ethical problem associated with social media research is traceability. This refers to 
the fact that all communication which is typed rather than spoken leaves a physical trace 
known as a “data trace” that can be archived or preserved (Duffy, 2002). In order to deal with 
this ethical problem, data mined from Facebook groups and profile pages will be used 
sparingly to ensure confidentiality and privacy (Sveningsson, 2004). Due to the political 
volatility of the Zimbabwean context and the sensitivity of some of the responses provided by 
respondents, I decided to use the term “male” or “female youth” in place of real names 
(associated with Facebook policy) to preserve confidentiality throughout findings chapter. 
The terms male or female youth were qualified with the use of the name of the social 
movement (for instance, female youth, NCA) with regards to the citation of interviews and 
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online participant observations. All “Googlable” postings were de-identified through a 
combination of paraphrasing and use of the term male or female youth.  
4.7 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have presented a detailed account of the choice and justification of the 
research methodology, methods and procedures. I have situated this study within the ambit of 
the comparative case study approach. Despite locating this particular study within the context 
of qualitative research design, I have argued that quantitative data is also useful in terms of 
assessing the participation levels on Facebook groups and profile pages. Consequently, I have 
noted that this study make use of data triangulation. Qualitative research has allowed me to 
investigate how and why Facebook is deployed for political activities “from the ground-level 
view of those using these tools” (Gerbaudo, 2012: 5-6). In order to gather qualitative and 
quantitative data, I have deployed three-pronged data collection techniques: online participant 
observation, qualitative content analysis and individual in-depth interviews. I have also 
discussed ethical considerations navigated in this study highlighting how these challenges 
were addressed.  
Thus, the research findings presented and discussed in the next two chapters (Chapter Five, 
Six and Seven) are derived from the methodological approach outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HOW YOUTH ACTIVISTS USE FACEBOOK FOR POLITICAL 
ACTION IN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has discussed at length the methodology and methods employed in this 
study. This chapter presents the research findings mostly informed by the literature and 
theoretical discussions outlined in Chapters One, Two and Three. As intimated in Chapter 
Four, data for this particular chapter was gathered through a combination of online participant 
observation, qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews. The chapter foregrounds a 
comparative analysis of how Zimbabwean and South African youths drawn from a range of 
social movements use Facebook for political purposes. The data is interpreted and presented 
in collaboration with verbatim quotations derived from the in-depth interviews and online 
participant observations culled from Facebook groups and fan pages. It is important to note 
that all the discussion and analysis of findings in the next four chapters are discussed in an 
integrated manner in order to avoid repetition. An integrated approach is concerned with 
synthesising both the discussion and analysis so as ensure a flawless articulation of issues. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, this study is situated within the context of comparative 
ethnographic and multi-sited fieldwork which allowed me to triangulate online and offline 
data collection techniques: social media ethnography, qualitative content analysis and in-
depth interviews. Social media ethnography enabled me “to immerse myself in the context 
and spaces in which they [Facebook users] use the technology” (Mabweazara, 2013: 106), 
thereby directly observing how youths behaved on Facebook pages and groups. Qualitative 
content analysis was also useful because it enabled me to analyse online data gathered from 
Facebook groups and fan pages. To corroborate online observations and qualitative content 
analysis, in-depth interviews were also deployed. The purpose of in-depth interviews was to 
investigate how and why youths in both countries used Facebook for political purposes. In 
this chapter, online data gathered from Facebook groups, fan pages and profile pages will be 
used without direct attribution to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. With the exception of 
a few Facebook posts which are presented in an abridged format, it is important to note that 
no changes have been made to the original spelling or grammar of all postings. For Facebook 
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postings written in vernacular languages (like ChiShona, isiXhosa, isiNdebele and so forth) 
translation is provided. Although not everyone on the six Facebook groups and fan pages 
studied in Zimbabwe and South Africa fit into the category of the youth (as defined in 
Chapter One), it is important to note that these digital spaces are frequented by young people 
(see Chapter Seven). As intimated in Chapter Four, all the 49 respondents (34 males and 15 
females) in Zimbabwe and South Africa were promised anonymity hence the use of terms 
like “male youth” and “female youth” for attribution purposes.  
5.1 Responses on how youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook for 
political purposes 
 
To answer this research question, all the 49 respondents were asked the following question: 
How are you using Facebook for political purposes? Administrators of the six Facebook 
groups and pages were also asked to give their opinion on how they utilise the platform to 
promote their political causes.  
5.1.1 Facebook as a platform for disseminating and receiving information 
 
One of the main findings of this study was that Facebook has become an indispensable 
“repertoire of communication94” (Mattoni, 2013) for politically active youths in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. Most respondents acknowledged that Facebook has allowed them to 
receive and transmit user and professionally-generated political information. Online 
observations and in-depth interviews revealed that respondents in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa utilised Facebook to respond to the “falsehoods” that they claimed were circulated 
through traditional media platforms. A classic example of the use of Facebook to respond to 
“falsehoods” was witnessed on the PASSOP Afrika page: 
Box 1:  Response by the PASSOP Afrika 
Braam Hanekom responds to Premier and Leader of the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), Helen Zille's newsletter, which referred to him as 
"(nephew of an ANC Cabinet member)" and to PASSOP as "his 
organisation “Passop” sought to unionise the workers for the COSATU 
affiliate, the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU)". 
Source: PASSOP Afrika Facebook page 
                                                          
94 It refers to the entire set of activist media practices that social movement actors might conceive as possible and then develop in both the 
latent and visible stages of mobilisation, to reach social actors positioned both within and beyond the social movement milieu. 
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The above post was circulated following the publication of a story entitled: “The Real Story 
Behind The Western Cape, 17
th
 March 2013” in a newsletter by the former Democratic 
Alliance (DA) leader and current Premier of the Western Cape referring Braam Hanekom as 
a nephew of ANC cabinet member. Braam Hanekom is the nephew of Tourism Minister and 
ANC national executive committee member Derek Hanekom. In response, Braam Hanekom, 
the director of PASSOP, pointed out that “my (family) relationship to a political leader does 
not define me politically or in any other way… My political views are defined by my 
experience and not my surname”. He added that the organisation was not a personal entity but 
collectively owned by the members. It is evident from the above post that Facebook offers 
young activists in South Africa an opportunity to “talk back” and challenge misrepresentation 
by other media platforms. As Khamis, Gold & Vaughn (2012: 8) observe, social media “can 
function as a proxy free press, a medium that can uncover and challenge falsehoods and 
misinformation”. It can be argued that Facebook enables youth activists to engage in frame 
articulation
95
 and disarticulation. 
Most of the interviewees in Zimbabwe and South Africa observed that Facebook enabled 
them to bypass traditional media gatekeepers and retain “control” over content production. 
As one of the male interviewees from the NCA put it: “it gives us an opportunity to put the 
record straight without relying on journalists to tell our own narrative”. This means that the 
site allowed youth activists to make their voices heard in an “unmediated” fashion. For 
instance, the post below illustrates the situation where the NCA by-passed the mainstream 
public and private media: 
Box 2: Media alert shared by one male youth from the NCA on the 19
th
 February 2013 
The National Constitutional Assembly has filed an urgent High Court application today 
seeking an extension on the referendum date. For more on that contact our lawyers 
Andrew Makoni on 0772218758, 0772234891, Alec Muchadehama on 0772218754.  
Take charge and complete the Change Vote No 
Asijiki No retreat No surrender 
 
Source: NCA Facebook page 
Box 2 clearly illustrates the importance of Facebook as a platform for timeous dissemination 
of information. In this case, the constitutional lobby group had filed an urgent High Court 
                                                          
95 Frame articulation involves “the connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they can hang together in a relatively unified 
and compelling fashion” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 622). This is achieved by assembling, collating and packaging different perspectives on 
various events and experiences, which result in the creation of new frames and interpretations. 
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application seeking to extend the referendum date (16 March) in 2013 proclaimed by 
President Mugabe. They launched the court application to stop the vote arguing the 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was improperly constituted and that acting 
commission chair, Joyce Kazembe could not run elections. Thus, the use Facebook to update 
the constituency and members allowed the organisation to by-pass the mainstream media. In 
terms of the social movement framing theory, Facebook can therefore be viewed as enabling 
youth activists to undertake “frame amplification96”. The use of “asijiki” (an isiNdebele 
which means we will never surrender in English) by the Facebook admin from NCA (see Box 
2) can be conceptualised as an attempt to construct collective identity in the online space. 
Melucci (1989:34) defines collective identity as a “shared definition produced by several 
interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their actions as well as the 
field of opportunities and constraints in which their actions take place”. Thus the use of 
slogans and militant language is necessary for identity formation (Melucci, 1989). 
  
The mainstream media has also been chastised by activists and scholars for reporting protests 
and demonstrations through the “law and (dis)order frame” (Cottle, 2008: 855) thereby 
promoting what Gitlin (1980) has described as the “protest paradigm”. This refers to “a 
routinised template for creating protest stories that has been naturalised through the process 
of journalistic socialisation” (McLeod, 2007: 186; Chan & Lee, 1984). Based on this template 
the mainstream media focuses on the spectacle of the protest, highlighting sensational details 
such as violence, visible drama, and deviant or strange behaviour, thereby obfuscating the 
core concerns raised by social movements and activists (Kielbowicz & Scherer, 1986; Atton, 
2002). Most of the respondents in both countries concurred that the mainstream public and 
private media could not be trusted to articulate their grievances impartially despite its self-
representation as the “voice of the voiceless” (Friedman, 2011). As one of the male 
respondents from the UPM in South Africa observed: “commercial media are part of 
capitalism and we can’t expect them to carry our grievances impartially”. It is problem for the 
UPM if the commercial media are part of capitalism because it means the media protect the 
interests of the capital rather than the jobless youths when it comes to reporting about the 
protest action targeted at corporate entities.  
                                                          
96 Frame amplification involves “accenting and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as being more salient than others” (Benford & 
Snow, 2000: 623). 
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Given the repressive media environment in Zimbabwe, most of the interviewees indicated 
that Facebook constituted one of the few communication channels through which they could 
“go around” the “captured” traditional public media platforms. As one male respondent from 
the CiZC noted, “Facebook has compensated somewhat for the lack of independent spaces 
for political communication”. Extending this view further, Kelly & Eitling (2008) argue that 
in authoritarian regimes, networked communications can allow participants to get around 
state control. Unlike in South Africa where respondents mentioned that Facebook was one of 
the many communication platforms they used to disseminate valuable information to their 
supporters, their Zimbabwean counterparts highlighted that the site provided an “alternative 
outlet for information dissemination”. This is consistent with research (Moyo, 2009; 
Manganga, 2012; Mare, 2014; see Chapter Two) that suggests that new media technologies 
allow marginalised publics to create a “parallel market of communication”. It is clear from 
the foregoing that the concern from youth activists in South Africa is economic censorship 
whereas in Zimbabwe it’s about political censorship of the media.  
Figure 1 below shows the front page of the Daily Catalyst
97
 circulated by the CiZC through 
Facebook messaging and email system to relay information that is not always accessible 
through traditional public media. Because the traditional media in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa are constituted differently—state-controlled and market-oriented respectively—
Facebook pages and groups allowed youth activists to circumvent different gatekeeping 
practices. As Postmes & Brunsting (2002) observe, the internet allows activists to take 
control of the message they want presented publicly. 
Figure 1: The CiZC’s Daily Catalyst: 
                                                          
97 It’s an email-based newsletter which updates members of the CiZC on internal activities, news and human rights alerts. 
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Source: CiZC Facebook Page 
Most interviewees in South Africa noted that Facebook was one of the many communication 
platforms they used to disseminate valuable information to their supporters. For instance, one 
male respondent from PASSOP Afrika stated that: “Facebook has given us another method of 
communicating with our members, for our members to communicate with us, for media to 
follow us, for us to share relevant news”. Respondents from the PASSOP Afrika also noted 
that the site was vital for timeous dissemination of information about deportations, asylum 
application processes and the plight of asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa. This also 
suggests that youth activists are using Facebook as a “public space of representation” 
(Melucci, 1996). For example, Box 3 urges asylum seekers who have been duped by South 
African officials at the department of home office in Cape Town to come forward and report 
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the issue. This was following the call by the new Minister of Home Affairs to report all cases 
of corruption and bribery related to the issuance of asylum papers in Cape Town. 
Box 3: Notice to asylum seekers 
IMPORTANT NOTICE!! 
WE ARE HEREBY ADVISING EVERYONE WHO HAS BEEN TO HOME 
AFFAIRS OFFICES AT FORESHORE, (CAPE TOWN), WITH AN EXPIRED 
ASYLUM PERMIT, AND WAS CHARGED A FINE OF R2500.00 TO 
CONTACT PASSOP OFFICES ON 021 762 0322 OR E MAIL: 
office@passop.co.za. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THANK YOU! 
Source: PASSOP Afrika Facebook page 
Unlike in Zimbabwe, where Facebook was hailed as an alternative medium for circulating 
marginalised civic content, most respondents in South Africa saw the same platform as 
complementing rather than substituting traditional media platforms. Online observations 
reflected that youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa used Facebook to publish press 
statements, to make public announcements and to upload photographs of demonstrations and 
marches. It was also observed that respondents in both countries employed Facebook for 
providing information in a unidirectional fashion rather than multi-directional conversations. 
Online observations indicated that most Facebook postings were aimed at broadcasting 
content rather than interacting with existing fans and potential members. This corroborates 
McCorkindale’s (2010) observation that social media users often under-exploit the 
opportunity for dialogical communication. Building on Duncan’s (2014) argument, one can 
posit that this demonstrates that most activists and social movements have not internalised the 
interactive nature of social media.  
Online observations also found that some respondents from the CiZC and R2K Campaign 
used the site live blogging of proceedings from public meetings (see Box 4). When asked 
why they used Facebook for live blogging of public meetings, one of the interviewees from 
the CiZC observed that it allowed them to route around limitations imposed by geographical 
dispersion of their supporters. He put it as follows: “you know mass migration has dislocated 
our population so through Facebook we are able to inform everyone about what’s going on at 
the meeting even if they can’t attend physically”. Live commentary enabled geographically 
dispersed Facebook fans to “virtually” attend public meetings and also to participate through 
asking questions to the panellists. This entails that the Facebook administrator plays an 
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intermediary role between the fans or members and the panellists during a public meeting. 
He/she ensures that textual content and images from the public meetings are posted on the 
Facebook page while also relaying questions posted by fans or members on the page to the 
panellists. The administrator/moderator also informs the fans about feedback from the 
panellists. For instance, Box 4 below shows a micro-blog post by one of the youth activist 
during a public meeting addressed by three signatories of the GNU. The post is relevant 
because it shows how youth activists use Facebook to report on public meetings:  
Box 4: Live commentary of a public meeting attended by panellists from the three 
major political parties in Zimbabwe 
(Priscilla Misihairambwi) Mushonga-Misihairambwi (MDC-N): tells 
Mutsvangwa that the liberation generation is not just from ZANU PF, it is 
about Zimbabwe. She states that she lost a brother in the war 
(Douglas) Mwonzora (MDC-T): states that the older people find it hard to 
believe that blacks can be clever and when something good and smart is 
done by the prodemocracy forces they assume that it must be the West.  
(Christopher) Mutsvangwa (ZANU-PF): says he knows ZIDERA and says 
that it wants Zimbabwe to reverse the land patterns in order for sanctions to 
be removed. Says Mwonzora shld nt guess what was fought for becoz the 
liberators knw. Says zim’s economy is doin well and will be the fastest 
growing economy in the world. Says MDCs hav been coopted into ZANU-
PF. 
Source: Facebook wall of a youth from the CiZC: 3 March 2013 
From the above post, it can be argued that “the storytelling infrastructure of platforms like 
Facebook…invites observers to tune into events they are physically removed from by 
imagining what these might feel like for people directly experiencing them” (Papacharissi, 
2014: 4). Qualitative interviews with the CiZC Facebook page administrator indicated that 
they used the site to “crowd-source” questions and feedback from their geographically 
dispersed members during public meetings with invited guests. She explained: 
Facebook is aiding our work. As panellists are talking we are posting. Even yesterday 
when the [former] Prime Minister [Morgan Tsvangirai] was discussing we were 
posting and crowdsourcing questions from the general public. It allows us to reach 
inaccessible people within a very short space of time. It’s more effective than 
traditional media because we don’t have to wait for the news cycle to publish. We 
also source information from other people which we then post on our page. 
It can be argued from the foregoing that the emphasis is on information dissemination rather 
than dialogical conversations, which means that the interactive potential of Facebook is 
under-utilised by respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This weakness can be 
attributed to limited knowledge in terms of social media activism as well as use of repertoires 
158 
 
of communication from other political contexts without localising them to suit their own 
contexts. 
5.1.2 Facebook as a venue to contact and engage with political figures 
 
Compared to their South African counterparts, most of the respondents in Zimbabwe reported 
using Facebook for contacting and accessing political figures. Unlike traditional political 
communication where citizens contacted politicians through face-to-face meetings, letters, 
public meetings and so forth (see Verba & Nie, 1972), in modern political communication 
young people use repertoires like mobile phone calls, emails and social media platforms for 
contacting political decision-makers (Stromer-Galley, 2014; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). As part 
of traditional political communication, citizens relied on sending letters to express deeply felt 
policy positions or to request assistance on personal matters related to public officials. 
Contacting, unlike voting, constitutes a direct attempt to influence political representatives 
and policy outcomes. From the responses, it was evident that respondents from both countries 
used Facebook to join fan pages administered by political parties and to comment on 
politicians’ status updates. As Schwartz (2015) notes, this platform is a way to circumvent the 
traditional media gatekeepers, and for the mass media, it is an easy source to gather political 
statements and vox populi. The interactive nature of the Facebook page allows young people 
to engage with politicians through public comments. 
It was established that compared to the Zimbabwean case, the South African respondents are 
less involved in interacting with politicians on Facebook largely due to the different 
characters of their electoral systems. Whereas South Africa uses the party list variant of the 
proportional representation (PR) system, Zimbabwe deploys a hybrid system of the first-past-
the-post (FPTP) of the single-member plurity system (for the National Assembly) and the 
party list system (for The Senate) of the single-member plurity system (Matlosa, 2002; 
Hodzi, 2014a). Unlike the FPTP system used for the National Assembly in Zimbabwe where 
a country is divided into relatively equal constituencies from which only one representative is 
chosen to occupy a parliamentary seat on behalf of that constituency, in South Africa the 
whole country is considered as one single constituency for the election hence there is no need 
for the delimitation of election boundaries (Matlosa, 2002). Compared to the PR system, the 
FPTP is hailed for ensuring accountability of the MP to his/her constituency. In the former, 
there are no direct lines of political accountability between the MP and his/her constituency.  
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Unlike the constituency-based system for the National Assembly in Zimbabwe, South Africa 
uses an opinion-based electoral system. This means that in Zimbabwe candidates contesting 
election for a seat in the National Assembly stand in their own right as individuals and not as 
political parties even if their candidature is endorsed by parties. In contrast, in South Africa 
candidates do not contest elections as individuals, but as party candidates appearing on a 
prepared list (Matlosa, 2002). Compared to the South African system, the FPTP used for the 
National Assembly in Zimbabwe ensures that voters have a say in whether the MP retains 
(notwithstanding electoral fraud) his/her parliamentary seat rather than the party. This partly 
explains why some Zimbabwean politicians especially in urban constituencies are active on 
Facebook (and other social media platforms) in order to bypass the mainstream media, create 
a personal publicity channel and to increase their accessibility and public visibility amongst 
their constituents.   
Although most respondents in Zimbabwe bemoaned the fact that very few politicians were 
active on Facebook, some of those who were very active on the site were from opposition 
parties. This is attributed to the fact that most of the MPs from the MDC-T and MDC-N are 
from urban areas. Another reason is that rural areas are considered no-go areas for the 
opposition parties. Compared to ZANU-PF, the opposition in Zimbabwe have relatively 
youthful politicians who are tech-savvy and active on social media platforms. Unlike the 
opposition, most ZANU-PF politicians are very old and digitally illiterate. Names of 
politicians from the opposition who are contactable through Facebook include: Job Sikhala 
(former MP for St Marys), Nelson Chamisa (MP for Kuwadzana), Jessie Majome (MP for 
Harare West), Douglas Mwonzora (MDC-T Secretary General), Jameson Timba (former MP 
for Mt Pleasant), David Coltart (MDC-N), Obert Gutu (MDC-T Spokesperson), Hon Tendai 
Biti (Leader of MDC Renewal), Cecil Zwizwai (MP for Gweru Central), Welshman Ncube 
(President of MDC-N), Arthur Mutambara (former President of MDC-N) and Morgan 
Tsvangirai (MDC-T President). Some of the respondents mentioned the names of ZANU-PF 
politicians whom they engaged on Facebook like Saviour Kasukuwere (Minister of Water, 
Environment and Climate Change), Prof Jonathan Moyo (Minister of Information, Media and 
Broadcasting Services), Fortune Chasi (former deputy Minister of Justice) and Psychology 
Maziwisa (ZANU-PF deputy-director of information). It is important to bear in mind that 
although most of these politicians are active on Facebook in so far as they post and respond 
to their fans’ questions regularly, some of them engage in vibrant online discussions with 
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citizens through chats, wall discussions and private messaging. For instance, Jessie Majome 
uses her Facebook page to inform, educate and interact with citizens in her constituency. This 
further affirms the view that social media has given the opportunity to candidates in party-
centred systems to engage in personal promotion outside the auspices of their parties (Enli & 
Skogerbø, 2013). More recent research (Miller et al., 2016) indicates that local politicians in 
South Italy construct long status updates to describe their achievements in the local council.  
From the interviews, it was evident that respondents in Zimbabwe have taken advantage of 
the accessibility of politicians on Facebook. As one male respondent from the YFZ stated, “in 
a political system where politicians are generally inaccessible because of the bureaucracy 
involved, new media affords me the opportunity to speak directly with them”. This echoes 
Booysen’s (2015: 64) view that social media “help establish an interface with their [citizens] 
otherwise frequently absentee (elected) representatives”. It also shows that youths in both 
countries are using Facebook to engage in “dutiful citizenship” (Bennett, 2008) practices. As 
invited spaces of participation, Facebook chat and messaging can be viewed as 
complementing the traditional methods of dropping of a complaint in the suggestion box. In 
South Africa, youth activists used Facebook to engage with mostly political parties rather 
than local representatives. Some of these respondents stressed that they used Facebook to 
comment and post their opinions on pages like the ANC, EFF, DA and Agang. This supports 
previous studies (Ndlovu & Mbenga, 2013; Hyde-Clarke & Steenkamp, 2014) which 
indicated that young South Africans are utilising Facebook to engage with youth leagues of 
the largest political parties. Although some of the respondents noted that they reached out to 
politicians like Mmusi Maimane, Julius Malema and Andile Mngxitama, most of the 
interactions occurred on Facebook pages which are administered by political parties. Similar 
to Bosch’s (2013) observation, this study established that despite liking Facebook pages of 
political parties and politicians, most respondents in South Africa did not interact with the 
content posted on these pages. 
Respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa observed that they also employed Facebook to 
participate in political radio and television talk shows. These practices constitute what 
Vaccari, Chadwick & O’Laughlin (2015) call “second or dual screening”. Second screening 
practices involved the use of new media technologies like mobile phones, laptops and ipads 
to comment on radio programmes, live television events and other mediated events. In both 
countries, respondents also reported that Facebook also enabled them to share and comment 
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on political news circulated by mainstream public and private newspapers. This is what one 
of the respondents from the CiZC had to say:  
… Facebook is now one of the few spaces where we as young people can interact 
directly with politicians. Take the example of Minister Kasukuwere, Nelson Chamisa 
and Minister Muzembi who are reachable on their Facebook pages, this allows us to 
engage directly with them. I like Minister Kasukuwere’s approach where every 
Sunday between 6pm and 8pm, he makes it a point to engage with young people on 
issues that affect them. He invites us to post questions which he answers and then give 
us his private contact details if we have further questions. 
The above response seems to confirm the view that Facebook allows citizens “to overcome 
the distance and alienation from the formal institutions of government” (Vromen, 2014: 23). 
As Coleman & Blumler (2009) argue, new media enable political decision-makers to create a 
sense of accessibility, which also allows them to foster some kind of “mutuality” through 
informal conversations online. At the time of this research, Jessie Majome, Job Sikhala, 
Obert Gutu and Saviour Kasukuwere were some of the few politicians on Facebook with 
highly interactive pages. For instance, Kasukuwere hosted a Facebook chat session every 
Sunday evening between 6pm and 8pm. As Box 4 illustrates, Minister Kasukuwere invited 
his Facebook fans to share their experiences and suggestions on ways of addressing the water 
crisis in the country. Some of these issue-driven chats focused on youth empowerment, 
climate change, waste management, and wildlife protection. As Lüders (2013) observes, this 
participatory turn gives citizens the opportunity to do politics in collaboration with their 
elected representatives. The problem with these invited spaces of participation, as Vromen 
(2007: 61) observes, is that they tend to “focus on…consultation with individuals rather than 
active processes of citizen ownership and collective forms of participation”. This means that 
politicians retain the power to frame the political agenda thereby relegating their Facebook 
fans to an amorphous public with little control over the consultative rituals. Although the 
presence of political candidates on Facebook has a democratic potential, the interactive 
features are often rather interaction-as-product than interaction-as-process (Stromer-Galley, 
2004). Arguably, the deployment of Facebook by political parties and politicians in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa exhibits a facade of interaction (Stromer-Galley, 2000), rather 
than a genuine attempt to use citizen interaction to further democratic process. As moderators 
or administrators of these invited spaces of mediated participation, politicians can choose to 
ignore unpalatable comments and block those who criticise their policies and viewpoints. As 
Dryzek (2000: 149) points out, “the most effective and insidious way to silence others in 
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politics is a refusal to listen”. In the end, this “rhetoric of participation” and the presence of 
interactive Facebook pages “create merely a spectacle of interactivity” (Stromer-Galley, 
2014: 5). Another problem with these invited spaces of participation is that they may also 
unintentionally lead to the systematic exclusion of a wide spectrum of people who are not 
connected to the internet or those fearful of expressing their deeply felt views online.    
Box 5: Sunday chat on Facebook hosted by Minister Kasukuwere 
Water situation discussion 
Minister Kasukuwere: Good evening friends. The ministry is exploring a number of 
interventions to alleviate the water problems across the country. These can be divided into 
long term and short term interventions. I am hoping to get some feedback from you regarding 
these interventions with a view of strengthening the processes we have put in motion. An 
example is Bulawayo, which we have made a priority. What has been your experience? I am 
equally open to your suggestions and comments on how we can improve the water situation 
in this country. Let’s chat. –SK- 
Source: Saviour Kasukuwere Facebook page 
5.1.3 Facebook as a vehicle for online fundraising and donations 
 
Another important finding of this study is that Facebook is also used to mount fund-raising 
campaigns. Online observations established that some youths from PASSOP Afrika are using 
the social network site as a channel for soliciting donations and crowd-funding. Crowd-
funding denotes the practice of funding a project or campaign by raising monetary 
contributions from a large number of people via the internet and other digital technologies 
(Prive, 2012). Writing about the American electoral campaigns, Chadwick & Howard (2010) 
suggest that online fundraising has become increasingly important because it encourages 
small donations from a multitude of sources. Online fundraising is also viewed as enabling 
for the mobilisation and recruitment of donors, who may be unreachable through offline 
methods (Reddick & Panomonov, 2013). Scholars (Wasserman, 2007; Chiumbu, 2015) 
observe that in South Africa websites are used to mobilise financial resources and develop a 
network of elite support. Bank details are placed on the website and users are able to donate 
money to the social movements. Although most respondents did not volunteer information on 
this aspect during interviews, it was observed that traditional vehicles (such as writing 
proposals to traditional donors, income-generating projects and voluntary donations) of 
fundraising remained instrumental. It must be noted that the internet is not a replacement tool 
for traditional fundraising. In developed countries like the UK, the #nomakeupselfie 
campaign raised more than £1 million ($1.6 million) for cancer charities through social media 
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platforms (Lewis, 2014). Research (Wasserman, 2007) in South Africa has also shown that 
the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) used the e-mail and the internet to solicit funds from 
supporters abroad. From online observations, it emerged that the administrator of the 
PASSOP Facebook page used the site to distribute the messages that encouraged people to 
contribute towards the holding of an LGBTI refugees’ conference.  
Box 6: Call for donations 
Passop Afrika will be holding an LGBTI Refugees’ Conference next month in Observatory, 
Cape Town. The objective of the conference is to provide expert human rights training for 
LGBTI refugees who still live in vulnerable and volatile conditions in South Africa. 
Homophobia is a growing concern in South African society and we must take the first step in 
eradicating it. In order to hold a successful conference, we are asking people to contribute as 
much as they can for this good cause. Please click on the link below for more information and 
we would welcome any contribution, no matter how minimal. Our goal is to raise 9000 rands. 
So far we have raised 2,830 rands. Please make it happen. Thank you very much. 
Source: PASSOP Afrika Facebook Page 
Similar to the above example, some of the observed youths from the CiZC employed 
Facebook to solicit for donations in cash and kind during the Tokwe-Mukosi floods disaster 
in Masvingo South. The post below is illustrative of how the site was harnessed for 
fundraising purposes:  
Box 7: call for donations 
To those who did not manage to attend the show, you can still bring your donations to our 
offices. ZimRights in Collaboration with The Women’s Trust, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 
Bhaso and The Design House; held a successful Soap and Shirt Donation Winter Festival at 
Belgravia Sports Club. We would like to thank everyone who donated and took time out in 
this cold weather to come for out and do something for charity! ZimRights is still compiling 
how much was collected and sorting according to the age groups; we will keep you posted on 
the dates when the donations will be taken to Tokwe Mukosi!  Thank you once again for 
being so kind and blessing the needy! We indeed are making a positive difference. 
Source: Facebook wall post by a CiZC activist 
It can be deduced from the foregoing that youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa have started 
to experiment with the utilisation of Facebook as a conduit for fundraising and online 
donations. Unlike other interviewees, it was established that youths from PASSOP Afrika in 
South Africa had embraced Facebook as a vehicle for small-scale donations. Miller et al 
(2016) highlight that when Islamic State (IS) occupied Sinjar in Kurdish Iraq, the Kurdish 
population in Mardin, Turkey used Facebook to show support and organise a collection of 
funds, clothes and goods to distribute to the Yezidi refugees who had arrived in the town. At 
the time of my research, it was not clear whether these online fundraising initiatives were 
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successful or not but it can be deduced that respondents are using Facebook to engage in 
alternative forms of political participation.  
 
5.1.4 Facebook as a conduit for political mobilisation 
 
Through online participant observation and in-depth interviews, it emerged that respondents 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook as a crucial tool for mobilising their supporters. 
Mobilisation refers “to the process by which a passive collection of individuals in a society is 
transformed into an active group in the pursuit of political, social and ideological change” 
(Nedelman, 2007: 181). As Gallagher (2009) points out, online mobilisation is not only 
limited to raising awareness, but also provoking people to take action. It also emerged from 
interviews that respondents in Zimbabwe viewed Facebook as providing them with an 
alternative to traditional channels of political mobilisation. This, is because in Zimbabwe, it is 
almost impossible for activists to organise public rallies, door-to-door visits and street 
demonstrations. Facebook thus enabled them to evade legal restrictions associated with 
offline political mobilisation. As Gerbaudo (2012) points out, this explains the reason why 
corporate social media have been appropriated and turned into an expansive medium of mass 
mobilisation in authoritarian regimes. Unlike in Zimbabwe, most respondents in South Africa 
observed that Facebook constituted one among many channels through which they mobilised 
the public for collective action. As highlighted in Chapter Three, compared to the 
Zimbabwean context, South Africa has several channels for activists to mobilise supporters 
for direct political action.  
Respondents in both countries indicated that given the diverse demographic backgrounds of 
their supporters they also used traditional channels like pamphlets, word of mouth, 
newsletters, telephone calls and door-to-door visits. This view chimes with Tilly’s (1978) 
argument that “repertoires of collective action98” are fixed in a certain time and space and 
generally slow to innovate. As such, Facebook is utilised in Zimbabwe and South Africa in 
collaboration with other traditional campaign methods rather than as a substitute. In this 
“hybrid media system”, Chadwick (2013) argues that older media logics increasingly operate 
in relations of interdependence with newer media logics. This is connected with the idea of 
                                                          
98 It refers to the distinctive constellations of tactics and strategies developed over time and used by protest groups to act collectively in 
order to make claims on individuals and groups. 
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communicative ecology which acknowledges the multiple platforms of mediation which are 
deployed in any given context based on historical and localised needs (Foth & Hearn, 2007). 
 From in-depth interviews, respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa articulated a number 
of reasons why they use Facebook for political mobilisation. Below are some of their views:  
We are alive to the reality that most youths do spend most of their time on social 
media, but they also shun conventional platforms for citizen participation like 
community meetings and rallies, equally they loathe reading civic education 
materials. Most parts of the country remain volatile, polarised and hostile to ordinary 
civic activities and in that atmosphere it takes the brave to fully participate. We 
realised that the majority of the youth feel safer to express themselves on social 
media. That’s why we are using Facebook to mobilise youths to register and go out 
and cast their votes (male youth, CiZC, 2013).  
I am using Facebook to mobilise first time voters to go out and vote. Basically I am 
educating them about the importance of participating in political processes and 
decision making. This is because I believe that almost 90 percent of the youth are on 
Facebook. Facebook is helping us to reach out to people. It is faster and flexible. If 
you put it on Facebook it can spread faster (female youth, YFZ, 2013).  
As for us in the Vote No campaign, we are not putting our eggs in one basket. We 
have many youths on social media. The conventional media campaign of road shows, 
rallies and public meetings has been overtaken by events. Limited funding means that 
we have had to devise cheaper means of communication. We have Facebook page, a 
blog, and a Twitter account. We are also using cheaper methods of conscientising 
people like door to door campaign (male youth, NCA, 2013).  
Much of my use of Facebook is to promote social or political opinions or create 
awareness of certain causes and beliefs, and also to mobilise people to get involved in 
political action (male youth, R2K Campaign, 2013). 
Online observations also revealed that most youths in Zimbabwe deployed Facebook to 
mobilise first time voters to register during the 2013 elections (see Box 7), to inspect the 
voters roll and to vote during the referendum and harmonised election (see Figure 2), and to 
boycott consumer products on political grounds (see Box 8). In terms of the social movement 
framing theory, this indicates that youth activists are using Facebook pages and groups for 
motivational framing. According to Benford & Snow (2000: 617), motivational framing is a 
“call to arms” of sorts—a “rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action, including 
the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive”. These findings suggest that 
Zimbabwean youths are using Facebook to mobilise others to engage in “dutiful” and “self-
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actualising” forms of citizenship (Bennett, 2008). Unlike their Zimbabwean counterparts, 
South African reported that they utilised Facebook for digital advocacy and mobilising 
citizens to engage in protests and demonstrations. Online observations also indicated that 
Facebook event pages and calls for action were used to mobilise protestors in South Africa. 
Unlike in South Africa, respondents in Zimbabwe noted that they were afraid to use 
Facebook for “getting people on the streets” (Lievrouw, 2011). This shows that the discursive 
aspects of Facebook assumed greater importance than the action-oriented aspects in 
Zimbabwe when compared to the South African case.  
Box 8: A call to action 
Bikita & Chiredzi, be the change you want to see in Zimbabwe, go and register to 
vote! Take no heed of any frustrations in the processes, continue going back until 
you are a registered voter!  
Source: CiZC Facebook page, April 12, 2013 
The above call to action as a “motivational frame” (Benford & Snow, 2000) urged first time 
young voters to be “the change you want to see in Zimbabwe” by actively taking part in the 
voter registration process.  
Figure 2: A post urging the youth in Zimbabwe to register and vote: 
 
Source: YFZ Facebook page: 29 December 2011  
Box 9: Call to action for Zimbabweans to boycott Gushungo dairy products 
Zimbabwe can get their message across to President Mugabe that they need him 
to change or adjust the way he governs us by: 
1. Boycott all Gushing Dairy products in supermarkets. Ensuring these is not 
bought. 
2. Boycott all Gideon Gono (former Reserve Bank governor) Lunar chickens 
and eggs kusvika zvaora (until it’s rotten). 
By hurting their capital we will force them to reconsider how they govern us. 
167 
 
toy toying in the streets is dangerous. Here I propose a peaceful but effective 
way of regulating the ruling elite’s behaviour. Identify these peoples businesses 
esp those with the big agro-based one and simply not buy from them. This is the 
only way we will have to deal not only with government but also with huge 
corporates such as Econet and Innscor. People should also boycott that Metro 
bus in support of the Kombi (taxi) industry (still need to change their rogue 
behaviour though). The masses are poor but their collective small dollars if 
withheld can cause pandemonium in the deep pockets of the exploitative rich. 
We must withhold rates, rent, school fees etc until we see reforms in this 
country. After all this government and these capitalists have been withholding 
our salaries. Ndiwo maonero angu (this is how I see it). By the way I’m not an 
anarchist. 
Source: Facebook wall post by a youth from the CiZC 
In the post above, a youth from the CiZC is mobilising other Facebook users to express their 
grievances to President Mugabe through boycotting dairy products processed by Gushungo 
Holdings(Pvt) Ltd. Gushungo Holdings is a business empire owned by the First Lady Grace 
Mugabe with subsidiaries like Alpha Omega Dairy based in Zimbabwe. Alpha Omega 
produces a wide range of dairy which are sold in local supermarkets. Gushungo is Mugabe’s 
clan name. Besides targeting products from Gushungo Holdings, the post also encourages 
citizens to boycott all chickens and eggs produced by Lunar Chickens (a company owned by 
Gideon Gono, the former governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe). The post also urges 
citizens to boycott paying rents, council rates and school fees in order to force the 
government to implement the necessary political reforms. By urging people to take action, 
the above “motivational frame” also identifies the diagnostic99 and prognostic100 frames. In 
this case, the President Robert Mugabe and his family are identified as the cause of people’s 
suffering in Zimbabwe and therefore the prognostic frame (solution) to boycott his business 
empire’s products.  
Unlike in Zimbabwe, respondents in South Africa used Facebook to mobilise people to attend 
physical demonstrations. This means that whereas most youths in Zimbabwe constructed 
motivational and diagnostic framing on their Facebook profiles, they were generally hesistant 
to engage in prognostic framing when compared to their South African counterparts. For 
instance, Figure 3 illustrates how the Facebook administrator from the R2K Campaign used 
the site to rally their members to attend the “Camp out for Openness” demonstration at the 
                                                          
99 Diagnostic framing deals primarily with “problem identification and attributions,” wherein “injustice frames” (i.e., identifying victims and 
amplifying victimhood) constitute the main part of the framing process (Benford & Snow, 2000: 615). Diagnostic framing also pinpoints the 
“sources of causality, blame and culpable agents” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). 
100 Prognostic framing involves the “articulation of a proposed solution to the problem or at least a plan of attack and the strategies for 
carrying out the plan” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 617). 
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South African Parliament in Cape Town. The demonstration was organised to put pressure on 
the South African parliament to stop passing the Secrecy Bill in November 2012.   
Figure 3: A call for action 
 
Source: R2K Campaign Facebook page 
Respondents in Zimbabwe indicated that they had internalised a set of rules which influences 
what they can share publicly, what they can share on fake profiles and what they can read but 
not share at all. This is very important because there have been criminal repercussions where 
an ordinary citizen (Vikazi Mavhudzi) was arrested for posting content on a Facebook page 
administered by MDC-T President Morgan Tsvangirai (see Chapter Two). Instead of relaxing 
laws governing the use of new media, the ZANU-PF government has continued to pass more 
statutory instruments governing the use of mobile phones (see Chapter Two) and also 
arrested a number of people suspected to be running the infamous Baba Jukwa Facebook 
page. As such, the fear and threats of state communication surveillance has forced youth 
activists to change their communication and mobilisation practices. As one male respondent 
from the CiZC said, “it’s a big risk to use your own Facebook page to mobilise for 
demonstrations in this country because in a short time the intelligence officers would have 
pounced on you or barricaded your offices”. Another female youth from the same movement 
added that “people are afraid to express their genuine feelings online because we have a 
dictatorial government”. These responses resonate with Freedom House’s (2013) report 
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which suggests that “the lack of anonymity…and fear of repercussions [in Zimbabwe] limit 
politically oriented statements, which can be traced back to those expressing them”. Self-
censorship in the Zimbabwean context demonstrates that some of the youth activists have 
internalised the disciplinary behaviour of the “panopticon” society (Foucault, 1995). Contrary 
to Gladwell’s (2010) assertion that online social networks demand low risk participation, it is 
clear from the foregoing responses that Facebook activism in Zimbabwe also demands high 
risk participation. Some of the respondents in Zimbabwe mentioned that they use fake 
accounts and pseudonyms. This shows that the threat of surveillance has changed people’s 
communication practices on Facebook. Respondents in Zimbabwe are engaging in everyday 
forms of surveillance resistance. Resistance to surveillance refers to “any active behaviour or 
interest groups that oppose the collection and processing of personal data, either through the 
micro-practices of everyday resistance to defeat a given application or through political 
challenges to wider power relations contest the surveillance regime per se” (Coleman & 
McCahill, 2010: 147). Besides indicating respondents in Zimbabwe’s “condition of being 
subaltern and living in fear” (Mhlanga & Mpofu, 2014), the use of pseudonyms highlights the 
creative ways in which young people are circumnavigating the risks associated with 
Facebook’s real name policy. As Miller et al., (2016) point out, state surveillance is a 
powerful force that has influenced how the semi-public spaces of social media are used in 
China and Turkey. 
Concern for social relations has also prevented some youth activists in Zimbabwe from 
disagreeing over, discussing or expressing political opinions, especially with regard to 
national politics. Because of the “strong-tie” nature of Facebook profile conversations, some 
of the respondents were concerned with maintaining or strengthening relations with their 
social media contacts, and did not want to risk damaging friendships or relationships with 
extended family or work colleagues. Most of the respondents felt that they are being watched 
and under constant surveillance. As Miller et al., (2016) aptly put it, social media leads to an 
interweaving of the social and political fabric, to the extent that state surveillance overlaps 
with – and is reinforced by – the social surveillance of friends, acquaintances or family 
members. Therefore Facebook profiles, pages and groups were not viewed as appropriate 
platforms for discussing politics and criticising the national government. Instead they viewed 
“private” spaces such as WhatsApp chat, emails, Facebook messaging system and Twitter’s 
direct message system as places of robust and frank political discussions. Like in China and 
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Turkey (see Miller eat al., 2016), the fear of communication surveillance and state 
harassment this has led to a suppression of open political discussion online, just like it is 
repressed offline.  
5.1.5 Facebook as a recruiting ground for potential supporters 
 
The findings also reflected that youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa are using Facebook to 
recruit supporters and sympathisers to take part in offline and online political action such as 
demonstrations, marches, petitions and letter writing campaigns. Most respondents in both 
case nations noted that they deployed Facebook as a means of virtual recruitment. Virtual 
recruitment entails the act of signing up to a campaign through liking or joining a Facebook 
group or fan page. The purpose of virtual recruitment is to stay in touch with people that 
supports the campaign and start them on the path to becoming donors and volunteers. Social 
networks are also effective methods for harnessing the power of these and other new 
volunteers and recruiting them to existing movements (Gonzalez-Bailon et al, 2011). 
Respondents in Zimbabwe observed that Facebook allowed them to bypass limitations 
imposed on offline political recruitment by the state and repressive legislation. Some of the 
respondents explained that “Facebook allows us to reach out to first time voters especially in 
this environment where civic education and offline canvassing has been severely curtailed by 
the ZANU-PF government”. For respondents in South Africa, Facebook provided an avenue 
of access to users who would otherwise not be reached through traditional recruitment 
strategies. As one of the female respondents from the R2K Campaign noted, “Facebook is 
another platform where we can recruit more people who identify with our cause”. This 
confirms earlier research (Gerbaudo, 2012; Harvey, 2014) that indicated that social media 
platforms are used as “recruitment booths” to conquer new members beyond the confines of 
the immediate offline activist community. As Gerbaudo (2012) observes, activists use 
Facebook because they know that it is on this media platform that they can find people who 
are not already within activist circles.  
Online observations and interviews with page and group administrators indicated that 
movements with websites and blogs (like the CiZC, YFZ, PASSOP Afrika and R2K 
Campaign) in Zimbabwe and South Africa used widgets
101
 as a strategy of building an online 
                                                          
101 This refers to a stand-alone application that can be embedded into third party sites by any user on a page where they have rights of 
authorship, e.g. a profile on a social media site.  
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constituency. This point also supports Gerbaudo’s (2013) observation that modern social 
movements have a majoritarian orientation which is evident on Facebook where activists tend 
to recommend their friends to like and join particular groups. This desire to build a huge 
online membership base is also evident in the way the administrator of the PASSOP Afrika 
page encouraged Facebook users to “like” their page (see box 9).  
Box 10: A call to like PASSOP page 
To support PASSOP, 
please like our Page! 
Click the link then 
click the like button. 
Thank you. 
Like Page 
 
Source: Passop Afrika Facebook page: October 31, 2011 
The call to support above demonstrates that the PASSOP Afrika is focused on growing their 
audience on Facebook and Twitter so as to maximise their reach and public visibility. 
Focusing on Facebook profiles, Miller et al., (2016) argue that its strength is that 
relationships are based on strong ties but also its weakness is that users tend to avoid 
commenting on posts and posting controversial content which can lead to antagonisms among 
friends and relatives. Although Facebook membership on groups and fan pages are 
sometimes characterised by “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1972), it is important to highlight that 
the relationship between weak and strong ties is one of complementarity and support, not one 
of opposition. For instance, weak ties can become strong ties when there is shared conviction 
and experience. As Tufecki (2013) opines, large pools of weaker ties are crucial for the 
building of robust networks of stronger ties. This argument has resonances with the social 
penetration theory which proposes that, as relationships develop, interpersonal 
communication moves from relatively shallow, non-intimate levels to deeper, more intimate 
ones (Altman & Taylor, 1973).  
Although the number of participants on a Facebook group or page can be used as a measure 
of mass support for a cause, it should be noted that all of them cannot be expected to 
participate in off-line activities. This is because people join Facebook pages for a myriad of 
reasons. As one female fan on the NCA Facebook page noted: “Liking u does not mean am 
with u, just want to see hw u think n yr arguments nothing more”. Administrators of 
Facebook groups and fan pages studied here urged their members or fans to invite their 
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friends and local networks to like or join their groups and fan pages. The following status 
update is instructive: 
Box 11: Status update on the YFZ page 
Have you told someone about Youth Forum? Help us reach more than 
60% of our young people in Zimbabwe by recruiting new members for the 
Forum 
Source: YFZ Facebook page 
The above post is instructive because it demonstrates the majoritarian orientation of the YFZ 
on Facebook. Its quest is to reach out to more than 60% of young people in Zimbabwe 
through virtual recruitment. As Naughton (2011) argues, social media empowers activists to 
easily connect while sympathisers can simply join in. It allows others to watch and participate 
in the real-life online activities. 
5.1.6 Facebook as a source of political and social news and information 
 
Unlike in South Africa, most respondents in Zimbabwe stated that Facebook constituted an 
important conduit for gathering solicited and unsolicited alternative political and social news 
and information. This can be explained by the fact that media systems in the two countries 
exhibit significant differences (see Chapter Two). Compared to Zimbabwe, South Africa has 
a vibrant public and private media space characterised by freedom of expression and 
investigative journalism, although it serves mostly an urban elite (Wasserman, 2010). Unlike 
Zimbabwe, it also boasted a robust media and a culture of free and open debate. The country 
also has a diverse community media sector, although it is largely under-funded, which 
compromises its independence from major vested interests (Duncan, 2010). In comparison to 
South Africa, Zimbabwe has a polarised public and private media environment riddled with 
both state propaganda and corporate censorship. As articulated in Chapter Two, the only 
other options for alternative political viewpoints in Zimbabwe are from the private and 
diasporic media. Because access to political information in Zimbabwe is severely constricted, 
one of the male youths from the NCA described Facebook as a “default source of alternative 
political information”.  
From the findings, Facebook constitutes an important source for alternative news. This in part 
corroborates studies (Moyo, 2009; Alexander, 2006) which suggest that the use of new media 
technologies in Zimbabwe is a result of the stifling media regulatory environment which 
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limits the free circulation of information thus forcing people to depend on alternative sources 
of information. Contrary to Zimbabwe, a few respondents in South Africa pointed out that 
they employed Facebook to solicit political information. Those who indicated that they used 
Facebook to gather political news information did that on fan pages administered by political 
parties and mainstream news organisations. Most of the respondents in South Africa reported 
that traditional media (like television, radio and newspapers) remained their first port of call 
for political information. This is consistent with research (SANPAD, 2013; Booysen, 2015) 
that indicates that young South Africans still rely on traditional media for hard political news.  
Respondents in Zimbabwe observed that they utilised Facebook to watch political videos, 
read political news displayed on their newsfeeds and fan pages administered by citizen 
journalists and mainstream news organisations. At the time of writing, some of the “venues of 
magnetic gatherings or trending places” (Gerbaudo, 2012) on Facebook in Zimbabwe 
included: Baba Jukwa (reactivated in 2015 after going offline in 2014), Nehanda Radio, 
Amai Jukwa (page closed), MuGrade Seven (page closed), Hon Tendai Biti (now inactive), 
Job Sikhala, Prof Jonathan Moyo, Psychology Maziwisa and Prime Minister Morgan 
Tsvangirai. It is important to highlight that although all of these pages were once popular but 
some of them have been closed down due to fear of political persecution. For instance, the 
witch-hunt by the state against the administrators of the Baba Jukwa led to the closure of 
several Facebook pages whilst the Hon Tendai Biti page became inactive following the split 
between the MDC-T and MDC-Renewal in 2013. Baba Jukwa Facebook page generated what 
Gerbaudo (2016: 255) calls “moments of digital enthuasism”. This refers to necessarily 
transient phases of intense, positive emotional mood emerging in political online 
conversations in proximity to major event (Gerbaudo, 2016) (for instance, the 2013 
harmonised election in Zimbabwe).  
Some of the afore-mentioned Facebook pages were popular because they provided 
perspectives often ignored by the mainstream public and private media for fear of 
victimisation. While some of these Facebook pages reproduced content from the mainstream 
media, others like the infamous Baba Jukwa were able to publish sensitive political 
information “shunned by the traditional media because of the restrictive legal environment 
which imposes stiff penalties for “falsehoods” or libellous stories” (Chari, 2013: 192). As one 
male youth from the YFZ observed:  
174 
 
The mainstream media is so polarised that you cannot make head or tale about what is 
really happening in the country. But Facebook is an important conduit through which 
we receive valuable political news updates via the news feed and recommendations 
from friends. Pages like Baba Jukwa are also instrumental for information and 
updates, to retrieve links to check their voter registration status and to write comments 
that encourage each other to vote.  
The foregoing response chimes with Mukhongo’s (2015) view that the contribution of social 
media to Sub-Saharan Africa has been its ability to provide information and tools to groups 
that otherwise would not have been able to access the political information. A point needs to 
be made, however, that some of the respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa bemoaned 
the increasing usage of Facebook to peddle misinformation, propaganda and outright 
falsehoods. For instance, respondents in both countries cited incidences where Facebook was 
used to misinform citizens about the deaths of Nelson Mandela (in South Africa) and the late 
Vice-President John Nkomo (in Zimbabwe). 
5.1.7 Facebook as an advertising platform for political and social events 
 
From online participant observation, it was established that respondents in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa deployed Facebook as an advertising platform. They deployed the site for 
announcing radio and television talk show appearances, public meetings, workshops, marches 
and demonstrations. Some of the respondents interviewed in both countries indicated that 
Facebook was an invaluable platform for broadcasting and viral advertising of public events. 
Porter & Golan (2006: 33) define viral advertising as “unpaid peer-to-peer communication of 
provocative content originating from an identified sponsor using the internet to persuade or 
influence an audience to pass along the content to others”. Compared to Zimbabwe, youths 
from the three social movements in South Africa created Facebook events
102
 as a way of 
cutting down on costs associated with traditional political advertising in the mainstream 
media. It is important to highlight that “free” advertising on Facebook is mainly targeted at 
users of the site although some of the posts’ reach and visibility are often amplified beyond 
the virtual sphere (through the word of mouth). As Mattoni (2009: 201) states that, “due to 
the relatively low costs of ICTs, those social movement networks, lacking material resources, 
gain a powerful tool to coordinate [and publicise] their offline and online collective actions”.  
                                                          
102On Facebook, users may create an event page and invite people they know to participate. People who have confirmed that they will 
participate in an event will then get reminders about this on their Facebook homepage.  
175 
 
Respondents in both countries also mentioned that apart from Facebook, they also utilised 
traditional forms of advertising, like door-to-door canvassing, pamphlets distribution, sticking 
of posters on lamp posts and word of mouth. Because the public media in Zimbabwe “often 
refuses to publish adverts that it deems too overtly “political” or human rights related” 
(Atwood, 2010: 92), some of the respondents indicated that they also used internal mailing 
lists, WhatsApp groups and Kubatana.net mailing list to spread the word about their 
upcoming events and activities. As one male youth from the NCA explained, “Facebook 
offers a relatively inexpensive option to advertise our activities because at the moment our 
traditional donors have deserted us. It allows us to advertise public meetings like we will be 
in Kariba. Journalists are also enquiring about our public events based on the information we 
are advertising on Facebook”. Another male respondent from the CiZC added, “I use 
Facebook to announce public meetings which are held in Kwekwe and surrounding areas”. In 
South Africa, one respondent from the UPM equated Facebook to a billboard, noting that 
“just like a billboard you can publicise about your marches and demonstrations”. However 
most of the respondents were oblivious of the fact that Facebook regulated the visibility and 
reach of a particular post through tinkering with its EdgeRank algorithm system (see section 
5.2.1). Most of them tended to view the platform as affording them access to an infinite 
audience.   
Compared to South African youths who created Facebook event pages, most of those 
observed in Zimbabwe uploaded and “shared” electronic copies of posters, pamphlets and 
banners on their walls, profile and cover pictures (see Box 11).  Most of the status updates 
were accompanied by calls for action like “please share with others and attend”. Only the 
R2K Campaign in South Africa used Facebook to share electronic copies of their posters (see 
Box 12). Box 12 invites R2K Campaigners to attend the right to march at the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria, South Africa. It is important to highlight that the difference in how 
Zimbabwean and South African activists used the Facebook advertising function can be 
attributed to disparities in social media skills.  
Box 12: An advert for a political event 
You are being invited to a youth public discussion forum on youth 
perspective on corruption @ GOWERO HSE, ZEWU offices on Friday 
from 2-4pm. Thus corner Mbuya Nehanda and Nkwame Nkrumah. 
Source: YFZ Facebook page: 23 August 2013 
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Box 13: A call for a march 
 
Source: R2K Campaign Facebook page: 21 September 2012 
I also observed that several respondents in Zimbabwe were tagging
103
 their friends as a 
strategy of sharing (RSVPing) and distributing pamphlets and posters. Some of them posted 
their advertisements on Facebook groups and pages administered by journalists and media 
advocacy groups like Newsroom Lingo, MISA-Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Union of 
Journalists (ZUJ) to increase the reach and coverage of their public events. Almost all the 
interviewed page administrators in Zimbabwe and South Africa reported that they did not 
promote or boost their Facebook posts to increase reach and visibility. This is largely because 
promotion or boosting of posts requires movements to pay Facebook for increased publicity 
on the site. One male youth from the CiZC shared the following advert on his wall:  
Figure 4: Notice of a public meeting 
 
                                                          
103 Tagging refers to a link (a photo or a status update) which is created when Facebook users tag someone on their profile.  
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Source: Facebook wall post: 3 June 2013 
The significance of the above post lies in the fact that unlike in South Africa where 
respondents utilised the Facebook advertising function, their Zimbabwean counterparts 
circulated adverts through sharing and reposting on their individual profiles. For example, 
Figure 4 illustrates a poster about an upcoming public meeting to discuss the issue of obscene 
salaries, tenderpreneurship and underhand dealings in the public sector. This was in the wake 
of revelations that some public officials in government were unduly benefitting from tenders 
and awarding themselves hefty salaries.  
5.1.8 Facebook as a forum for everyday political talk 
 
Online observations and qualitative interviews indicated that youths in both countries utilised 
Facebook as a forum for everyday political talk. Kim & Kim (2008: 53) define everyday 
political talk as “non-purposive, informal, casual, and spontaneous political conversation 
voluntarily carried out by free [young] citizens, without being constrained by formal 
procedural rules and pre-determined agenda”. Unlike in South Africa, Zimbabwean 
respondents deployed Facebook as a way of circumventing political and legal restrictions 
imposed on freedom of expression by the ZANU-PF regime. As one male respondent from 
the YFZ remarked: “things that cannot be discussed in physical spaces for fear of political 
victimisation can now be deliberated on Facebook groups and private messages
104”. Another 
male youth from the NCA added that: “in view of the restrictions on access to information 
and freedom of speech digital platforms like Facebook have opened up spaces for debate and 
discussion”. This view dovetails with Fraser’s (1997: 81) postulation that marginalised 
groups need “venues in which to undertake communicative processes that were not, as it 
were, under the supervision of dominant groups [or else they would be] less able than 
otherwise to articulate and defend their interests in the comprehensive public sphere. They 
would be less able than otherwise to expose modes of deliberation that mask domination by 
absorbing the less powerful into a false “we” that reflects the more powerful”.   
 
Besides expanding the discursive arena, Facebook has also reinvigorated what De Bruijn, 
Nyamnjoh & Brinkman (2009) call the “new talking drum of everyday Africa”. These 
discussions on Facebook constitute “virtual extensions of what used to be physically localised 
                                                          
104 The messages function is a tool for Facebook users to send direct messages to each other. This is mostly used for individual 
communication and for smaller groups. 
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coffeehouses, salons, town-level meetings” (Ndlovu & Mbenga, 2013: 177). As such, they 
represent the digitisation of “pavement radio” (Moyo, 2009; Walton, 2014) in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. One male respondent from the NCA in Zimbabwe sums it up thus: “I canvass 
for my political views and ideas on Facebook through my wall with over 1000 friends. 
Things we used to discuss over a glass of wine can now be digested via chat or the inbox”. As 
will be explained further below, youth activists pointed out that they resorted to chat and 
inboxing when discussing organisational and political (like the private life and health status 
of the president) issues in Zimbabwe. Similar views were expressed by interviewees in South 
Africa when they indicated that: “Facebook is a space for discussion and sharing of notes 
with comrades on political developments”.  
 
Topics that received most attention on Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe related to 
the Global Political Agreement (GPA) (see Chapters One and Three for context on these 
issues) such as:  
 the outstanding issues of the GPA (such as the need for 
security, electoral and media reforms, repealing of repressive laws and institutional 
reform of the public service sector),  
 Voting rights of people in the diaspora,  
 Constitutional making process (referendum and passage of the 
new charter in 2013),  
 The distribution of the youth fund by the Zimbabwe Youth 
Council,  
 The performance of major political parties (ZANU-PF, MDC-T 
and MDC-N) during the GNU era,  
 The role of youth in the 2013 election process 
 The 2013 harmonised election campaign process and the 
results.  
In South Africa, the most prominent topics (see Chapters One and Three for context on these 
issues) on the R2K Campaign, PASSOP Afrika and UPM Facebook pages and groups were:  
 the tabling of the Secrecy Bill,  
 the public consultation process leading to the Secrecy Bill’s 
debate in parliament,  
 the Marikana massacre,  
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 xenophobic attacks against African immigrants,  
 The Youth Wage Subsidy discussions in parliament 
 The Nkandla Report (see Chapter Eight for more details)  
 
Generally there were a few similarities in the nature of political and social issues that were 
picked up for discussion by Facebook pages in Zimbabwe and South Africa. During the run-
up to the July 2013 election in Zimbabwe, issues like the implementation of GNU reforms, 
voter registration, state sponsored violence and the funding for the plebiscite also generated 
“moments of digital enthusiasm” (Gerbaudo, 2016). The interaction between Facebook 
admins and users took the form of an ascending spiral of collective emotional activation 
culminating in impressive spikes of user engagement (Gerbaudo, 2016: 255). Similarities 
were discernible in terms of issues dealing with the state of the economy, corruption by 
government officials, lobbying against repressive laws (like POSA, AIPPA and ICA in 
Zimbabwe and the Secrecy Bill and National Key Point Act in South Africa as discussed in 
Chapters One, Two and Three) and youth unemployment. Significant differences were also 
observable in the sense that whereas in Zimbabwe discussions on Facebook touched on the 
need for reforms of the entire political system, seismic changes in the economic policies, 
dismantling of dictatorial tendencies of ZANU-PF and electoral violence, in South Africa the 
talk centred on deepening government accountability, safeguarding political and social rights 
of citizens and immigrants as well as the rights of Lesbian Gay Bi-Sexual Transgender 
(LBGTI) communities.  
 
Significant gaps and silences were also observable in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. For 
instance, in Zimbabwe the NCA Facebook page only focused on the negative aspects of the 
new charter thereby downplaying the positive issues. Whilst there was a critique of the 
government’s Look East Policy105, there was no thorough-going debate about the foreign 
direct investment. Dictatorial tendencies within the MDC-T received little engagement when 
compared to the disproportionate focus on ZANU-PF. Another silence was the lack of 
engagement with the capitalist economic system. It was important for these organisations to 
engage with these issues because they form part and parcel of the Zimbabwean crisis besides 
those attributable to the governance and land questions (see Chapter Three). In South Africa, 
                                                          
105 This policy aimed to expand bilateral and trade relations and offer priority to investors from not just China but Malaysia, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, India, and Russia, has focused increasingly on China, to the exclusion of other countries. 
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there was silence on the darker side of self-regulation on the media. The UPM Facebook page 
didn’t adequately unpack the problems associated with neoliberal economics and the issue of 
labour broking in South Africa. These are crucial issues especially in South Africa where 
self-regulation has been accused of lacking the necessary teeth to effect sanctions on 
journalists who go over the board and the issue of labour broking is the core of the labour 
crisis which has manifested itself in wildcat strikes.  
 
As Graham & Harju (2011: 22) notes, political talk takes places when “a participant makes a 
connection from a particular experience, issue or topic in general society, which stimulates 
reflection and a response”. Most of the issues discussed on Facebook ranged from public to 
private concerns. Some of the everyday issues that were discussed related to sexual and 
gender identities as well as gender-based violence in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This 
further reinforces Fraser’s (1990: 71) view that what counts as a public issue should be 
decided through discursive contestation which means “no topics should be ruled off limits in 
advance of such contestation”. Below are some of the everyday political discussions hosted 
on Facebook walls by a respondent from the CiZC: 
 
Box 14: Everyday political talk 
 
QUESTION OF THE DAY: ZANU PF WILL WIN THE ELECTIONS? 
Comment: Mugabe is afraid of Chiwenga (Army General) and 
Mnangagwa (now Vice-President) for your own information. How can a 
sane person vote for a person who is afraid of his so called comrades? 
Wake up Zanu PF. NYIKA YAORA IYI (This country is rotten). 
CHINESE LOOTING EVERYWHERE AND THE ONLY PEOPLE 
BENEFITTING ARE THE LIKES OF OBERT Mpofu. Pathetic Zanu PF. 
Comment: Muchauraya vanhu mukaneta (You can kill until you are tired) 
and ngozi dzichakuteverai but you will not change the inevitable. Zanu PF 
is rotten to the core and it's a party of selfish and brutal criminals. 
Comment: I will never vote for a Malawian bustard called Robert Matibili 
'Mugabe'. His constituency should be in Malawi not in Zimbabwe. I have 
put Mugabe in quotation marks because hakuna (there is no) Mugabe 
weGushungo. The real Mugabes come from Masvingo kwete dhongi 
raparadza nyika iri. Vanhu vaZanu PF kupusa kunge makapfuhirwa 
nemboko iyi. Stupid. 
Comment: If Zimbabwe is truly independent, why do you fear the 
opposition so much? MDC is made up of Zimbabweans and to treat it as a 
puppet of the west is simply stupid especially coming from a party which to 
all intends and purposes is a Chinese appendage. Zanu PF needs to be 
reminded that we did not fight a war so that we enrich Chinese people. 
Source: Facebook wall post  
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From the above wall post, it is clear that youths in Zimbabwe are using the platform to 
deliberate on political issues like elections. One of the posters disputes Mugabe’s 
Zimbabwean ancestry suggesting that he is from Malawi and therefore unfit to rule the 
country. The xenophobic tinge expressed on the above post suggests that Facebook is not 
only a medium for progressive political discussion, but also reactionary views. Although 
Facebook provides citizens with an informal space where they can interact among 
themselves, it can also be argued that it amplifies ethnic and tribal tensions. In polarised 
societies like Zimbabwe, Facebook also accentuates the phenomenon known as 
“balkanisation” where small groups of people who share similar political beliefs and ideas 
become hostile to groups with antithetical ideas.  
Box 15 also shows one respondent from the UPM hosting a vibrant discussion about 
community programmes in Grahamstown.  
Box 15: Suggestions for community programmes in Grahamstown 
 
Youth of Makana we are looking for programmes that u would like to 
suggest for us this festive season.... 
Comment: The use of Dakawa Arts and Cultural Centre as a venue for 
hosting Music Shows, Stand Up Comedy, Drama and Spoken Word, Socio-
Political Documentaries during the festive season. 
Comment: A serious sports tournament with a serious prize for the Makana 
youth clubs. A youth concert/competition for the youth gifted in the 
performance arts which will be judged by a well-known national 
performing artist, this popular artist will then have to perform in 
closing...Both events should have free entry for the youth of Makana. 
Comment: an urgent programme is the assistance of matriculants in 
applying to various higher institution of learning... because this tendency of 
applying late after seeing that you have done well is definitely not assisting 
the child of the working class. 
Source: Facebook wall post  
From the above post, it can be concluded that some of the discussions on Facebook elicit 
rational-critical debate as envisaged by Habermas (1989). For instance, participants on the 
above post made suggestions about programmes they wanted to see implemented in 
Grahamstown. Suggestions included holding workshops for the youth on fundraising, sports 
tournament, assisting matriculants to access tertiary education and hosting performance arts 
concerts. 
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In view of Boxes 14 and 15, it is arguable that “irrespective of the questions of access, there 
is a serious political conversation between young [Zimbabweans and] South Africans going 
online” (Ndlovu & Mbenga, 2013: 181). In both countries, it was found that there is an inner 
circle that always posts and comments on Facebook. It was also established that highly active 
activists in offline spaces are also heavily involved in initiating online political conversations. 
These constitute what Dennis (2015) describes as “civic instigators” and “contributors” 
instrumental in kick-starting and sustaining online conversations (see Chapter Seven for a 
detailed explanation). Mostly the discussions are predominantly made up of males in all the 
Facebook groups and pages observed which is reflective of the patriarchal nature of politics 
in both countries. Everyday political discussions amongst mostly middle class and urban 
citizens in both countries suggest that young people are actively interested in and discuss 
political issues with friends in online spaces (see Mattes & Richmond, 2014). These online 
conversations promoted what O’Donnell (1986) calls “horizontal voice” where youths 
interact with their friends and fellow group members. As O’Donnell (1986) observes, this 
kind of horizontal voice is seen as a necessary precondition for the formation of collective 
identity and the formulation of “collective vertical voice”. These discussions are more 
widespread on Zimbabwean Facebook pages compared to the South African case. As Chapter 
Seven will demonstrate, this study also found that everyday political discussions are 
dominated by a small group of opinion leaders. This illustrates that an inner circle of 
Facebook users always post and comment, whilst most of the fans and followers are relegated 
to roles such as lurkers and “likers”. As boyd (2014: 173) writes, these discussions which 
occur in silos reinforce homophilous social networks rather the effective use of technology to 
connect across lines of difference. 
 
To circumvent surveillance and monitoring by state security agents, some of the respondents 
in Zimbabwe acknowledged using Facebook chat, private messaging and video calling to 
engage in everyday political talk. Unlike in South Africa, the Zimbabwean experience 
suggests that in repressive contexts Facebook facilitates “authoritarian deliberation106” (He, 
2006) rather than democratic deliberation. Such online public deliberation is authoritarian 
because, similar to offline practice, the state actively shapes and prescribes the boundaries of 
                                                          
106 The term “authoritarian deliberation” gained currency when it was used to describe the Chinese public sphere, which does provide the 
illusion of new models of governance without having any significant impact on the regime itself. 
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political discourse in the Zimbabwean cyberspace (see Chapter Seven). The term also 
acknowledges the limited public discussion and debate in authoritarian regimes. The fear of 
overstepping boundaries of public speech shapes the nature and content of everyday political 
discussions on Facebook in Zimbabwe (see Chapter Seven). On Facebook pages and groups, 
where weak-tie relationships are based on following, liking and membership, interviewees in 
Zimbabwe indicated that they could opt out of the conversation or group when they feel that 
the issues being discussed put them in danger by association, without necessarily causing 
irreparable damage to their social relationships. The discussions are however deliberative in 
the sense that argumentation and reasoning are used by citizens to discuss collective 
problems (see Box 14).   
 
In comparison to South Africa, interviewees in Zimbabwe mentioned that they: “prefer to 
discuss political issues with people they already know from offline settings rather than with 
total strangers”. As one female youth from the CiZC put it: “people don’t trust each other 
even activists treat each other with suspicion on Facebook”. This corresponds with boyd’s 
(2014: 166) observation that “although the technology makes it possible in principle to 
socialise with anyone online, in practice, youth connect to the people that they know and with 
whom they have the most in common”. Another male respondent from the YFZ noted: “I can 
move the discussion to the inbox if I feel it’s very sensitive to be discussed on my wall”. 
These responses are in line with Tarrow’s (1998) postulation that it is difficult to construct a 
sense of trust online.  
 
In contrast with Zimbabwe where fear of political persecution has had a “chilling effect” on 
political conversations on Facebook, in South Africa the situation was quite different. The 
findings in Zimbabwe confirm Miller’s et al., (2016) study in Turkey where social media 
generally reflected the strategies of political debate and silence that were developed in the 
offline world. As Miller et al (2016) suggest, there are a variety of reasons why offline 
political debate may not be reproduced online. These include: feelings of indifference, 
disillusionment or apathy (see Dahlgren, 2009; Chapter Two), or not wanting to be seen by 
others as “being political”. Most of the respondents in South Africa observed that they were 
free to discuss political issues without resorting to self-censorship. However some of the 
interviewees from the PASSOP Afrika acknowledged that they were afraid to discuss about 
corruption and ill-treatment at the hands of public officials at the department of home affairs. 
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This was because some of them felt that openly discussing such issues on Facebook could 
hamper their chances of securing asylum and refugee permits.  
 
It is clear from the above that the usage of Facebook as a platform for everyday political talk 
is influenced by the broader political opportunity structure, communication surveillance and 
concern with social relations. This explains why political participation generally takes 
different forms on social media. The fear of communication surveillance and concern with 
social relations makes social media a conservative and a disempowering space in an 
authoritarian context. The Zimbabwean field site has shown that compared to South Africa, 
Facebook discussions are characterised by the “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), 
this phenomenon describe people’s fear that politics might lead to them becoming isolated or 
ostracised.  
 
5.1.9 Facebook as a venue of activism and protest 
 
As outlined in Chapter Four (see section 4.4.1), based on a two-year online participant 
observation this study established that Facebook was also creatively used by respondents in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa as a means of action in itself. This dovetails with Lievrouw’s 
(2011) argument that social media platforms serve as the “field” of activism itself. For 
Zimbabwean respondents, Facebook allowed them to advance political causes that are 
difficult to undertake in physical spaces. As intimated earlier, it also enabled them to 
circumvent limitations imposed on street demonstrations by the state. For them, Facebook 
constituted an indispensable “digital repertoire of electronic contention” (Costanza-Chock, 
2003; Earl & Kimport, 2011). Online observations also revealed that compared to their 
counterparts in South Africa, respondents in Zimbabwe were more likely to deploy Facebook 
to engage in what Micheletti (2003) calls “individualised collective action107”. These online 
activities include: changing one’s profile picture, creating a Facebook page related to a social 
movement issue, letter writing, blogging about a social movement issue and posting a call to 
action on one’s Facebook wall urging others to boycott certain products on political reasons 
(Cohen & Kahne, 2012). As Postmes (2002: 291) observes, these individual forms of 
collective action can be thought of as collective in nature when they are intended as a means 
                                                          
107This refers to the practice of responsibility-taking through the creation of everyday settings on the part of citizens alone or together with 
others to deal with problems which they believe is affecting what they identify as the good life (Michelleti, 2003). 
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of achieving a collective outcome. Most of these political activities are “more ad-hoc, less 
dependent on traditional organisations and on elites mobilising their standing cadres of 
supporters” (Dahlgren, 2009: 33). These individualised collective actions share similarities 
with Scott’s (1990) notion of “everyday forms of resistance” which are enacted in spaces of 
relative autonomy. Facebook is, therefore, used to engage in what Vegh (2003) describes as 
“internet-enhanced activism”. This entails its utilisation to “enhance the traditional advocacy 
techniques, as an additional communication channel, by raising awareness beyond the scope 
possible before the internet” (Vegh, 2003:72).  
As mentioned earlier, it was found that South African youths deployed Facebook to augment 
traditional forms of direct action like rallies, gatherings, marches, demonstrations, and 
collection of signatures in Grahamstown, Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban. As one 
female youth from the R2K Campaign noted: “my political involvement in Facebook 
activism is an extension of what I do offline”. They also used Facebook to rally people to 
take part in all night vigils and to circulate online petitions. Whilst interviewees in South 
Africa viewed Facebook as a tool for supplementing traditional forms of activism, those in 
Zimbabwe saw it as space for new forms of online protest activities. In the same vein, Fenton 
(2006: 233) argues that virtual computer-mediated ties will not replace traditional forms of 
protest, such as rallies and demonstrations but may complement them in terms of building 
collective identity and reinforcing solidarity. In South Africa, some of the respondents used 
Facebook to create online modes of existing off-line protest actions.  Below (Box 16) is a call 
for a demonstration against xenophobia on the PASSOP Afrika Facebook page aimed at 
mobilising people to put pressure on the South African parliament to act on the issue.  
Box 16: Call for a demonstration 
PASSOP AFRIKA 
EMERGENCY CALL 4 A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST XENOPHOBIA Lets 
stand together for African Unity! 
June 30, 2012: There's going to be a solidarity march to parliament, organised by the 
Somali Association of South Africa - Tomorrow Friday June 7. 2012 
Everyone’s gathering at Keizergracht (CPUT) at 10AM 
Let's all say No to Xenophobia 
Source: PASSOP Afrika Facebook page 
During the fieldwork, I observed a number of youths in Zimbabwe changing their profile 
pictures as a way of protesting against a number of grievances. This creative use of Facebook 
as a venue of political activism dovetails with Wasserman’s (2011: 12) view that new media 
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technologies can also be seen as “the location where [young] people are transgressing the 
hitherto fixed boundaries of what counts as political participation”. For instance, several 
youths from the NCA and CiZC changed their status updates to: “We are all Munyaradzi 
Gwisai”. This was in the wake of the arrest of Munyaradzi Gwisai (former MDC MP for 
Highfield) and 29 activists on allegations of planning to use social media to topple the 
Zimbabwean government in 2011. The use of the “we” reminiscent of the “We are all Khalid 
Said”can also be viewed as attempted at constructing a sense of collective identity. Another 
Facebook activism campaign occurred when Beatrice Mtetwa (a prominent human rights 
lawyer) was arrested by the police on allegations of obstructing the course of justice. Some of 
the observed youths from the YFZ and CiZC changed their profile pictures to an avatar 
inscribed: “Release Beatrice Mtetwa Now!!!!”   
 
As illustrated in Box 16, some youths updated their status to the message: “Release Beatrice 
Mtetwa Now”. These kinds of symbolic protests have become signature occurrences on 
Facebook whenever a human rights activist is arrested in Zimbabwe. The use of these 
“protest avatars” (digital images that act as symbols for individualised and collective action) 
is not unique to Zimbabwe and South Africa. Protest avatars were widely used by supporters 
of the 2011 protest wave, from Egypt to Spain and the US (Gerbaudo, 2015). From the 
photos of Egyptian martyr Khaled Said adopted as profile pictures, to protest posters and 
multiple variations of Anonymous’ mask, a great variety of images stemming from Arab 
Spring have acquired the status of “collective avatars”, icons displayed by internet users to 
express their sense of belonging and support for protest movements to all their internet peers 
(Gerbaudo, 2015: 1). . 
Box 17: A call for action 
If you are in favour of her release update your to ‘Release Beatrice Mtetwa 
Now’. If you read this status update, immediately update your status to ‘Release 
Beatrice Mtetwa Now’!!!! She needs your support at this critical moment. 
 
Source: Facebook wall post by a CiZC youth, 18 March 2013 
For instance, following the brutal murder of a 12-year-old boy Christpowers Maisiri (son to 
Shepherd Maisiri, MDC-T deputy organising secretary for Headlands) in February 2013 in an 
alleged case of politically-motivated violence, some of the respondents from the YFZ and 
CiZC changed their cover and profile pictures to a black square (see figure 5) as a way of 
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expressing joint grief and raising awareness about an issue of public concern. By changing 
their profile picture to a black square, youth activists in Zimbabwe turned what is the 
quintessential form of individual self-presentation (Goffman, 1959) on Facebook, into an act 
of identification with collective, crowd-like aggregations gathering on political online 
networks. As Gerbaudo (2015: 1) argues, the use of profile pictures has also become a means 
to express collective identification, through the adoption of various protest icons as their 
personal profile pictures (Gerbaudo, 2015: 1). He adds that these protest avatars constitute 
“memetic signifiers”, that is, symbolic references which because of their inclusive and post-
ideological content, their memetic character, their capacity to spread with extreme rapidity, 
are highly conducive to processes of collective identification. Similar to identity badges in the 
analogue world, such as political T-shirts, stickers, flags, buttons and the like, sporting digital 
avatars conveys one’s identification with an online group, satisfying the sense of belonging to 
a political community by new means (Gerbaudo, 2015).  
 
In an informal interview with one of the respondents from the CiZC, she had this to say: “it’s 
a symbolic gesture on our part, we are trying to communicate that the loss of human life to 
political violence is just unacceptable”. This foregoing interview extract validates the view 
that “young people are expressing themselves in ways that do not always conform or restrict 
themselves to the formal and procedural processes of decision-making” (Fakir, et al 2010: 
118). 
Figure 5: A black profile picture 
 
Below are calls for action shared by some of the respondents in Zimbabwe: 
Box 18: A call for action 
Its Thursday today, every Thursday we are blackening our profile photos to SEND 
the message NO TO VIOLENCE. Please share and blacken in solidarity. 
Source: Facebook wall post by a CiZC youth 
From Box 17 above, it is clear that profile pictures constitute novel spaces for expressing 
dissent, outrage, fostering solidarity and communicating political statements. Another female 
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youth in Zimbabwe encouraged her Facebook friends and colleagues to use the avatar below 
as their profile picture: 
Figure 6: Picture: Say NO to Gender-based Violence!!! #16DaysOfActivism 
 
Source: Facebook profile page 
The following informal interview between the researcher and a male respondent from the 
CiZC is very instructive about the use of Facebook as a ‘field’ of activism: 
Interviewer: Is that black profile picture symbolic? 
Respondent: Yes, it’s symbolic of the current and continuing hopelessness of the 
Zimbabwe situation, no light at the end of the tunnel yet. 
Although some of the youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa used Facebook as a venue of 
activism, they emphasised that meaningful political action can only be achieved through 
offline demonstrations, marches and protests. Respondents in Zimbabwe noted that whilst 
they would prefer to engage in street demonstrations as a way of raising their grievances, 
militarised policing and repressive pieces of law stood in their way. As one male respondent 
from the CiZC observed: “so people are not going to trust you when you say let’s meet at the 
Africa Unity Square on Facebook. People will not turn up”. Another female interviewee 
chipped in as follows: “rather than doing nothing about the situation Facebook enables us to 
engage in symbolic protests”. Although they viewed Facebook as a change agent tool, most 
of the respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa emphasised that it: “should be 
complemented with street action”. One male youth from the R2K Campaign in South Africa 
observed that: “If you want to get a physical presence in the streets, Facebook is a limited 
medium for organising. But online involvement is more relevant than many people think”. As 
the interview extracts from Zimbabwean respondents show even in a political context 
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characterised by a “habitus of fear”, situated actors exhibit remarkable “art of presence” 
(Bayat, 2010). This denotes “the use of courage and creativity against all odds to assert the 
collective [and individual] will of the people” (Bayat, 2010: 91).   
From the foregoing discussion, it can be noted that youths in both countries are creatively 
appropriating Facebook as both a means to an end as well as an end in itself. Compared to 
South African youth activists their Zimbabwean counterparts were more inclined to use 
Facebook as a venue of activism. This validates the view that “there are other preferred 
means of participation which are less formal and driven by political ideology” (Fakir et al., 
2010: 119). It also demonstrates that youth activists in both countries are deploying Facebook 
to develop a new “biography of citizenship” (Vinken, 2005: 155) that is characterised by 
more individualised forms of activism.  
It is important to note that, whilst political action on Facebook has often been denigrated as 
signifying “slacktivism” (Morozov, 2009), the usage of Facebook as a venue of political 
action in Zimbabwe and South Africa suggests that a more nuanced conceptualisation of 
political participation is long overdue. As scholars (Dennis, 2015; Gerbaudo, 2015) observe, 
these apparently trivial acts can be properly understood as manifestations of important 
processes of collective identification that are relevant for the analysis of contemporary protest 
movements. Although this study has not found cases where youth activists in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa are using Facebook to engage in internet-based acts of civl disobedience (such 
as hacktivism, virtual sit-ins, distributed denial of service (DDOS) actions and website 
defacements) aimed at upsetting the status quo by disrupting the normal flow of information 
(Garret, 2006), it was clear that the venues and cultures of protest action are changing in 
contemporary activism.   
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has discussed how and why youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa use 
Facebook for political purposes. It has looked at similarities in the ways youth activists and 
movements deploy Facebook for political purposes in both countries. The chapter has also 
focused on significant differences in the way Facebook has been appropriated by activists in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. Whereas some uses of Facebook like external communication, 
advertising, mobilisation of supporters, everyday political discussion were more apparent, 
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others such as sourcing political information, contacting politicians and virtual recruitment 
were very subtle. Compared to other movements, the PASSOP Afrika and CiZC used 
Facebook as a tool for fundraising and soliciting donations. In contrast with respondents from 
South Africa, it has been demonstrated that those in Zimbabwe deployed Facebook for 
contacting politicians and political parties. Respondents from all the social movements in 
both case nations indicated that they used the site as a recruitment booth for potential 
supporters. In contrast with South Africa, interviews showed that respondents in Zimbabwe 
utilised Facebook as a source of political news and information. Interviews and online 
observations established that Facebook was used as an advertising platform for public events 
by all the social movements.  
 
Social movements like the CiZC, R2K Campaign and PASSOP Afrika exhibited some 
particular uses of Facebook more than the other activist groupings. Although respondents 
from all the movements used Facebook as a venue for everyday political conversations, in 
Zimbabwe such online discussions are constrained by fear of state surveillance. Whereas 
respondents in South Africa deployed Facebook for action-oriented mobilisation of 
supporters, in Zimbabwe it was for discursive-oriented aspects. Because of the constrained 
nature of politics in Zimbabwe, most respondents have turned Facebook into a field of 
activism when compared to their South African counterparts. This means that in Zimbabwe 
Facebook has become part of the signifying framework within which youths construct 
political meanings and stake communicative claims in the political domain. The findings 
show that respondents in both countries utilise Facebook to engage in both traditional and 
alternative forms of political participation. These findings reinforce previous studies (Delli-
Carpini, 2000; Dahlgren & Olsson, 2007; Livingstone, Markham & Couldry, 2007; Storsul, 
2014) which conclude that young people, who are already politically engaged in offline 
spaces use the internet to sustain, expand and strengthen their political participation. 
 
The next chapter discusses the reasons why youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa are 
using Facebook to engage in political action. 
 
191 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
WHY YOUTH ACTIVISTS USE FACEBOOK FOR POLITICAL 
ACTION IN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
6. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I examine the reasons why politically engaged youths in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa deploy Facebook for political purposes. Participants were asked the following 
questions: What would you say are some of the major reasons why you use Facebook for 
political purposes in this country? In comparison to other social media platforms, what are 
some of the reasons why you use Facebook to advance your political objectives? As this 
section will demonstrate, it emerged from interview responses in both countries that they are 
resorting to Facebook for strategic and practical reasons. Although there are few similarities 
in terms of why youths are using Facebook for political activism in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, there are also significant differences. Respondents in Zimbabwe observed that they 
are resorting to Facebook for political purposes because of lack of access to the mainstream 
media, lack of political space, the social and technical affordances of the site and the 
demonstration effect
108
 of the Arab Spring. Interview responses in South Africa showed that 
youths are deploying Facebook for political activism because of limited access to the 
mainstream media, social and technical affordances of the platform and the demonstration 
effect of the Arab Spring.  
As intimated in Chapter Five, respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa also noted that they 
used Facebook in collaboration with a mix of traditional and digital media platforms. These 
include face-to-face communication, community meetings, WhatsApp groups, Google+ 
groups, Twitter, mailing lists, websites, community media, pamphlets, posters, newsletters 
and mobile phones. Instead of individual technologies, responses from youth activists in both 
case nations suggests that it makes sense to examine the various layers of the communication 
ecology
109
 which are deployed by youth activists to engage in political action in specific 
media environments. As Foth & Hearn (2007) put it, there are various layers which constitute 
                                                          
108 The term refers “to the diffusion of protest behaviour and tactics caused by observation of the actions of others and their consequences” 
(Tarrow, 1994: 40).   
109It denotes “the context in which communication processes occur” (Foth & Hearn, 2007:  9). This approach is concerned with the various 
types of media or communication spaces and tools which are available to communities and that people use in specific geographical area 
(Tacchi, Slater & Hearn, 2003). 
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media ecologies: discursive (themes or content of both mediated and unmediated 
communication), technological (ICTs, TV, radio) and social (community meetings, informal 
networks, institutions). Far from being disconnected, these layers are intricately interrelated 
and mutually constitutive. This suggests that in any given context social movent actors (in 
this case, youth activists) could possibly deploy all the various layers of the media ecologies 
rather than the single media determinism (Bennett & Segerberg, 2011) as propounded by 
cyber-optimists.  
From the interviews, it was clear that respondents do not only utilise individual technologies 
(like Facebook) but a whole gamut of communication technologies available at their disposal. 
This means that for youth activists which struggled to command substantial mainstream 
media attention like those from the UPM in South Africa, they resorted to the “social layer” 
(Foth & Hearn, 20007) in order to mobilise and conscientise people on collective grievances. 
Responses from interviewed youths from the NCA and YFZ in Zimbabwe also revealed that 
in the absence of donor funding for mainstream media advertising and media blackout by 
both the private and public media, they resorted to door-to-door campaigns, community 
meetings and informal networks to spread the word against the adoption of the COPAC-
authored constitution. It is important to emphasise that the wider political
110
 and mediated
111
 
opportunity structure had a determining impact on which communicative platforms are 
deployed for mobilisation and claim-making purposes. Context played a significant role in 
terms of which layers were used to reach out and mobilise their constituencies in both 
countries.  
For instance, when the youths from CiZC indicated that they used different communication 
platforms to reach to urban and rural youths. Similarly, youth activists from PASSOP 
indicated that they deployed the technological layer (which include Facebook, Twitter and 
emails) when they are communicating with their members based in urban areas. For those 
outside urban areas like migrants who worked on farms, they made use of the social layer 
                                                          
110 The concept of political opportunity structure refers to how political and social structures at any moment in time affect social movements 
(Garret, 2006). 
111 Cammaerts (2012: 122) argues that the mediated opportunity structure is made up of three analytical levels. The first is the media 
opportunity structure which defines the extent to which movements are able to access and get their messages across in the mainstream 
media. The second level is that of discursive opportunity structure and this involves self-mediation strategies used by social movements to 
produce counter-narratives outside the mainstream media. The third level is that of the networked opportunity structure referring to 
resistance practices by social movements that are mediated through new media technologies (Cammaerts, 2012: 128). These three levels are 
interrelated and they impact on each other in various ways.  
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(which invlve the use of community meetings, face-to-face communication and informal 
networks). Youth activists at CiZC in Zimbabwe, for instance, indicated that discursive layer 
was mostly deployed to attract the attention of policy makers and the broader population. At 
the height of the campaign to register first time youth voters, youth activists at CiZC 
observed that they made use of the popular Urban Grooves and ZimDance Hall music , 
poetry, radio, dance and and theatre to reach out politically apathetic young people across the 
country. This reinforces Dawson’s (2012: 321) postulation that social movement actors in 
South Africa creatively appropriated dress, slogans, murals, songs, radio, dance, poetry and 
political theatre for mobilisation and claim-making. The point is that youth activists in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa used each layer of communication ecology creatively to target 
specific audiences and to publicise their struggles. Facebook although located within the 
“technological layer” (Forth & Hearn, 2007) was also viewed as “bridge”to access the 
“discursive layer”. This means that through self-mediating strategies on Facebook, some 
youth activists hoped to attract the attention of mainstream journalists as well as to build their 
own unique audience. As Chiumbu (2015) adds, in an effort to produce counter-narratives 
and disseminate them independently from the mainstream media organisations, social 
movement actors have made use of films (documentaries), books, leaflets and pamphlets, as 
discursive tools to amplify their struggles. 
6.1 Responses on why youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa use Facebook to facilitate 
political action 
 
6.1.1 Facebook’s social and technical affordances 
 
There was consensus amongst respondents in both countries that the major reason why they 
use Facebook for political purposes had to do with its affordances. The concept of affordance 
denotes “the perceived and actual properties of a particular technology, primarily those 
fundamental properties that determine just how the thing [technology] could possibly be 
used” (Norman, 1988: 9). As scholars (see Earl & Kimport, 2011) observe, the concept of 
affordances provide strong clues to the operations of a technology as well as the reasons why 
people might prefer this or that technology for some particular purpose. The reason is that 
affordances of certain technologies are more inviting than others for enabling users to 
participate in political activities (Tully & Ekdale, 2014). The properties of Facebook afford 
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its users to post and share content (including images and video) instantaneously, to comment 
or offer “likes” to existing content, or to create “events”, which people may “join”, signaling 
their intention to participate.  Respondents in South Africa noted that some of the properties 
of Facebook were best suited for the storage of protest photographs, political event 
organisation, member management, and communication of relatively long messages to a 
broader audience. Unlike traditional media platforms which are subject to various 
gatekeeping practices, most respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa mentioned that 
Facebook was invaluable because it allows for relatively cheap, fast and [un]restricted 
dissemination of information. The affordances of social media have made them a relatively 
low-barrier means of communication and organisation (Shirky, 2008). Writing about student 
activism in Australia, Britain and America, Loader, Vromen, Xenos, Steel & Burgum (2015) 
argue that the cost effective access to social network sites and functional capacities to 
instantaneously communicate and share digital content makes them valuable tools for 
activists to organise themselves.  
Respondents in South Africa also reported that the social network site was an ideal platform 
for activism because it allowed them to create Facebook events and to gauge the response in 
terms of attendance. Compared to their South African counterparts, respondents in Zimbabwe 
observed that they utilised Facebook for political activism because it enabled them to stay in 
touch with fellow activists who are based in the diaspora. As one male youth from the CiZC 
explained, “most of our cadres are studying abroad and want to remain connected to the 
struggle so Facebook offers instant messaging, video-calling and private messaging”. 
Interview responses also indicated that Facebook was used largely due to its potential to 
facilitate interactive communication beyond the boundaries of space and time. This finding 
reinforces Earl & Kimport’s (2011) view that one of the affordance of new media which is 
relevant for activism is the decreased need for activists to be physically together in order to 
act together.  
In both countries, the respondents reported that unlike Twitter’s hashtags, Facebook had the 
advantage of allowing them to create groups. In contrast with traditional media platforms, 
Facebook was lauded for allowing youth activists to communicate via private (through 
private messages and instant messaging) and public (through walls and discussion threads) 
communication channels. For respondents in Zimbabwe, private and secret Facebook groups 
were important because they enabled them to control who can see their walls, comments and 
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private conversations. The advantage of Facebook privacy settings is that it hides users’ 
content from most search engines (except Facebook social plug ins) and web crawlers. In a 
country dogged by state surveillance, Facebook groups were viewed as defying legal 
restrictions imposed on public gatherings. As noted in Chapter Three, Facebook privacy 
settings are also crucial in a political context where ordinary people have been arrested for 
political statements posted in online spaces. This also concurs with the view that the 
internet’s capacity to “bypass state control and communicate in a secure environment” (Scott 
& Street, 2001: 46) makes it attractive to youth activists in particular and social movements 
in general. As Dahlgren (2000) further asserts, the internet’s possibilities for cheap, 
transnational and synchronous communication contributes to advocacy groups only achieving 
visibility in counter-publics isolated from other counter-publics and the dominant, 
mainstream public sphere. 
Some of the respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa mentioned that the reason why they 
used Facebook was largely due to its participatory and interactive nature. This contrasts 
significantly with traditional media platforms which are generally hierarchical and linear 
(Livingstone, 2009). As Livingstone (2009: 121) observes, the architecture of the internet 
[and social media platforms] fits well with young people’s informal, peer-oriented, anti-
authority approach to political activity. Although respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
hailed Facebook for its interactive architecture, online observations indicated that 
participation levels on the pages and groups were generally low (see Chapter Six). Qualitative 
interviews with youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa also established that they perceived 
Facebook as giving them an access to a larger audience compared to any other social media 
platform. As one male youth from the UPM commented: “Facebook is one of the few 
available options for us to reach out a significant constituency on a shoe-string budget”. This 
supports Gerbaudo’s (2012: 146) point that in using Facebook as a ground for mobilising 
efforts, activists in Egypt were focusing on the site where they could potentially reach the 
largest number of users. Similarly, Fuchs (2014) argues that the big advantage of commercial 
social media like Facebook is that activists can reach out to the public and everyday people. 
However a caveat is needed here.  
As already mentioned, although theoretically Facebook enabled the youths to reach out to 
everyday people, it must be noted that public visibility and reach on Facebook are dependent 
on the EdgeRank system. EdgeRank is important because it plays a part of manipulating and 
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shaping circulations of data and deciding what becomes visible and what does not on the 
newsfeed (Beer, 2014; Dahlberg, 2015). The system is designed in such a way that certain 
content types (for instance, photos and video) and interactions (commitment from fans) have 
a higher EdgeRank than a simple status (text only) and are therefore more likely to be visible 
on most newsfeeds. The relevance of the EdgeRank algorithms
112
 for activists is that mostly 
data heavy posts (like videos) are privileged, which requires money, bandwidth and a good 
signal. Thus for activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa who rely on mobile phones to access 
Facebook posting videos and audios on Edge is extremely difficult and expensive. As Poell 
(2014) observes, this demonstrates that there is a mismatch between the commercial 
considerations of Facebook and the needs of activists. Based on analysis of EdgeRank, the 
algorithm structuring the flow of information and communication on Facebook’s “News 
Feed”, Bucher (2012: 1164) argues that the regime of visibility constructed imposes a 
perceived “threat of invisibility” on the part of the participatory subject. Reversing Foucault’s 
notion of surveillance as a form of permanent visibility, Bucher (2012: 1164) observes that 
“participatory subjectivity is not constituted through the imposed threat of an all-seeing 
vision machine, but the constant possibility of disappearing and becoming obsolete”.  
Respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa also observed that they deployed Facebook 
because it was accessible through a wide range of technologies. Facebook is accessible 
through personal computers, smartphones, tablets and ipads. This however raises the question 
of access and cost of use which somehow favours the privileged few thereby reinforcing 
“elite continuity” (Sparks, 2011) in online public deliberation. As one male youth from the 
YFZ in Zimbabwe puts it: “you can log on to your mobile phone at any time and tell your 
comrades that I have been arrested or I am in trouble”. Another point is that Facebook 
enabled youth activists to tap into their local social networks. A female youth from the R2K 
Campaign also stated: “Facebook offers great opportunities for campaigners, because your 
audience is there and it is incredibly cheap and easy to get information to them. However, it 
is also easy for your audience to perform their interest, by engaging with your message, 
information or call to action in a way that costs them very little and has limited effect”.  
                                                          
112 Algorithms, or computational processes that are used to make decisions, are often deployed as gatekeepers; in this function, they are 
somewhat similar to the role of a newspaper editor, but possess important differences from their offline, non--‐interactive and non-
-‐computational counterparts. Hence, Algorithmic gatekeeping raises significant yet novel issues in many realms (Tufecki, 2015: 206).When 
I use the word “algorithms” in this study to refer to computational processes that are used to make decisions of such complexity that inputs 
and outputs are neither transparent nor obvious to the casual human observer (Tufecki, 2015). 
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Whilst affordances are synonymous with preferred Facebook usage practices from the 
perspective of designers, it is important to highlight that in practice the interaction between 
users and the architecture of Facebook is characterised by complex structuration (intersection 
of structure and agency). Users exhibit their own human agency through creatively using 
profile pictures as platforms for disseminating counter-hegemonic discourses. As pointed out 
earlier, Facebook usage cultures differ from context to context. These different Facebook 
usage cultures support the argument by the social shaping approach that technologies are 
characterised by interpretive flexibility which enables users to challenge 
designers’preferences in terms of the use of features. 
6.1.2 Lack of political space 
 
Unlike in South Africa, respondents in Zimbabwe cited lack of political space as one of the 
driving factors behind their deployment of Facebook for political activities. Although 
respondents in South Africa bemoaned the militarised nature of policing and the abuse of the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act by some municipalities which has contributed significantly to 
the shrinkage of the democratic space, they observed that generally the country still had 
several spaces for political expression. In contrast with South Africa, almost all interviewees 
in Zimbabwe observed that the existence of repressive laws had contributed immensely to the 
curtailment of the right to protest in physical spaces. As Gerbaudo (2013) aptly puts it, 
authoritarian regimes are afraid of street demonstrations “which could create a dangerous 
interaction between the activist community and the popular classes on the streets”. As 
highlighted in Chapter One, Zimbabwe has a piece of legislation that governs the right to 
demonstrate and hold public gatherings, christened the Public Order and Safety Act (POSA). 
The Act criminalises the distribution of political posters, pamphlets or other such material in 
public places and private homes without the permission from the police. Noteworthy to 
highlight that contravention of POSA attracts a jail sentence of up to five years. POSA also 
requires people to notify the police 14 days before holding a public event, thereby giving the 
police excessive powers in terms of determining “legitimate” and “illegitimate” gatherings. 
The irony about POSA is that it makes people’s right to protest subject to the approval of 
their adversaries (the police who are subservient to the current government).  
In such an environment the holding of “lawful” public demonstrations by civic groupings and 
ordinary people who are seen as the anti-establishment is extremely difficult when compared 
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to the South African case. Thus Facebook is used to circumvent the limitations imposed on 
the right to protest and freedom of assembly in the Zimbabwean context. As one respondent 
from the NCA remarked, Facebook has become synonymous with an “alternative site of the 
struggle for political activists inside and outside of Zimbabwe”. Given the regulation of 
public gatherings in Zimbabwe, Facebook groups and pages function as “spaces of 
withdrawal and regroupment” (Fraser, 1992) for politically engaged youths in Zimbabwe. 
From the foregoing arguments, one can also argue that Facebook provides youth activists 
with an invented space of participation (Cornwall, 2002). 
Although the right to protest is enshrined in the new Constitution of Zimbabwe, in practice, 
the police continue to manipulate certain sections of POSA and the Criminal Law 
(Codification and Reform) Act of 2004 to thwart efforts by social movements and activists to 
organise street demonstrations. As Moyo (2009) argues, the passage of POSA not only 
constrained civil society’s political activism in “real” space, but also contributed immensely 
to the closure of democratic space for civic networking, mobilisation and participation in 
national politics. Extending this argument further, Lewis (2006) suggests that Zimbabwean 
activists used ICTs in several innovative ways to exercise the right to assembly and freedom 
of association in the face of on-going government repression. Writing about the Arab Spring 
in Egypt, Gerbaudo (2012) points out that Mubarak regime’s tight control on the public space 
forced young Egyptians to turn to social media platforms to share their dissent. Respondents 
in Zimbabwe were unanimous in terms of pointing out that the major reason why Facebook 
has become a field of activism was that it compensated for their lack of political space in 
offline settings. They observed that Facebook allowed them to virtually congregate like-
minded people outside the restrictive environment. As one interviewee from the YFZ noted, 
“Facebook is POSA defiant because you don’t need a police clearance to express your 
grievances”. As some of the respondents in Zimbabwe explained:  
…as you are aware, the narrowing of the democratic space has played a big role in 
pushing activists to look for new spaces to continue with their political actions. Ever 
since the ZANU PF regime became dictatorial through amongst other issues 
detaining, harassing, torturing and arresting vocal activists we have seen that street 
activism has become risky and as a result the coming in on board of social media 
platforms has opened up other avenues for activism. So in essence, the closure of the 
democratic space is one of the main reasons why we are using Facebook to promote 
their causes… (male youth, YFZ, 2013). 
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…..You see, Chief. There is no space for demonstrations and strikes in the current one 
party system in Zimbabwe. There are several pieces of legislation which gives the 
police the authority to outlaw and detain activists without any repercussions. This 
means that the cyber-space has become a safe space for us to raise political issues 
which we cannot raise in the physical space (male youth, NCA, 2013). 
This finds support in boyd’s (2008) assertion that online spaces are increasingly becoming 
alternatives in contexts where physical public squares have become inaccessible, untenable, 
heavily regulated or downright oppressive. Although the shrinkage of public spaces in 
Zimbabwe is largely due to political restrictions, in South Africa social inequalities also 
contribute to a fragmentation of public space and exclusions. Facebook allows for what 
Miller & Slater (2000) calls “expansive realisation”. Expansive realisation means that people 
who have access to a new media are at first usually concerned to use this technology to 
facilitate things they already had been trying to do but were thwarted by the lack of means 
(Miller & Slater, 2000). Unlike in Zimbabwe, respondents in South Africa noted that they 
deployed Facebook as an additional political space where they could amplify their grievances 
beyond the alienating nature of formal political spaces. This supports Miller’s (2011:169) 
view that “Facebook provides an additional space for personal [and political] expression”.  
6.1.3 The demonstration effect of the Arab Spring 
 
Probably the most often cited explanation why politically engaged youths in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa employ Facebook for political purposes had to do with the demonstration effect 
of the Arab Spring. As defined earlier, the demonstration effect is premised on the notion that 
the more successful a particular tool or tactic is [perceived], the more likely it is to be 
adopted, adapted and diffused among activist groupings (Tarrow, 1994). It should be noted 
that the diffusion and adaptation of a new tactic does not automatically sound a death knell to 
old tactics. As Harlow (2014) observes, repertoires of collective action are slow to innovate, 
and most new tactics are abandoned as soon as they are adopted. In fact, the new tactics (like 
new media) often coexist with old tactics (traditional media). Most of the respondents in both 
countries indicated that the creative deployment of Facebook by young activists during the 
Arab Spring had convinced them that the site could be used to mobilise support for their 
work. Although interviews with some of the Facebook administrators revealed that some of 
the movements had already created groups and fan pages before the Arab Spring, they stated 
that prior to the events they were rather casual and unsystematic in their deployment of the 
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platform. One male respondent from the YFZ put it in this way: “before the Arab Spring, I 
was using Facebook pretty much for social purposes like communicating with my friends and 
relatives in the diaspora. But this changed in 2011 when I began to host vibrant political 
discussions on my Facebook wall”.  
Respondents in both countries observed that the usage of Facebook during the Arab Spring 
had made them realise that the platform could be used to enlist external media attention, to 
mobilise, organise and coordinate public gatherings. In response to the question whether they 
thought the demonstration effect of the Arab Spring had contributed to their utilisation of 
Facebook for political purposes, some of the respondents in South Africa stated that, “yes, it 
was a turning point because all of a sudden Facebook pages began to rally people to stand up 
for their rights”. Another respondent from the NCA in Zimbabwe added that “the events in 
North Africa taught us that whatever tool one can use should be used strategically to achieve 
our political goals”. Responses from the youth activists from the UPM in South Africa 
indicated that the use of social media in Egypt and Tunisia had spurred them to launch their 
own Facebook group in 2011. As one male youth from the UPM remarked: “we opened our 
page in 2011 following the events in Egypt and Tunisia with the sole aim of mobilising 
people to demand democratic accountability from their leaders”. This is how some of the 
respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa articulated the role of the demonstration effect of 
the Arab Spring on their usage of Facebook for political purposes:  
 …yea the Arab Spring has a big influence on how we use social media in this 
country. The mere fact that some people from another country used these social 
platforms to mobilise and organise demonstrations gives you enough reasons to 
believe that we can do the same here (male youth, NCA, 2013). 
…You cannot escape the influence of the Arab Spring in the way you use social 
media for political activism. As activists, we have learnt a lot from Egypt and Tunisia 
in terms of the dos and don’ts’. For instance, we have learnt that we cannot rely on 
online communication alone. This is because it is susceptible to state surveillance and 
its reach is limited to the privileged few (male youth, UPM, 2013). 
…Facebook use for activism was popularised by the Arab Spring and the Occupy 
Movement so naturally you expect us to copy and paste here and there. The influence 
of these revolutions is therefore inescapable although each context is different (female 
youth, YFZ, 2013). 
6.1.4 Lack of access to the mainstream media 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, activists depend on the mainstream media for a number of 
reasons, including for mobilising political support, legitimation and validation of their 
demands and to enable them to widen the scope of conflict beyond the like-minded (Gamson 
& Wolfsfeld, 1993). This means that gaining attention in the mass media is a key goal of 
many social movement organisations (Saguin, 2015). From the interviews, it emerged that 
lack of access to the mainstream media in Zimbabwe was one of the major reasons why 
youths are resorting to Facebook to communicate their grievances. With the exception of a 
few respondents in South Africa who noted that they experienced limited access to the 
mainstream media, most of those interviewed acknowledged that they had access to several 
channels of communication. This is largely attributed to economic forces (for instance, 
commercial news values) in the South African media sphere which privileges marketable 
news content over activist grievances. Respondents from the UPM and PASSOP Afrika in 
South Africa observed that they had limited access to the mainstream media and in cases 
where such coverage occurred, it focused on violent and dramatised protests and 
demonstrations. This invokes the notion of the “protest paradigm”, as discussed in section 
5.1.1, where the mainstream media tends to marginalise movements and activists by drawing 
attention away from the core concerns raised by such non-state actors (Gitlin, 1980).  
Respondents in Zimbabwe observed that besides the private press and diasporic media which 
at times provided an outlet for their grievances, they were generally shut out from the public 
media. Although youths noted that they also relied on the mainstream “private” press which 
has assumed an anti-government editorial stance, it must be noted that its circulation and 
distribution figures are surpassed by the public press. Respondents in Zimbabwe also 
highlighted that the public media had the tendency of refusing to grant them editorial and 
advertising space. One interviewee from the NCA recalled a situation, where the public 
media refused to air their radio advertisements because they were seen as decampaigning the 
government’s COPAC-drafted constitution. Another respondent from the same movement 
also recounted an incident where a pre-recorded programme was heavily edited to remove 
scenes which were seen as casting the government in bad light by the gatekeepers at the ZBC. 
This is consistent with previous studies (Kariithi & Kareithi, 2008; Duncan, 2010) which 
demonstrate that dissenting voices are often side-lined by the mainstream media.  
Although the licensing of two commercial radio stations (namely StarFM and ZiFM stereo) 
has been touted as signifying the beginning of the liberalisation of the airwaves in Zimbabwe, 
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interview responses indicated that because of the ownership structures (see Chapter Two) of 
these radio stations it is difficult to flight content which is considered as anti-establishment. 
Respondents in Zimbabwe also noted that it was extremely expensive to buy airtime at the 
two radio stations to flight advertisements and programmes. For a one-hour radio programme, 
the price ranged between US$1000 and US$4000 depending on the time slot. Besides the 
programme content was subjected to heavy censorship by the producers and presenters from 
the radio stations. Because of the limited access to independent channels for political voice, 
most interviewees in Zimbabwe described Facebook as constitutive of an alternative channel 
through which they could express their grievances without gatekeeping controls. It is 
arguable therefore that Facebook functions as a compensatory vehicle for the lack of access 
to the mainstream media. Some of the respondents remarked in this regard:  
People resort to Facebook because they have limited options. For instance, on the 
state controlled media, we are not given an opportunity to say out our grievances. 
During talk shows we are not given an opportunity to express our political opinions. 
These platforms are muzzled. So we are using our own Facebook pages to express our 
views which are inexpressible through mainstream media platforms. If people had 
independent platforms to voice their opinions, they would certainly use them. 
Facebook gives us options to express our views (male youth, NCA, 2013).  
Without access to the mainstream media, Facebook becomes our alternative avenue to 
air our views. It is extremely difficult to have access to mainstream public media in 
this country unless something negative has occurred. We are viewed with disdain and 
often referred to as regime change agents by the public press (male youth, YFZ, 
2013). 
Compared to Zimbabwe, interviewees from the R2K Campaign in South Africa noted that 
their use of Facebook for political purposes was driven by the desire to expand their 
communicative platforms rather than because of limited access to the mainstream media. This 
could be attributed to the fact that the R2K Campaign enjoys significant support from the 
mainstream, commercial media. Furthermore, because freedom of expression is an issue 
shared by a broad cross-section of media practitioners and ordinary citizens at large, 
campaigners from the R2K Campaign have access to a wide array of communicative 
platforms.  
From the interviews, it was evident that respondents from the UPM were also critical of the 
SABC for not covering their public events and marches despite sending invitations to their 
journalists: 
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Box 19: Demonstration against the SABC for non-coverage 
We are occupying SABC offices in PE. Our demand is simple, SABC must cover our 
conference and stop being the mouthpiece of the ruling party and the ruling class. They must 
stop marginalising the voices of the poor and dispossessed black people. We shall not be 
moved! 
Source: Facebook wall post 
It can be deduced from the above post that activists from the UPM have had a hard time 
trying to access the public broadcaster. This forced some of the activists to picket at the 
SABC offices in Port Elizabeth demanding the public broadcaster to cover their conference. 
As noted earlier, the mainstream media in South Africa tends to focus on suburban views and 
hence marginalises the voices of the poor. Writing about the ambivalent relationship between 
social movements and the mainstream media in South Africa, Willems (2010: 492) observes 
that some of the activist groupings have “little access to the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC) and the influential national newspapers such as The Star, The Sunday 
Times, Mail and Guardian and Business Day”.  
Mainstream media attention garnered by social movement organisations differ significantly 
depending on the character, social standing and media relations of each organisation in the 
two countries. The dominant explanation of media attention to SMOs is that the media act 
like a filter, selecting some types of SMOs and events for attention, and ignoring others based 
on characteristics of these SMOs, events, and their political environment (Saguin, 2015). 
Compared to predominantly middle-class oriented movements like the CiZC, NCA and R2K 
Campaign, others such as YFZ, UPM and PASSOP Afrika complained that it was difficult 
for them garner significant media attention. This further demonstrates that the “media 
opportunity structure” (Cammaerts, 2012) tends to favour certain social movements at the 
expense of others. Because of the unequal access to the “mediated opportunity structure” 
(Cammaerts, 2012), it follows that visibility and attention are also unequally distributed 
resources. As Tufecki (2013) argues, the emergent new media ecology has fundamentally 
affected the means of production and distribution of attention, a key resource for social 
movements. As interviews with youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa revealed, 
Facebook was seen as having broadened mediation opportunities and weakened the 
mainstream media’s monopoly on public attention. 
Interview responses with respondents from the UPM revealed that coverage in the 
mainstream private and community press was increasingly difficult to attain. As one male 
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youth from the UPM observed: “although journalists attend our public meetings and 
demonstrations, news stories that are published are generally negative”. Youth activists from 
the UPM and PASSOP also observed that: “journalists only come to cover us when we do 
something out of the ordinary throwing poo at the offices of high ranking authorities”. This 
observation seems to validate research (Duncan, 2010, 2014; Chiumbu, 2015; Wasserrman, 
Bosch & Chuma, 2016) in South Africa that the coverage of protest actions in South Africa 
tends to be episodic, focusing on the moment of protest, which does not explain why a 
community got to the point where they felt that the only way of communicating their message 
was to barricade roads, stone the mayor‘s house or torch a library. This explains the 
normalisation of these protest repertoires in contemporary activism in South Africa as 
protestors seek to attract the attention of the inaccessible and slow-to-act mainstream media.  
Another respondent from the UPM added that: “even the Grocotts Mail113 sometimes does 
not cover us in good light because of their overreliance on the Makana municipality for 
advertising revenue”. The perceived cosy relationship between Grocotts Mail and the 
Makana municipality was seen as undermining the paper’s editorial independence. This is 
despite the fact that in recent years there has been evidence of a much more fractious 
relationship between the paper and the municipality with the latter boycotting to advertise in 
the newspaper. A recent study (Wasserman, Bosch & Chuma, 2016) shows that community 
protests in South Africa receive unfavourable coverage. The study also found that the 
reporting also routinely fails to provide depth and context to explain the underlying issues 
that lead to the protests. Because the underlying structural issues are not unpacked, the net 
result is superficial and limited reporting (Wasserman, Bosch & Chuma, 2016).  
                                                          
113This is the oldest surviving independent newspaper in South Africa. Founded in 1870 (but incorporating the Grahamstown Journal which 
was founded in 1831), this weekly newspaper has survived many years and is today the only newspaper that is published in Grahamstown 
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Respondents from the PASSOP Afrika also castigated newspapers like the Daily Sun for 
concentrating on what they described as “stereotypical xenophobic representations of 
refugees and asylum seekers’ issues in South Africa”. Facebook thus provided them with a 
space to circumnavigate the public invisibility associated with the elite public sphere. As 
some scholars (Willems, 2010, 2015; Dawson, 2012; Chiumbu, 2012) argue, because of their 
limited access to formal media at national level, social movements often use range of 
alternative channels of communication in order to highlight their campaign issues and to 
draw more activists into their struggles. In the case of the PASSOP Afrika and UPM, 
respondents hailed Facebook for allowing them to set the agenda for media coverage as well 
as to react against what they perceived as unfair coverage from mainstream media. This 
corroborates Papacharissi’s (2014) view that although social media platforms do not 
necessarily give citizens and under-represented groups a stronger voice, but they get the 
ability to tell their own story, in their own terms. This is because platforms like Facebook 
enable activists to construct the “injustice frame114” (Gamson, 1992) as well as challenge the 
“protest paradigm” (Gitlin, 1980) thereby changing the terms and manner in which their 
causes are represented. As Cottle (2008) writes, this contributes significantly to the 
emergence of “discursive contest” on the ways protests and demonstrations are reported on 
the mainstream and social media. Rather than simply constructing counter-hegemonic 
discourses, Rodríguez (2001) argues that alternative communication platforms also offer 
opportunities for ordinary people to tell their own stories in their own language. Facebook 
has also provided youth activists “spaces to develop counter-discourses that challenge and 
resist dominant ideologies” (Chiumbu, 2015: 1). 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
 
Compared to South Africa, respondents in Zimbabwe indicated that the reasons for using 
Facebook for political purposes related to the lack of political space, lack of access to the 
mainstream media, the demonstration effect of the Arab Spring and the perceived technical 
and social affordances of the site. For respondents in South Africa, the reasons include 
limited access to the mainstream media, technical and social affordances and the 
demonstration effect of the Arab Spring. It is clear from the foregoing there are more 
                                                          
114 An injustice frame is a collection of ideas and symbols that illustrate both how significant the problem is as well as what the movement 
can do to alleviate it. 
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similarities compared to the differences cited by respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
Thus the political use of Facebook by youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa is predominantly 
shaped by the socio-political and communication context in which the technology is 
deployed. This dovetails with several other studies (Mudhai, 2012; Mabweazara, 2010) which 
show that the wider social context structures the nature and form of the deployment of new 
media technologies for political purposes. Besides the wider social contextual factors, 
interview responses reflected that the diverse demographic backgrounds of the supporters of 
the movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa had a significant bearing on how the 
technology was appropriated for political purposes. 
The next chapter focuses on the discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation on 
Facebook groups and pages in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCURSIVE INTERACTIONS AND MICRO-POLITICS OF 
PARTICIPATION ON FACEBOOK GROUPS AND FAN PAGES 
 
7. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined why politically engaged youths in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa use Facebook to facilitate political activism. This chapter looks at the discursive 
interactions and micro-politics of participation on selected Facebook groups and pages. 
Relying on both qualitative and quantitative meta-data gathered from the six Facebook 
groups and pages under consideration, this chapter uses platform specific tools to measure 
levels of participation. It also assesses the extent to which Facebook pages and groups in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa can be considered as alternative spaces for political activism. 
The chapter is divided into three sections: firstly it looks at the discursive interactions (I will 
define this concept shortly); secondly it discusses the micro-politics of participation (will be 
defined in section 7.2 below)  and thirdly, it focuses on the extent to which Facebook groups 
and fan pages can be viewed as alternative spaces for political activism.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, qualitative content analysis was used to get an idea of the 
variety of participants, the amount and nature of interaction and the diversity of debated 
issues on selected Facebook pages and groups. Based on this data, this section provides 
valuable quantitative data about levels of engagement. In order to evaluate the levels of 
engagement on the six Facebook pages and groups under investigation, I drew up a set of 
indicators based on the numbers of likes, comments and shares. Categories of low levels of 
engagement represent 0 to 30 likes, comments and shares, medium levels of engagement 
refer to 31 to 60 while high levels of engagement meant 61+ likes, comments and shares. 
Before teasing out the levels of participation on Facebook, it is important to underscore the 
fact that the degree of participation in online spaces depends on a myriad of factors such as 
the design of medium, the will of the participants to engage in conversations, availability of 
time, economic and cultural capital, access to the internet, and a conducive legal and political 
environment.  
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Discursive interactions relates to “the establishment of socio-communicative relationships 
[embodied in language] within the media sphere” (Carpentier, 2011:29). It denotes the talk 
and conversations—the speech acts—and written communications of movement members 
that occur primarily in the context of, or in relation to, movement activities (Chiumbu, 2015). 
It also encapsulates user-to-user interaction as well as the user-to-(media) technology 
component. Participation
115
 is defined here as “involving leaving some kind of trace on the 
web: a message, a comment, a like, a share, a vote and so forth” (Olsson & Svensson, 2012: 
50). It also involves users taking advantage of different interactive features of a technology. 
Olsson & Svensson (2012: 51) distinguish between different levels of participation: “active 
participation” which refers to participation where a user initiates a discussion by posting a 
message and “reactive participation” where a user reacts to what is published by a producer 
and chooses to post a comment. They further submit that reactive comments can also be 
effected by exhortations pronounced by the producer which they called “promoted reactions”. 
Reactive participation can be self-generated or promoted. As noted in Chapter One, Facebook 
provides their users with both private (chat and private message) and public (discussion 
board, walls, groups) opportunities for participation.  
7.1 The discursive interactions on Facebook groups and pages in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa 
 
It emerged from the online participant observation and qualitative content analysis that in 
Zimbabwe the CiZC Facebook page had 980 posts, followed by the YFZ with 389 and the 
NCA had 283 during the selected time range (see Table 2 below). Compared to the 
Zimbabwean case, the South African Facebook pages like the R2K Campaign had 1052 
posts, followed by PASSOP Afrika with a total of 261 and then the UPM with 217 posts. It is 
evident from the findings that the CiZC and R2K Campaign had the highest number of 
postings. The findings of this study show that the type of postings shared by Facebook users 
included: links, videos, audio, questions, status updates and photos. In both countries, it was 
discovered that links, status updates and photos were the most posted and shared types of 
postings. The least shared type of postings were videos, audios and questions in both 
Zimbabwean and South African Facebook pages and groups. This could be attributed to the 
                                                          
115I acknowledge that the concept of participation can signify many different things, and the meaning of the concept can also vary between 
different empirical contexts (Pateman, 1970; Carpentier, 2011). Fraser defines it as the ability “to speak “in one’s own voice, thereby 
simultaneously constructing and expressing one’s cultural identity through idiom and style” (1992: 68), 
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fact that video and audio sharing activities are data intensive and relatively expensive to 
upload for users relying heavily on mobile internet access.  
As can be seen in Table 2 below, in Zimbabwe the CiZC had the most popular Facebook 
page in terms of the number of people who have liked it followed by the NCA and lastly the 
YFZ. Given the mass migration which has hit Zimbabwe since the turn of the century 
(Kamete, 2010a); it is possible that most the fans and group members on Facebook are based 
outside the country. In South Africa, the R2K Campaign had the most number of fans 
followed by the PASSOP Afrika and UPM. In comparison to South African Facebook groups 
and pages, those in Zimbabwe had the most number of fans and group members. Facebook 
meta-data revealed that with the exception of one page, the other five Facebook pages (YFZ, 
NCA, R2K Campaign, UPM and PASSOP Afrika) in Zimbabwe and South Africa were 
dominated by young people between the ages of 25 and 34. The most interactive 
demographic group on the CiZC Facebook page were between ages of 18 and 24.  
Table 2: The table shows the number of postings and group members on the six 
Facebook pages and pages studied between the 1
st
 of August 2011 and the 31
st
 of August 
2013. 
Facebook page or group Country Number of Facebook 
fans/ group members 
Number of Facebook 
posts 
Crisis in Zimbabwe 
Coalition 
Zimbabwe 67 981 980 
Youth Forum Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 40 000 389 
National Constitutional 
Assembly  
Zimbabwe 33 000 283 
PASSOP Afrika South Africa 4 964 261 
UPM South Africa 917 217 
R2K Campaign   South Africa 7753 1052 
Total   154 615 3182 
 
The table above illustrates the popularity of Facebook for political work in Zimbabwe 
relative to South Africa. As pointed out earlier, because the mainstream mediated public 
sphere in Zimbabwe does not allow for open public discourse, Facebook constitutes an 
important space for political commentary and debate. This is reflected in the afore-mentioned 
statistics where all the social movements in Zimbabwe had high numbers of fans and group 
members when compared to those in South Africa. Table 2 shows that the CiZC in Zimbabwe 
had fan base of 67 981 compared to 7753 members for the R2K Campaign which was the 
most popular Facebook page in South Africa. It should be noted that in both countries the 
210 
 
most popular Facebook pages were of those NGO-oriented movements
116
 with a strong 
political voice off-line as well as significant funding from donors. In contrast, grassroots 
movements like the UPM in South Africa with a predominantly unemployed youth 
membership had low levels of engagement on Facebook. Given the nature and dynamics of 
social media penetration rates in South Africa (see Chapter Three), social movements like the 
UPM and PASSOP Afrika whose membership comprise of unemployed youth and vulnerable 
immigrants respectively face a lot of hurdles in their usage of Facebook for political 
purposes. Unlike most movements in South Africa, all the movements in Zimbabwe had 
parallel Facebook pages for specific campaigns and target audiences. For instance, the CiZC 
also had the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition-Regional Office (SA) while the YFZ also 
administered the Youth Decide page and the NCA created the “Take Charge 179489”. In 
contrast the R2K Campaign in South Africa also had the R2K_Youth. 
From Table 2, it is also clear that NGO-oriented movements had more postings compared to 
grassroots movements. This is because NGO-oriented movements (such as the R2K 
Campaign, CiZC, YFZ and NCA) had both full-and part-time social media staff who 
constantly updated their pages and websites. The UPM and PASSOP Afrika relied 
extensively on part-time administrators and leaders of the social movements to post content 
on their Facebook pages. This explains the reason why they had low levels of engagement 
compared to other social movements. As Dennis (2015) observes, there are three types of 
users of social media platforms: civic instigators, contributors and listeners. Civic instigators 
and contributors engage in digital micro-activism by way of refining their political identity. 
Listeners use social media to consume political information but refrain from public forms of 
expression and instead take to private spaces for political discussion (Dennis, 2015). Lurkers 
or listeners in the Zimbabwean case can be viewed as “spectators” who use Facebook pages 
to “watch” politics rather than to “do” politics (Miller et al., 2016: 153). Even though the UPM 
Facebook group allowed members other than the administrator to post content, it was 
observed that only a few people took advantage of these privacy settings to initiate public 
discourse. These few people consisted of what Matthews (2012) refers to as the “relatively 
privileged”. This refers to black middle class and white people with a greater degree of 
income, education and access to media resources than most South Africans.  
                                                          
116 These organisations have functionally specialised, paid, professional staff and, sometimes, a limited group of volunteers; receive funding 
from bilateral and multilateral agencies and (usually foreign) private foundations; and engage in pragmatic strategic planning to develop 
“reports” or “projects” aimed at influencing public policies (Alvarez, 1997: 307) 
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Besides the level of access, it can be argued that the different characters of the social 
movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa impact on their posting habits and levels of 
participation. As noted earlier, NGO-oriented movements had higher levels of interaction 
compared to grassroots movements. In terms of posting habits, grassroots movements tended 
to post more infrequently compared to NGO-oriented movements in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. This is attributable to the fact that the former relies on part-time Facebook 
administrators to update their pages. In contrast NGO-oriented movements in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa were more likely to post links to external websites compared to grassroots 
movements like the UPM without a website. Out of the six movements in both countries, 
only the R2K Campaign and YFZ maintained high levels of interaction on their Facebook 
pages. The NCA and UPM had low levels of interaction compared to the other pages. As 
pointed out earlier, this is because these grassroots organisations had funding problems at the 
time of my fieldwork which could have contributed to the lack of marketing and advertising 
of their pages and groups beyond their activist community. The NCA also cut funding ties 
with their traditional donors as well as partners like the MDC-T which affected their public 
standing. 
Compared to Zimbabwe, postings related to calls for action were well-received on R2K 
Campaign, UPM and PASSOP Afrika Facebook pages and groups observed in South Africa. 
For instance, 722 people expressed interest to attend a demonstration in Grahamstown 
following a call for action by one of the participants on the UPM Facebook group. An extract 
of the post reads as follows: 
Box 20: Call for a demonstration in Grahamstown 
A Call to Unite & Save Grahamstown from the Vultures in the Municipality 
Grahamstown Town Hall in Grahamstown, Eastern Cape 
Comment: Sorry George - am out of town this week! Have a good one  
Comment: we'll be there 
Comment: If people in my hometown do not stand up as one, then nothing will ever 
change!! Go for it #in solidarity 
Comment: we will be there 
Comment: Our frustration is very real, but we must be careful not to tar the professional 
and technical people with the same brush as those responsible for the administrative 
problems which are at the root of the trouble.  There are amazing people working 
incredibly long and hard to sort Makana out - do not dis-hearten them further with 
blanket accusations. 
Comment: @above, I don't think anyone is doing that. There were many Makana 
municipal workers at the protest in support of the motion to dissolve the municipality. 
It's clear that there are people who work hard and care. 
Source: UPM Facebook group 
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In contrast with the above South African case, postings on calls for action on the YFZ, NCA 
and CiZC Facebook groups and pages in Zimbabwe garnered low levels of engagement and 
expression of interest from users.  This is despite the fact that unlike South Africa, social 
movements in Zimbabwe have high numbers of Facebook fans and members which suggests 
that most of them are “lurkers” or people who are scared to speak out (see Table 2). In 
Dennis’s (2015) typology these lurkers constitute “listeners” who use Facebook to consume 
political information but refrain from public forms of expression and instead take to private 
spaces for political discussion. This also echoes Carpentier’s (2011) argument that access 
(which generates the opportunity for people to have their voices heard) to media technologies 
does not automatically lead to participation. He adds that “access and interaction remain 
important conditions of possibility of participation, but they cannot be equated with 
participation” (Carpentier, 2011: 31). 
Although it was observed that some of these postings on the CiZC Facebook page received 
high levels of engagement in terms of “likes”, it was noticeable that participants avoided 
making comments and sharing the postings with their own friends. This is because “liking” 
postings was considered as less risky when compared to commenting and sharing which 
leaves traceable digital footprints. As one respondent from the YFZ observed, “liking a post 
is safer option than commenting and responding to sensitive political issues because it’s an 
ambiguous form of communication”. As highlighted in Chapter Five, this could also be 
attributed to fear of political victimisation and state surveillance harboured by most Facebook 
users in Zimbabwe. This is also supported by the following explanation from one respondent 
from the CiZC: “I usually get messages on my inbox from friends and relatives asking me 
why I like and comment on political posts”. The use of private participation channels 
highlights the agency of users in terms of circumventing Facebook’s real name policy as well 
as state surveillance. As such, some of the Zimbabwean respondents felt that posting 
sensitive political issues had the unintended consequence of putting friends and relatives on 
the firing line. This reinforces Zuckerman’s (2013: 11) view that Facebook “can be a space 
for political discourse, though censorship [and fear of surveillance] probably shapes and 
distorts that discourse”. 
In both Zimbabwe and South Africa, qualitative content analysis established that status 
updates and photos attracted high levels of engagement compared to other types of postings 
(such as links, videos and audios). This could be because status updates and photos are likely 
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to involve more original content than links and videos. It is also possible that they elicited 
more interest as they are considered by friends to be less tired and more authentic content. As 
intimated above, low levels of interaction on video and audio postings could be attributed to 
the fact that most Facebook users in Zimbabwe and South Africa depend on mobile internet 
access which makes it difficult for them to view, share and download data intensive files. 
This supports Walton & Leukes’s (2012) view that young people who have easy access to 
desktop computers, cheaper forms of broadband, sophisticated smartphones and media 
production software remain at a distinct advantage.  
In both countries, it was observed that only the R2K Campaign, YFZ and PASSOP Afrika 
Facebook pages periodically used questions to solicit feedback from participants. In South 
Africa, one participant on the PASSOP Afrika page posted the following question on the 15
th 
of July 2013: How will you use your 67 minutes to take action & inspire change on   Mandela 
Day later this week? This question evoked a torrent of responses from participants. In 
Zimbabwe, pages like the CiZC mostly posted links aimed at self-promotion and driving 
traffic to their website rather than fostering dialogic conversation. On the contrary, the YFZ 
Facebook page used online polls to solicit opinions and to generate reactive participation on 
topical issues. A typical example follows:  
Box 21: Harare Water Poisoning Saga: What’s your view? 
 Someone wanted to poison all of Harare  
 It was a genuine mistake 
 If found guilty, those implicated should be 
hanged 
 Add an 
answer…………………………………….. 
Source: YFZ Facebook page: 3 August 2012 
This study also found that postings dealing with international causes tended to receive low 
levels of interaction on all the six Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
In South Africa, for instance, a link shared on the R2K Campaign Facebook page on the 22
nd
 
of August 2013 detailing the sentencing of Bradley Manning (the US soldier who leaked a 
trove of secret government documents to Wikileaks) to 35 years in prison, only received 10 
likes, zero comments and 3 shares from a potential audience of 7753 fans. This trend was also 
witnessed on the PASSOP Afrika and UPM Facebook pages, where status updates and links 
aimed at encouraging people to show solidarity with the people of Palestine garnered 8 likes, 
zero comments and shares. Similar trends were also witnessed in Zimbabwe where, for 
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instance, a call for action posted on the CiZC Facebook page in relation to the 
 BringBackOurGirls campaign received only a single ‘like’ out of a potential audience of 
67 981 fans. This was following the kidnapping of over 200 school girls from Chibok by 
Boko Haram militants in Nigeria. This lack of engagement with international posts can be 
attributed to the fact that most people are more concerned with issues that affect them directly 
in their everyday lives rather than those which indirectly affect them. However, informal 
interviews with respondents in Zimbabwe revealed that lack of engagement on Facebook 
group and page walls did not mean users were inactive. They observed that they preferred to 
engage with politically sensitive postings via private messaging and chat system in order to 
circumvent monitoring by the state. Online observations showed that posts dealing with 
national or local causes attracted high levels of engagement among Facebook users in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. For instance, a status update posted on the UPM Facebook 
group on the Marikana memorial commemorations received 85 likes and 55 comments. This 
outpouring of public response on local causes suggests that Facebook users in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa reflect local affiliations much more strongly than global awareness. As will be 
illustrated in Chapter Eight, it was found that comedic postings like memes
117
 and cartoons 
received most comments, likes and shares on Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. This also corroborates Knobel & Lankshear’s (2007: 201) observation that 
“what scales in networked publics is often the funny, the crude, the embarrassing, the mean, 
and the bizarre, ranging from the quirky and off-beat, to potty humour, to the bizarrely funny, 
to parodies, through to the acerbically ironic”. As Miller et al (2016) rightly observe, a major 
effect of social media is that human communication has become more visual at the expense 
of oral and textual modes. They argue that memes allow people to be able to express their 
values and disparage those of others in less direct and more acceptable ways than before 
(Miller et al, 2016). 
Carpentier’s (2011) insightful work on minimalist and maximalist versions of participation 
provides a useful heuristic tool for teasing out the levels of participation afforded by 
Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South Africa. It acknowledges that the extent 
of inclusion or exclusion of participants in decision-making-processes can be situated in a 
continuum between minimalist and maximalist forms of participation (Carpentier, 2011). As 
scholars (Harlow, 2014; Chiumbu, 2015) note, theories of participation allows one to 
                                                          
117It refers to cultural items in the form of an image, video or phrase that spreads via the internet and is often altered in a creative or 
humorous way (Knobel & Lankshear, 2007: 199). 
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examine who is allowed to speak and who is not; who participates in media production and 
who does not; the tyranny that may exist within these supposedly “structureless” (Freeman, 
1972) platforms and elite interests that may manifest behind the rhetoric of participation. 
 Online observations revealed that the YFZ (in Zimbabwe) and UPM (in South Africa) 
groups offered more space for users to engage in “active public participation” (Olsson & 
Svensson, 2012). Apart from liking, commenting, sharing and responding, these Facebook 
groups provided users with the means to start acts of public communication and potential 
dialogue, on their own initiative. This means that they fell within what Carpentier (2011) 
calls the maximalist forms of participation continuum. As Walton (2014) has argued, this is 
because Facebook groups are designed to foster open conversations among “equal” voices. 
Because of their architectural design, these Facebook groups reinvigorate what Fraser (1992) 
refers to as “strong publics” which are spaces of institutionalised deliberation whose 
discourse encompasses both opinion formation and decision-making. Findings of this study 
shows that the other four Facebook pages (CiZC, NCA, PASSOP Afrika and R2K Campaign) 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa only provided space for users to engage in “permitted reactive 
participation” (Olsson & Svensson, 2012) hence fell within the minimalist forms of 
participation spectrum (Carpentier, 2011). Participants on Facebook pages are relegated to 
liking, commenting and sharing existing content posted by the administrator. This is because 
page administrators “set the frames for the content and control infrastructure as well as the 
production process” (Jönsson & Örnebring, 2011: 140). This indicates that NGO-oriented 
movements are less democratic in their online practices when compared to grassroots 
organisations.  
In a way, these Facebook pages are therefore synonymous with “weak publics” which Fraser 
(1992) describes as spaces whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion 
formation and does not also encompass decision making. It can be argued therefore that these 
Facebook pages foster what Jönsson & Örnebring (2011) describe as an “interactive illusion”. 
This is because the participatory nature of these spaces is significantly limited, and as such 
terms like “mediated or symbolic interaction” (Carpentier, 2011) or even “mediated quasi-
interaction” (Thompson, 1995) are more appropriate descriptors. The differences between 
minimalist and maximalist participation relate to the character of the social movement 
organisations in Zimbabwe and South Africa in the sense that those which fall within the 
former are mostly NGOs oriented organisations while the latter is made up of grassroots 
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movements. As Carpentier (2011: 32) observes, “while minimalist participation is 
characterised by the existence of strong power imbalances between the actors, maximalist 
participation is characterised by the equalisation of power relations”. This also further 
reinforces the view held by critical participatory theories (see Cooke & Kothari, 2001) that 
top-down goal-oriented participation models imposes institutional barriers over communities 
and thereby inhibits other processes that promote empowerment and freedom. In their book, 
Participation: The New Tyranny, Cooke & Kothari (2001) assert that participation in practice 
is not often participatory, bottom-up and open. Instead, it maintains existing power 
relationships, though masking this power behind the rhetoric and techniques of participation.  
Cornwall (2003: 1325) also adds that’s:  
claims to “full participation” and “the participation of all stakeholders’”––familiar 
from innumerable project documents and descriptions of participatory processes––all 
too often boil down to situations in which only the voices and versions of the vocal 
few are raised and heard 
As highlighted in Chapter Five (see section 5.1.8), most of the interactions within the studied 
Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South Africa were dominated by a small group 
of highly influential users. This dovetails with Fenton’s (2006: 227) argument that “many 
sites are generated and maintained by individuals or small groups with little or no 
accountability or representativeness.” Online observations revealed that a small group of 
influential Facebook users [re]produced content which was consumed by the rest of the 
participants. Apart from initiating online conversations, this minority group of Facebook 
users were highly vocal on the discussion wall. This finding confirms previous studies 
(Benkler, 2006; Shirky, 2010) which indicated that communication on the web is 
characterised by a “power law distribution” whereby a tiny minority of internet users 
produces the content the great majority consumes. Unlike in Zimbabwe, this study found that 
online conversations on the R2K Campaign page in South Africa were dominated by white 
participants compared to the other racial groups. As Wasserman (2014) observes, the 
continued asymmetry of power in the social domain and the political economy of social 
media allow middle class, white voices to be heard more often than those of marginalised 
groups in South Africa. This affirms Fraser’s (1992) view that achieving participatory parity 
is only possible if underlying economic and status inequalities are first addressed. Similar 
views have been expressed by some scholars (see Marwick & boyd, 2011; Lim, 2003) who 
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argue that the same people who have social, cultural, or economic capital in offline spaces 
also exert their influence in online spaces. Gaventa (2002) further submits that without a 
critical engagement with multiple sources of power inequalities it is likely that spaces of 
participatory citizenship may entrench some power inequalities. Online observations 
established that Facebook groups and fan pages in Zimbabwe and South Africa are 
dominated by male participants in terms of membership and active participation when 
compared to their female counterparts. This highlights what Freeman (1972) calls the 
“tyranny of structurelessness” where ―informal elites arise within the affected [online] 
communities and control the production of ideas. As intimated in Chapter Four, this could be 
attributed to the fact that political activism is predominantly male-centric in most stratified 
and patriarchal societies. 
Language also acts as a barrier to effective participation in both online and offline 
deliberations (Chiumbu, 2015). There are two kinds of languages on Facebook: the language 
of the platform (structured by code and algorithms) as well as language of users (vernacular 
and slang languages used by different users). The jettisoning of the language of the platform 
in favour of the language of users signifies the creative tempering with the structure 
(architecture of social media) put in place by designers and the manifestation of human 
agency through the use of local languages on Facebook. Although English (language by 
design) was the lingua franca of all the Facebook groups and fan pages studied in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa, it was noted that some vernacular languages (languages of users) were also 
deployed as vehicles of social interaction. In Zimbabwe, for example, Facebook users 
deployed English and Shona as well as chat lingo and slang for interaction purposes. It was 
also observed that Facebook users in Zimbabwe deployed what Chuma (2002) calls 
“Shonglish” (a mixture of English and Shona) to interact with each other. The use of chat 
lingo and slang in the Zimbabwean context by Facebook users can also viewed as an attempt 
to route around censorship of public speech by the state (see Chapter Eight). This reinforces 
Eaton’s (2013) argument that usage of one particular language over another may not be a 
trivial matter. This is because language plays an instrumental role in terms of facilitating and 
impoverishing social interaction in stratified and multicultural societies.  
In South Africa, it was also observed that some members on the UPM Facebook group 
occasionally used isiXhosa and a mixture of IsiXhosa and English for social interaction 
purposes. In multi-cultural and stratified societies like Zimbabwe and South Africa, the use of 
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vernacular languages as the mode of communication has the unintended consequence of 
keeping non-speakers out of the conversation. As Katsaura (2013) observes, language as a 
means of human association is inherently a political tool, one that is deployable to confirm 
and entrench of socio-political difference. It can be used as a tool for the exclusion of 
particular groups of people on Facebook who do not share the same language, by those whose 
language and cultural group is dominant. Scholars (Bosch, 2013; de Lanerolle, 2012) in 
South Africa indicate that online spaces and forms of participation are dominated by a select 
group of users who have the cultural and linguistic capital to engage in the English-
dominated conversations. Sinwell (2010) also engages with this idea of using websites 
written in English by social movements in South Africa when most community members 
generally speak Xhosa and Afrikaans. He argues that they do not assist the cause of the poor 
and do little to build movements on the ground. Buhlungu (2006: 84) further argues that the 
vast majority of Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) members are disadvantaged and therefore 
remain dependent on those with resources and who speak English, the language through 
which these interactions are conducted.  
It is clear from the foregoing that most Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa are characterised by low levels of interactivity. Most of these pages and groups are 
populated by lurkers rather than active contributors. It has been argued that Facebook fan 
pages promote minimalist forms of participation whereas Facebook groups nurture 
maximalist forms of participation. This section has argued that Facebook is permeated by 
different forms of exclusion. Besides exclusion based on access to new media technologies, 
language is also another barrier of effective participation on South African Facebook pages 
and groups. As Chiumbu (2015) notes, the day to day social and discursive practices of social 
movements marginalise and exclude others voices on grounds of lack of access to mediated 
communicative structures, digital inequality and language. The voices of the more marginal 
are barely raised, let alone heard, on Facebook pages and groups. This means that ordinary 
community members without access to the Internet are not part of content creation and the 
Internet is not an alternative space for them to contest dominant representations of themselves 
and produce non-conformist and counter-hegemonic representations of their views (Chiumbu, 
2015).  
7.2 The micro-politics of participation in Facebook groups and pages 
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As discussed in Chapter One, this study also looks at the micro-politics of participation which 
characterise the discursive interactions on Facebook pages and groups. “Micro-politics” 
refers to the formal and informal power-seeking and power deployment as well as (often 
hidden) miniature processes of interaction within/between groups or by individuals within 
and outside physical or virtual communities (Barnes et al., 2004; McAreavey, 2006). It also 
foregrounds the subtle forms of control that are encoded into the conventions of discourse. As 
McAreavey (2006) adds, micro-politics consists of the intangible aspects that arise due to 
such groups of individuals interacting and working together on a shared activity. In the 
context of this study, micro-politics of participation is concerned with what actually happens 
on Facebook groups and pages as well as the “structures and processes beyond what are 
immediately perceivable” (McDowell, 1992: 213). Facebook users, including social 
movement actors, are at the mercy of the structuring influence of the tyranny of algorithms.  
Contrary to claims by cyber-optimists that Facebook ensures the “levelling of the playing 
field” (Lievrouw, 2011), it was established that because Facebook is still embedded within a 
capitalist world order (Fuchs, 2014), it retains some degree of mediation and control that 
explicitly and implicitly shapes what can be freely circulated or rendered visible on the site. 
Poell & van Dijck (2015) demonstrate that algorithms have a determining effect on the free 
flow of information and visibility of content on Facebook. As a commercial social media 
platform, Facebook also reserves the right to delete, suspend and remove accounts of people 
who violate the company’s own self-regulatory norms and standards (MacKinnon et al, 
2014). There are cases where Facebook has deleted or deactivated pages and groups of social 
movements and activists for posting content which was considered violent and obscene 
(Youmans & York, 2011; Poell, 2014; Gerbaudo, 2012). This means that Facebook does not 
necessarily promote “symmetrical participation” (Shirky, 2008) since it has the power to 
directly or algorithmically
118
 control activists and social movements’ internal and public 
communication capabilities (Fuchs, 2014). On Facebook, “algorithmic manipulations are 
performed routinely, ranging from purposes as mundane as deciding the colour of a button to 
decisions as significant as which news article is shown to the public” (Tufecki, 2015: 204). 
Filtering on Facebook constitutes “technological gatekeeping” (Zittrain, 2006) or 
                                                          
118 Facebook’s News Feed and other such algorithmic decision makers “decide” whether a news article shared by one of its users is shown to 
other users or not. 
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“algorithmic gatekeeping119” (Tufecki, 2015). Technological gatekeeping refers to efforts 
made to “change the technology itself to facilitate direct identification and regulation of 
individuals” (Zittrain, 2006: 255-56). The foregoing views supports Cornwall’s (2002) view 
that all spaces for participation are not neutral, but are themselves shaped by power relations, 
which both surround and enter them.  
It is, however, not merely the corporate owners or governments that limit the democratic and 
participative potential of social network sites (Cammaerts, 2008). Thus the specific features 
of Facebook pages and groups impact on the power relation between administrators and fans 
or group members. The communicative architecture of Facebook is designed in such a way 
that pages and groups are run by administrators. These administrators (or moderators) are 
responsible for managing page roles and settings, editing the page and adding apps, creating 
and deleting posts, responding to and deleting comments, posting to the page, sending 
messages, creating advertisements, and viewing insights. As Cammaerts (2008) points out, 
these structural/organisational and individual levels are also treats to the participatory 
potential of social media. Although all the six Facebook groups and pages studied here were 
managed by administrators, it is important to note that they had different moderation 
strategies. From the interviews with the administrators of the Facebook pages and groups in 
South Africa, it was evident that although they engaged in post-moderation processes, it was 
more of monitoring spams, pornographic materials and trolls rather than strict online 
gatekeeping. Moderation or online gatekeeping is an editing process of selection, rejection 
and prioritisation of content for publication on a website (Mwilu, 2010). It is used to prevent 
or retrospectively remove “objectionable” material from sites in line with formal and 
informal standards of acceptable use. The service provider (Facebook) inevitably becomes 
active and political curator, instead of providing a neutral and open space for user-generated 
content (Schwartz, 2015).  
On Facebook pages and groups, social movements rely on traditional gatekeeping where 
human intermediaries (admins) are enlisted to guide “individual behaviour and maintaining 
collective norms” (Lackaff, 2004:1). As Schwartz (2015) points out, the page owners 
moderate content and may choose to create individual terms-of-service documents for their 
particular page, on top of the one provided by Facebook as the service provider. The page 
                                                          
119 It denotes “the process by which such non—transparent algorithmic computational--‐tools dynamically filter, highlight, suppress, or 
otherwise play an editorial role—fully or partially—determining: information flows through online platforms and similar media; human 
resources processes (such as hiring and firing); flag potential terrorists; and more” (Tufecki, 2015: 207-208).  
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owner has a big influence on the public interactions: directly in the ability to post updates, 
reply to comments, delete comments and so on, but also indirectly by political association 
and authority (Schwartz, 2015). One of the co-administrators of the UPM Facebook group 
explained the situation as follows: “we allow people to say what they want on our group 
without interfering. Facebook is an open platform of communication so our role is to 
facilitate rather than limit public discourse”.  
It is important to note that the different character of these social movements shaped the nature 
of politics of participation on Facebook groups and pages. For instance, NGO oriented social 
movements (like YFZ, CiZC and NCA) in Zimbabwe were more inclined to practice online 
gatekeeping compared to grassroots movements (like the UPM) in South Africa. Responses 
from some Facebook administrators in Zimbabwe acknowledged removing, hiding and 
blocking content which they considered to be in “bad taste”, “inappropriate” and “fanning 
hate speech”. While removing hate speech messages does not necessarily constitute 
infringement of freedom of expression, some of the moderation practices constituted 
illegitimate forms of censorship. This view reinforces Foucault’s (1975) assertion that even 
the architecture and the organisation of physical spaces (as well as virtual spaces) can serve 
as a means of domination and control. For example, Carpentier (2011: 14) stresses that, 
“participation …involves specific actors interacting within a context of power”. As one 
Facebook administrator at the CiZC puts it:  
Our page is our brand name so I don’t tolerate status updates which promote panic 
and pandemonium. In that case, I often delete posts without any warning because 
imagine someone calling for “regime change” through our page. It’s our organisation 
which will be targeted by the police for prosecution. Administering a Facebook page 
involves dealing with inappropriate or negative comments and content, handling 
disgruntled page contributors, and knowing what is acceptable and what is not.  
Another Facebook administrator at the YFZ also observed that: 
It is my duty to post content on our page but in some cases I am forced to delete posts 
which are politically sensitive. We don’t want a situation where the page degenerates 
into political boxing match. Participants should focus on constructive discussions 
about how we can improve the lives of the youth. 
From these responses, it is evident that the Facebook administrators from the CiZC and YFZ 
in Zimbabwe are concerned with creating what Marichal (2013) calls the hoped for “digital 
front stage”. As such, what is often presented as interactions on Facebook page can be 
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described as the “staged authenticity”. The response from the YFZ Facebook administrator 
also calls into question the extent to which the platform is actually acting as an alternative 
public sphere and a site for everyday forms of resistance (see section 7.3). Because of the 
subtle role of administrators, Facebook pages are not characterised by “leaderless 
horizontality” as espoused by cyber-optimists but accentuates hierarchical power relations. 
Contrary to what we would like to believe, there is no such thing as a structureless group 
(Freeman, 1971). Any group of people of whatever nature that comes together for any length 
of time for any purpose will inevitably structure itself in some fashion. The structure may be 
flexible; it may vary over time; it may evenly or unevenly distribute tasks, power and 
resources over the members of the group. The very fact that we are individuals, with different 
talents, predispositions, and backgrounds makes this inevitable. A “laissez faire” group is 
about as realistic as a “laissez faire” society; the idea becomes a smokescreen for the strong 
or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over others (Freeman, 1972). This 
hegemony can be so easily established because the idea of “structurelessness” does not 
prevent the formation of informal structures, only formal ones. In view of the asymmetrical 
power relations between administrators and users, Gerbaudo (2012) describes the former as 
“movement choreographers” or “soft leaders”. Discussing the operations of the Rassd 
Facebook page in Egypt, Sakr (2013) also found that it was characterised by the same 
hierarchical power structures, with strong top-down supervision on all the material published. 
This further cements Fraser’s (1992) argument that subaltern counter publics are not 
inherently democratic and virtuous as they might be used by powerful subaltern elements for 
selfish ends.  
As the findings show, compared to South African Facebook administrators, responses from 
those interviewed in Zimbabwe reveal that strategies they use to restrict content and 
participation on their groups and fan pages can be categorised into three: censoring by 
deletion, censoring by hiding and censoring by blocking. Censoring by deletion refers to the 
practice through which Facebook administrators remove content which is considered 
unpalatable from the wall or discussion thread. This means that content which has been 
deleted can no longer be seen by other participants within the group. Censoring by hiding 
refers to a practice where a post is hidden from the wall or the discussion thread by the 
Facebook administrator. Instead of an outright banishment from the Facebook group, a 
participant whose opinion is seen as sowing discord can be censored through hiding his or her 
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posts from the wall or discussion thread. This frames the possibilities for engagement, 
circumscribing what can be said and what cannot by defining the contours of what is up for 
discussion and shunting other considerations out of the frame (Cornwall, 2009). Censoring by 
blocking denotes the practice where a Facebook administrator “unfriend” a participant on a 
page or group. In cases of repeated or extreme violation of the “silent” norms and guidelines, 
users can be banned from participation. Once someone has been “unfriended” he or she 
cannot engage in conversations with others or view what is posted on the timeline or group 
discussion wall. These strategies limit the potential for competing views and the free flow of 
alternative ideas since some voices are either silenced or totally barred from entering these 
spaces. Without necessarily denying the participatory potential of Facebook, this study 
therefore acknowledges “the limitations of and constraints to these participative and 
democratic potentials” (Cammaerts, 2008, 360). As Gaventa (2006: 60) points out, “the 
dynamics of participation in particular arenas [like on Facebook] will vary a great deal 
according to who creates the space for it to occur, and therefore, whose rules of the game are 
used to determine the space, and how they behave once they do”. This is because existing 
relations of power can be reproduced and further amplified within these newly created arenas 
(like Facebook) through the way in which spaces are  managed (by admins) as well as 
through associations people may have with particular spaces. In cases where certain sections 
of society are excluded from Facebook pages and groups, these new spaces of participation 
can be viewed as amplifying societal inequalities.  
7.3 Can Facebook groups and fan pages be considered as alternative spaces for political 
activism? 
 
The analysis and discussion in this section is informed by Fraser (1992) and Örnebring & 
Jönsson’s (2004) ideas on the concept of alternative public sphere as articulated in Chapter 
Two. Fraser’s (1992) ideas allows me to assess whether Facebook groups and fan pages in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa are enabling users to express their grievances, challenge 
symbolic domination and advance their political interests. Örnebring & Jönsson’s (2004) 
conceptualisation of alternative public sphere is also invaluable for evaluating the extent to 
which discourse on Facebook groups and pages takes place somewhere else other than in the 
mainstream mediated public sphere; whether other participants than the ones normally 
dominating mediated discourse have access to and a place in the debates and discussions 
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taking place on Facebook groups and pages; whether Facebook groups and pages are open to 
other issues than those commonly debated in the mainstream media and finally, whether the 
use of other ways or forms of debating and discussing common issues than those commonly 
used in the mainstream media is tolerated on Facebook groups and pages. This entails 
looking at who gets to participate (or speak), on what conditions, what kind of limitations do 
Facebook groups and pages impose on conversations, which issues are discussed and what 
forms and styles are used to represent issues and actors. As Karayianni (2013) observes, 
when focusing on the potential use of the internet as an alternative public sphere one needs to 
pay attention to who is using it and what they are using it for (topics discussed). It also 
assesses whether Facebook pages and groups studied in Zimbabwe and South Africa ensure a 
plurality of voices.  
It is important to point out that on Facebook ‘the discourse [does not] takes place somewhere 
else’ (Örnebring & Jönsson, 2004) other than in the mainstream mediated public sphere. As 
pointed out in Chapter One, Facebook is very much part and parcel of corporate capitalism 
(Fuchs, 2013). This is because Facebook is a privately-owned company with its own agenda 
and interests. As Fuchs observes, Facebook is “part of the capitalist economy and therefore 
produce not only public information, but capital and monetary profit by selling users and/ or 
content” (2015: 330). Although Facebook at face value seems to be a “free” service, as 
outlined in Chapter One, it creates surplus value through storing, comparing, assessing, and 
selling the personal data and usage behaviour of several hundred million users. As Fuchs 
(2012) points out, social network sites are especially suited for targeted advertising because 
they store and communication a vast amount of personal likes and dislikes of users that allow 
surveillance of these data for economic purposes and finding out, which products the users 
are likely to buy. Consequently, targeted advertising is the main source of income and the 
business model of Facebook (and other social media platforms). Similar to the mainstream 
mediated public sphere, Facebook to use the words of Habermas (1989) is “colonised or re-
feudalised by capitalist market forces”. The point here is that Facebook is not free from state 
censorship and private ownership. For instance, section 3.1 of the Facebook statement of 
rights and responsibilities states that, “you will not post content that: is hate speech, 
threatening, or pornographic; incites violence; or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous 
violence”. It should be noted that some of these restrictions (for instance, hate speech, 
pornographic) by Facebook constitute legitimate grounds for censorship while others are 
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illegitimate like gratuitous violence. Under such conditions of both state and corporate 
censorship, Facebook users are not able to exercise “democratic participation and open public 
debate” (Fraser, 1992). The problem is that there is no transparency on how Facebook 
enforces its own terms of service (McKinnon et al, 2014).  
Two Facebook users in Zimbabwe have been arrested because of their posts. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, Vikazi Mavhudzi was arrested in 2011 for commenting on the then Prime 
Minister Tsvangirai’s Facebook page drawing parallels between the Arab Spring and the 
political situation in Zimbabwe. Another case occurred in 2014 when Gumisai Manduwa was 
arrested over a post claiming President Robert Mugabe was dead and kept in a freezer. 
Several people have also been picked up for questioning over the Baba Jukwa Facebook page 
by the police. As such, the social network site cannot be considered as an alternative site of 
political activism in Zimbabwe.  
Whilst Facebook groups and fan pages have the potential to enable other participants than 
the ones normally dominating media discourse to have access to and a place in the debates 
and discussions taking place (Örnebring & Jönsson, 2004), it emerged from online 
observations that a small group of active contributors dominated online conversations across 
the six social movements under consideration. As one respondent from the CiZC said, “a few 
people become domineering meaning that opinion of others becomes diluted. It is like in a 
football team...if (Lionel) Messi
120
 is good the rest of the people might never be recognised. 
Thus our voices get drowned in the ocean of very strong opinions by the established elite”. 
These comments point to the fact that although Facebook groups and fan pages are designed 
in a way that other participants can have access to and a place in the debates taking place, but 
in practice those who have economic and cultural capital from other spaces tend to enjoy a 
monopoly of attention. As Olsson & Svensson (2012: 48) note, the “already established 
political and cultural elites appropriate the blogosphere and make it their participatory space 
and public sphere, rather than everyone’s”. This view also supports Fuchs’s (2013) 
observation that public visibility and attention are highly stratified on social media with 
celebrities commanding a lot of attention. In both case nations, it was observed that some of 
the active contributors on Facebook groups and pages have access (as news sources and 
citizen journalists) to the mainstream media. For instance, some of the users observed from 
                                                          
120 He is believed to be one of the greatest footballers who currently plays for FC Barcelona and Argentina 
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the NCA Facebook page had their own personal blogs which they used to comment on 
political and everyday issues.  
As pointed out earlier, the political economy of access to social media in South Africa puts 
middle class whites at an advantage when compared to other racial groups (de Lanerolle, 
2012) on Facebook conversations. As Verba & Nie (1972: 17) opine, “citizens of higher 
social and economic status participate more in [online] politics”. In both Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, online observations revealed that female users are under-represented on the 
Facebook groups and fan pages. The gendered nature of Facebook activism also reminds us 
that these social media platforms often amplify voices of males at the expense of their female 
counterparts. As such, the view that Facebook groups and pages constitute an alternative 
public sphere becomes very problematic. Besides some of the Facebook groups and pages 
(like the R2K Campaign and UPM) in South Africa being overtly gendered, it was also 
established that they are also racialised and classed. On the basis of the social profile of users 
and active participants on these Facebook pages and groups, it is arguable that these spaces 
are male-centric. They are also classed in so far as some of the unemployed youths from the 
UPM bemoaned the fact that they cannot afford smartphones and air time to engage in online 
conversations. Noteworthy to highlight that although Facebook groups provide an outlet for 
“voice” to other participants, these technologies are double-edged swords in the sense that 
they create new social hierarchies between the information have and have-less. Instead of 
facilitating greater inclusion of previously marginalised groups, these online spaces 
contribute “to the further exclusion of subaltern, economically-marginalised publics from the 
mediated public sphere” (Sparks, 2011).  
Facebook groups and fan pages can also be seen as contributing towards an alternative space 
for political activism through opening up to other issues than those commonly debated in the 
mainstream mediated public sphere. Qualitative content analysis revealed that at least one 
Facebook page in each of the two countries attempted to raise other issues other than those 
covered in the mainstream. These are the NCA (in Zimbabwe) and PASSOP Afrika (in South 
Africa) Facebook pages. The rest of the Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa regurgitated content sourced from the mainstream media. For instance, out of the 389 
posts circulated on the YFZ page 281 of them were links from the mainstream media while 
the rest were a combination of original and remixed content. Qualitative content analysis 
revealed that most of the posts shared by the admins of the NCA and CiZC Facebook pages 
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in Zimbabwe were sourced from mainstream newspapers like The Herald, the NewsDay, the 
Daily News, Southern Eye and so forth. In South Africa, admins and participants on the R2K 
Campaign and UPM Facebook pages shared links of news stories from mainstream 
newspapers such as the Business Day, Mail & Guardian, Grocotts Mail, The Dispatch, Cape 
Argus, Cape Times and so forth. Contrary to the view that everyone is a “produser” (Bruns, 
2008) on social media, it was established that some of the participants on Facebook could be 
aptly described as “forwarding” and “sharing” agents rather than original content producers. 
This is because most of the Facebook pages and groups were characterised by cutting and 
pasting of content from the mainstream media. As Zuckerman (2008) observes, those using 
networked media to contribute to the dissemination of news selectively amplify stories 
introduced by traditional media outlets, thereby replicating offline cultural foci. It is arguable 
therefore that the communicative spaces spawned by some Facebook groups and pages in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa are “alternative in appearance than in substance” (Wasserman, 
2010: 91).  
In Zimbabwe, Facebook users on the NCA page circulated information and images that 
undermined hegemonic discourses of the government. They discussed topics such as the 
loopholes of the COPAC-drafted constitution and lack of consultation which characterised 
the constitution making exercise. The NCA Facebook page provided an alternative view of 
the COPAC-drafted constitution found in the mainstream media. Whilst the mainstream 
media campaigned for the Vote Yes, it systematically ignored the shortcomings of the 
constitution. Hence the NCA Facebook page provided the opportunity for users to discuss 
issues which were swept under the carpet by the mainstream media. Facebook users on the 
NCA page mobilised Zimbabweans to vote against the COPAC-drafted constitution. They 
highlighted that the constitution was not democratic and people driven as well as left the 
powers of the president intact. As one Facebook user posted on the NCA page on the 8
th
 of 
March 2013: “I am convinced that voting NO at the referendum is one of the few remaining 
ways of building a brighter future for our future generations”. Another user added: “We 
remain ready to die for a genuinely people-driven and democratic constitution and not this 
fraud by COPAC which every political leader is saying they will change once they assume 
power”. In the South African case, the PASSOP Afrika page raised awareness on the plight 
of asylum seekers and refugees which are often ignored in the mainstream commercial media. 
Facebook users on the PASSOP Afrika also discussed about the rights of LGBTI refugees 
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and violations of the rights of farm workers. Because of the issues they dealt with, the NCA 
and PASSOP Afrika can be viewed as constituting alternative spaces for political activism. 
An important reason why Facebook groups and pages have the ability to constitute an 
alternative public sphere is that rather than simply fostering rational-critical debate there are 
other forms of debating and discussing common issues which are practised. From the online 
observations, it was evident that Facebook groups and pages in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
allow for diverse modes of political expression through posts, images, video and comments. 
These modes of political debate include: rational-critical debate, emotional (see Chapter 
Two), agnostic
121
 and carnivalesque
122
. As Wahl-Jorgensen (2014) observes, the emotional 
architecture of Facebook is designed in such a way that it promotes the expression of positive 
emotion through features such as the “like” button. At the time of writing this thesis, 
Facebook had announced plans to launch the much anticipated “dislike” button. The postings 
that get the most attention on Facebook are posts that get the most likes, and the posts that get 
the most likes are, well, more likable (Pariser, 2011: 149). This indicates that the architecture 
of Facebook shapes communication practices through fostering of affirmative or uncritical 
interaction. On the six Facebook pages and groups, users who interacted tended to be fuelled 
by passion and emotions encompassing disgust, fear, compassion and care.  
As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa are characterised by sensational and humorous expressions of political issues (see also 
section 5.1.9). Compared to Facebook groups and pages in South Africa, those in Zimbabwe 
were more likely to resort to carnivalesque modes of political debate. This playful satirisation 
of political figures and policies has the potential to “draw historically subordinated publics 
into the realm of the political in a way that formal political debates are unable to” 
(Wasserman, 2010: 92). This also dovetails with Bakhtin (1984) notion of carnival which 
suggests that “laughter, frivolity and the carnivalesque open up an “unofficial” discursive 
space from which the ‘official’ world may be ridiculed and resistance sustained”. In both case 
nations, Facebook pages and groups were punctuated by emotional expressions. These 
emotional conversations allowed Facebook users to express their “deeply felt interests” (Lunt 
                                                          
121Facebook pages constituted a battleground on which different hegemonic and counter-hegemonic ideas are contested, debated and 
confronted, without any possibility of final reconciliation (Mouffe, 2000).. 
122Bahktin’s (1981) concept of the carnivalesque refers to an inversion of ordinary public life.  Similar to the “popular character of the 
carnival” (Bakardjieva, 2008), Facebook pages were characterised by the excessive deployment of popular culture to critique and engage 
with dominant power relations in society, resembled early modern marketplace and public squares in which diverse social types and 
language styles intermingled, the figures of speech, modes of debate and performances mirrored a carnival atmosphere, punctuated by the 
suspension of all hierarchical differences. This is because participants on Facebook pages and groups come from different walks of life 
bringing differential life experience, economic and educational status. 
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& Stenner, 2005). Although liberal democratic theory tends to cling to visions of rational-
critical debate, Livingstone & Lunt (1994) argue that emotional expressions play an 
invaluable role in authenticating the accounts of participants. This corroborates Bickford’s 
(2011) assertion that emotional expressions, whether as angry street protests or personal 
responses to everyday life via social media or mobile phones should also be considered as 
having political implications. For instance, one of the youth activists in Zimbabwe expressed 
his frustration with the political status quo as follows:  
Figure 9: Enough is Enough? 
 
Source: Facebook wall post by a CiZC activist 
It is evident from the above image, that the user was expressing his deeply felt views about 
the status quo in Zimbabwe. This post was made prior to the 2013 harmonised election. The 
ZANU-PF regime is depicted as a bunch of “bastards” which must leave office. By saying 
“enough is enough” the Facebook user suggests that time has come for Zimbabweans to vote 
out ZANU-PF. This further supports Papacharissi’s observation that affect which refer to the 
sum of—often discordant—feelings about affairs, public and private is the energy that drives, 
neutralises, or entraps networked publics” (2014: 7). Online observations also indicated that 
compared to Facebook groups and pages in Zimbabwe, those in South Africa were 
characterised by conflict and dissensus. Facebook like other private and public-facing social 
media enable youth activists in both countries to express antagonistic positions via their 
specific radical discursive practices, articulate emancipatory alternatives and develop 
counter-hegemonic cultural and economic practices. Far from rational-critical debate, 
Facebook pages and groups are also punctuated by ideological clashes, name-calling and use 
of obscenities to silence others. These findings challenges Fraserian ideas on subaltern 
counter-publics by highlighting the creative appropriation of social media platforms “as 
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channels of a radical democratic project by allowing community members from divergent 
social groups to define and constitute themselves, facilitate debate and transmit their 
viewpoints to a wider public” (Chiumbu, 2015: 10). As Mouffe (2005) propound, agonistic 
public spaces are places for the expression of dissensus, for bringing to the floor what forces 
attempt to keep concealed. This does not mean to say that communication complying with the 
rules and ideals of a rational-critical debate never occurs on Facebook pages and groups but 
the predominant modes of debating followed carnivalesque, emotional and agnostic lines. 
Instead of deliberated consensus, some of the Facebook groups and pages in South Africa 
were characterised by heated clashes and name-calling of minority groups. For instance, on 
the 7
th
 of December 2011 PASSOP Afrika posted the following topic: “BBC debate on 
Homosexuality in Africa with Junior, one of our LGBTI project volunteers- Homophobia is a 
huge problem. As PASSOP we believe that homosexual rights are human rights”. This 
posting elicited a wide range of divergent responses. Some of the responses are illustrated 
below:   
Comment: How is this society linked with gays? I didn’t know 
Comment: ‘Homosexuals are worse than dogs and pigs’ 
Comment: You ARE being homophobic Mdhara - stop hiding behind religion. 
Comment: Hey Theo you are a real twirp what will u do if your child is gay will u 
disown him or her. Get a life cos religion is just a way of life. Peanut head and no 
correspondence will b entered into. 
Comment: Homosexuality is a sin! 
Comment: I think the scientists should work extra hard to come up with antigay drug. 
All addicts should get free treatment. 
It is clear from the foregoing that Facebook pages are also riddled with reactionary
123
 politics. 
A sample of responses cited from the PASSOP Afrika Facebook page shows that rather than 
only promoting progressive politics, online spaces also amplify homophobic tendencies. As 
boyd (2014: 158) notes, “tools that enable communication do not sweep away inequality 
distrust, hatred, and prejudice”. Her argument is that far from being the panacea, social media 
platforms simply sheds new light on the divisive social dynamics that plague contemporary 
society. Critiquing the Habermasian notion of the public sphere, Örnebring & Jönsson’s 
                                                          
123 Reactionary politics support the status quo or a return to the previous political state of society. It includes calls for the incarceration of 
gays and lesbians, killing of foreigners and asylum seekers and descriptions of blacks as kaffirs. 
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(2004) point out that political participation builds not only on rational processing of 
information, but also on emotion, sensationalism and sometimes even outrage.  
This study also found that compared to groups, Facebook pages (like CiZC, R2K Campaign, 
NCA, PASSOP Afrika) in Zimbabwe and South Africa cannot be viewed as alternative 
spaces of political activism because of the limitations they impose on conversations. All of 
these movements operate as NGOs hence are more concerned with safeguarding the 
organisational image. As highlighted earlier, Facebook pages do not allow users to create 
their own discussion topics but rely on content posted by the administrator. As Walton (2014) 
observes, page owners determine the level to which participants may contribute (whether 
they may set the agenda by posting or merely follow the owner’s agenda in their comments). 
This makes it difficult for everyday Facebook users “to tell their stories and bring their 
struggles into the public arena (Örnebring, 2006: 862). This is because Facebook pages allow 
for a tight control of content and clearer differentiation between administrators and users.  
Unlike pages, Facebook groups like the UPM (in South Africa) and YFZ (in Zimbabwe) 
allow participants to speak as “equals” although administrators retain more power. Thus 
Facebook groups have the potential to create alternative spaces of political activism because 
of their architectural features. Because of their “democratic model of collective participation 
under the governance of “admins’” (Walton, 2014: 453), groups allow people with a similar 
interest to come together around an issue or activity to organise, express objectives, discuss 
issues, post photos and share related content. This was witnessed on the YFZ and UPM 
Facebook groups where members posted and shared content they considered to be of 
common concern. Unlike Facebook pages which are public by default, groups’ privacy 
settings allow administrators to have control over who gets to participate in them. Members 
of these groups were approved by the administrator. As closed Facebook groups, interactions 
on the YFZ and UPM can only be seen by those approved by the administrator. In the case of 
the UPM and YFZ Facebook groups, discourse takes place within the context of what Squires 
(2002) calls an “enclaved public sphere”. This is because deliberations are hidden from the 
purview of state and the dominant public.  
7.4 Conclusion 
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Despite the hyperbolic accounts which present Facebook as the sine qua non for participatory 
culture, this chapter has demonstrated that most of the pages and groups in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa are characterised by low levels of interaction. Based on the analysis of the 
discussion threads, it was found that unlike in Zimbabwe, conversations on some Facebook 
pages in South Africa are dominated by white participants compared to other racial groups. In 
the case of the UPM Facebook group, where a small group of white participants tended to 
dominate public discourse, thereby contributing to the “paradox of the participation of the 
privileged” (Scholz, 2008). In terms of discursive interactions, a small group of participants 
dominated conversations on Facebook in both countries. Women participants also seem 
marginalised from the online political discourse in both countries. The study found that 
language is a major barrier to effective participation on Facebook in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. Because most of the Facebook pages and groups in both countries fall within the 
“minimalist form of participation”, I concur with Valytsson’s (2014: 52) apt observation that 
“the communicative efforts of the general public remain in the form of weak publics 
belonging to the cultural public spheres since decision-making still takes place in the “upper” 
structures of political public spheres”. 
With regards to the micro-politics of participation on Facebook groups and pages, this 
chapter has highlighted that compared to South Africa, most page administrators in 
Zimbabwe engage in subtle forms of content gatekeeping through censoring by deletion, 
hiding and blocking. Although new media technologies make it possible to combine top-
down corporate media production structure with more fluid, bottom-up participation, this 
study has argued that Facebook groups and pages are not inherently democratic. These spaces 
are riddled with power and hierarchical relations. The admins exert hierarchy and control 
over the fans of their pages. Most pages prevented fans from publishing directly on the page’s 
wall and all the material had to be filtered through the admin. The admins acknowledged 
banning and blocking fans who used strong language or whose opinions diverged too far 
from the group. In her study amongst the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign in South 
Africa, Chiumbu (2015) also found that a few key activists rise up in an unofficial leadership 
position to steer mobilisation activities. It therefore suggests that the “structurelessness” of 
Facebook pages and groups serve to mask the power dynamics and discursive struggles 
immanent in communicative action. As Chiumbu (2015) argues, these contradictions within 
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social movements highlight the importance of recognising power dynamics and discursive 
struggles present and their influence in use of media and ICTs for mobilisation.  
This study has also established that the extent to which Facebook pages and groups can be 
viewed as alternative public spheres depends largely on who gets to participate (or speak), on 
what conditions, what kind of limitations do Facebook groups and pages impose on 
conversations, which issues are discussed and what forms and styles are used to represent 
issues and actors. In terms of who gets to participate on Facebook conversations, this study 
has argued that social media platforms are still very much an elite form of communication in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. This significant limits the potential of Facebook to act as an 
alternative space for counter-hegemonic activism. As Chiumbu (2015) posits, genuine cyber-
activism is based on real participation and online deliberations by ordinary people. The 
chapter has looked at the arguments for and against whether Facebook groups constitute 
alternative spheres. It has argued that Facebook is part of the mainstream in terms of its 
political economy although it has been appropriated for activist purposes in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa.  
It has also demonstrated that some Facebook groups in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
constitute alternative spheres because they validate a more diverse spectrum of topics and 
styles considered worthy of public discussion (Van Zoonen, 2000).  Instead of monoglossic 
spaces inhabited by rational-critical debate only, this chapter has argued that we need to 
conceptualise “actually existing” (Fraser, 1990) public spheres on Facebook as punctuated by 
hybrid modes of debate or heteroglossia as theorised by Bakhtin (1968). Heteroglossia views 
the world as constituted by a diversity of voices, styles, genres and texts [or modes of debate 
by extension]. Arguably, a heteroglossia of political expressions is the best description of the 
actually existing public spheres in Africa. Facebook, therefore, closely approximates a 
heteroglossic space where multiple modes of debate and political speech conhabit, critique, 
reinforce and ultimately deconstruct each other. This is contrary to the Habermsian notion of 
public sphere as discussed in Chapter Three. This chapter has also argued that the assumption 
that Facebook holds progressive potential needs to be viewed critically. This is especially 
important in the context of pervasive reactionary politics that pervade Facebook discussions 
and interactions. 
The next chapter looks at digital hidden transcripts which are circulated by youth activists on 
Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DIGITAL HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS CIRCULATED ON FACEBOOK BY 
YOUTHS IN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
8. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation 
on Facebook groups and pages in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This chapter documents and 
analyses the various kinds of political discourses (referred here as digital hidden transcripts) 
which are circulated on Facebook by youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa. As outlined in 
Chapter Two, some of the digital hidden transcripts which are posted and shared on Facebook 
groups and pages include: gossip, rumour, political jokes, subvertisements, online petitions, 
cartoons and letters addressed to public and political representatives (I will discuss each of 
these discourses below). As will be discussed in more detail below, these kinds of online 
commentary can be viewed as circuits of political discussion because they are directed 
towards engaging with how power and resources are organised in society as well as raising 
political questions that are instrumental in kick-starting debate or even direct action. 
Although most of these modes of political commentary and critique are often seen as 
channels of “irrational” and “uncivil” social and cultural expressions, they also transmit 
symbolic and virtual acts of resistance or opposition in the politics of everyday life. This 
chapter will also show that these informal media genres constitute alternative routes through 
which young people use to express their political convictions and beliefs.  
As argued in Chapter Two, the metaphor of digital hidden transcripts provide a more 
productive space for analysing active citizenship practices of the youth in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. Digital hidden transcripts refer to the ways of communicating political 
viewpoints as well as resisting or ridiculing power which are circulated through digital forms 
(see Chapter Two). The over-arching argument of this chapter is that an over-emphasis on 
rational critical discussion as espoused by Habermas may blind us from focusing on how 
politically engaged youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa appropriate popular culture “to 
engage, debate and contest the state” (Willems, 2010: 48) in seemingly irrational ways. 
Although engagement on Facebook can be viewed as “irrational” in the sense that most of it 
does not conform to the conventional definitions of rational debate and formal political 
235 
 
participation (see Chapter Seven), these emotional and carnivalesque forms of political 
discourse should be seen as valid forms of discursive contestation (see Chapter Two). The 
problem with assessing the quality of deliberation occurring on Facebook pages against the 
Habermasian normative standards of rational-critical debate, as Janssen & Kies (2005) 
observes, is that such an approach misses the importance of other communicative forms. In 
other words, such an approach “may prevent analysis from assessing online political forums 
on their own merits” (Bakardjieva, 2008: 292). Hence the deployment of Fraserian ideas 
which allows one to look for “actually existing” public spheres rather than impose normative 
ones. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Fraser’s ideas are relevant here “because they elaborate on 
those dimensions of social communication and public life that remain outside the scope of the 
Habermasian perspective” (Bakardjieva, 2008: 292).  As Gardiner (2004: 38) points out: 
The marketplace and public square in early modern times were witness to a 
tumultuous intermingling of diverse social groups and widely divergent styles and 
idioms of language, ranging from the serious to the ironic and the playful… In such 
contested spaces … existing social hierarchies were often questioned and subverted 
through carnivalesque strategies of remarkable variety and invention, including the 
use of parodic and satirical language, grotesque humour, and symbolic degradations 
and inversions. There never was a “golden age of communicative utopia”: the real 
public sphere was always marked by a pluralistic and conflictual heteroglossia. 
It is evident from the quote that it borrows heavily from Bakhtin’s (1984) concept of the 
carnival as a “popular” site of the inversion of hierarchies through ridicule and parody. 
Besides offering a more nuanced critique of the Habermasian public sphere, Bakhtin’s 
concepts of dialogue and the carnival “opens up the scope of available ways of 
conceptualising online political forums as a mode of public communication in their own 
right” (Bakardjieva, 2008: 292). In the context of this study, digital hidden transcripts feed 
into and from Bakhtin’s notions of carnivalesque, humour and the inversion of normal 
rational modes of political communication. Similar to Fraser’s (1992) concept of subaltern 
counter-publics, Bakhtin (1984) acknowledges that there are alternative modes of 
communication other than those belonging to the rational-critical discourse. This dovetails 
with Brough & Shresthova’s (2012) argument that defining political participation as 
explicitly linked to traditional political institutions alone obscures the role of [popular] 
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culture in social and political change. It also fuels the alarmist discourse about youth 
disengagement from formal politics without taking into consideration other innovative ways 
through which young people in Africa are engaging with the state through informal media.  
As outlined in Chapter Two, Fraser (1992) points out that counter-discourses are circulated 
within the confines of subaltern counter-publics in order to circumvent censorship from 
gatekeepers of the dominant public sphere. Her argument shares many similarities with 
Scott’s (1990) observation that hidden transcripts are disseminated through “social spaces of 
relative autonomy”. The concepts of counter-discourses and hidden transcripts refer to similar 
issues (see Chapter Two). Another term which is synonymous with these two concepts coined 
by Bourgault (1995) is “parallel discourse”. This refers to the means through which mostly 
Africans attempt to “deform, through deconstruction and reconstruction, the praises they are 
forced to sing and perform” (Bourgault, 1995: 201). Her argument is that deconstruction and 
reconstruction occurs through subversion of official party slogans and songs by ordinary 
people during official visits of government officials (Bourgault, 1995).  
Building on Barber (1987), hidden transcripts constitute “unofficial cultures” which can be 
viewed as popular art forms that are representative of muted, under-represented, or 
misrepresented media cultures. These kinds of political commentary chimes with what 
Willems (2015) calls “mediated civic agency”. This denotes “a wider spectrum of actions in 
which [young] citizens engage power through a range of media forms, whether formal or 
informal” (Willems, 2015: 4). However, in political contexts where invited spaces of 
participation are repressed, digital hidden transcripts or what O’Donnell (1986: 261) termed 
“oblique voice”, often non-verbal signals of common identity intended to be understood only 
by like-minded people, but not to be perceived by the agents of the state.  
Although digital hidden transcripts were not as frequent when compared to other types of 
political postings, it was established that they attracted a lot of interaction on Facebook 
groups and pages as well as elicited different modes of debate (see Chapter Seven). As 
Zuckerman (2013: 16) writes, “messages that are funny are more likely to be spread, and 
those that are remixable invite participation and amplification”. As intimated in Chapter Four, 
drawing on a two-year social media ethnography and qualitative content analysis, online 
discourses which elicited a lot of engagement were purposively chosen based on empirical 
and theoretical considerations. Qualitative content analysis was deployed in this particular 
study because it enables researchers to discover, compare and contrast “relevant situations, 
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settings, styles, images, meanings and nuances” (Altheide, 1987: 8). After spending a 
considerable amount of time observing and archiving online postings, I then categorised 
different kinds of political discourses into distinct genres, themes and narratives (see Chapter 
Four). Thus similar forms of expressions were grouped together for comparison purposes. In 
keeping with the comparative thrust of the present study, this chapter foregrounds the 
commonalities and divergences in terms of the political discourses circulated in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa as well as between the activist groupings under investigation. It also focuses 
on the social profile of the posters of the political discourses and how they were received 
through comments, likes and shares. With these issues in mind, the next section looks at 
political jokes.    
8.1.1 Political Jokes 
 
This study found that youths from Zimbabwe and South Africa used Facebook as a socio-
cultural space for “poking” fun at the ruling elite. As Flesher Fominaya (2014) observes, 
jokes are produced and disseminated in both democratic and non-democratic societies with 
the aim of ridiculing those in power as well as communicating political viewpoints. Although 
jokes thrive in both political contexts, it is in the authoritarian regime where they are more 
pervasive largely due to restrictions imposed on public speech and curtailment of freedom of 
expression. In the Zimbabwean context, political jokes have become a forum for young 
people to vent, mock and say things that they would not say or do openly for fear of political 
victimisation (Manganga, 2012; Kuhlmann, 2012). It is important however to highlight that 
because of the differences in the political, economic and cultural make-up of Zimbabwe and 
South Africa the subject matter of most of the jokes also differed significantly. Similarities 
were only noticeable in relation to jokes dealing with the intellectual capabilities of political 
figures. The subject matter of most political jokes circulated in both case nations tended to 
focus on the president, his policies and decisions. It was observed that the themes in the jokes 
were not constant but changed periodically to adapt to shifts in political and economic 
circumstances. The butt of most political jokes in Zimbabwe were Joseph Chinotimba (MP 
for Buhera South and war veteran), Robert Mugabe, Grace Mugabe (the first lady and 
ZANU-PF’s secretary for women’s affairs), Jonathan Moyo (minister of information, media 
and broadcasting services), Joice Mujuru (ex-Vice President) and Morgan Tsvangirai. These 
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political figures were targeted because of their political scandals and shenanigans within 
Zimbabwean politics. 
In both countries, some of the digital hidden transcripts circulated on Facebook groups and 
pages transgressed the boundaries of permissible public speech. In the Zimbabwean context, 
the boundaries of permissible and impermissible speech are enshrined within the 2013 
Constitution as well as other repressive pieces of legislation as espoused in Chapter One. 
Whilst Chapter 4 of the new charter which deals with the declaration of rights explicitly 
guarantees citizens’ freedom of expression, freedom of the media, access to information, it is 
important to note that existing media laws have not yet been aligned to the new constitution. 
For instance, the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (2004) makes it a criminal 
offence to “insult” the honour or dignity of public officials and other very-important-persons. 
Section 33 of the law criminalises statements that undermine the authority of or insult the 
president, while sections 95 and 96 create the crimes of “criminal insult” and “criminal 
defamation”. Despite this law being declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court in 
October 2013, the law enforcement agents have continued to deploy it to arrest activists and 
ordinary people for insulting and ridiculing President Mugabe. The police have also used 
AIPPA, POSA and the Interception of Communications Act to limit the citizens’ ability to 
freely communicate and to self-express without the fear of adverse consequences. As noted in 
Chapter One, these laws impose serious limitations on open political discourse and the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression.   
In the South African case, the boundaries of reasonable expression are spelt out in the 1996 
Constitution and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 
2000, also known as the Equality Act. The right to freedom of expression is set out under 
section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. For instance, section 16(2) 
sets out the limitations with regards to the right of freedom of expression. It states that the 
right to freedom of expression does not apply to “propaganda for war, incitement of 
imminent violence or advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion 
and that constitutes incitement to cause harm”. It follows that the South African Constitution 
defines hate speech as “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion 
and that constitutes incitement to cause harm”. Despite the existence of progressive laws 
there seems to be confusion over what constitutes acceptable satire, speech and artistic 
expression. For instance, a section on the right to dignity in the South African Constitution, 
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which is similar to the Zimbabwean “insult law”, has been appealed to by the ANC in their 
criticism of Brett Murray’s The Spear. The situation is made worse by the fact that the 
Constitution and the Equality Act define hate speech differently. The Equality Act seeks to 
give effect to the letter and spirit of the Constitution by amongst others, providing measures 
to facilitate the eradication of unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment. It states that 
“no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate words based on one or more of 
the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate 
a clear intention to (a) be hurtful; (b) be harmful or to incite harm; or (c) promote or 
propagate hatred.” This means that there are limits to the right to online freedom of 
expression as espoused in the aforementioned pieces of legislation.  
Having outlined the boundaries of permissible and impermissible public speech in the two 
countries, I now turn my attention to political jokes with similar themes before teasing out 
those which are different. The first set of political jokes identified from this study related to 
the intellectual capabilities of political figures in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The jokes 
below poke fun at the dim-wittedness of Joseph Chinotimba and Jacob Zuma (President of 
South Africa): 
Box 22: Joke about Joseph Chinotimba 
Journalist: “Mr. Chinotimba, first of all, is it true that you are the bread winner in your family.” 
Chinos: “I am not hearing that allegation for the first time, I have been hearing it for some time, I 
know this allegation is coming from my political enemies who want to tarnish my image. I want to 
tell you that I have never been in any competition to win bread. Ask them where I won that bread. 
If anyone saw me entering a competition to win bread, then they must provide the evidence 
otherwise I will start suing anyone saying I am a bread winner, yes including you reporters and 
your newspapers.” 
Source: Facebook profile page 
Box 23: A joke about Jacob Zuma and four other people 
A plane with 5 people on board was about to crash, but there were only 4 parachutes. 
The 1st person, Lionel Messi, said, “I'm the world’s best footballer, I can’t die now!” 
So he took one of the parachutes and left. 
Aliko Dangote, said, “I’m the richest man in Africa, I can’t die now!”  So he took the 
2nd parachute and left. The third was a Jacob Zuma and he said, “I’m the president of 
SA moreover another election is around the corner, so I can’t die now!” So he took one 
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and left. Then the Pope said to the little girl, “Take the last one, I’ll sacrifice my life 
for you.” The little girl replied, “No need for that, your Holiness, there are two 
parachutes left." The pope asked her, “How come?” The little girl replied, “That SA 
President took my school bag! 
Source: Facebook profile page 
The two political jokes cited above were circulated by observed respondents from the YFZ 
and PASSOP Afrika respectively. The joke about Chinotimba garnered a total of 61 likes, 23 
comments and 12 shares while that of Zuma received 32 likes, 15 comments and 3 shares. 
This indicates that the Zimbabwean joke attracted high levels of engagement in terms of likes 
but low levels of engagement with regards to comments and shares like the South African 
one. Some of the comments on the two jokes described Zuma and Chinotimba “intellectual 
midget”, “foolish politician” and “imbecile”. It is important to note that the joke about Zuma 
in South Africa was shared by a male white youth illustrates an element of racism. This also 
highlights the reactionary nature of Facebook politics where discriminatory practices are 
easily played out. In fact, the tone of the discourse of the joke focusing on Zuma’s education 
further shows that it was circulated by a poster from an educated, middle-class section of the 
population. As for the Zimbabwean case, the Chinotimba joke was shared by an educated and 
urban youth. Writing about the Kenyan context, Musila (2010: 286) argues that satire can be 
seen as a form of “self-reflexive laughter” which “is the kind of humour that entails laughing 
at ourselves, at our various weaknesses, vices and flaws”. 
Boxes 20 and 21 are similar in the sense that they portray Zuma and Chinotimba as dim-
witted. Both politicians have been on the receiving end of most satire in their respective 
countries. Zuma and Chinotimba are generally depicted as politicians with low educational 
qualifications and a poor grasp of the English language. In Box 20, Chinotimba is caricatured 
as an epitome of politicians who have been voted into parliament but with little understanding 
of the meaning of the word “bread winner”. By reducing Chinotimba to a laughing stock, the 
joke invites people to reflect on the quality of politicians who are entrusted to make laws on 
their behalf. In Box 21, Zuma is portrayed as someone who is so dumb that he cannot make a 
distinction between a parachute and a school bag. It is clear from the foregoing that these 
jokes are not really challenging power relations but reinforcing them. For instance, mocking 
Jacob Zuma for his lack of education is a tricky thing to do in a country where the education 
system has been so skewed. The same can be said of Chinotimba (a war veteran) who spent 
most of his childhood life fighting in the liberation struggle. It should be noted there is a 
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difference between someone’s intellectual capabilities and their education levels. This is 
because a politician can be poorly educated, but still highly intelligent. The satirisation of 
politicians as dim-witted is not something unique to Zimbabwe and South Africa because 
dictators like Hosni Mubarak have not been spared (Anagondahalli & Khamis, 2014).  
Compared to South Africa, some of the jokes shared on Facebook in Zimbabwe ridiculed the 
way Robert Mugabe had ruined a country once known “as the breadbasket of Africa into an 
African basket case” (Tonini, 2005). The joke below is illustrative: 
Box 24: Joke about Robert Mugabe’s hell country 
Queen Elizabeth, Bill Clinton & Robert Mugabe died & went straight to hell. Queen 
Elizabeth said “I miss England, I want to call England and see how everybody is doing 
there. She called and talked for about 5 minutes, then she asked “Well, devil how much do 
I owe you???? The devil says “Five million dollars” She wrote him a cheque and went to 
sit back on her chair. 
Bill Clinton was so jealous, he starts screaming, “My turn! I wanna call the United States, 
I want to see how everybody is doing there too” He called and talked for about 2 minutes, 
then he asked “Well, devil how much do I owe you???? The devil says “Ten million 
dollars” With a smug look on his face; he made a cheque and went to sit back on his chair. 
Robert Mugabe was even more jealous & starts screaming, “I want to call Zim too, I want 
to see how everybody is doing there too. I wanna talk to the ministers, to the deputy, I 
wanna talk to everybody”..... He called Zim and he talked for about twenty hours, he 
talked & talked & talked, then he asked “Well, devil how much do I owe you???? The 
devil says “One dollar”. Mugabe is stunned & says “One dollar??? Only one fuc*ing 
dollar??" The devil says “Well if you make a call from hell to a hell hole, it’s a local call”. 
Source: Facebook profile page 
The joke cited above was circulated by a male youth from the CiZC in Zimbabwe. In Box 23, 
the joke pokes fun at President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe describing it as “hell”. Unlike Bill 
Clinton’s United States of America and Queen Elizabeth’s Great Britain, Mugabe is 
portrayed as requesting the devil to grant him permission to make a call from “Hell” 
(assumed to be a place of eternal torment where sinners go when they depart Earth according 
to the Bible) to his ministers, deputies and everybody to enquire about their well-being in 
Zimbabwe (a hell hole). Another sub-text of this joke is the fact that Mugabe swears, making 
him appear unstatesman-like and therefore less unassailable. Given the fact that Christians 
constitute 70 per cent of the Zimbabwean population (Ruzivo, 2008), Mugabe is depicted as 
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destined for hell because of his numerous documented sins. As Manganga (2012) observes, 
jokes in Zimbabwe constitute crucial outlets for political expectoration, to navigate and 
subvert state power and media censorship. This further cements Dundes’s (1971: 51) view 
that “the more repressive the regime, the more numerous the political jokes”. At the time of 
this research, the joke posted on a Facebook profile page had received 85 likes, 20 comments 
and 11 shares. As noted in Chapters Five and Seven, because of the chilling effect of internet 
surveillance most Facebook users are more inclined to “like” rather than to “comment” on 
sensitive issues related to President Mugabe.As Obadare (2009: 250) notes, jokes “are often 
targeted at official vulgarity, and are also a means through which the “powerless” hold a 
mirror to themselves.” 
Writing about the use of humour in Zimbabwe, Moyo (2009) argues that jokes tend to 
condense powerful political messages. He also suggests that by choosing to convey political 
messages through jokes, citizens are to some extent “resisting the formal or institutional ways 
of packaging information, while at the same time responding to the nature of the technology 
at hand which demands brevity” (Moyo, 2009: 557). In reference to the Nigerian context, 
Obadare (2010) argues that jokes are a vehicle through which ordinary citizens subverts, 
deconstructs, and engages with the state. This is because jokes function as a powerful comic 
expression of ideas and a strategy for discussing people in authority in social contexts where 
direct criticism could be risky. As Davies (2007) adds, jokes in authoritarian regimes are tiny 
realms of freedom that allows the masses to speak their mind and vent their frustration. It is 
important to note that fear of political victimisation especially in Zimbabwe influences the 
content and themes of jokes which are circulated. Although this is not more pronounced in 
democratic settings like South Africa, it should be highlighted that creative artists such as 
Jonathan Shapiro and Brett Murray have been criticised by the ANC for over-stepping the 
boundaries of permissible speech. Others like controversial columnist David Bullard was 
fired from the Sunday Times because his writings made fun of Zuma’s education as well as 
peddled racist remarks. Whilst scholars (Anagondahalli & Khamis, 2014; Obadare, 2013) 
contend that unlike mass media content, jokes cannot be successfully repressed, it is 
noteworthy to highlight that they are not beyond state censorship. As intimated earlier, 
ordinary people in Zimbabwe have been arrested for ridiculing the president. In the South 
African context, the most caricatured politicians were President Jacob Zuma, Thuli 
Madonsela (Public Protector), Julius Malema (EFF leader) and Helen Zille (DA leader). 
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Contrary to the Zimbabwean case, some of the jokes circulated in South Africa dealt with the 
thorny issue of racism. As Musila (2014) suggests, through “comic discourses” people have 
been able to confront issues considered uncomfortable to deal with by the mainstream 
channels of communication. She argues that satire constitutes a vehicle of transgressive 
engagement with a problematic racial status quo in South Africa (Musila, 2014). The 
following joke circulated by a white youth from the R2K Campaign on her Facebook profile 
is illustrative:  
Box 25: Racism will never end in South Africa? 
1. Racism will never end as long as white cars are still using black tyres. 
2. Racism will never end as long as white bread still costs more than brown bread. 
3. Racism will never end if people still use BLACK to symbolise bad luck and WHITE 
for peace! 
4. Racism will never end if people still wear white clothes to weddings and black clothes 
to the funerals 
5. Racism will never end as long as those who don’t pay their bills are Blacklisted not 
Whitelisted. 
Source: Facebook profile page 
The foregoing joke about racism in South Africa seems to belittle a very serious issue. For 
instance, the joke insinuates that, “racism will never end if people still use white clothes to 
weddings and black clothes to the funerals”, this statement fails to acknowledge the root 
causes of the racism. The above post drew a torrent of humorous and angry responses from 
Facebook users. Many of the exchanges included racist and obscene language. Although the 
intention of the post was possibly to get people talking about racism, the joke in Box 24 is 
many ways racist and serves to normalise and naturalise the scourge when society should find 
ways of ending it. It is racist in many ways because it portrays the scourge as natural and 
unchangeable, when it’s basically socially-constructed. As highlighted in Chapter Seven, this 
demonstrates that online popular cultures often reinforce societal hegemonic discourses 
(Ligaga, 2012; boyd, 2014). These findings contradict cyber-optimists’ portrayal of social 
media as “liberation” technologies (Diamond, 2010). It demonstrates that social media can 
also give a voice to extremely reactionary perspectives. The results also validate Aouragh’s 
(2013) argument that social media platforms are rife with contradictions which are 
synonymous with the sword of Damocles (see Chapter One).  
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Although political satire has traditionally been seen as a “concealed voice” (Hirshmann, 
1970) against dominant elites, it can nevertheless take a confrontational stance and challenge 
a regime. It constitutes an important vehicle for the transmission of political information. As 
Hammett (2011) observes, jokes as political ephemera can be seen as ad-hoc, unorganised 
and often uncivil responses to experiences of power and politics which undermine and 
demythologise hegemonic power and create certain kinds of truth while contesting the 
politics of belonging which underpins such political engagement. Next I discuss 
subvertisements. 
8.1.2 Subvertisements 
 
Online observations and qualitative content analysis established that Zimbabwean and South 
African youths also employed Facebook to circulate subvertisements. Subvertising is a 
portmanteau of “subvert” and “advertising”. Subvertisement denotes “a popular online 
strategy, in the form of language, picture and animation, which comically subverts and 
deconstructs corporate and political advertisements” (Nomai, 2008: 26). It turns corporate 
identity on its head, subverting the popular imagery associated with a brand, slogan or an 
artwork to force the reader to consider broader social and political issues in line with political 
dynamics of the day (Kuntz, 1998; Cammaerts, 2007). This creative vernacular practice has 
similarities with Scott’s (1985) notion of “linguistic tricks” because it entails the informal use 
of mainstream icons to deliver social and political commentary. This dovetails with Leibold’s 
( 2011) assertion that political parodies playfully subvert a range of authoritative discourses 
and provides a vehicle for both comic criticism and emotional catharsis.  
In both Southern African countries, Facebook users creatively subvertised the names of 
political parties and their mottos. Unlike in Zimbabwe, some of the observed respondents 
from the UPM in South Africa subvertised the acronym the EFF (Economic Freedom 
Fighters) to stand for the “Economic Foolishness Fighters” on their Facebook personal 
profiles. Still others from the same movement noted that EFF stands for “Every Fool Follow” 
on their personal profiles. This is despite EFF’s commendable performance during the 2014 
election where it won 25 seats in the National Assembly. Some of the observed youths from 
the R2K Campaign subverted the acronym ANC to stand for the “African National 
Corruption” on their Facebook personal profiles. This was following the much publicised 
Nkandla report, where the President Jacob Zuma was found to have unduly benefited from 
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public funds during the renovation of his Nkandla homestead. Writing about the use of 
Facebook in South Africa, Walton (2014) argues that that hackronyms (hijacked acronyms) 
have been deployed as replacements of official party acronyms (ANC became African 
National Corruption) and EFF became Expelled Frustrated Fools whilst the popular acronym 
BBM (BlackBerry Messenger) was appropriated to stand for “Bring Back Malema”. BBM 
was popularised following the expulsion of Julius Malema from the African National 
Congress Youth League (ANCYL).  
Compared to South Africa where observed youths subverted acronyms of political parties, in 
Zimbabwe mostly urban based youth tinkered with slogan of the MDC-T. For instance, some 
of the youths from the NCA subverted MDC-T’s slogan “the party of excellence” to “the 
party of SEXexcellence” in reference to the sexual escapades of the leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai. The motto of the MDC-T was also renamed as a “party of unprotected 
SEXcellence”. As Toulabor (1981) writes, Togolese citizens have also used linguistic 
subversion to turn official party names into obscene word play, designed to demystify and 
ridicule the government. 
Given the political economy of access to social media in South Africa, mostly white 
Facebook users from the R2K Campaign changed the name of the Protection of State 
Information Bill to the “Secrecy Bill”. The reason was that the Bill was viewed as putting a 
lid on the free flow of information. Qualitative content analysis also showed that one male 
white Facebook user from the UPM circulated Julius Sello Malema’s photoshopped Matric 
result transcript on his profile page. As the caption of the transcript (see Figure 10) illustrate, 
“what I put it to you that from high school, I was an “EFF” President, Malema’s low 
academic grades are subverted to suggest he was always a below par student since his school 
days. Like in the jokes poking fun at Zuma, the above subvertisement of EFF based on 
Malema’s matric transcript was shared by a poster who comes from an educated, middle-
class section of the population. Most of the comments came from white participants who 
lambasted Malema as a “buffoon”, “Mugabe’s disciple” and an “idiot”. 
Figure 10: Malema’s Matric transcript 
246 
 
 
Source: Facebook profile page 
It is evident from the above that some fans on the R2K and UPM Facebook pages are 
creatively “poaching” (de Certeau, 1984) acronyms from official discourses thereby using 
these to their own advantage. As Jiang (2008) points out, such poaching does not necessarily 
create opposition to the system, but instead exploits the space between the system’s 
production and its use. “Poaching of meanings” (de Certeau, 1984) has also been identified in 
Togo by Mbembe (2001) where the Togolese party acronym RPT was treated as synonymous 
with “the sound of faecal matter dropping into a sceptic tank” or “the sound of a fart emitted 
by quivering buttocks which can only smell disgusting”.    
In comparison to the South African case, observed respondents from the YFZ, NCA and 
CiZC in Zimbabwe creatively subverted the names of parastatals thereby undermining 
positive aspects of the targeted brand name. For instance, the acronym of the country’s public 
broadcaster ZBC (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Authority) was also subverted to Zanu 
Broadcasting Corporation by Facebook users on the CiZC page. The major reason for the 
linguistic subversion is that ZBC covers ZANU-PF activities only and acts as the mouthpiece 
of the ruling party. Similarly, in the South African context, the SABC has been derogatively 
referred to as the “South African National Corporation” (SANC). In view of the linguistic 
subversion in Zimbabwe, Willems (2015: 6) observes that ZBC has also been described as 
247 
 
“Dead BC” when discussing television content because of the “screening of documentaries 
about the liberation war, the emergence of nationalist talk shows and the recycling of 
liberation war songs”. Observed youths from the CiZC also renamed the Zimbabwe Republic 
Authority (ZRP) to the “Zanu Republic Police”. This is because of the partisan operations of 
the police force which has been involved in the persecution of opposition politicians, 
journalists and human rights activists. As Willems (2011) points out, naming and re-naming 
has been a powerful strategy that has long been used in Zimbabwe in order to comment upon 
political affairs. Similarly, Ellis (1998: 473) notes that “radio trottoir is immensely inventive 
in parodying these [names of parastatal organisations], and there is hardly an acronym in 
Togo which has not been co-opted by radio trottoir for subversive purposes”. This further 
complements Scott’s (1990) view that behind the scenes we may expect to hear much raucous 
laughing, merciless lampooning and bitter criticism.  
Examples of subvertisements cited above also corroborate the argument that in many African 
countries, media consumers have re-circulated state media discourse in very inventive ways 
such as by adopting slogans from radio and television, by creating parodic phrases and by 
renaming acronyms (Spitulnik, 2002; Barber, 1987). This gives credence to Nyamnjoh’s 
(2005: 84) insightful postulation that “it is necessary to look beyond meta-narratives of 
euphoria and victimhood to understand how marginalised individuals and communities are 
responding to state repression [...]”.  
8.1.3 Online petitions 
 
An online petition is a statement published online that individuals can sign as a show of 
support to a cause (Earl, 2006). Methods used to deliver petitions vary from physical to 
electronic delivery. These online petitions constituted digital hidden transcripts in the 
Zimbabwean context because of the nature of their circulation. Unlike public transcripts 
which are distributed in the offline world, digital hidden transcripts are distributed by 
approaching selected individuals beforehand through Facebook messaging and chat systems. 
There is secrecy attached to the distribution of these online petitions witnessed on 
Facebookin Zimbabwe. As Scott (1985) argues, everyday social practices and networks are 
deliberately masked, dissimulated and made opaque, in ways that render them illegible to and 
ungovernable by the state. In South Africa, online petitions can be conceptualised as digital 
public transcripts because they are circulated openly on Facebook pages and groups. The 
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differences in terms of the distribution channels of online petitions in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa are closely related to the nature and character of their regime types. In non-democratic 
societies like Zimbabwe, petitions often find their way to pre-selected individuals through 
enclave and subaltern counter-public outlets. In democratic contexts, the distribution of 
petitions occurs publicly and the idea is to reach a critical mass of supporters which is 
important for the credibility and impact of the protest action.  
Although it was observed that online petitions are circulated on Facebook in both countries, it 
was noted that this repertoire of “connective action” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012) was much 
more popular amongst youth activists from South African social movements. Mostly 
addressing pressing societal issues, online petitions were spread via Facebook fan pages and 
groups compared to the messaging and chat systems. Unlike in South Africa, qualitative 
content analysis indicated that only one online petition was circulated by an observed 
respondent from the CiZC in Zimbabwe. Some of the petitions shared by South African 
youth activists focused on the fighting against policy changes, appointments of board 
members on public entities, police violence, internet censorship threats and the slashing of 
mobile call prices. It is clear from the foregoing that targets of the petitions in South Africa 
included the government, politicians, public institutions and private companies. This 
corroborates Earl & Schussman’s (2008) observation that many citizens are now protesting 
against private companies themselves in hopes of directly changing corporate policies or 
products. Instead of relying on traditional repertoires of protest, online petitions can also be 
viewed as an invaluable unconventional method of claim-making (Vromen, 2007; Earl & 
Schussman, 2008). For example, one of the observed black youth from the UPM shared the 
following petition aimed at putting pressure on President Zuma not to appoint Justice 
Mogoeng Mogoeng as South Africa’s Chief Justice:  
Box 26: An online petition 
Here is the open letter to President Jacob Zuma. Please consider endorsing it and 
pass it on to as many organisations and individuals as possible. If you and/or your 
organisation would like to endorse the letter please send your endorsements by 
email to mazibuko@amandla.org.za or by fax to 086 661 9470 or post your 
endorsement on this group page.  
07 September 2011  
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TO: President Jacob Zuma 
Dear Sir 
OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT JACOB ZUMA: MAY YOU PLEASE NOT 
APPOINT JUSTICE MOGOENG AS CHIEF JUSTICE 
We write to you as a collection of progressive individuals, activists and 
organisations committed to equality, non-discrimination, human rights and social 
justice as enshrined in our country’s Constitution. We write to you to submit our 
appeal that you not appoint Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng to the position of Chief 
Justice as per your nomination and recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission (JSC). We submit this request mindful of your constitutional role in 
the appointment of the Chief Justice and the deliberations of the JSC to date. We 
respectfully submit this request to you motivated by the following considerations: 
Source: Facebook profile page 
As illustrated by the aforementioned petition, activist groupings (including the UPM) 
mobilised against the appointment of Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng as the Chief Justice whom 
they argued was not suitable for such a high post. Their argument was that Justice Mogoeng 
was not suitable because of his lack of experience and his lack of sensitivity to a court’s role 
in protecting the rights and interests of vulnerable groups. His views as expressed in some of 
the rulings he has made as a judge were said to be reflective of an insensitive, patriarchal and 
backward mind-set that is chauvinistically inclined towards the stereotypical role of women. 
It received 21 likes, 34 comments and 3 shares. This illustrates that the post low levels of 
engagement with regards to likes and shares but medium levels of engagement in terms of 
comments. Most of the Facebook comments described Mogoeng as “too conservative”, “a 
threat to progressive gains”, “male chauvinist” and “culturally-backward”. 
Compared to South Africa, the petition shared in Zimbabwe by a diaspora-based youth from 
the CiZC via the Facebook messaging system focused on the voting rights of people in the 
diaspora: 
Figure 11: Please sign our petition 
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Source: Facebook profile page 
From Figure 11, it is evident that the poster is urging citizens to sign the petition in order to 
put pressure on the Zimbabwean government to grant its citizens in the diaspora their 
inalienable right to vote in the 2013 referendum and the subsequent national elections. This 
represents a counter-hegemonic discourse because the ZANU-PF has consistently denied 
people living in the diaspora the right to vote citing logistical and practical challenges in 
terms of voter registration. It is also generally believed that ZANU-PF fears that those in the 
diaspora would support the opposition. The petition received favourable reception from 
Facebook users based in the diaspora. It received 130 likes, 85 comments and 12 shares 
which means high levels of interaction in terms of likes and comments while shares had low 
levels of engagement. 
8.1.4 Political cartoons 
 
It was found that political cartoons were some of the most circulated digital hidden transcripts 
in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Cartoons are “a particular media genre of visual 
discourse relying on the interplay between visual and textual elements” (Müller et al., 2009: 
28). As a genre of comic art, their stock in trade is “distortions and exaggerations that 
characteristically puncture pretension or single out vulnerable features in a target” (Farwell, 
1989: 9). The main purpose of “political cartoons are to make social and political 
commentary that simplifies the subtle and often complex underlying issues” (Fairrington, 
2009: 205). Scholars (Eko, 2007; 2010; Hammett, 2010: 202) also highlight that political 
cartoons “capture complex social and political issues, acknowledge and resist power 
relations, and are used symbolically to generate identities and propagate ideologies”. 
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Research (Eko, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2005) on popular culture in Africa has shown that the 
emergence of political cartoons has been influenced by a need to have an alternative platform 
to voice unpopular political opinion in the face of government crackdown on dissent. In the 
same vein, James (1997) suggests that black oppression in the face of white authoritarian rule 
in South Africa under apartheid drove political dissent underground and political cartoons 
founded a platform for resistance where mainstream press would ordinarily muzzle these 
opinions. This form of political engagement not only visually documents key socio-political 
issues but also mobilises new political publics, most of whom are not formally literate but 
very astute with digital media use (Oduro-Frimpong, 2015). Like all popular cultural genres, 
political cartoons can also be used to legitimise the status quo and naturalise oppressive 
power relations. 
Most of the political cartoons, memes and photoshopped images circulated on Facebook 
groups, fan and profile pages in Zimbabwe and South Africa focused on Robert Mugabe, 
Morgan Tsvangirai, Julius Malema, Helen Zille and Jacob Zuma. Photoshopped images and 
cartoons also caricatured and parodied political and public representatives in relation to issues 
like promiscuity, corruption, LGBTI rights, electoral conflict and political violence. 
Compared to South Africa, most of the cartoons shared on Facebook groups and pages in 
Zimbabwe were photoshopped images of political figures. Most of the photoshopped images 
had no attribution emphasising the anonymous nature of their production and dissemination. 
This can be attributed to the fear of political persecution by the state. Unlike in Zimbabwe, it 
was observed that most of the cartoons circulated on Facebook groups and pages in South 
Africa were sourced from the mainstream private media. Some of the editorial cartoons 
circulated in South Africa were drawn by Sifiso Yalo (whose pen name is Yalo) and Jonathan 
Shapiro (whose pen name is Zapiro). Whereas Yalo’s cartoons are published in The Sowetan,  
Zapiro’s are published in the Mail & Guardian, The Star, the Sunday Times, the Cape Times, 
The Mercury and Pretoria News. As intimated earlier, the fact that most of the cartoons 
posted on Facebook in South Africa were recycled content from the mainstream media 
validates van Dijck’s (2009) argument that the availability of social media does not turn 
everyone into active participant (produser).  
There were also notable similarities in terms of the themes or subject of the cartoons 
circulated on Facebook in both case nations. These included cartoons and photoshopped 
images dealing with police brutality, sexual proclivities of political representatives, creeping 
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forms of authoritarianism, corruption and the systematic pillaging of public funds. Some 
cartoons were distinct in the sense that they focused on very specific territorial 
representations of societal ills. As Monga (1996: 110) observes, cartoons are “spaces of 
expression hidden behind the unsaid”. 
I will begin by teasing out similar cartoons poking fun at the sexual proclivities of Jacob 
Zuma and Morgan Tsvangirai, then look at the systematic pillaging of public funds and abuse 
of power. Thereafter I will discuss cartoons with different thematic focus in both countries.  
Below are illustrations of political cartoons poking fun at the sexual peccadilloes of Morgan 
Tsvangirai and Jacob Zuma: 
Figure 12: Zuma’s response to the Spear painting 
 
Source: Facebook profile page 
Figure 13: Tsvangirai’s sexual appetite 
 
Source: Facebook profile page 
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Figures 12 and 13 above depict President Jacob Zuma and Morgan Tsvangirai as sexual 
perverts. Both photoshopped images have no bylines, whilst Figure 12 has an English 
caption, Figure 13 combines both English and ChiShona. The first photoshopped image 
circulated by a youth from the UPM on his Facebook page alludes to Zuma’s imagined 
response to the Brett Murray’s The Spear painting. The painting depicted Zuma in a pose 
reminiscent of Vladimir Lenin (from Russia), with his genitals exposed. It triggered a 
defamation lawsuit by the ANC although it was eventually vandalised on the 22
nd
 of May 
2012. In his defence, Brett Murray pointed out that the painting was an “attempt at humorous 
satire of political power and patriarchy within the context of other artworks in the [Goodman 
gallery] exhibition and within the broader context of the South African discourse”. Zuma, in 
his response to the artwork, is on record as having said; it portrayed him as “a philanderer and 
a womaniser”. This is significantly different from the satirised response captured in Figure 12 
where Zuma is quoted as saying: “I have decided 2 take legal action against him (Brett 
Murray)…I’ve never been this humiliated in my whole life. I don’t have problem with him 
drawing my penis…but he must draw the right size. The penis on the portrait is not mine…its 
Malema’s. Mine is bigger and stronger…I demand the right size…He must draw the real size. 
Nxa (swearing in isiZulu) stupid mulungu (white person)…How will I find another wife with 
that small Mshini (penis)?” The sub-text of this satirised Zuma response is that it focuses on 
the size of the penis rather than the message behind the original painting. It presents Zuma as 
someone with a big penis which he uses as a bait to lure women. Figure 12 also depicts Zuma 
as disowning the size of the penis painted by Murray claiming that his is stronger and bigger. 
He even suggests that the penis on the painting belongs to Julius Malema (his arch-rival). As 
noted earlier in relation to Mugabe’s joke, Zuma is presented as swearing which makes him 
unstatesman-like. Zuma is also presented as a serial polygamist who is concerned with 
finding more wives. It is also ironical that the term “Mshini” (isiZulu language which means 
machine gun in English which was popularised by members of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, the 
ANC’s military wing during the struggle against apartheid) is inappropriately used here as a 
synonym for ‘big penis’. Another meaning of “Mshini” is that it refers to Zuma’s signature 
song which is called Umshini Wam.  Figure 12 echoes similar (Eko, 2010) editorial cartoons 
which have ridiculed Zuma for his polygamous lifestyle with many wives and girlfriends. 
The satirisation of Zuma in the wake of The Spear painting also reinforces Ligaga’s (2012) 
view that when a political scandal occurs, it creates an opportunity for mockery and insult to 
be exchanged between online users. 
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Unlike Figure 12, Figure 13 portrays Morgan Tsvangirai addressing a political rally in 
Zimbabwe. In the background are mostly MDC-T supporters wearing red T-shirts and berets 
(symbols of the party). Behind Tsvangirai is a male photographer who is capturing the 
proceedings. The word “Meanwhile…” inscribed in eye-catching bold letters on top of the 
photoshopped image is meant to attract the attention of the reader to focus on an informal 
chat between a husband (Baba Domingo) and wife (Mai Domingo) rather than on Tsvangirai 
addressing the rally. Expressing shock at Tsvangirai’s open zip, the wife (Mai Domingo) is 
quoted in Figure 13 as saying: “Hezvo Baba Domingo tarisai muone zip yake. 
Yakavhurika!!!” (in ChiShona language). In English, it means: “Hey Father of Domingo, 
Look his fly is open!!!” The moral of the photoshopped image is that Tsvangirai is a sex-
crazed womaniser who is on the prowl for women even at political rallies. Similar to Zuma, 
Morgan Tsvangirai has been subject to satire largely due to his sex scandals which came to 
the surface in 2012 following the death of his wife Susan Tsvangirai in 2009. Given that most 
Zimbabweans and South Africans “are deeply conservative on sexual matters, and shy away 
from public discussions of sex” (Duncan, 2012: 4); the two cartoons cited above generated 
mixed reactions from Facebook users. Some of the Facebook users in Zimbabwe exonerated 
Tsvangirai from wrong doing pointing out that President Mugabe had also cheated on his first 
wife. Others noted that there was nothing wrong with dating many girlfriends as long as it 
was not marital infidelity.  
The next set of cartoons in Zimbabwe and South Africa dealt with corruption and the abuse 
of public funds. Figure 14 was circulated by a white male youth from the R2K Campaign his 
profile page whilst the Figure 15 was shared on the YFZ Facebook page.     
Figure 14: Nkandla Report 
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Source: Facebook profile page 
Figure 15: Unequal distribution of public funds? 
 
Source: YFZ Facebook page 
Both cartoons depict the systemic pillaging of public funds by political and public 
representatives. Whereas Figure 14 is an editorial cartoon drawn by Sifiso Yalo in South 
Africa, Figure 15 like most cartoons observed in Zimbabwe has no attribution. Figure 14 
depicts the President Zuma dipping his hand in the cookie jar whilst Jackson Mthembu (ANC 
former spokesperson) and Gwede Mantashe (ANC General Secretary) are demanding 
answers from Thuli Madonsela (the Public Protector). The cookie jar here signifies the 
national treasury. Mthembu is depicted as asking an ironical question to Thuli Madonsela: 
“We want to know who put the President’s hand in that cookie jar”? This was following the 
256 
 
release of the report by the Public Protector which revealed that President Zuma unduly 
benefited from the R246-million security upgrades at his Nkandla homestead. The sub-text of 
the cartoon is that President Zuma is looting the public funds while his lieutenants are 
shielding him from public and parliamentary accountability. The cartoon also exposes the 
abuse of power and rampant corruption in high offices. It attracted 50 likes, 32 comments and 
5 shares. This suggests that the post elicited medium levels of engagement with regards to 
likes and comments. Most of the comments from white South Africans called upon Zuma to 
pay back the money, while others blamed the president and “his acolytes” for running down 
the economy through their corrupt practices. Some of the participants subverted the ANC’s 
motto “working together we can do more” to “working together we can steal more”. One of 
the few black interlocutors commented that, “show me one perfect government; otherwise 
you better zip your mouth!” These foregoing remarks validate Fraser’s (1990: 67) view that 
“in stratified societies, the discursive relations among differentially empowered publics are as 
likely to take the form of contestation as that of deliberation”.  
Similar to Figure 14, Figure 15 is a metaphor of how Zimbabwean public representatives 
syphon public funds at the expense of the ordinary people. Figure 15 spotlights the unequal 
nature of income distribution based on social stratification. It demonstrates that the trickle-
down effect disadvantages the general public who are situated at the lower rung of the ladder. 
Like most of the humorous posts, it garnered 56 likes, 21 comments and 7 shares. Based on 
indicators presented in Chapter Seven, the post attracted medium levels of engagement in 
terms of likes while comments and shares enjoyed low levels. It generated substantial 
political discussion with most participants accusing the ZANU-PF government of being 
“selfish”, “insensitive to the plight of the poor” and “self-enriching parasites”. The cartoon 
satirises the shady disbursement of the US$20 million youth fund which benefited high-
ranking ZANU-PF officials at the expense of the youth. This reinforces Muwonwa’s (2012) 
observation that young people in Zimbabwe use new media technologies to critique and poke 
fun at some of the ruling elite’s policies. Similarly Eko (2010: 4) further submits that 
“cartoonists and comic strip artists use humorous satirical texts to expose African 
contradictions and hypocrisies and to focus the humiliating searchlight of ridicule and 
irreverence on greed, corruption, and abuse of power”. 
Online observations also indicated that respondents in both countries circulated cartoons 
which foregrounded cases of police brutality and creeping forms of authoritarianism. Unlike 
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in South Africa where police brutality has become more pronounced during community 
protests (Duncan, 2010), in Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF government has consistently deployed 
state-sponsored political violence against opposition supporters since 2000 (Moyo, 2013). 
Below are illustrative examples: 
Figure 16: Phiyega has blood on her hands? 
 
Source: Facebook profile page 
Figure 17: We have degrees in violence? 
 
Source: Facebook profile page 
The afore-cited photoshopped images critique the crimes committed by the repressive state 
apparatuses against ordinary people in both countries. While Figure 16 is a graffiti inscribed 
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on a building wall, Figure 17 is a photoshopped image of President Mugabe seating on a 
throne with human skulls hanging over shoulders. Figure 16 was circulated by an interviewed 
youth from the UPM on his Facebook profile. Unlike Figure 16 which depicts the South 
African Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega as responsible for the killing of 34 miners during 
the Marikana massacre (see Chapter Three), Figure 17 blames the post-independence 
atrocities in Zimbabwe squarely on the shoulders of President Mugabe. Figure 16 can 
arguably be read as a critique against militarised policing which has seen several activists 
losing their lives during community protests in South Africa. This is despite the police’s 
claim that they shot at striking miners in self-defence. The post attracted 23 likes, 34 
comments and 3 shares with most of the interlocutors blaming the police for massacring 
unarmed civilians and applying unnecessary excessive force. In the above image, it is clear 
the issue of the “blood” is used for “accenting and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs 
as being more salient than others” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 623). These figures show that the 
post generated medium levels of interaction with regards to comments and low levels in 
terms of likes and shares.  
Figure 17 was shared by an observed male youth from the CiZC on his Facebook profile. As 
noted in Chapter Three, President Mugabe has been fingered in the Gukurahundi massacres, 
the killing of white commercial farmers during the Fast Track Land Reform (FTLR) and 
opposition supporters during electoral campaigns in recent years. Unlike in South Africa, 
where parodying of public representatives can be seen as an attempt to transgress the 
exclusionary rational political communication associated with the elite public sphere, in 
Zimbabwe the practice can be viewed an attempt to circumvent state surveillance and 
censorship. Figure 17 generated 31 likes, 16 comments and 2 shares which indicate low 
levels of interaction. The open character of memes fosters creative thinking thereby making 
them valuable entry points in political discussion. Most of the participants accused Mugabe 
of genocide, sustaining his rule through the spilling of blood and of being a blood-thirsty 
dictator. Some went as far as drawing parallels between Mugabe and Germany’s Hitler. 
Drawing parallels between President Mugabe and Adolf Hitler is used by cyber-activists in 
Zimbabwe as a tactic to magnify the crimes against humanity allegedly committed during his 
tenure as the leader of the country. 
In contrast with Zimbabwe, cartoons shared on the R2K Campaign Facebook page dealt with 
threats to media freedom and freedom of expression in South Africa. This confirms Eko’s 
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(2010: 19) poignant observation that an analysis of “cartoons from countries where there 
have been major confrontations between governments and the media revealed that African 
political cartoons are irreverent counter-discourses that use African mythic idioms to portray 
a sombre picture of media realities on the African continent”. An example of this cartoon is 
below:   
Figure 18: Public consultation? 
 
Source: R2K Campaign Facebook page  
The above cartoon is concerned with freedom of expression in the wake of the promulgation 
of the Secrecy Bill. It was drawn by Sifiso Yalo. Like most cartoons observed on Facebook 
pages in South Africa, it was sourced from the mainstream private media. Figure 18 presents 
President Zuma attempting to apply “lipstick” on a “pig”. The “pig” refers to the Secrecy 
Bill. This refers to the saying of putting lipstick on a pig, that is, cosmetic changes do not 
change the substance. The sub-text of the cartoon is that “lipstick” denotes cosmetic public 
consultation processes which do not allow for citizens to air their views. In short, the cartoon 
is a direct critique against the Bill which the R2K Campaign argued would threaten 
whistleblowers and investigative journalists.  
In terms of levels of participation, the cartoon received 35 likes, 5 comments and 12 shares 
which demonstrate low levels of engagement. The comments from mostly white South 
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Africans read: “ready to become the ANC’s bitch...”, “Somewhat insulting to the porcine 
species, perhaps”, “I am fond of pigs..., dogs look up to us. Cats look down on us. Pigs treat 
us as equals.” W.S. Churchill”, “Well, if you put lipstick on a pig, it’s still a pig! What’s to 
consult? The public have said no!”, “Al dra 'n aap 'n goue ring...(Even if a monkey puts on a 
gold ring, it will remain a monkey, an Afrikaans idiom)”. It is clear from these comments that 
some participants saw public consultation as pointless while others criticised the cartoonist 
for insulting the porcine species. The participation of white people reinforces Duncan’s 
(2014: 17) observation that “given that Facebook in South Africa is not available in a stripped 
down version, which means that it still remains bandwidth-heavy and consequently is skewed 
towards wealthier internet users”.  
Unlike in South Africa, cartoons circulated on Facebook groups and pages in Zimbabwe 
explicitly focused on President Mugabe’s authoritarian tendencies. The cartoon below is an 
example: 
Figure 19: Hypocritical Mugabe? 
 
Source: Facebook profile page 
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The cartoon posted above sourced from the NewZimbabwe.com (a diasporic online 
newspaper) portrays President Mugabe as an untrustworthy politician. Drawn by Gavin 
Brown, the cartoon depicts Mugabe as embracing peace and reconciliation through shacking 
the hand of Tsvangirai during the signing of the Global Political Agreement in 2008 (see 
Chapter Three). Figure 19 alludes to Mugabe’s darker side where he relies on the police and 
military to silence dissenting voices and opposition parties. It presents the military as using 
Mugabe as a shield to discipline Tsvangirai. This visual representation of the unpredictable 
nature of Robert Mugabe echoes widespread belief amongst Zimbabweans that he relies on 
repressive state apparatus to safeguard his political power. Writing about the Kenyan context 
under Arap Moi, Musila (2007) points out that the cartoon form became a potent discursive 
site for engaging with the absurdities of authoritarian rule. Similar findings (Yang, 2009; 
Zuckerman, 2013) have been noted in China where due to tight controls on political 
expression, internet users have grown savvy at expressing themselves through political satire 
and spoofs to evade censorship and avoid repression.   
In authoritarian contexts like Zimbabwe, “where the formal, invited spaces for political 
participation and functioning of the public sphere are severely curtailed, alternative 
expressions and actions in invented and often hidden spaces of participation are required” 
(Obadare, 2013: 135). In such contexts, cartoons provide “sites of protest” (Monga, 1996) as 
well as allowing citizens to engage with the prevailing official discourse. As already noted 
earlier, cartoons can also serve the purpose of limiting the range of possible modes of debate 
by reproducing and even accentuating hegemonic discourses contained in the other editorial 
genres. Despite the appropriation of Facebook pages as “social spaces of relative autonomy” 
(Scott, 1990), it should be emphasised that several people have been arrested for the 
possession and circulation of photoshopped images of President Mugabe in Zimbabwe.  
8.1.5 Letter-writing campaigns 
 
Facebook provides novel transitory “moments of freedom” (Fabian, 1998: 21) for citizens to 
write letters addressed to political and public representatives. Although described as “low risk 
and low effort actions” (Snow, Soule & Kriesi, 2004: 270), letter-writing campaigns 
constitute new digital repertoire of contention. From this study, it was observed that some of 
the respondents from both countries drafted and disseminated letters directed at public 
representatives, which were circulated via the Facebook notes, messaging and chat system. 
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Online participant observation established that some respondents in Zimbabwe (mostly from 
the YFZ and CiZC) and South Africa (from the PASSOP Afrika and R2K Campaign) wrote 
notes which they shared via Facebook messaging and chat. It was found that the YFZ shared 
19 notes, the CiZC had only one note while the NCA had none in Zimbabwe. In South 
Africa, the PASSOP Africa posted a total of 61 notes, the R2K Campaign circulated 3 notes 
and the UPM shared none. It is evident that notes are most popular amongst South African 
movements when compared to their Zimbabwean counterparts. This could be explained by 
the fact that youth activists in South Africa have mastered the use of Facebook features than 
their Zimbabwean counterparts. Similar to petitions, most of the Facebook notes were 
directed at government institutions and public representatives. As such, these letters 
constitute a vital lobbying strategy as well as an informal outlet for “produsers” (Bruns, 
2008) to articulate their grievances or to inform political representatives on particular issue of 
concern. These helped in awareness raising and frame articulation of the important 
grievances requiring urgent action. In contrast to jokes (see section 7.1) and cartoons (see 
section 7.4) which are largely about circulating existing content, letters addressed to political  
representatives allowed Facebook users in Zimbabwe and South Africa to become 
“produsers”. It is important to reiterate van Dijck’s (2009) view that there are relatively few 
active creators of content on new media.  
 
As a repertoire of collective action, letters addressed to public representatives like those 
written to the editor are aimed at bringing urgent matters to the attention of a targeted  
audience who can then learn how to act upon the “injustice frame” (Gamson, 1992). In the 
Zimbabwean case, where participation in marches and demonstrations is considered risky and 
dangerous, letter writing campaigns can be viewed as platforms for ventilating, complaining, 
critiquing government policies and suggesting policy alternatives. In comparison to the South 
African case where Facebook users from the R2K Campaign and PASSOP Afrika posted 
formal letters which were published in the mainstream media and delivered to their respective 
addressees, in Zimbabwe all the letters were only published on Facebook. Unlike in South 
Africa, some of the observed respondents in Zimbabwe used their own Facebook messaging 
and chat to circulate humorous and satirical letters targeted at public representatives. For the 
purposes of this chapter, I will focus on formal letters circulated on Facebook in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa:  
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Box 27: Stop Media Personnel Abuses! 
Stop Media Personnel Abuses!!! December 7, 2011 
Zimbabwe’s police continued with their irrational persecution of media 
personnel on Tuesday when they raided the Media Monitoring Project of 
Zimbabwe (MMPZ) offices and arrested MMPZ Projects Co-ordinator Andy 
Moyse and seized more than 100 CDs and DVDs “containing Gukurahundi 
Information”. 
The Youth Forum, currently coming up with a plan to make information 
accessible to youths in marginalised areas in order to improve the free flow of 
news, ideas and information, would like to strongly condemn the incarceration of 
private and independent media personnel and this deplorable situation raises 
obvious questions over charges being concocted out of politically motivated 
harassment. We urge the regime to cease the arbitrary detention of selected 
citizens on sham charges, and repeat our call for the revision of laws such as 
AIPPA and POSA. It is important to restore the right to meet in public places, to 
organize, to share opinions, ideas and express them no matter how critical or un-
popular they may be, as this is an essential aspect of public life. Youth Forum 
Source: YFZ Facebook page 
Box 27 calls upon the government of Zimbabwe to stop the arbitrary arrest of media 
personnel on trumped up charges. It also urges the responsible authorities to repeal repressive 
laws such as AIPPA and POSA. The solidarity note also urges the government to restore the 
right to meet in public places, to organise, to share opinions, ideas and express them without 
fear of retribution. This constitutes a digital hidden transcript in the sense that it is circulated 
outside the public gaze and is aimed at frame articulation and amplification (Benford & 
Snow, 2000). In South Africa, the following letter addressed to the Minister of Social 
Development was circulated by a white male youth from the PASSOP Afrika:  
Box 28: An Open Letter: Urgent appeal for the vulnerable workers facing off-season 
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Dear: Honourable Minister of Social Development; Minister Bathabile Dlamini 
We, the undersigned organisations, would like to express our urgent concern that thousands of 
vulnerable workers are soon to be facing the off-season period. The majority of workers are still 
paid substantially lower than the new stipulated minimum wage of R105 per day. We are 
concerned because we anticipate unemployment during this off-season period to exceed over 
80% of those currently employed; the majority of whom are women.  
These workers are paid extremely low wages; making it impossible for them to save enough to 
survive the off-season. It is our view that a humanitarian crisis is imminent and workers have 
advised us that the farm bosses and owners do not provide adequate support for this difficult 
period. We do not believe that we will be respecting human rights as members of civil society if 
we fail to raise concerns as the crisis unfolds. It is in this light that we respectfully and earnestly 
appeal for your assistance for at least three months for the thousands of households that will be 
affected by this crisis. We would like specific attention to be paid to the De Doorns community, 
which has a sizeable population of farmworkers. The off-season will take survival away from 
7,000 households, in De Doorns alone. 
These communities are diverse and include migrant workers who are equally affected, and we 
therefore appeal that the aid distribution be inclusive of all community members to avoid causing 
divisions and inter-communal tensions. After working several months, workers should be able to 
earn enough to save money to survive during the many months of off-season. That said; the new 
minimum wage is yet to be implemented in practice and workers continue to be exploited and 
abused.  
Yours sincerely,  
PASSOP 
Source: PASSOP Afrika Facebook page 
Focusing on the precarious labour rights of farm-workers, the afore-mentioned Facebook note 
constitute an alternative discourse in the sense that it deals with the issue which is often 
ignored by the South African mainstream commercial media. As Kariithi & Kareithi (2007) 
point out, the private press in South Africa legitimated neoliberal economic policies while 
delegitimating organised labour’s grievances. This further suggests that some Facebook notes 
and messaging system “function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities 
directed toward wider publics” (Fraser, 1992: 110).  
8.1.6 Political Rumour 
 
This study found that observed youths from social movements in Zimbabwe were more 
inclined to circulating rumours on their Facebook profile pages compared to those in South 
Africa. These findings support Kapferer (1990) view that rumours are mostly circulated in an 
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authoritarian context with restrictions on independent news media when compared to a 
democratic society. Although the terms rumour and gossip overlap and are often used 
interchangeably, it is important to note that they are not equivalent. Gossip typically deals 
with the “personal affairs of individuals while rumour may deal with places and events of 
great importance and prominence” (Rosnow & Fine, 1976: 11). In other words, gossip is an 
unverified message about someone (see section 7.7) while rumour is an unverified message 
about something, either a trite or of great importance. Rumours are “a recurrent form of 
communication through which men [and women] caught together in an ambiguous situation 
attempt to reconstruct a meaningful interpretation of it by pooling their intellectual resources” 
(Shibutani, 1966: 17).  
Three broad categories of rumour can be discerned on the basis of its effect on the listener: 
”pipe dream rumours,” those that express one’s hopes and fantasies but are otherwise 
harmless; “bogies,” those rumours that mirror fears and anxieties; and “wedge-driving 
rumours,” those that divide groups (Rosnow & Fine, 1976: 23). According to Scott (1990), 
rumour constitutes a powerful form of “hidden transcript” which denotes discourse that takes 
place off-stage beyond direct observation by power-holders. Scholars (Nyamnjoh, 2005; 
Ogola, 2011) posit that rumour is generally fuelled by the absence of trustworthy information 
from the official channels of communications and the need of the masses to be informed 
about key events and personalities.  
From interviews and observations, it emerged that rumour in Zimbabwe is circulated via 
closed groups or affinity communities (like secret Facebook groups, private messaging and 
chat). Most of the rumours focused on the resolution of the outstanding issues of the GNU 
through SADC-brokered meetings, the anticipated return of the Zimbabwean dollar, internal 
struggles within the MDC-T and ZANU-PF as well as election dates. It should be noted that 
unlike other circuits of political commentary (as discussed earlier) with an explicit 
oppositional thrust, most of the rumours on Facebook groups and pages in Zimbabwe 
contested and engaged with official discourses. This is because despite rumour “often 
[presented] in opposition of the official discourse” (Kapferer, 1987: 22), it is not always 
oppositional to power.  
Rumours circulated by observed youths from the social movements in Zimbabwe include: the 
issue of the vanishing ink during the 2013 election, the role of NIKUV International Projects 
(an Israeli-based security company) in the election and internecine power struggles within the 
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MDC-T. It was suspected that NIKUV was working with the Registrar General to manipulate 
the voters’ roll and that the voter registration process was skewed in favour of ZANU-PF. 
One of the observed youths from the CiZC shared the post below:  
Box 29: NIKUV rigging? 
Guys it has come my attention that ZANU-PF working in cahoots with ZEC and 
Nikuv are planning to rig the election by providing voters with pens whose ink would 
vanish several hours after the voting process. I urge you to carry your pens on the 
actual day of voting. Spread the word. Remember its Feya Feya. 
Source: Facebook profile page 
It is evident from Box 29 that the rumour focused on warning voters to carry their own pens 
to the ballot box in order to circumnavigate the rigging machinery put in place by ZANU-PF 
and NIKUV. This “bogie” rumour reflected Facebook users’ anxieties about the likelihood of 
a stolen election. It prompted fearful voters to carry their own pens on the actual day of 
voting. As Rosnow & Fine (1976) observe, “ambiguity and anxiety must exist for rumours to 
flourish. There must be a demand for news on a topic and a lack of reliable information or 
hard evidence”. It is also arguable that this kind of rumour was meant to critique the official 
discourse which framed the electoral environment leading up to the plebiscite as conducive 
for a free, fair and credible election. The post elicited 68 likes, 47 comments and 13 shares 
which suggest that high levels of engagement in terms of likes and low levels with regards to 
shares. Given the polarised nature of the Zimbabwean society along party political lines 
(IMPI Report, 2014), some of the interlocutors lambasted the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission (ZEC) for favouring ZANU-PF, others criticised the MDC-T for spreading 
rumours about rigging to exonerate themselves from an impending election defeat. Some of 
the participants urged the MDC-T to boycott the elections while others pointed out that Baba 
Jukwa had already exposed plans by Nikuv to temper with the voters roll and constituency 
boundaries.  
Another rumour was circulated on the NCA Facebook page a few months before the eventual 
split between Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC-T and Tendai Biti’s MDC Renewal:  
Box 30: Rumour about political divisions within the MDC-T ahead of the 2013 election 
We have just received intel (shorthand for intelligence) to the effect that Hon Tendai Biti is 
currently running a ‘bhora musango’ (sabotage campaign) on Morgan Tsvangirai and that 
267 
 
MT (Morgan Tsvangirai) has become aware of it. The TB (Tendai Biti) faction seems to have 
lost faith in the leadership of MT and is pushing for MT to lose the next election so that he 
goes. Keep watching this space for more on the inside job of the demise of MT. 
Source: NCA Facebook page, 18 June 2013 
From the above post, it is clear that Tendai Biti (secretary general) was planning to sabotage 
Morgan Tsvangirai’s election campaign with the hopes of eventually succeeding him as the 
leader of MDC-T. Eventually following the 2013 election defeat the MDC-T imploded into 
two camps with the other faction being led by Biti. The above post illustrates that in a country 
where authoritative information is in short supply, rumour provides people with an outlet to 
break news as well as misinforming the public about political events. This is important 
especially in the Zimbabwean context where the private media has gone to bed with the main 
opposition party, the MDC-T. As scholars (Kapferer, 1990; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Ogola, 2011) 
note, rumours in authoritarian contexts are often exacerbated by the lack of credible public 
information from the free media.  
In view of the foregoing discussion, the pervasive sharing of rumours on Facebook (and other 
platforms) in Zimbabwe can be viewed as an attempt at sense-making as well as nonsense 
making. As Nyamnjoh (2005) observes, rumours can also serve the purpose of eliciting 
official denial or confirmation. Unlike the “official press, which is tedious, censored, 
uninformative, and often unintelligible” (Bourgault, 1995: 202), the entertainment and 
pleasure associated with popular culture could serve to draw historically subordinated publics 
into the realm of the political in a way that formal political debates are unable to 
(Wasserman, 2010).  
8.1.7 Gossip 
 
Gossip constitutes one of the circuits through which alternative discourses contest and engage 
with public transcripts (Scott, 1985). As defined in the previous section, gossip can be 
categorised into three types: informative, moralising and entertaining. Informative gossip is 
used for news trading and for providing participants with a cognitive map of the social 
environment (Rosnow & Fine, 1976: 130). Moralising gossip is a manipulative device 
through which one person attempts to gain social control over another. Entertaining gossip is 
primarily geared towards the mutual entertainment of the participants (Rosnow & Fine, 
1976:130).  
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Qualitative content analysis established that gossip was generally circulated on Facebook 
profile pages in Zimbabwe when compared to South Africa. Gossip rarely manifested itself 
through Facebook pages in South Africa largely because of the vibrant nature of the private 
media which acts as the fourth estate when contrasted with Zimbabwe where this circuit of 
political communication constitutes an important avenue for information transmission and 
discussion. Most of the observed respondents in Zimbabwe shared different kinds of gossip 
with their friends. Given the restrictive nature of media environment, most of the gossip 
mongering observed on Facebook in Zimbabwe was disseminated through profile walls 
rather than via public groups and fan pages. This is because gossip tends to have an “inner-
circleness” (Rosnow & Snow, 1976) about it, in that it is customarily passed between like-
minded people. Unlike rumours, the most discussed gossip issues in Zimbabwe included both 
private and confidential information like the health of the president, sexual shenanigans of 
Morgan Tsvangirai, and the death of the late Vice-President John Nkomo. Most of these 
stories were aimed at filling an information vacuum occasioned by the public media blackout. 
These rumours also filled the void created by the absence of authoritative information and the 
“rigid control of information and communication by the power elite” (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 218). 
Nyamnjoh (2005) further submits that gossip serves repressed groups as “a rebuttal of 
censorship” against “the totalitarian discourse of the Party State”, often through the display of 
an extraordinary verbal creativity’ rich in humour, parody and irony.  
Box 31 below illustrates the gossip about the most anticipated death of President Mugabe. 
Following the live-broadcast of a prophecy by a Nigerian televangelist and prophet TB 
Joshua predicting the death of an aging head of state from Southern Africa, most observed 
respondents from the YFZ and CiZC began to hypothesise that it was President Mugabe:  
Box 31: First prophecy by TB Joshua 
We should pray for one African head of state, president, against sickness that will likely take his 
life. It is a long time sickness – being kept in the body for a long time. God showed me the country 
and the place but I’m not here to say anything like that. I am still praying to God to deliver the 
president concerned. 
Source: Facebook profile page: 5 February 2012 
Then on 1st April, TB Joshua reiterated the prophecy saying:  
Box 32: Second prophecy by TB Joshua 
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Last time I said we should pray for a leader of a country and you people gave different meanings to 
what I said and I want to say, God will forgive you all. I never mentioned name or time. You can never 
stop me from saying what God has put in my heart. What I’m saying is very close now. Whether you 
like it or not, pray for your leaders. The person concerned, God showed me but I’m praying to see 
whether this can be changed. Pray for your leaders. A head of a nation, I’m seeing a sudden death as a 
result of sickness. Pray, this is Africa, not even West Africa. I will continue to bring this issue, when it 
is too close, the name, the country. Pray for your country, your continent, the whole world.  
Source: Facebook profile page 
Despite clarification from President Mugabe’s spokesperson George Charamba that the head 
of state had gone for his periodic medical reviews in Singapore, the afore-mentioned 
prophecies elicited significant levels of engagement on Facebook. For instance, the second 
prophecy garnered 123 likes, 96 comments and 21 shares. It shows that this post attracted 
high levels of interaction in terms of likes and comments while shares registered low levels. 
The post attracted a flurry of responses with some of the participants remarking that the 
prophecy was aimed at President Mugabe because of his failing health. Others went as far as 
insinuating that the prophecy mentioned the words “aging dictator”, “Southern Africa” and 
“long time sickness”.  Still other comments were less buoyant: “Guyz stop celebrating this 
TBJ guy is a cultist who can say anything to please anybody ha ha ha. If you think it’s our 
Mugabe he ain’t going nowhere”. Some comments were very celebratory: “Let the leader die 
and we celebrate l’m waiting to hear those good news Satan is waiting for him”. Other 
participants were cautious: “Give us the date time and the name of the president and or 
country. until tht comes out correct l wl never believe u TBJ”. It is evident from these 
responses that some of the discourses circulated in online platforms are not progressive
124
 at 
all but rather reactionary. 
The gossip only subsided after the release of the news that Malawian President Bingu wa 
Mutharika had died of heart attack at the state house. As pointed out by Willems (2013), 
informal means of expression like gossip are crucial channels through which ordinary people 
gain information about the formal realm of politics and also through which they express their 
views about the state. However it is important to note that an overreliance on gossip is a 
double-edged sword which can fuel misinformation as well as impoverish political 
deliberation.  
                                                          
124 Progressive politics are geared at advocating progress, change, improvement, or reform, as opposed to wishing to maintain the status quo 
and preventing different forms of disenfranchisement,  
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8.2 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has established that although there are many striking differences between the 
way Zimbabwean and South African youths use Facebook to reinvent and circulate digital 
hidden transcripts, there are also similarities. As this study has argued, these circuits of 
commentary are moments of political engagement and participation (Obadare, 2013). In other 
words, Facebook groups and pages provide novel spaces to engage with the political, “even if 
not in the form associated with the rational public sphere of official media” (Wasserman, 
2010: 85). This is because Facebook opens up spaces where young people with access to the 
internet are able to “to articulate their opinions and desires, perform their identities, present 
the unsaid, circulate information and negotiate the meaning of political and cultural issues in 
their lives” (Ligaga, 2012: 2). The chapter has also demonstrated that jokes, rumours and 
gossip are mostly [re]invented and circulated in Zimbabwe when compared to South Africa 
due to the repressive nature of the media environment. There are also similarities in terms of 
the kinds of subvertisements aimed at critiquing public institutions and political parties in 
both countries. Unlike in Zimbabwe, online observations have revealed that online petitions 
are generally deployed as a “repertoire of digital contention” in South Africa. This indicates 
that youths are mobilising outside of the political system. Unlike youth activists from 
Zimbabwe who distributed online petitions which can be catergorised as digital hidden 
transcripts, those from South Africa circulated digital public transcripts aimed at mobilising 
people to take action against pressing societal concerns. Out of the six movements studied, 
only PASSOP Afrika (in South Africa) and YFZ (in Zimbabwe) posted and shared letters 
addressed to public representatives as a way of engaging with the political system. In contrast 
with the South African case, some of the letters circulated by youths in Zimbabwe were 
framed in sensationalist and humorous language which allowed them to transgress boundaries 
of public speech. Although cartoons were circulated in in both countries, it was clear that 
respondents from South Africa regurgitated professionally generated content (cartoons) 
sourced from the mainstream private media when compared to their Zimbabwean 
counterparts who circulated photoshopped images with no attribution. This shows that in 
South Africa use Facebook to circulate mostly public transcripts whereas those in Zimbabwe 
utilise the site to circumvent state surveillance through sharing anonymous memes. It is clear 
that cartoons (either professionally or user generated) were used for the purpose of frame 
amplification. 
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This chapter also contradicts mainstream literature which presents online forums as 
inherently democratic and progressive. It has argued that reactionary and hegemonic 
discourses are also amplified thereby validating the notion that online forums are double-
edged swords. As such, this alerts us not to uncritically celebrate popular culture as a space of 
agency and resistance without engaging with its contents and texts. The chapter has 
demonstrated that digital hidden transcripts enable the youths to transgress the “exclusionary 
norms of the bourgeois public [sphere], elaborating alternative styles of political behaviour 
and alternative norms of public speech” (Fraser, 1992: 116). As such, these circuits of 
political discussion have many similarities with Bakardjieva’s (2010) notion of 
“subactivism125” as well as Bayat’s (2010: 56) “quiet encroachment” outside formal political 
channels. For Bayat (2010), these “the politics of informal people” in non-Western contexts 
foreground how youth activists, through their individual everyday actions, not only resist but 
also gradually conquer new space from dominant groups and undermine the capacity of the 
state to exercise surveillance. Miller et al (2016) describe these “quiet enchroachments” as 
“passive participation” which denotes the tendency to criticise things in a more resigned way.  
The next chapter discusses the conclusion and summary of the empirical and theoretical 
contributions of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
125 This is a kind of politics that unfolds at the level of subjective experience and is submerged in the flow of everyday life. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
 
9. Introduction 
 
The main objective of this study was to examine how and why youth activists in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa use Facebook to mediate political action. This chapter wraps up this study 
by discussing and analysing some of the major findings in relation to the research questions I 
set out to answer. I specifically focus on the summary of the empirical and theoretical 
contributions to the discipline as well as identify possible areas for future research. The 
chapter also offer practical recommendations.  
 
Compared to some previous studies (Gerbaudo, 2012; Lim, 2012) on social media and 
political activism which have been driven by events (like the Arab Spring, Occupy 
Movement and Spanish Indignados), this qualitative comparative study (small-N analysis) 
represents one of the few studies to empirically investigate how and why youth activists in 
democratic and authoritarian contexts utilise Facebook for political purposes. This study can 
also be viewed as partly an answer to Everatt’s (2014) insightful observation that one the 
most glaring weaknesses in youth research in Africa is the lack of comparative research. 
Although scholars (Yin, 2003; Stake, 2003) hail single-case studies for their ability to 
generate rich data based on extensive examination of cases, it is important to emphasise that a 
comparative case study offers a more abstract explanation that can inform scholarly 
knowledge beyond a particular case. As Hallin & Mancini (2004: 2) observe, “most literature 
on media is highly ethnocentric, in the sense that it refers only to the experience of a single 
country, yet it is written in general terms, as the though the model that prevailed in that 
country were universal”. Enlightening as it might be in its own right, a single-case design 
“would not allow [me] to draw this kind of general conclusion because there is no variation in 
the context in which the case unfolds” (Voltmer & Kraetzschmar, 2015: 13). In view of these 
methodological considerations, this study combined the most similar and most different 
system designs (see Chapter Four). The study was concerned with answering the following 
four set of questions:  
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 How and why do politically engaged youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa deploy 
Facebook to mediate political action?  
 How do discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation play out on 
Facebook groups and pages used by youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa? 
 To what extent, if any, do Facebook groups and pages constitute alternative spaces for 
political activism for youths in Zimbabwe and South Africa?  
 What kind of political discourses are being circulated by Zimbabwean and South 
African youths on Facebook? 
 
In order to generate empirical answers for the afore-mentioned questions, this study 
triangulated qualitative and quantitative data, although it is predominantly rooted in 
qualitative research tradition. Three data collection tools (online participant observation 
(social media ethnography), qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews) were 
deployed to capture the perspectives and experiences of Zimbabwean and South African 
youths on how and why they appropriate Facebook to facilitate political activism (see 
Chapter Four). As discussed in Chapter Four, social media ethnography involved immersing 
myself in Facebook groups and pages, learning about posting behaviours, and then producing 
first-hand accounts based on personal observation (Postill & Pink, 2012). This was important 
because it enabled me to make sense of the levels of participation as well as to document the 
various kinds of digital public and hidden transcripts circulated on Facebook in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa. 
 
9.1 Empirical contribution 
 
9.1.1 How are youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa using Facebook for 
political purposes? 
 
Chapter Five focused on how youth activists from a range of social movements in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa used Facebook to mediate political action. Overall, interviews and online 
participant observations revealed that there are several similarities between Zimbabwean and 
South African youth activists in their localised usage of Facebook for political purposes, with 
the most significant differences emanating from the ways these actors deployed this medium 
to facilitate traditional forms of political participation. The study has established that 
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respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa appropriated Facebook to address their political 
objectives like: the dissemination of information, social and political mobilisation, 
advertising of upcoming events, recruiting more supporters, everyday political talk, venues of 
political action, crowd-funding and online donations, contacting and interfacing with political 
representatives and as a source of alternative political information. To a certain extent, these 
findings are similar to usage patterns identified in international contexts (Gerbaudo, 2012; 
Lim, 2014; Storsul, 2014). This further indicates that social media have become an important 
platform for young people to participate in political activities. 
 
Chapter Five has demonstrated that South African youths are deploying extra-parliamentary 
platforms like Facebook to engage in alternative forms of political participation whereas their 
Zimbabwean counterparts used the same site to facilitate traditional forms of political 
participation. In Bennett’s (2008) conceptualisation, this means that South African youth 
activists are using Facebook to engage in “self-actualising forms of citizenship” whilst 
Zimbabweans are appropriating it to advance “dutiful forms of citizenship”. For instance, 
most interviewees from the social movements observed that Facebook functioned as a 
backchannel to engage with mediatised political events like election debates, public meetings 
and talk shows hosted by the mainstream media. In contrast, South African youths used 
Facebook to amplify existing off-line forms of collective action. These country-specific 
discrepancies in usage patterns are attributable to variations in socio-political and media 
contexts.   
 
In comparison to South African youths who relied on traditional media for news and 
information, this study has found that respondents from Zimbabwe also deployed Facebook 
as a source of news and political information alternative to state propaganda. Dissimilarities 
in terms of how situated youth activists used various forms of media to source political 
information and news suggest that context matters. As scholars (Dahlgren, 2009; Nyamnjoh, 
2005) observe, everyday appropriations of available ICTs may differ according to variations 
in socio-political contexts. In the case of Zimbabwe and South Africa, it is also evident that 
the political uses of Facebook are shaped by local conditions rather than pre-determined by 
the medium.   
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This study has found that some of the Zimbabwean and South African youth activists 
leveraged the connectivity of the internet to crowd-fund and solicit for online donations so as 
to complement existing traditional financing models. This supports Agre’s (2002) 
amplification thesis which holds that new media technologies build on and extend existing 
communication structures in communities rather than putting into place a completely new 
communication structure. Besides providing access to a large audience, Facebook made it 
possible for respondents to tag, create event pages, to attach posters, pamphlets and invitation 
cards as well as to send private invitations to their supporters. As such, Facebook allowed 
respondents in both transitional societies to subvert the structural limitations (space 
limitations and distribution problems) associated with the traditional media.  
 
As intimated earlier, marked differences were observable in terms of how respondents in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa used Facebook to engage in traditional forms of political 
participation. Chapter Five has argued that contrary to South African youths who deployed 
Facebook to “like” specific causes and to join interest groups, their Zimbabwean counterparts 
used the site to contact and interact with what Fenton (2012) calls “transparent126” politicians 
and political parties. This might be explained by the fact that the two countries have different 
electoral systems. Whereas Zimbabwe deploys a hybrid system (both the candidate and party-
centred), South Africa uses the proportional representation (party-centred) system (see Shale 
& Matlosa, 2013; Hodzi, 2014a). Although contacting and interfacing with political leaders 
via their Facebook pages can be viewed as signifying the rejuvenation of traditional forms of 
citizenship amongst Zimbabwean youths, it is important to highlight that the creators and 
administrators of these “invited spaces of [mediated] participation” (Cornwall, 2002) retain 
the “dictatorial power in selecting participants, allowing certain comments and cutting off or 
silencing others” (Bakardjieva, 2008: 293). This means that most politicians have not yet 
incorporated “democratic listening across difference” (Bickford, 1996: 15; Dreher, 2009) into 
their online deliberation which encapsulates ceding control over political communication in 
favour of interactive and reciprocal relationship with citizens. 
 
From the findings, Facebook pages and groups functioned as a training ground for agitational 
activities directed at the wider public. Notwithstanding similarities, striking differences were 
also witnessed across the two case nations with regards to how youth activists used Facebook 
                                                          
126 Those who are easily and readily available to engage in discussion with their constituencies via social media platforms 
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for mobilisation purposes. For instance, respondents in Zimbabwe appropriated Facebook to 
mobilise first time voters and their peers to go out and inspect their names on the voters roll 
as well as to go and cast their votes during the referendum and harmonised election in 2013, 
whereas South African interviewees acknowledged using the site to mobilise their 
constituencies to engage in street action. These differences can be explained by the “election 
year effect” in Zimbabwe especially in 2012 and 2013 which saw many youths using 
Facebook to engage in conventional politics.  
 
Findings from the South African case suggest that youths are generally mobilising politically, 
but “outside of the political system” (Sloam, 2012). With regards to the Zimbabwean youth, 
they used Facebook in order “to circumvent the structural challenges that inhibited them from 
registering as voters, verifying their voter registration details and obtaining essential 
information about where they should vote and their nearest polling station” (Hodzi, 2014a: 
55). Thus the usage of Facebook for mobilisation purposes varies from country to country as 
well as organisation to organisation as they are largely influenced by the socio-political 
context. As Fuchs (2016) aptly puts it, contemporary social media is a field of power 
struggles, in which dominant actors command a large share of economic, political and 
ideological media power that can be challenged by alternative actors [including youth 
activists] that have less resources, visibility and attention, but try to make the best use of the 
unequal share of media power they are confronted with in order to fight against the dominant 
powers. These findings alert us to be wary of the technological determinism which overlooks 
the unpredictable ways in which the wider societal context and technology are mutually 
implicated.   
 
Both online observations and in-depth interviews highlighted that most of the respondents 
used Facebook as “a site for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle 
be critical of the state” (Fraser, 1997: 70). Most Facebook pages and groups of the six social 
movements studied served as repositories of press statements, position papers, shadow 
reports and protest pictures. Chapter Five has also revealed that most youths in both case 
nations were using Facebook to broadcast information rather than dialogue about it. In light 
of this observation, it appears reasonable to submit that most youth activists have not 
internalised the interactive nature of social media, hence their posting behaviour can be best 
described as “politics as usual” (Margolis & Resnick, 2000).  
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Some of the respondents utilised the site to micro-blog public meetings and events. This 
practice of micro-blogging was instrumental in going around the limits of traditional 
communication channels thereby bridging physical distances. In the Zimbabwean case where 
mass migration has dislocated the activist community, micro-blogging on Facebook 
illustrates that “contextual factors have a strong bearing on the uses of the technologies 
resulting in localised appropriations” (Mabweazara, 2010: 229). This practice demonstrates 
that respondents in both countries are able to contextualise and appropriate ICTs to meet their 
own needs and priorities in response to local dynamics and historical conditions (Rodriguez, 
Ferron & Shamas, 2014; Nyamnjoh, 1999).  
 
Facebook pages and groups also provided venues for everyday political talk for Zimbabwean 
and South African youth activists. It allowed them to overcome the limitations of inter-
personal communication and spatial distance. Unlike in South Africa where debate was much 
more open and critical on Facebook, respondents in Zimbabwe indicated that the threat of 
state surveillance and regulations governing internet and mobile phone usage had a “chilling 
effect” on online conversations on public Facebook pages (see Chapter Five). This shows that 
in a political context permeated by a culture of fear and intimidation political conversations 
on Facebook closely resembles “authoritarian deliberation” (He, 2006). Whereas political 
conversations on Facebook in Zimbabwe were highly polarised along political affiliation and 
party political faction lines, in South Africa they tended to be polarised along racial lines. 
From the findings, it can be argued that off-line societal cracks and crevices are often 
replicated or even magnified on social media. In the same vein, Mutsvairo (2016) reminds us 
that, it is too early to celebrate the “normalisation of protest” (Norris, Walgrave & van Aelst, 
2005) in undemocratic political contexts where there is a heavy price to pay for disobeying 
state-sponsored orders. Because of the existent culture of fear and mistrust of conventional 
political discussions, youth activists in Zimbabwe are hesistant to fully embrace the 
“potential” and “opportunities” created by new media technologies.  
 
 
Unlike some experienced South African youth activists who deployed Blackberry mobile 
phones, encrypted emails, secret Google and WhatsApp groups when discussing sensitive 
organisational issues, their Zimbabwean counterparts indicated that they used pseudonyms, 
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private messaging systems, face-to-face communication, shorthand codes and fake accounts 
to post and share sensitive political issues on Facebook. This means that the fear or threat of 
state surveillance is forcing youth activists in Zimbabwe to change their communication 
practices as well as avoiding certain features of Facebook like walls, commenting on public 
groups and so forth. This support findings from earlier studies (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 207; Poell, 
2014), which show that given the flexible nature of the internet, real identities of users can be 
hidden under ambiguous usernames, making provocative and fearless exchanges more 
possible. These practices show that youth activists in democratic and non-democratic 
contexts display remarkable ingenuity in overcoming the obstacles put in their way by state 
and technology-capitalism complex.   
 
Chapter Five also indicated that respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa deployed 
Facebook as “bases for agitational activities directed at the wider public” (Fraser, 1992). 
Compared to South African youths who used Facebook as a vehicle to call for off-line 
collective actions, some of the Zimbabwean respondents utilised the site to perform what 
Bennett & Segerberg (2012) call “personalised connective actions”. This means that 
respondents in Zimbabwe used Facebook to engage in profile and cover picture activism. 
Given the personalised nature of these activities and the failure to activate friends and friends 
of friends’ emotions in the absence of an iconic figure, this kind of everyday forms of 
resistance in Zimbabwe failed to transform into off-line collective action. It also shows that 
respondents in Zimbabwe are resorting to “biographical solutions to structural problems” 
(Couldry, 2010: 113). Unlike in Zimbabwe, cyber-activism in South Africa where there is a 
vibrant protest culture was deployed as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. This 
finding resonates with the political opportunity structure theory which suggests that 
opportunities for protests and other types of extra-institutional activities often are greater in 
more open and liberalised environments (like South Africa) where governments tolerate 
protests and thereby the costs to collective action are lower (see Tarrow 1998).  
 
Findings from the Zimbabwean case debunk the cyber-optimistic claims that Facebook is the 
place where the fearful of the world can overcome their fear and unite to fight against the 
oppressive power structures (see Castells, 2011). Interview responses in Zimbabwe revealed 
that youth activists are generally afraid to use Facebook to call for off-line collective action. 
These responses suggest that it is difficult to construct a sense of trust online in authoritarian 
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contexts (Tarrow, 1998; Gerbaudo, 2012). They also counter Gladwell’s (2010) over-
simplified argument that Facebook activism demands low-risk participation. The 
Zimbabwean case therefore reminds us that online activism is equally a high risk undertaking 
just like its off-line counterpart.  
 
9.1.2 Why are Zimbabwean and South African youths utilising Facebook for political 
purposes? 
 
Chapter Six outlined the reasons why youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa use 
Facebook to facilitate political action. The study revealed that what determined technology 
use in Zimbabwe and South Africa were localised and historical information and 
communication needs rather than simply the structural features of the medium. Besides 
striking similarities, the study also found that reasons vary considerably within and across 
social movements and countries studied. From the interviews, four broad reasons were 
mentioned: social and technical affordances of the technology, lack of political space, limited 
access to the mainstream mediated public sphere and the demonstration effect of the Arab 
Spring.  
 
In terms of similarities, almost all the respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa indicated 
that they preferred Facebook because of the various potentialities it offered towards 
answering their local-specific political objectives. They cited architectural features like 
groups, private messaging, chat system, Facebook events, notes, newsfeed, privacy settings 
and video call as enabling them to sidestep the limitations of other media platforms. Most of 
the respondents observed that they preferred Facebook because of its flexible privacy settings 
which allowed them to control who can have access to their online conversations. These 
similarities in terms of the reasons behind the deployment of Facebook for political purposes 
in both transitional societies suggest that conventions have been established as to how to 
appropriate the existing features of the site.  
 
The study also found that compared to South Africa, respondents in Zimbabwe observed that 
they utilised Facebook mainly because of lack of political space. Narratives from interviews 
showed that most youths in Zimbabwe have resorted to creating their own spaces of political 
discussion as a way of circumventing the exclusionary nature of the mediated public sphere 
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and the state. In the Zimbabwean case, the fragmentation of the political space is largely due 
to the criminalisation of street demonstrations and public gatherings as well as political 
restrictions. In South Africa, deep-seated social inequalities, repressive policing of 
community protests, the abuse of the Regulation of Gatherings Act by municipalities and 
over-commercialisation of the private media have cumulatively contributed to the shrinkage 
of spaces for democratic participation. These findings indicate that Facebook is used to go 
around the structural limitations associated with the off-line space. As Chapters Six and 
Seven have illustrated, it is important to highlight that all [virtual and physical] spaces have 
their own structural limitations. As Voltmer (2013: 16) highlights, although new media 
technologies open up new opportunities of organising collective action, they are almost 
always accompanied by new constraints and particular disadvantages. This is because 
although Facebook enabled youth activists “to create the own spaces” (Fraser, 1992), findings 
of this study have also shown that these spaces expose them to massive state and corporate 
surveillance.   
 
Another reason cited for the use of Facebook for political purposes by most respondents in 
both countries related to the lack of access to the mainstream media. Unlike Zimbabwean 
respondents who indicated that they lacked access to the mainstream public sphere, whilst 
some interviewees from South Africa observed that that they had limited access to the 
mainstream media. This means that youth activists used Facebook to circumvent the political 
and economic restrictions bedevilling the mainstream media in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
Following Fraser’s (1992) insightful ideas, it can be argued that Facebook allowed youth 
activists “to enter the [online] public sphere on their own terms by representing themselves”. 
This finding corroborates one of the assumptions of this study that youths who lack 
meaningful political voice in the mainstream mediated public sphere often resort to Facebook 
[and other social media platforms] as an alternative communication channel (Lim, 2014). 
Therefore understanding the reasons why youth activists are using new media technologies in 
Africa requires “a firm commitment to contextualising the concept within a broader and 
diverse framework that underpins the continent’s cultural, economic, geo-political and 
historical backgrounds” (Mutsvairo, 2016: 12).  
 
Chapter Six also found that respondents from both countries deployed a wide array of 
available communication platforms like WhatsApp groups, Google groups, Twitter, word of 
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mouth, mobile phones, mailing lists, community meetings, pamphlets, posters, newspapers 
and radio and so forth. This suggests that rather than assuming that youth activists utilise 
single technologies to mediate political action, there is need to pay attention to the ways 
hybrid media infrastructures are appropriated in different historical contexts. Such an 
acknowledgment helps us to shy away from promoting the “myth of the mediated centre” 
(Couldry, 2003) as well as fetishising single technologies (Segerberg & Bennett, 2011) 
through flagging terms like “Facebook revolutions”. This is precisely because digital and 
non-digital as well as new and old forms of media intersect and complement each other in 
complex and capricious ways. It also re-affirms views by the communication and media 
ecology scholars (Foth & Hearn, 2007; Tacchi et al, 2003) that situated communicators use 
available multiple forms of media platforms with varying potentialities to address different 
needs in historical and local contexts. Youth activists use diverse forms of media to subvert 
dominant social, economic and cultural codes in order to get their messages across to a 
broader spectrum of citizens. As Wasserman (2014) adds, the potential of social media to 
facilitate political action should be evaluated within the wider media ecology and in relation 
to other social spheres of influence.  
 
Some of the respondents indicated that the “demonstration effect” of Arab Spring had 
significantly influenced their appropriation of Facebook for political action in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. They observed that they had incorporated Facebook into their repertoires of 
contention after learning about their use during the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement. 
This indicates that repertoires of contention are often borrowed from other political contexts 
without necessarily being influenced by local needs. The diffusion of these repertoires of 
communication highlights the fact that when activists realise that a certain tool has been 
successfully appropriated in another context they are more likely to borrow it. This reliance 
on imported repertoires of contention also explains the reason why some of the observed 
Facebook pages had a lot of fans but were characterised by low levels of engagement and 
limited dialogical communication (see Chapter Seven). This suggests limited appreciation of 
the interactive features of the medium. 
 
9.1.3 The discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation on Facebook groups 
and pages 
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Chapter Seven shows that the intra-public relations within the six Facebook pages and groups 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa. It established that societal inequalities infects Facebook 
pages and groups and taints the discursive interaction within them (see Fraser, 1990). For 
instance, it was observed that NGO-oriented movements (CiZC, R2K Campaign, PASSOP 
Afrika, NCA and YFZ) in Zimbabwe and South Africa had the most number of fans when 
compared to grassroots organisations (like the UPM). This means that that donor-funded 
social movements which are generally popular in the physical world also “enjoy an oligopoly 
of the publicistically effective and politically relevant formation of assemblies and 
associations” (Habermas, 1989: 228) in the online public sphere.  
 
Facebook pages and groups do not promote the ideal of equal participation. As articulated in 
Chapter Seven, social movements (like R2K Campaign, CiZC and YFZ) with predominantly 
urban and middle class members who are also literate in English and highly connected on the 
internet had the most postings when compared to grassroots movements with a working class 
and rural membership. Findings also show that movements (R2K Campaign and YFZ) with a 
youth-oriented membership base with access to broadband and mobile internet had the most 
interactive Facebook pages and groups than those organisations (the UPM, PASSOP Africa 
and NCA) whose membership are from the working class and unemployed youth segment of 
the population. This suggests that access to the internet shapes the nature and quality of 
participation on Facebook pages and groups. It also reinforces the view that “interlocutors do 
not set aside social inequalities and speak to one another as if they were social and economic 
peers” (Fraser, 1992) on Facebook. This indicates that those social groups who lack equal 
access to the material means of equal participation are excluded from the discursive 
interactions on Facebook or at worst restricted passive forms of usage such as liking without 
commenting, reading without commenting and sharing without commenting.  
 
As Chapter Seven has shown, professionally generated content (like mainstream news links) 
was mostly posted on all the Facebook pages and groups when compared to original user 
generated content. This finding contradicts the notion of “produsage” (Bruns, 2008) which 
informs most literature on social media and political activism from Western contexts. In 
contrast to Bruns’s concept, this study has proposed the use of sharing and forwarding 
“agents” to refer to people who engage in the systematic regurgitation of mainstream media 
content on Facebook pages and groups. Because of the economic and cultural capital 
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associated with making full use of the potentials offered by Facebook, most of the 
respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa find it difficult to graduate into “produsers” 
(Bruns, 2008).  
 
As this study has demonstrated, postings dealing with international causes attracted 
insignificant levels of engagement when compared with those focusing on national or local 
causes in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This indicates that youth activists in both countries 
use Facebook to connect with local causes rather than international struggles. Online 
observations established that humorous postings (like jokes, cartoons, memes and so forth) 
generated significant levels of engagement when compared with “serious” postings (political 
news, press statements and so forth) in both countries. As Zuckerman (2013) observes, 
messages that are funny are more likely to invite participation and amplification. In-depth 
interviews with some respondents from Zimbabwe revealed that insignificant levels of 
engagement on Facebook pages and groups may be deceptive because they often resorted to 
chat and private messaging to discuss sensitive political issues. This finding suggests that 
solely focusing our attention on qualitative analysis of discursive interactions on public 
Facebook pages may actually miss out on private interactions that occur via the inbox and 
chat in authoritarian contexts.  
 
Chapter Seven has shown that discursive interactions on Facebook pages and groups in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa tended to operate to the advantage of other groups and to the 
disadvantage of others (see Fraser, 1992). Online participant observations revealed that 
discussion threads on Zimbabwean and South African Facebook pages and groups were 
dominated by a minority group of participants. Whereas white participants dominated online 
conversations on Facebook in South Africa, in Zimbabwe black participants were dominant. 
In both countries, male participants were generally more participative on Facebook pages and 
groups when compared to their female counterparts. Most of these Facebook pages can 
therefore be viewed as gendered, racialised and classed spaces. This confirms Fraser’s view 
that “participatory privileges are enjoyed by members of dominant social groups” (1997: 82). 
As Chapter Seven has illustrated, participants on Facebook cannot deliberate as if they are 
social equals “when these discursive arenas [pages and groups] are situated in a larger 
societal context that is pervaded by structural relations of dominance and subordination” 
(Fraser, 1992: 65). Findings from both case nations suggest that Facebook “can entrench or 
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exacerbate unequal gendered or classed power relations (Etzo & Collender, 2010: 660). This 
corroborates the view that participation on Facebook ushers in an era of leetocracy, where a 
small tech-savvy elite gain influence at the expense of the majority (Gustafsson, 2013). 
 
Facebook pages and groups are infected by “informal impediments to participatory parity that 
can persist even after everyone is formally and legally licensed to participate” (Fraser, 1992: 
63). Besides the political economy of access to social media, cultural factors like language 
differences also militated against equal participation on Facebook as non-English language 
speakers were excluded from the conversations (see Chapter Seven). Thus, language remains 
a political fault-line in multi-cultural and stratified societies which hampers mutual 
comprehension. As Fraser (1992) observes, “the language people use as they reason together 
usually favours one way of seeing things and discourages others”. In this regard, I concur 
with Habermas’s (1989: 22) that “participants do not always have the same cultural capital 
for participating in [online] public sphere”.   
 
From the findings, it emerged that Facebook groups (UPM and YFZ) are characterised by 
“strong publics” while Facebook pages (R2K Campaign, CiZC, PASSOP Afrika and NCA) 
are populated by “weak publics” (Fraser, 1992) in Zimbabwe and South Africa. This is 
because the former promoted active participation whilst the latter privileged reactive 
participation. Facebook pages users can only comment on posts initiated by administrators 
while on groups anyone can initiate a post and comment on other posts (see Chapter Seven). 
 
As the findings indicate, some of the formal impediments to equal participation on Facebook 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa included: the cost of the internet and technologies, lack of 
digital literacy and skills, lack of time, the structural features of the medium, fear of state 
communication surveillance (mostly in Zimbabwe), lack of the required linguistic capital (in 
South Africa) and the architectural design of the medium. In terms of the design of the 
medium, scholars (Dahlgren, 2013; Freelon, 2015) have observed that technological features 
can powerfully influence both the form and content of civic discussion although users retain 
some degree of agency. Although Facebook is associated with the “reducation of 
participation costs” (Garret, 2006: 204), it is important to reiterate that structural factors such 
as the pervasive culture of fear and mistrust can also hinder people from taking advantage of 
the potential of the platform. 
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Chapter Seven has argued that Facebook pages and pages are arenas of micro-politics of 
participation as well as “sites of power” (Lefebvre, 1991; Foucault, 1995). For instance, 
Facebook as a corporate social media entity retains the power to engage in both legitimate 
and illegitimate forms of content restrictions. Facebook pages and groups can also be 
interpreted as “culturally specific rhetorical lenses that [algorithmically] filter and alter the 
utterances they frame; they can accommodate some expressive modes and not others” 
(Fraser, 1992: 68). As such, Facebook’s opaque and centralised control of its code and 
architecture is incompatible with the idea of democratic participation and ownership. The 
interactive and participatory character of Facebook communications does not mean social 
media platforms are inherently horizontal spaces (Gerbaudo, 2016). This is because Facebook 
pages are in fact characterised by a strong hierarchy in which leadership, far from being 
eliminated, acquires new forms (Gerbaudo, 2012).  
 
The study has established that Facebook exercises “subtle forms of control” (Fraser, 1992) 
via ownership, algorithms and acceptable use policies (see Chapter Seven). Thus contrary to 
cyber-optimists’ (Shirky, 2008; Diamond, 2010) hyperbolic views that social media platforms 
are characterised by democratic and symmetrical participation, Chapter Seven has illustrated 
that users of Facebook have no control over platform changes (like privacy settings, 
surveillance of data and value ranking algorithms). Apart from this “control divide” 
(Dahlberg, 2015) between platform owners and users, Chapter Seven has also argued that 
Facebook pages and groups are also permeated by other forms of control which are exercised 
by creators and administrators. Interviews with Facebook administrators in Zimbabwe 
indicated that they engaged in gatekeeping practices like censoring by deletion, censoring by 
hiding and censoring by blocking whilst those in South Africa mentioned that they adopted a 
hands-off approach (gatewatching) to content filtering and moderation. As Dahlgren (2005) 
notes, internally social movement organisations strive for some consensus that ends up 
silencing other minority voices within the groups. With the exception of the UPM and YFZ 
Facebook groups which filtered who can become their member on the site, the other four 
public Facebook pages allowed participants to “like” them as part of joining. Similarly, 
Chiumbu (2015: 15) argues that “media production is not often democratic, communication is 
not always non-hierarchical and power to facilitate coordinated and collective action not 
evenly redistributed.”  
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Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South Africa are not “spaces of zero degree 
culture, equally hospitable to any possible form of cultural expression” (Fraser, 1992: 68). 
This means that Facebook is not a discursive space that is neutral, with no acceptable use 
policies or established norms that determine how interaction occurs. Algorithms introduce 
new obstacles in the quest for accountability and transparency in consequential gatekeeping 
(Tufecki, 2015: 208-9). As the Zimbabwean case show, Facebook administrators determine 
the rules of the game as well as the [un]acceptable modes of participation. This affirms the 
view that “producers, with a capital “P,” are not that easily overthrown by scattered 
produsers’ participatory practices” (Olsson & Svensson, 2012: 41) on Facebook groups and 
pages. Similarly, Moyo (2012) argues that participation is generally regulated and therefore 
exclusive and undemocratic. Although there are similarities between traditional editorial and 
algorithmic gatekeeping, editing in the latter is dynamic, invisible and individually tailored 
(Tufecki, 2015). 
 
It important to note that these platforms also engender an ambivalent situation which 
Marcuse (1964/2007) calls “democratic unfreedom”. According to Marcuse (1964/2007), 
“democratic unfreedom” denotes the free acceptance of oppression and surplus repression. It 
underscores the double-edged nature of communication on social media platforms, where 
despite the aura of democratic participation these platforms are constrained and conditioned 
by algorithms and socio-political and cultural factors. In the same vein, Curran (2002) 
foregrounds the contradictory character of contemporary [social] media. He argues that there 
are “eleven main factors that encourage the media to support dominant power interests” 
(Curran, 2002: 148), but “the [social] media are also subject to countervailing pressures 
which can pull potentially in the other direction” (Curran, 2002: 15). The major argument 
here is that Facebook like other media platforms can best be viewed dialectically: it is subject 
to elite control, but has the potential for acting as and being influenced by counter-powers 
that question elite control (Fuchs, 2016).  
 
9.1.4. To what extent, if at all, do Facebook groups and pages constitute alternative 
spaces for political activism? 
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This study has established that all the Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa can be understood as alternative public spheres because they allow for the expression 
of other forms of debate and deliberation of common issues when compared to those 
privileged by the mainstream media. Besides rational-critical debate which is deified by 
Habermas’s public sphere theory as the sine qua non of political deliberation, other forms of 
debating like agnostic confrontation, emotional engagement and carnivalesque (ironic 
playfulness, humour and satire) expressions were pronounced on Facebook in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. As scholars (Bickford, 2011: 1027; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2015) reminds us, 
emotion and rationality are not necessarily entwined – and they have been separated in the 
history of Western political thought – but nor are they necessarily antagonistic. Given that 
Facebook groups and pages constitute arenas in which groups with diverse values and 
rhetorics participate, online observations revealed that some of these forums constituted 
battlegrounds on which different ideas were confronted, without any possibility of final 
reconciliation (see Mouffe, 2005). It is the argument of this study that political participation 
on Facebook is largely driven by alternative styles of political debate that run counter to 
Habermas’s liberal democratic theory.  
 
Based on the analysis of discussion threads and online membership statistics, Facebook pages 
and groups in both countries cannot be viewed as counter-public spheres in the sense that 
other participants than are excluded and marginalised from the discussions forums. For 
example, other races (whites and Indians) were excluded from discussions on Facebook in 
Zimbabwe. In South Africa, black participants were also marginalised from the online 
forums. Rural and female participants were generally excluded from the deliberative arenas 
in both case nations. As such, Facebook is implicated in the reproduction of “structural 
elitism” (Örnebring & Jönsson, 2004) associated with the mainstream media.  
 
Chapter Seven has highlighted that only two Facebook pages and groups (the PASSOP 
Afrika in South Africa and the NCA in Zimbabwe) can be conceptualised as alternative 
spheres of political activism because they were open to the circulation of “counter-
discourses” (Fraser, 1992). This entails disseminating information on topics, which the state 
and capitalist media tended to neglect. The two Facebook pages and groups were also 
dissimilar from others because they allowed their administrators and fans to critique the 
unequal power relations, name and shame corrupt officials and expose inconsistencies in 
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government policies. The other four Facebook pages and groups in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa could not be viewed as alternative spheres because they were characterised by the 
systemic regurgitation of professionally generated content. The findings therefore counter the 
cyber-optimists’ view that social media are sites for the circulation of marginalised social 
content. 
 
Facebook groups and pages cannot be viewed as alternative public spheres because the site is 
heavily embedded in corporate capitalism (Fuchs, 2013; Dahlberg, 2015). Because Facebook 
cannot be separated from corporate and political powers, it is difficult for activists to create 
autonomous spaces which are ring-fenced from surveillance and censorship. Like the 
mainstream media, Facebook’s bottom line is to ensure profit maximisation for its 
shareholders. As Dahlberg (2015) notes, preferential treatment on Facebook is given to those 
voices (like corporate advertisers and celebrities) that offer more to the company in terms of 
driving revenues. This promotes the “visibility divide” which results in voices of those with 
little (like grassroots activists) to offer to platform owners being rendered invisible through 
the strategic manipulation of value ranking algorithms (Dahlberg, 2015). The net result is that 
activists who cannot afford to “promote” and “boost” their content experience limited 
visibility and reach.  
 
9.1.5 What kinds of political discourses are circulated on Facebook by Zimbabwean and 
South African youths? 
 
The study has established that youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa circulate 
different kinds of hidden transcripts like political jokes, gossip, rumours, subvertisements, 
letter addressed to political representatives, online petitions and political cartoons. These 
findings indicate that the various types of hidden transcripts identified by Scott (1985) which 
are circulated by subordinate groups (like peasants and slaves) in off-line spaces against the 
ruling elite needs to be modified in order to make sense of digital hidden transcripts shared on 
online spaces. As Chapter Eight has shown, digital hidden transcripts like letters addressed to 
political representatives, online petitions, subvertisements and political cartoons have been 
grafted into Scott’s (1985) insightful typology. These actually occurring practices constitute 
what Fraser (1992) calls “alternative styles of political behaviour” which are sprouting at the 
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margins of the formal political system, especially in extra-parliamentary spaces like 
Facebook. 
Chapter Eight has illustrated that digital hidden transcripts are mostly circulated in political 
and media restrictive contexts like Zimbabwe when contrasted with liberal-democratic 
settings like South Africa where a culture of open and vibrant debate are still practiced 
despite the deep-seated social inequalities which makes it difficult for subaltern voices to 
impact the policy-making sphere. Qualitative content analysis indicated that in South Africa 
most of the respondents shared public transcripts (mainstream media content) on public 
Facebook pages. As pointed out earlier, these variations can be explained by the fact that 
traditional media systems in both countries are different (see Chapter Two). In light of the 
above, it makes sense to concur with the view that in political contexts (like in Zimbabwe) 
where spaces of opinion formation are repressed, Facebook can “potentially facilitate 
activists to form subaltern counter-publics needed in the fostering of hidden transcripts” 
(Lim, 2014: 58). 
Unlike South African youth activists who circulated political discourses such as cartoons, 
online petitions, subvertisements, jokes and letters addressed political representatives on 
public Facebook pages, in Zimbabwe most of the observed respondents shared digital hidden 
transcripts (like cartoons, jokes, gossip, rumour and subvertisements) on their private 
Facebook profile walls. This suggests that respondents in Zimbabwe are subverting 
circumventing the structural limitations of Facebook by inventively circulating their 
alternative ways of political expression through personal profile walls. Compared to their 
South African counterparts, the study observed that Zimbabwean respondents preferred to tag 
and share political memes and cartoons with their off-line “friends” rather than distributing 
them via Facebook public groups and pages. It is arguable therefore that spreading of 
political discourses in authoritarian settings occurs among friends or trusted others rather than 
with complete strangers.    
Findings of this study also show that some of the digital hidden transcripts (such as political 
jokes, cartoons and subvertisements) circulated in Zimbabwe and South Africa served to 
legitimise, naturalise, and mystify dominant discourses. Rather than simply critiquing 
oppressive power and social relations, some of the political discourses were also transmitters 
of reactionary politics in the form of xenophobia, tribalism, homophobia and racist attitudes. 
This dovetails with Aouragh’s (2013) view that technologies are janus-faced which means 
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that Facebook has both empowering and disempowering potentialities. Discussing this issue 
further, Fuchs (2016) observes that the ambivalent nature of social media platforms does not 
mean they are not completely unimportant in situations of social struggles. Social media have 
contradictory characteristics in contradictory societies: they do not necessarily and 
automatically support/amplify or dampen/limit rebellions, but rather pose contradictory 
potentials that stand in contradictions with influences by the state, ideology, capitalism and 
other media (Fuchs, 2016). These platforms can both play a role for exerting control, 
exploitation and domination as well as for challenging asymmetric power structures of 
domination and exploitation. 
Like Zimbabweans, South African respondents shared political jokes which poked fun at 
political and parliamentary leaders for their limited formal education. Most of the political 
jokes and cartoons made references to politicians’ personalities, actions, policies, quotes and 
gaffes. In both case nations, jokes, memes and photoshopped images of political leaders can 
be viewed as “alternative norms of public speech” (Fraser, 1992). This is because in the 
Zimbabwean case some of these political discourses allowed Facebook users to transgress 
boundaries of permissible speech (see Chapter Eight). As Wasserman (2011: 153) asserts, the 
carnivalesque usage of Facebook “alerts us to the fact that popular media provide alternative 
ways of engaging with the state and with politics that do not carry the formal hallmarks of 
liberal democracy”. This corresponds with Bickford’s (2011: 1031) argument that through 
emotional responses “[c]ommunity activists […] are not simply trying to get a specific point 
heard; they are defending, or trying to legitimate, a mode of expressing and perceiving 
value”. 
Unlike in Zimbabwe, online petitions and letters to the public representatives were generally 
a South African phenomenon. This can be attributed to the fact that South Africa has a 
relatively open political system than Zimbabwe, which allows citizens to freely express their 
grievances (see Chapter Three). South Africa youth activists circulated digital public 
transcripts as online petitions when compared to their Zimbabwean counterparts who 
distributed digital hidden transcripts through Facebook messaging snd chat systems. 
Compared to South Africa, letters addressed to public representatives circulated by 
Zimbabwean youths on Facebook were not published in the mainstream media. Given the 
lack of substantive opportunities for subalterns to exercise a voice in the public sphere, the 
circulation of digital hidden transcripts on Facebook enables youth activists “to engage with 
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the political system and intervene in the mainstream mediated public sphere” (Wasserman, 
2011: 153). Similarly, the circulation of digital transcripts on Facebook groups and pages 
allow youth activists in Zimbabwe and South Africa “to transgress [mainstream] norms of 
[rational] deliberation, generate debate and remake shared [political] meaning” (Fraser, 1992: 
81).  
Despite the circulation of these political discourses on Facebook in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, it is important to note that online petitions and subvertisements were integrated into 
off-line collective action by the R2K Campaign and PASSOP Afrika. In Zimbabwe, the 
sharing of digital hidden transcripts constituted “everyday forms of resistance” (Scott, 1985) 
which did not spill into off-line collective action. This can be attributed to the failure by 
Zimbabwean activists to use Facebook as an emotional and carnivalesque conduit for the 
creation of an “emotional choreography of assembly” (Gerbaudo, 2012). Rather than 
galvanising people to engage in street action, the circulation of these discourses was 
accompanied by active participation on Facebook.  
The circulation of political discourses in both countries should be seen as “a way of 
circumventing the limitations of the mainstream public sphere by drawing on the resources of 
popular culture” (Willems, 2010: 56) rather than as a barometer of the “breakdown of the 
rational deliberation” (Walton & Donner, 2009). It also demonstrates that rational 
deliberation is not the only route for the youth to engage in political action because there are 
a “variety of ways of accessing public life” (Fraser, 1990: 61). This chimes with Barber’s 
(1996: 38) observation that in countries “where the majority of the [young] people are 
silenced and excluded from public debate by the state control of the law-courts, the pulpit, 
parliament and the press, and they turn to popular genres as the only space in which to 
represent their views”.  
9.2 Theoretical contribution 
 
This section discusses the theoretical contributions to the study of how and why youths use 
Facebook to engage in political action in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In view of the 
criticisms levelled against the Habermasian concept of public sphere, this study adapted 
Fraser’s (1992) ideas of subaltern counter-publics to an African context. Cognisant of 
Bakardjieva’s (2008: 292) apt advise that “there is no longer a need to foist one particular 
garment over a living phenomenon only to be disappointed that it does not fit well or at all”, 
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this study has demonstrated the applicability and usefulness of Fraserian ideas in 
understanding political participation in a changing political and media environment especially 
in multi-cultural and stratified societies. Contrary to the Habermasian notion of public sphere, 
Fraserian ideas have directed our attention to actually existing forms of political participation. 
It has also directed our attention to alternative spaces where marginalised groups curve out 
for themselves in order to continue with their own kinds of politics (Fraser, 1992).  
 
Notwithstanding criticisms levelled against her feminist critical theory, Fraser’s ideas provide 
invaluable insights into several ways used by the youths to access public life in “actually 
existing” democracies rather than imposing normative views. This study has argued that 
Fraserian ideas like “intra-public relations” offer a more fruitful analytical tool which can be 
used to analyse the character and quality of discursive interactions in online forums in post-
colonial societies. It has also highlighted the elasticity and relevance of Fraser’s notion of 
“subtle forms of control” in analysing the micro-politics of participation on Facebook pages 
and groups.  
 
This thesis has also made an original theoretical contribution that calls for a thorough-going 
diaological engagement between Western and non-Western theoretical concepts. As 
Wasserman & de Beer’s (2009: 431) argue, there is need for “dialogic” approach to media 
studies “that would develop non-Western-biased concepts …that extend beyond Western-
grown models, incorporating valuable ideas and norms from both Western and non-Western 
traditions”. Based on theoretical insights gleaned from Fraser’s subaltern counter-publics and 
Scott’s metaphor of hidden transcripts, this study has also incorporated ideas on popular 
culture gleaned from African studies. As this thesis has argued, actually existing public 
spheres in Africa are made up of a diverse range of political discourses. Not only are rational 
critical discourses circulated, but in these heteroglossic spaces other styles of speech like 
emotion, humour, passion and agnostic discourses. This demonstrates that in actually existing 
public spheres, interlocutors draw on a wide range of modes of political debate. Various 
modes of political debate are deployed to enrich and enliven political engagement. I therefore 
concur with Fraser (1992) that our main task as researchers is to examine and envestigate 
“actually existing” public spheres on social media platforms rather than impose normative 
models based on borrowed theoretical lens from Western contexts. 
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To capture the “alternative styles of political behaviour” (Fraser, 1992) and to delineate 
specific “counter-discourses” circulated on Facebook pages and groups, Scott’s metaphor of 
hidden transcripts and ideas on popular culture have been grafted to Fraser’s ideas. As 
Willems (2010: 37) points out, Scott’s concept is “very suitable in the African context in 
order to grasp the multidimensional aspects of political communication between the state and 
citizens”. In this study, it has broadened my conceptualisation of political action to include 
politics of the everyday (everyday forms of resistance) that occur on Facebook. This directs 
our attention to the “political” which takes place in “non-political” spaces of everyday life. 
Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts provides useful heuristic indicators of counter-
discourses which are circulated in online spaces (see Chapter Three). Through qualitative 
content analysis, this study found other alternative styles of political expression which can 
further strengthen Scott’s original heuristic indicators of hidden transcripts. These include: 
cartoons, online petitions, subvertisements and letters addressed to political representatives.  
 
9.3 Areas for further research 
 
This comparative study raises a number of focus areas for further research. The predominant 
focus on one form of technology (Facebook) at the expense of the broader communicative 
ecologies could be seen as one of the weaknesses of this particular study. Future research can 
undertake an ethnographic study on how and why activists use available technologies within 
specific media ecology to advance their political objectives. Given that this study was 
anchored with a qualitative research methodology (interviewed 49 respondents) which 
emphasises understanding particulars rather than generalising to universals, there is scope for 
a quantitative research which will allow for a representative picture of how and why youths 
use Facebook for political activism.  
 
Whilst this study focused on mostly urban politically engaged youths in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, future research can also look at how rural youths (who have limited access to a wide 
array of mediated public spheres) interact with social media for political purposes. Such a 
study will contribute towards the challenging of the “urban bias” that punctuates most studies 
of youth and political participation in Africa. 
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Another important future study which is long overdue is to investigate how politicians in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa are using Twitter to engage with citizens and the electorate. This 
is quite pertinent given the observation that at the time of this fieldwork political 
conversations were increasingly migrating from Facebook to Twitter. Facebook was being 
seen as “Baba Jukwa”territory by Zimbabwean politicians and they were in the process of 
migrating to Twitter which is seen as “professional” and inhabited by the middle class 
(known as Twimbos). Even in South Africa, politicians were more active on Twitter in their 
individual capacity when compared to Facebook which was used to host party political pages 
and groups.  
 
Further research can advance a theoretical building excercise which combines Fraser’s 
subaltern counter-publics and social movement framing theory in order to make sense of how 
social movement actors in democratic and non-democratic contexts deploy social media 
platforms for mobilisation purposes. By appreciating the link between social movements’ 
frames and mobilisation, framing analysis provides a basis for bridging the gap between the 
ideational and symbolic dimensions of collective action and direct forms of mobilisation 
(Moussa, 2013). Framing theory also provides a suitable framework with which to link online 
communication with offline action, and allows us to better analyse how Facebook’s potential 
and specific technological characteristics contribute to social movements’ mobilisation 
efforts.  
 
Another limitation of this study could be its deployment of the MSSD and MDSD designs 
which suffer from the inherent problem of “many variables, few cases” (Collier, 1993: 107), 
future studies can adopt a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2000) 
or a longitudinal single case study approach which enables for the intensive examination of 
social phenomena. There is also scope for research that looks at how youths in either similar 
or different electoral systems are deploying social media to contact and interface with 
politicians and political parties during elections in Africa and to what extent new media 
technologies are changing contacting practices between politicians and citizens. Further 
research can also examine the issue of activism and communication surveillance. It can 
investigate how state and corporate surveillance are changing online communication practices 
of activists in other transitional societies. Research can also focus on how youth activists are 
resisting or circumventing both state and corporate social media surveillance in different 
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political contexts. Linked to this aspect is the issue of whether and how activists in different 
contexts are avoiding commercial social media platforms (which are generally compromised) 
in favour on non-commercial platforms like Diaspora and Lorea.  
 
9.4 Recommendations 
 
This study raised several structural limitations associated with Facebook and regulatory 
frameworks in both countries. Some of the limitations were linked to the ways various social 
movements and youth activists used Facebook to mediate political action. This section 
discusses some of the reforms that Facebook needs to consider to bring it closer to being an 
alternative public sphere, rather than being the controlled, commercialised space that it is 
currently. Based on the empirical findings, I proffer a number of recommendations:   
 
How should Facebook change?  
 From the findings, youth activists from Zimbabwe and South Africa complained 
about Facebook’s real name policy which infringes on their right privacy and 
anonymity. I therefore suggest that Facebook must abandon its real name policy so 
that it becomes easier for activists to work anonymously or pseudonymously in 
authoritarian contexts.  
 As highlighted in Chapter Six, Facebook reserves the right to modify its architectural 
design whenever it wishes. This can possibly affect how activists communicate with 
each other as well as undermine their security. I recommend that instead of closed 
systems of control and decision making, there is need for Facebook to embrace 
democratic and decentralised systems so that its rules and platform infrastructures are 
open to challenge, debate, input, and redesign by users.  
 Given that Facebook subjects its users to data surveillance for commercial purposes, 
there is need for the company to incorporate an in-built opt-in or opt-out option which 
enables users to choose whether they want to be subjected to commercial surveillance 
or not. 
 In terms of Facebook’s EdgeRank value ranking algorithms which privileges data 
heavy postings over light weight postings which are popular with users who rely on 
mobile phones for internet access, there is urgent need for the company to use the 
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unfiltered timeline of postings like Twitter. This will ensure that all postings have the 
same probability in terms of reach and visibility.  
 As Chapter Seven show, one of the major impediments to Facebook use is English 
language literacy especially in South Africa. I also recommend that Facebook should 
be available in many African languages (besides KiSwahili and Afrikaans) so that 
more and more can be part of the online public sphere.  
 Facebook should desist from engaging in overbroad content moderation especially 
blocking and deleting posts and pages which do not necessarily violate their 
acceptable use policies. Their community mechanism of self-regulation should be 
transparent, consistent with the Necessary and Proportionate Principles
127
 and provide 
rights to reply to take-down requests.  
 
How does the regulatory environment need to change?  
 As interviews with respondents in Zimbabwe and South Africa have revealed, there is 
need for both countries to repeal laws which infringe on the right to freedom of 
assembly and freedom of expression. In Zimbabwe, the laws which should be 
repealed include: the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), 
Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act, Public 
Order and Security Act (POSA), Interception of Communications Act (ICA) and the 
Postal and Telecommunications Act. All media laws should also be aligned in line 
with the new Constitution in Zimbabwe. In South Africa, the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act, and the right to dignity clause in the 1996 Constitution should be 
amended so as to enhance freedom of expression and assembly. Unconstitutional 
elements of RICA should be reformed so that it incorporates user notification, outline 
legitimate grounds for interception directions, tighter protections for metadata and put 
limits on the retention of data. These laws should be in line with the Necessary and 
Proportionate Principles. 
 As this study has shown, mobile internet data plans which are used to access the 
internet are extremely expensive in both countries. In order to address these 
                                                          
127 The Principles outline how international human rights law applies in the context of communication surveillance. They are founded on 
established international human rights law and jurisprudence. Cognisant of the fact that new media technologies have complicated the 
realisation of human rights norms across the globe, the Necessary and Proportionate Principles call on all national laws to adhere to human 
rights norms in communication surveillance (https://es.necessaryandproportionate.org). Acknowledging that new media technologies have 
facilitated increased state surveillance and intervention into individuals’ private lives, the Principles call upon the States to update their 
understandings and regulation of surveillance and modify their practices to ensure that individuals’ human rights are respected and 
protected. The Principles further argue that mass surveillance in all its manifestations is unnecessary, disproportionate and fundamentally 
lacking in transparency and oversight. 
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challenges spawned by oligopolistic (in Zimbabwe) and duopolistic (in South Africa) 
tendencies, there is need for governments to enforce mandatory infrastructure sharing 
policies which will lead to reduced operational costs as well as trickle-down benefits 
to subscribers in the form of cheaper data plans. 
How can social movements use Facebook more effectively?  
 
 From the findings, it is evident that there was poor interactivity and limited dialogical 
communication on Facebook in Zimbabwe and South Africa. To address this, there is 
need for administrators to actively participate in the conversation, taking the time to 
instigate and respond to comments rather than simply posting content. Administrators 
can also make use of humorous content, questions, polls, interactive calls to action 
and language understood by most fans so to encourage active participation on 
Facebook.    
 As the Zimbabwean case has illustrated, there is a mismatch between online and off-
line activism. There is need for social movements to ensure that there is a direct link 
between the two forms of activism.  
 Online observations also revealed that only two Facebook groups had adjusted their 
privacy settings in Zimbabwe and South Africa. I recommend that social movements 
should adjust their Facebook privacy settings to safeguard their information and 
protect users from state surveillance. This can include the use of secret and private 
Facebook groups. 
 Given that most users of Facebook in both countries rely on mobile internet, there is 
need for social movements to devise content dissemination strategies that are 
compatible with Opera Mini and Edge’s light-weight data requirements. 
Administrators can upload portrait pictures rather than landscape pictures and short 
video clips without sound which are automatically played on Facebook.   
 Social movements in both countries should use Facebook to mobilise support for local 
causes as they generate more interest and willingness to participate rather than 
international struggles.  
 Administrators of pages and groups should be well-versed in how Facebook 
algorithms function. Instead of relying on regurgitated professionally generated 
content and articles sourced from their websites, there is need for administrators to 
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produce original content, tweak the length, size and content of videos, photos and 
audios to suit the usage behaviour of their fans and members and platform algorithms.  
 Instead of engaging in overbroad censorship of content on Facebook, administrators 
must confine their moderation role to policing content that violate legitimate 
acceptable use policies. They should become “gate openers” allowing the public to 
become active and equal contributors to the production of content. 
In view of the Edward Snowden revelations about the connection between state and corporate 
social media surveillance, I recommend that activists should start using non-profit social 
media initiatives like Diaspora and Lorea for their communication and mobilisation purposes. 
Unlike corporate social media platforms like Facebook, Diaspora and Lorea put ownership of 
platform rules and code, and even of their servers and data, in the hands of their community 
of users. These platforms have also developed decentralised and free software systems which 
enable users to bypass surveillance, whether from within or without the platform. 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1 
 
Release Letter for Admire Mare 
 
 
To whom it may concern, 
Request for your participation in the interview process 
1 am writing to request your assistance in a research project being undertaken as part of a 
PhD degree in journalism by Admire Mare (g09m4514), a research student of ours at Rhodes 
University. His PhD thesis is titled “Youth, Social Media and Political Action: A comparative 
study of South Africa and Zimbabwe”. In particular, we would appreciate your assistance for 
him to collect a limited amount of information on how youth activists are using Facebook to 
engage in political activism in the Zimbabwean context. We would be grateful, therefore, if 
you could permit him access to interview you on a number of issues related to his area of 
study.  
We must stress that the data collected will not identify the individuals personally excerpt 
where permission is sought. Further, the findings will be used strictly for academic purposes 
only. If you would like to discuss this further, please do not hesitate to email us. Our email 
addresses are jane.duncan@ru.ac.za and h.wasserman@ru.ac.za. 
Your assistance will be greatly appreciated. 
Yours faithfully, 
Prof Jane Duncan and Prof Herman Wasserman  
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview Questions: Facebook and political activism in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
 
Thank your agreeing to take part in this academic research. The sole purpose of this PhD 
research is to advance scientific understanding of the use of Facebook by activists to engage 
in political action.  
1. How you do use Facebook to facilitate various modes of political participation? 
2. How exactly do you use Facebook in your activist work? 
3. Can you explain how you use Facebook to engage in political activism on a daily 
basis?  
4. What kind of political activities do you engage in on Facebook?  
5. How do you use Facebook to engage and contact political representatives or political 
parties in your country? 
6. How do you use Facebook to mobilise people to engage in electoral participation in 
your country? 
7. How do you use Facebook to monitor and observe national or local electoral 
processes? 
8. How do you use Facebook to organise demonstrations and protests in your country? 
9. How do you use Facebook to seek out political information? 
10. What kind of political information do you often post on your Facebook group or 
profile page? 
11. Does your national legislation on communication surveillance have any implications 
on Facebook activist routines and practices? If so, explain further. 
Why do you use Facebook to engage in different modes of political participation? 
1. As an activist, what would you say are some of the factors that have shaped or 
influenced the way you use Facebook for political purposes in your country?  
2. What would you say is the connection between free or repressive media environment 
and the growth of Facebook activism? 
3. Has the broader media context influenced how you use Facebook for political 
purposes in your country? If so how has it contributed to your use of social media?  
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4. Has the broader political context influenced how you use Facebook for political 
purposes in your country? If so how has it contributed to your use of social media? 
5. Would you say the demonstration effect of the Arab Spring has influenced you to also 
use Facebook for political purposes or you were using it before the events? 
6. Under what circumstances do you think activists resort to using Facebook for political 
activism? 
7. Besides Facebook, what other traditional and social media platforms do you use for 
political purposes? 
8. In what ways has Facebook practices (liking, commenting, sharing, discussion groups, 
video-calling and private messaging) changed the ways in which you engage in 
political activism in your country? 
9. What do you think can be done by activists to bridge the gap between online and 
street activism? In other words, what can be done to translate the virtual into offline 
activism in your country? 
10. What would you say is the connection between online and offline activism in your 
line of work? 
11. Are there any cases where your online activism spilled into offline activism? If yes or 
no, can you explain how and why?  
12. Are there any failures or successes you have experienced while using Facebook to 
engage in political work? 
13. Are there any other reasons why you use Facebook for political activism in this 
country? 
Discursive interactions and micro-politics of participation on Facebook pages and 
groups 
1. What are some of the factors would you say influence how people participate on 
Facebook pages and groups? 
2. Would you say internet access have a role to play in how people participate on 
Facebook pages. If so, explain further. 
3. Would you say educational qualifications give others an advantage when it comes to 
online deliberation on Facebook? If so, explain. 
4. Would you say language have a role to play in how people engage in Facebook 
pages? If so explain. 
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5. Does English language ability play a significant role in how one participates on 
Facebook groups and pages? 
6. Do you think Facebook ensure equality of participation or it actually exacerbates 
inequalities? 
Thanks a lot once again for taking time to answer the questions 
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Appendix 3 
 
Interview questions with Facebook administrators 
 
1. As a group administrator, can you explain how you use Facebook to facilitate political 
action?  
2. Would you say Facebook has empowered or disempowered you in the way how you 
engage in activism? 
3. In what ways has Facebook enriched your organisational tactics and strategies when it 
comes to activism? 
4. In your opinion, what challenges do you face as activists when you rely on Facebook 
to promote your causes? 
5. How has Facebook influenced or shaped how you interact with your broader 
constituency?  
6. What role has Facebook played in your interaction with donors and members of your 
organisation? 
7. What challenges (if any) do you generally face in using Facebook for activism? 
8. How do you deal with some of these challenges, for instance communication 
surveillance? 
9. Do you have a code of conduct on how you moderate content and interact with fans or 
group members on your Facebook page or group? (If yes, what does the code 
address?  
10. Do you sometimes deal with content from fans or group members which you consider 
to violate your own code of conduct? (If Yes, give an example and how you dealt 
with it) 
11. Do you think that you as a Facebook administrator should delete or hide content that 
goes overbroad? If yes why? 
12. When using Facebook, have you ever blocked, unfriended or hidden someone because 
they posted political issues that you disagreed with or found offensive? If yes, explain 
how did you deal with it? 
13. Do you think content moderation is good for online deliberation? Yes or No? Give 
reasons why? 
Thanks a lot once again for taking time to answer the questions 
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Appendix 4 
 
Online Participant Observation checklist 
 
What kinds of political discourses are circulated on different Facebook pages and groups in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa? 
 Photoshopped images depicting political issues 
 Political jokes 
 Political cartoons 
 Online petitions 
 Rumour 
 Gossip 
 Any other political discourses 
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